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Abstract 2
ABSTRACT 
 
Traditionally, company law assumes that the directors’ role is to run the company for 
the benefit of its shareholders alone and to maximise profits for them. 
 
It can be argued, however, that this view is too narrow and outdated; that is, 
company directors should have regard to the rights and interests of a broader range 
of corporate stakeholders. Hence, the question is whether we should change our 
perception of the company or corporation from one run by directors dedicated 
exclusively to serving the interests of shareholders to that of a corporation whose 
main purpose is to bring benefit not only to its owners and creditors, but also to its 
employees, the community and the environment. 
 
Given that reforms of directors’ duties in light of the above considerations have 
found their way into legislation across the globe, this thesis examines how and to 
what extent legal rules and policies should develop in South Africa to place directors 
under a positive duty to take account of the interests of bodies other than 
shareholders. Current South African company law does not contain clear rules 
regarding corporate governance issues and the duties and liabilities of directors. 
These matters have been left to the common law and Codes of Corporate Practice. 
Thus, there is no extensive statutory scheme in South Africa, which covers the 
duties, obligations and accountability of directors. 
 
The focus in this thesis is on the rights and interests of employees and the premise 
that is defended is that it is valuable to corporations to provide employees with an 
institutionalised voice at board level. It is argued that there is global evidence that 
where employees participate in the decision-making processes of the company, 
performance is generally enhanced. This, in turn, directly impacts upon and 
improves economic productivity, generating a ‘win-win’ situation.  
 
The question of the duties of company directors and managers is attracting much 
attention in South Africa. With rapidly developing and changing labour legislation in 
South Africa, it is essential to consider the extent to which the country should 
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reassess its traditional principles of company law and corporate governance policies 
in order to encourage participatory roles for employees in the workplace.  
 
It is argued that if South Africa is to improve corporate productivity levels with its re-
entry into international markets, management and labour must find improved ways 
of dealing with one another. The main purpose of this thesis, therefore, is to propose 
and formulate a workable corporate governance model for South Africa – one that 
would be advantageous to all stakeholders, especially the employees. This is 
achieved by comparing and contrasting international models of corporate governance 
and by applying the best features of each to the unique South African corporate 
system of values, structures and traditions.  
 
It is suggested that the current unitary board structure operating in South Africa has 
become outdated and does not provide employees with rights enabling them to 
engage in the decision-making processes of the corporation with their employees at 
an adequate level. In its place, a two-tier board system of corporate governance is 
proposed.  
 
The economic success of a company will bring about social benefits to many 
stakeholder constituencies. This will not happen if the company is a financial failure. 
The issue of obliging directors to act primarily for the benefit of shareholders alone is 
questioned. Corporate governance reforms were undertaken in many parts of the 
world in the late 1980’s and early 1990’s. This reform process questioned whether 
the interests of the company should be managed for the shareholders alone or for 
the other corporate stakeholders as well. There are many views that strongly 
support the idea that corporate governance should be seen as a system by which 
corporations are to be governed for the benefits of all stakeholders, including 
shareholders, employees, creditors, suppliers and the community. In this way, 
companies should be run as communities in partnerships with all their stakeholders. 
Thus, this thesis proposes that the success of a company is inextricably intertwined 
with a consideration of the rights and interests of its employees and other 
stakeholders. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
I. Overview and objectives 
 
This study is premised on three key research theses: 
 
Research thesis 1: Corporate governance systems in South Africa have become 
anachronistic with regard to corporate stakeholders, especially in regard to employee 
participation (see introduction and chapters 1 to 4 inclusive). 
 
Research thesis 2: In order to achieve higher levels of corporate performance and to 
become more competitive on the global market, South Africa needs, amongst other 
things, to update its corporate governance systems, structures and legislation (see 
introduction and chapters 5, 6 and 7). 
 
Research thesis 3: Corporate governance models based on those systems, which 
have proven successful elsewhere and can be adapted to South Africa’s specific 
needs and cultural dimensions, will provide a strategic platform to facilitate 
substantial improvements in corporate performance and productivity (see 
introduction and chapter 8). 
 
In short, this thesis is concerned with recognising the rights and interests of all 
corporate stakeholders. However, the principal focus of the study and of the reforms 
suggested is on employee participation. This is because South Africa is emerging 
from a protracted period of relative isolation from participation in international 
markets. Many of South Africa’s competitors have evolved corporate governance 
systems that reflect sound practices with regard to employee participation, while 
South Africa has not. It is therefore important that South Africa’s economic 
performance is maximised by a change in its approach to corporate governance by 
including employee participation. This would result in an improvement in the 
productivity and efficiency levels attained by its corporations.  
 
Introduction 18
Consequently, the traditional company law concept, which enshrines the doctrine of 
profit maximisation for shareholders and which ignores other stakeholder rights, 
including those of employees, as stated in Hutton v West Cork Railway Company per 
Bowen LJ, will be examined in detail. Bowen LJ noted that  
 
… there should be ‘no cakes and ale except such as are required for the benefit of the company … 
(and) … charity has no business to sit at the board of directors qua charity’.1  
 
Even early writers referred to this decision and argued that the conventional role 
(and the prevailing view of the late nineteenth century) of the company in the Ango-
American context maximising its profits to shareholders should be questioned. 2  
 
Thus, this thesis considers the traditional theories of company law and the interests 
and rights of the various stakeholders in so far as aspects of corporate governance 
practices are concerned. It also considers in detail South African and international 
legislation, reports, cases and materials pertaining to the legal and social aspects of 
corporate governance. 
 
The focus of the improvements that I propose is on the rights and interests of the 
employees. I will also consider the rights and interests of the other non-shareholder 
constituents, including those of the creditors, bondholders and the community and 
environment. I examine the models in Germany (see parts VII and 8.2.1), Japan 
(see parts VIII and 8.2.2) and France (see heading 8.2.3) and propose a new model 
of corporate governance for South Africa (see chapters 9 and 10). This model will, I 
argue, be of immense benefit to industry in South Africa while also facilitating the 
successful re-entry of the nation as a fully-fledged trading partner in the modern 
world. 
 
To this end, four ‘building blocks’ as steps in the process of designing and promoting 
a new and highly improved corporate governance model for South Africa are 
suggested to achieve an improved system of corporate governance in South Africa. 
Such a system has the potential to become a very significant and decisive factor in 
bringing about a wealthier and economically brighter South Africa. 
 
The suggested steps in creating an improved corporate governance model are: 
 
                                                     
1 Hutton v West Cork Railway Company, (1883) 23 Ch.D 654. 
2 DF Vagts, “Reforming the ‘modern’ corporation: Perspectives from the German”, (1966) 80 Harvard 
Law Review, 36. 
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1. The introduction and maintenance of a system of organisational development 
within corporations (chapter 5); 
2. The introduction of new legislation, which promotes an improved and more 
meaningful system of worker participation (chapter 6); 
3. The introduction of changed patterns of corporate thinking and an accelerated 
rejection of antiquated principles of company law (chapter 7); and 
4. The introduction in South Africa of some of the favourable features of successful 
international corporate governance models (chapter 8).  
 
To set the scene for a discussion of corporate governance in South Africa in so far as 
it pertains to the interests and rights of the non-shareholder constituencies, 
especially those of the employees, I have included in this introduction a brief 
discussion of the features and powers of corporations, corporate governance and 
employee participation and a consideration of the British, American, German and 
Japanese models of corporate governance. A brief discussion in the introduction of 
this information will provide a focused and immediate appreciation of the need for 
South Africa to restructure and redevelop its present model of corporate governance 
in so far as the rights and interests of corporate stakeholders are concerned. That is, 
corporate governance models currently employed in South Africa generally limit the 
participation on the board or at management level of any other group or body, other 
than the directors themselves, the shareholders or the officers. It can be argued that 
these models are becoming increasingly unworkable in corporate governance 
settings where all stakeholders, whether small or large, have a role to play in 
achieving effective corporate governance practices. Some countries have recently 
adopted procedures and rules, which provide non-shareholder interests with 
mechanisms for improved participation in corporate governance practices. This has 
compelled South Africa to re-evaluate its position with regard to its corporate 
governance practices. These principles will be fully developed in the 10 chapters of 
the thesis that follow. 
 
II. Traditional characteristics and powers of corporations 
 
The strengths and virtues of the corporation over other types of business entities 
have been succinctly stated as follows: 
 
A corporate body is not a natural person but has legal personality attributed to it by the law. A 
corporate body, therefore, acts through a living person who has a mind, which can have knowledge or 
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intention or who can be negligent. The human who acts does so as the corporate body, and his mind 
directing his actions is the mind of the corporate body. 3
 
Corporations are the most common business structure in the Western world and 
have been so ever since the nineteenth century. This is mainly because corporate 
structure has given businesses independence from their investors and limited their 
liability. Corporations are thus able to acquire funds from a large number of investors 
without having to acquiesce to vested interests. Consequently, a number of large 
companies have come into existence. 4 Some Chinese intellectuals are of the opinion 
that corporations greatly contributed to the prosperity of countries and, in so doing, 
improved the well-being of society. 5 It is also thought, however, that 
(t)wo centuries ago, in his Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith wrote of the ‘benign hand’. … He … 
contemplated that business entities, all acting collectively in free and open competition in the pursuit of 
their own respective interests, would allocate resources optimally and, as a consequence, maximise the 
satisfaction of the population and the wealth of nations. Over the centuries there have been some 
serious misgivings regarding the ‘hand’ that guides the destinies of mankind. Most certainly the 
presumption implicit in Adam Smith’s thesis, that of free and open competition with full access to all 
information, has not yet been made operative. Nonetheless, this philosophy is presently alive and 
kicking in the financial marketplace. 6
 
However, notwithstanding the comments of Adam Smith, the corporate entity does 
have several advantages. It is the most effective structure for capital accumulation. 
Additionally, it has a legal persona separate from that of its investors. The 
corporation also has the potential to demonstrate an effective management system 
because it allows a separation of ownership from management. 7  
 
Traditionally, however, the cornerstone of company procedure is based upon a 
provision found in the articles of almost all companies to the effect that the directors 
(who can also be the managers) should manage the business of the company. 
Consequently, the standard operating procedures at present can be described as 
pyramidal in form . 8 At the base are the shareholders whose vote is required to elect 
                                                     
3  D Bailes, “Watch your corporation”, (1995) Journal of Business Law, 3(1), 24. 
4  Y Wei (2003), Comparative Corporate Governance: A Chinese perspective, Global Trade and Finance 
Series, Vol. 3, Kluwer Law International, 2. 
5  Ibid 8. 
6  AJ Briloff, “The corporate governance and accountability malaise: an accountant’s perspective”, 
(1984) Journal of Corporation Law, 9, 473. 
7  P Jiang & LF Fang (eds) (1998), New Corporate Law Textbook, 9th edn, Legal Publishing House, 
Beijing, 48-50. See also Y Wei, above n 4, 49. 
8  RI Tricker (1984), Corporate Governance: Practices, procedures and powers in British companies and 
their boards of directors, The Corporate Policy Group, Oxford, 236. 
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the board of directors and to decide upon their major corporate actions. The 
directors, who constitute the policy-making body of the company and who select its 
officers, represent the next level. At the top of the pyramid are the officers and 
managers who have some discretion but, in general, must execute the policies 
formulated by the board. Thus,  
 
[managers] occupied … a position analogous to that of the captain and officers of a ship at sea; in 
navigation their authority might be supreme; but the direction of the voyage, the alteration of the 
vessel, the character of the cargo, and the distribution of the profits and losses were settled ahead of 
time and altered only by the persons having the underlying property interest. 9
 
Additionally, it is interesting to note that the 500 largest corporations in the world 
control 25 percent of the global economic output. Therefore, the powers of 
management may affect others significantly: 
 
… managers now have more power than most sovereign governments to determine where people will 
live; what they will do, if any; what they will eat, drink, and wear; what sorts of knowledge they will 
encourage; and what kinds of society their children will inherit. 10
 
Employees, however, generally have limited powers but may, upon the authorisation 
of directors, either expressly or impliedly, bind the company as the articles of 
association may permit. However, authority to perform the act in question, which in 
terms of the articles must be performed by the directors, cannot be delegated to the 
employees. Thus, directors may delegate executive functions to employees but 
cannot delegate the exercise of their discretion. 11 Accordingly, in Barlows 
Manufacturing Co Ltd v R N Barrie (Pty) Ltd Conradie J noted that a director owes a 
fiduciary duty to his company, which he cannot, as director, divest himself of. 12 A 
director may delegate some or even all of his powers of controlling the company but 
he may not delegate his fiduciary duty and “power to control the controller”. Thus, 
 
(h)e may delegate but he may not abdicate. The board must retain ultimate control. 13
 
Hence, this ‘pyramidal’ form of a company reflects a distribution of powers that is 
being increasingly criticised throughout the world, including South Africa. This is 
                                                     
9  AD Boyer, “Articles: Activist shareholders, corporate directors, and institutional investment: some 
lessons from the robber barons”, (1993) Washington and Lee Law Review, 50, 1041, 998. 
10  P Goldenberg, “IALS Company law lecture – shareholders v stakeholders: the bogus argument”, 
(1998) The Company Lawyer, 19(2), 34. 
11  JTR Gibson (1997), South African Mercantile and Company Law, 7th edn, Juta & Co Ltd, 338. 
12 1990 (4) SA 608 (CPD) at 610–11, paragraphs I-A. 
13  Ibid at 611, paragraph A. 
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because it excludes the participation on the board or at management level of any 
other group or body, other than the directors themselves, the shareholders or the 
officers. Thus, in terms of this ‘pyramidal’ type of model, employees, customers, 
suppliers and creditors are effectively excluded from such participation. 
Consequently, as a result of traditional and conservative company law models, 
typically, the distribution of powers may be formulated by distinguishing between the 
following three types of powers: 
 
1. Constitutional powers (including internal management powers, such as the 
powers to appoint directors); 
 
2. Business management powers; and 
 
3. Powers, which are part constitutional and part management. 
 
Constitutional powers are those for altering the company's constitution. On the other 
hand, a prime example of a management power is a general provision, usually 
contained in the articles conferring on directors the powers to manage the business 
of the company. Examples of the part constitutional and part management powers 
are the powers to issue shares, to sell all or part of the company and to authorise 
borrowing. Generally, constitutional powers are given to the members/shareholders, 
while the management powers are given to the directors. Powers that partake of 
both elements are given to the directors subject to the consent of the members. 
Therefore, the other stakeholders in the company, including the employees, would 
hold neither constitutional nor management powers nor a part combination of either 
in terms of the traditional models of company law. It can be argued that these 
models are becoming increasingly unworkable in corporate governance settings 
where all stakeholders, whether small or large, have a role to play in achieving 
effective corporate governance practices. 
 
Furthermore, there has been much controversy about the proper role of the 
corporation in the larger community and the extent to which directors should 
consider the interests of those other than shareholders. This debate continues and 
consensus has not yet been reached. Therefore, a discussion of corporate social 
responsibility considers whether companies should have a wider responsibility to 
other ‘stakeholders’, including customers, consumers, employees, the environment, 
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charities and local communities. 14 Furthermore, in terms of traditional company law 
models, once one turns from general policy to a consideration of the actual 
distribution of power, it becomes evident that, while the distribution of the 
company's powers between the members in general meeting and the board of 
directors is in some instances explicit, in other cases, it reflects areas of corporate 
theory, which have been only partially resolved. Therefore, the distribution of powers 
is, in the first place, determined by the Companies Act, secondly, by the articles of 
association of the company and, thirdly, by the common law, within which members 
have certain powers. 
 
For the purposes of the Companies Act 61 of 1973, in terms of section 1(1), the 
term ‘officer’ includes (unless the context otherwise indicates) any managing 
director, manager or secretary, but excludes a secretary, which is a body corporate. 
Hence, the very exclusion of the other bodies or stakeholders from partaking in or 
being invested with the various powers of the company, by virtue of both this 
‘pyramidal’ form and company legislation, highlights the need for a review of the 
principles of corporate governance. 
 
This thesis will explore in detail an alternative corporate governance model (see 
chapter 9) – one, which does not conform to the traditional pyramidal approach 
discussed above. 
 
III. What is corporate governance? 
 
‘Corporate governance’ is a concept that has been used for at least twenty years and 
is derived from American corporate law. 
 
According to Farrar, 
 
… (i)n its narrower, and most usual, sense it refers to control of corporations and to systems of 
accountability by those in control. … In a wide sense, corporate governance includes ‘the entire 
network of formal and informal relations involving the corporate sector and their consequences for 
society in general’. 15
                                                     
14  CM Slaughter, “Corporate social responsibility: a new perspective”, (1997) The Company Lawyer, 
18(10), 313. 
15  J Farrar (2005), Corporate Governance Theories, Principles, and Practice, 2nd edn, Oxford University 
Press, 3-6. 
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The term ‘corporate governance’ has become a widely used term in modern 
corporate practice. Although, it has been the focus of attention in developed 
countries since the 1980s, the meaning, however, is not always clear. 16  
 
A beginning, a muddle, and an end. Ubiquitous though it may be in late 1990s legal discourse, 
‘corporate governance’ is hardly a clear concept. At one level, ambiguity exists as to the scope of 
corporate governance – whether it encompasses only the relationship between shareholders and 
managers, or whether it is more expansive, involving the relationship between a broader range of 
stakeholders and the board. 17
 
It has been noted, however, that the term corporate governance is used globally and 
encompasses all the issues facing a board in directing and controlling a company’s 
operations. These issues include its interaction with management and with other 
stakeholders including the shareholders, employees, financiers, suppliers, 
purchasers, auditors, corporate regulators, the community at large and the 
Government. 18
 
In popular use, however, corporate governance refers mainly to the functions of 
directors and managers in especially larger corporations, including the structure of 
management. Therefore, how directors carry out their fiduciary duties, and what the 
law prescribes that they ought to do, are issues, which affect all of us. This draws 
attention to the struggle between two basic principles that form the pillars of 
authority in our society - corporate activity and freedom of enterprise on the one 
hand, and legal procedure and accountability on the other.  
 
Consequently, “(a)lthough corporate governance can be defined in a variety of 
ways”, it generally refers to the “mechanisms” by which a company “is directed and 
controlled”. These mechanisms include a determination of the accountability for 
corporate conduct and performance by managers and directors. 19
 
There is also a view that a shift towards governance through a consideration of 
market principles has been justified by those who believe that ‘market’-based 
                                                     
16  Wei, above n 4, 3. 
17  J Hill, “Deconstructing Sunbeam – Contemporary issues in corporate governance”, (1999) Company 
and Securities Law Journal, 17, 288. 
18  T Shaw (1999), Corporate Governance a Director’s Handbook, CCH New Zealand Limited, Auckland, 
New Zealand, 5. 
19  Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP (2002), Comparative Study of Corporate Governance Codes Relevant to 
the European Union and Its Member States, 
<http://www.odce.ie/_fileupload/services/EU%20Comparison.pdf>, 1. 
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transactions provide a more rational and efficient basis for economic organisation. 20 
Consequently, some believe that market forces should be the main, if not the only, 
regulator of corporations and their managers. 21
 
There is, however, an alternative view. The idea of corporate restructuring, which 
was once only considered possible by a few academics, has, within the last decade, 
progressed to such a stage that, even people with conservative instincts, are willing 
to consider this issue. 22
 
Jacoby writes that in the last decade, corporate governance has become a 
controversial issue because the rules for governing public corporations are being 
challenged by many critics, ranging from investors to social activists. Consequently, 
some critics hope to give greater power in corporate decision-making to 
shareholders, whilst others hope to provide this to other stakeholders, such as 
employees and customers. However, Jacoby emphasises an important point, which is 
that no two countries deal with corporate governance issues in precisely the same 
way. 23  
 
Furthermore, it is important to remember that the main task of corporate 
governance in any modern company is to reduce its costs so that it may increase 
productivity and managerial efficiency. Consequently, corporations should divide and 
balance corporate powers amongst the shareholders’ meetings, the board of 
directors and the managers. Thus, corporate governance must address the balancing 
of powers and interests amongst the corporate stakeholders. 24 In effect, the main 
objective of corporate governance is to improve corporate efficiency. Thus, questions 
regarding the nature of the corporation, the reasons for incorporation, for whose 
benefits the corporation is governed and how the corporation should be governed 
should be addressed. These answers would provide the direction and basis for 
judging corporate efficiency. 25 Thus, 
 
                                                     
20  M Ezzamel & H Willmott, “Corporate governance and financial accountability: recent reforms in the 
UK public sector”, (1993) Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, 6(3), 109. 
21  DM Branson, “The American Law Institute principles of corporate governance and the derivative 
action: a view from the other side”, (1987) Corporate Practice Commentator, 28(4), 475. 
22  DF Vagts (1981), “The governance of the corporation: reality and law”, Commentaries on Corporate 
Structure and Governance, The ALI-ABA Symposiums 1977-1978, 159. 
23  SM Jacoby, “Corporate governance in comparative perspective: prospects for convergence”, (2000) 
Comparative Labour Law & Policy Journal: Employees and Corporate Governance, Vol. 22, No. 1, 5. 
24  Wei, above n 4, 2. 
25  Ibid 37. 
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(t)wo competing policies must be balanced by whatever solution to this problem is chosen. On the one 
hand, management must be free to make corporate decisions, including litigation decisions; the board 
of directors must be able to avoid strike suits. On the other hand, the board must be held accountable 
to its shareholders and society generally for its actions; corporate accountability must be maintained.26
 
There are, however, powerful economic and technological forces at work, which are 
forcing corporations towards greater efficiency. These forces include the re-
aggregation of shareholders in institutional investors and the emergence of the 
global economy. 27Thus, the fact that current law assumes that the directors’ role is 
to run their company for the benefit of its shareholders alone and to maximise profits 
for them is acknowledged by Fiflis, who suggests that corporate governance should 
enforce adequate procedures to ensure that the corporation is operated solely for the 
benefit of shareholders. Corporate managers would then adequately discharge their 
duty to them. 28
 
This view, however, is too narrow and outdated. That is, directors should, especially 
in the larger type of corporations, have regard to a wider range of interests. More 
specifically, directors should have a concern not only for its shareholders, but also, 
for example, for employees, customers, suppliers and creditors. This idea, by 
extending its application, would refer to and also include the environment and 
community at large. Consequently, in different countries, the development of 
corporate governance would be shaped by the ideology, economic circumstances, 
political preferences and social ethos of the time. 29  
 
Thus, the question arises as to whether we should change our perception of the 
corporation as being run by directors dedicated exclusively to the benefit of 
shareholders to that of a body whose main purpose is for the creation of wealth, not 
only for its owners and creditors, but also for its employees, the community at large 
and the environment. This latter situation might, for example, mean creating and 
preserving jobs while taking better care of its community and environment. Some 
countries have recently taken into account and have adopted procedures and rules, 
internally and through the enforcement of legislation, which provide non-shareholder 
interests with mechanisms for improved participation in corporate governance 
                                                     
26  PN Edwards, “Compelled termination and corporate governance: The big picture”, (1985) Journal of 
Corporation Law, 10, 373. 
27  TW Allen, “Contracts and communities in corporation law”, (1993) Washington & Lee Law Review, 50, 
1406. 
28  TJ Fiflis, Commentary: “Thoughts evoked by ‘accounting and the new law’”, (1993) Washington & Lee 
Law Review, 50, 964. 
29  Wei, above n 4, 3. 
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practices. It is this trend, together with domestic pressures from within, that has 
compelled South Africa to re-evaluate its position with regard to its corporate 
governance practices. 
 
Hence, the real issue to be considered is how and to what extent legal rules should 
develop, which place directors under a positive duty to take account of the interests 
of bodies other than shareholders. The issue of the extent to which the rights and 
interests of non-shareholder corporate constituencies (the employees, creditors, 
suppliers, customers, and communities) should be considered by management is one 
of the most complex issues in modern corporate scholarship. 30
 
In South Africa, the duties of company directors and managers are an issue that is 
attracting much attention at present. With rapidly developing and constantly 
changing labour laws, it is now timely to examine this situation in detail and to 
consider reassessing the law to bring it into line with other countries that have 
adopted more modern corporate governance practices. Consequently, the question 
of how fiduciary duties should be allocated within the corporation must be 
considered. This is because corporate law doctrines have for decades provided that 
directors’ fiduciary duties relate to shareholders alone. While protection for other 
corporate stakeholders has existed only in terms of contract, this principle has been 
subjected to debate as a result of recent legislative action in Canada, which 
authorised directors to consider the interests of other non-shareholder 
constituencies. 31 Furthermore, in New Zealand, 32 the powers of directors are not 
only limited “to make provision for the benefit of employees of the company in 
connection with the company ceasing to carry on the whole or part of its business”. 
The definition of a company also includes its subsidiaries. 33
 
This thesis proposes a model of corporate governance for South Africa that takes 
into account the extent to which other non-shareholder interests and rights, 
especially those of the employees, should be considered. The extent to which 
employees should be permitted to participate in the actual running of the 
corporation, alongside the directors and shareholders, will, therefore, be considered 
in great detail. The corporate world is in a stage of rapid change and development. 
                                                     
30  R Daniels, “Stakeholders and takeovers: can contractarianism be compassionate?”, (1993) University 
of Toronto Law Journal, 43, 315. 
31  JR Macey and GP Miller, “Corporate stakeholders: A contractual perspective”, (1993) University of 
Toronto Law Journal, 43, 401-402. 
32  Section 132, Companies Act 1993. 
33  CCH (2001), New Zealand Companies and Securities Legislation, Volume A, 18th edn, CCH New 
Zealand Limited, 313,004. 
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The creation and rise of new economic powers and the increased domination of 
corporate groups and multinationals have created new complexities for corporate 
governance. We need to use a new approach to define the roles of corporations. 34  
 
In short, this study maintains that poor corporate governance can lead to business 
failure. Thus, South Africa’s existing corporate governance programmes need to be 
reformed and modernised to enable it to face new challenges that may affect its 
businesses. 35 Thus, public policy requires a corporate governance model that “is 
both legally justifiable and acceptable in our developing economic community”. 36 In 
short, James Wolfensohn, president of the World Bank in 1999, noted very 
appropriately that 
 
(t)he proper governance of companies will become as crucial to the world economy as the proper 
governing of countries. 37
 
Thus, the main objective of corporate governance must be ultimately to improve 
corporate efficiency. To achieve this, issues regarding the nature of the corporation, 
the reasons for incorporation, for whose benefits the corporation is governed and 
how the corporation should be governed should be addressed. 
 
IV. The nature of employee participation in corporate 
governance 
 
There are various ways in which employees can participate in corporate governance 
decisions. For example, they might engage in individual and collective bargaining 
about the terms and conditions of employment, participate in workplace committees 
or consider matters such as occupational health and safety or employment equity. 
Moreover, there is no reason why employees could not become members of a 
company’s board of directors. 38
 
                                                     
34  Wei, above n 4, 7. 
35  M Ross (1999), Corporate Reconstructions Strategies for Directors, CCH New Zealand Limited, 
Auckland, New Zealand, 2–3. 
36  M Havenga, “Directors’ fiduciary duties under our future company-law regime”, Inaugural lecture 
(UNISA), (1997) 9 South African Mercantile Law Journal, 313.
37  RAG Monks & N Minow (2005), Corporate Governance, 3rd edn, Blackwell Publishing, US, 295. 
38  K Swinton, “Comment: On labour participation in workplace governance”, (1993) University of 
Toronto Law Journal, 43, 793. 
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Consequently, an important question that needs to be considered in this regard is 
the extent to which employee participation in decision-making processes would 
actually improve productivity standards and product quality. Jacoby notes,  
 
(i)n theory, giving employees a voice in governance – either at the workplace or corporate levels – 
should enhance their willingness to invest in firm-specific skills and to share productivity-enhancing 
ideas with the employer. … Voice should also reduce … turnover-related costs. 39  
 
It is also argued that where workplace-based institutions for worker representation 
are absent, labour/management relations are likely to be exceedingly poor, 
ultimately affecting the efficiency, performance and profitability of the corporation. 
Furthermore, it is important to remember that corporate governance systems are 
riddled with a complex set of costs and benefits. Thus, a reluctance to change to a 
more costly system of governance might arise. 40  
If South Africa has any hope of achieving improvement in productivity levels with its 
re-entry into international markets, then management and labour must find 
improved ways of dealing with each other. To this end a model needs to be 
formulated, which would be mutually advantageous to all sectors and bodies 
constituting the work place. This model needs to take into account the interests and 
rights of non-shareholder constituents of the corporation. Furthermore, it needs to 
be remembered that the best laws can be justified by usual practice. 41 Thus, if a 
model is too far away from reality and makes it too difficult to apply to current 
legislation, its influence will be reduced. 42 Furthermore, it must be noted that 
although some corporate systems have developed some of the strongest economics 
in human history, it is difficult to determine which country’s corporate governance 
system is the best one. 43  
 
It is evident from the research discussed above that some of the most influential 
corporate governance systems in the world have emanated from Germany, France 
and Japan. These systems have either created powerful corporate economies in the 
world, or carried out drastic corporate reforms and brought new insights into 
corporate development. Consequently, in discussing and analysing different models, 
                                                     
39  Jacoby, above n 23, 24. 
40  Ibid 21. 
41  DC North (1990), Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance, Cambridge University 
Press, New York, US, 37-69. See also Y Wei, above n 4 at 3. 
42  Ibid 3. 
43  Ibid 12. 
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the distinguishing features, which shape the system of corporate governance, can be 
identified. This entails examining the successful systems of corporate governance 
and identifying the conditions that have resulted in this success. The German and 
Japanese models operate in the strongest corporate economies in the world. The 
economies, political preferences and cultural and legal traditions are important 
features, which shape a country’s corporate system. Therefore, the development of a 
corporate system in a specific country should be studied and applied in the country’s 
own historical context. 44 It is also important to make the proposed governance 
model as scientific as possible. However, it must be remembered that the ultimate 
design cannot be entirely free from arbitrariness. 45 That is, even after a model is 
formulated and put into practice, ongoing work is still required to develop this model 
because there are always gaps between theories and practice. These gaps must be 
filled by informal rules, tradition, culture and customs. Legislation does not always 
reflect the reality completely or predict all foreseeable events. Thus, a model of 
corporate governance must take into account the conditions of a particular system in 
a particular country, which include its economic, political, cultural, historical and 
legal factors. 
 
 
V. A model of corporate governance for South Africa – 
a question of discipline 
 
In developing a corporate governance model for South Africa, the corporate 
governance models of Germany, Japan and France have been considered in this 
thesis. The reasons why these models have been chosen as the building blocks of 
the new South African corporate governance model are fully discussed elsewhere in 
this thesis (see introduction and chapters 8, 9 and 10). However, briefly stated, the 
German, Japanese and French systems of corporate governance have unique 
features, which could, I argue, improve South Africa’s current model of corporate 
governance, which is based upon a single tier board structure. Germany operates a 
mandatory two-tier board structure, which is designed to be advantageous to all 
stakeholders in the corporation. Japan relies, to a large extent, upon customary 
practices rather than on an institutionalised legal system of governance. Japanese 
corporations also emphasise the significance of lifetime employment. The French 
                                                     
44  Ibid 12-14. 
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system provides a unique selection of corporate governance systems. Companies 
may either select to adopt a unitary or two-tier board structure of governance. 
Furthermore, companies may choose to alternate freely between these governance 
systems as they wish. The British and American systems of governance, I argue, are 
unlikely to take South Africa’s current system of corporate governance much further 
at present. This is because the UK and US models of governance are based upon the 
unitary board system, which does not provide adequate levels of participation to 
employees and the other corporate stakeholders in the governance of corporations. 
 
Overall, corporate governance must be concerned with directing corporations to 
achieve its maximum efficiency. Hence, corporate governance must ensure the 
organisation of various relationships amongst its corporate participants for an 
optimal economic outcome. 46  
 
There is also the view that financial hardship in a corporation can create the 
opportunity to reallocate the economic resources through the use of corporate 
governance mechanisms. Thus, the extent to which corporate governance may play 
a role in generating improved economic returns is a question that needs to be 
considered. Parker et al believe that the evidence shows that effective corporate 
governance mechanisms are very important in increasing the likelihood of survival of 
distressed firms. 47 Consequently, the very survival of corporations depends upon 
discipline introduced through managers. This discipline, affected through good 
governance mechanisms, may arise through the market place or it can come from 
within the firm itself through the corporate governance structures. 48 Thus, Parker et 
al note,  
 
… (i)n the process, more and more people are recognising that corporate governance is indispensable 
to effective market discipline. … I have come to view strong corporate governance as indispensable to 
resilient and vibrant capital markets. 49  
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VI. The British and US systems of corporate 
governance 
 
As mentioned previously, both the UK and US adopt a unitary board structure of 
governance. This has also been referred to as the shareholder system of corporate 
governance in terms of which the employees and other corporate stakeholders have 
very limited or no influence on corporate governance matters. The UK and US are 
reluctant to adopt a two-tier board structure because this would facilitate a worker 
participation system of governance. 
 
VI.I BRITAIN 
 
The British model of corporate governance has not been considered in detail in this 
thesis, as it is unlikely to take the present system of corporate governance in South 
Africa much further than it is at the moment. This is because the UK system adopts 
a one-tier board structure. Furthermore, it has always been held that in this type of 
board structure the interests of employees and the interests of shareholders conflict. 
50 The problem with one-tier board systems is that they are required to fulfill two 
incompatible corporate functions. That is, it is both the supreme executive body and 
the supervisory organ. This raises the possibility of abuse of executive power by 
management and doubts about the accountability of directors are high. 51 Moreover, 
one-tier board systems emphasise the role of non-executive directors on the basis 
that the non-executive directors’ independent judgment and monitoring of corporate 
governance strategies can raise the standards of good corporate governance. 52 
Employees, appointed as directors, are usually known as the executive directors. 53
 
Furthermore, the unitary board has been attacked on further fronts. Firstly, it is 
argued that even where the unitary board applied, a de facto distinction existed 
between active members managing the business of the company and passive 
members who confined themselves to supervision. Secondly, it is argued that the 
unitary system did not answer the “needs of modern management undertakings”. 
Thirdly, the unitary system does not provide “equivalent safeguards to shareholders 
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and third parties”. Thus, “all member states (should) abandon a system of a single 
board and … replace it (with) a two-tier system in … public companies”. 54
 
Hence, the proposed model of corporate governance for South Africa is based upon a 
two-tier board structure. The two-tier board system constantly attempts to enhance 
the independence and strength of the supervisory board. Independent auditors are 
introduced into many jurisdictions and, therefore, major creditors, financial 
institutions and related companies can effectively influence the board. 55 Regarding 
the single board structure operating in the UK, Dore notes,  
 
… what seems to me the obvious “social justice” case for subordinate-employee power … is most 
obvious here in Britain where, last year, executive compensation (not including stock options) rose by 
15% while average salaries rose by 5%. 56  
 
Thus, in British companies, directors have a fiduciary relationship towards the 
company and, consequently, must act in the interests of the company. The interests 
of the other groups, namely the employees, creditors, investors, customers, the 
community and the state “are ill-defined in … company law”. Traditionally, 
management was only accountable to the shareholders. Thus, the German system 
with its work councils, system of co-determination and supervisory board structure is 
“at the ultra-red end of the comparative spectrum on industrial democracy”, whilst 
the British system falls within the “ultra-violet band”. 57 Hence, the contractual 
model best describes UK company law in which the company is regarded as the 
property of its owners. Thus, the wishes of the shareholders are the most significant 
consideration for management acting in the best interests of the corporation. In this 
way, creditors and employees are considered as “outsiders”, whilst the interests of 
the shareholders are equated with the interests of the company. 58However, 
ownership and control may be in different hands and thus “the identification of the 
shareholders with the company no longer represented reality”. 59  
 
The constituency model, on the other hand, has two variants. The first variant 
describes the company as being run in the interests of shareholders who must take 
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account of the other interest groups. 60 The second variant accepts that the interests 
of the other group must be taken into account because this would benefit the 
company directly. In this case, it is clearly the company, rather than the 
shareholders, that has this corporate governance role. 
 
The enterprise model differs from the constituency model because directors must 
take into account the interests of all stakeholders and regard them as part of the 
company. Each stakeholder then has its own corporate governance role in the 
decision-making process. This model is the classic model developed in Germany. 61  
 
Thus, in describing models of corporate governance, Jacoby identifies two distinctive 
governance systems in industrial countries. There is the ‘shareholder’ or Anglo-
American system, also referred to as the ‘market-outsider system’ or ‘stock-market 
capitalism’. This model is used in Britain, the US and in South Africa. There is also 
the ‘stakeholder’ system, which is also referred to as the ‘relational-insider’ system, 
the ‘dedicated-capital’ system or ‘welfare capitalism’. This model is used in Germany 
and Japan. Thus, the shareholder model is an “exit” model, in terms of which 
shareholders sell their shares to express dissatisfaction with management. The 
stakeholder model is a “voice” model, in terms of which the other stakeholders 
within the corporation, including the employees and shareholders, express concerns 
by communicating directly with management. These systems provide employees 
with very different roles in corporate governance. Employees have little or no 
influence on corporate matters under the shareholder system. Under the stakeholder 
model, employees have a moderate role, through custom, in Japan, and an 
important role, through statute, in Germany. In Germany, this occurs through a legal 
system of work councils and co-determination. In Japan, most large companies have 
unions and joint committees with access to senior management. Thus, employees 
are important stakeholders and management mediates between the shareholders, 
employees and other stakeholders. 62  
 
Moreover, the British have recently realised that their hesitation to take a significant 
step forward to reform their existing corporate system have made the UK corporate 
system and company law outdated. Since the mid-nineteenth century, the 
development of UK company law has been a process of constant addition of new 
rules to the existing legal framework. Thus, although the law became voluminous 
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and complex, no attempts were made to reassess its traditional principles and 
policies. 63  
 
The British have been reluctant to adopt a two-tier board system, as they believe 
that it would facilitate a worker participation system. This would contradict 
traditional mainstream corporate theory, which is that corporations should be run 
only for the interests of shareholders. Consequently, the interests of employees and 
shareholders remain in conflict. It will, however, be interesting to see, with the 
development of corporate laws within the European Union, whether the UK’s 
corporate governance system will move towards a two-tier board system, which 
would incorporate employee participation. 64  
 
Worker participation is no longer a question of whether they will participate or not; 
the question is rather how they will participate in the decision-making processes of 
the corporation. Thus, “employee participation in the broadest sense of the term “is 
a desirable development in a democratic society”. 65 The fact that workers’ 
participation has developed even in “lean years” is indicative of the fact that that this 
is “a lasting and deeply rooted movement”. 66
 
Vitols et al argue, however,  
(t)here is no ‘one best’ system of corporate governance. Rather, the two systems have different 
comparative advantages. The British corporate governance system better supports companies in 
sectors where there is a need to move quickly into and out of new markets and in which there is need 
for greater flexibility in the use of employees. The German system, by contrast, better supports 
companies in sectors that require long-term commitments and investments by employees, suppliers 
and other ‘stakeholders’. 67  
 
Because the UK model of corporate governance places managerial decision-making 
in the hands of the board and chief executive, it is likely to be able to take and 
implement decisions faster than the German model. This entails greater risks as top 
management may then make “strategic mistakes”. However,  
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the two systems are unlikely to converge: ‘change can better be characterized as incremental 
adaptation rather than the wholesale adoption or replacement of corporate governance systems’. 68  
 
VI.II THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
 
Corporate governance in the USA involves a unitary board structure with 
shareholders being the owners of the corporation. In America, it is believed that 
shareholders alone should direct management decision-making. This can be achieved 
either through proxies, through the fiduciary duties of managers and corporate 
boards, or through legal and economic means, which align management decisions 
with shareholder interests. In other countries, however, there is a greater willingness 
through the law and through the managers and shareholders to allow employees to 
participate in corporate governance. 69  
According to Jacoby, the implications of this for corporate governance are clear. He 
notes that corporations favour shareholders in the United States in order that capital 
for diversification and acquisitions may be obtained. In contradistinction, 
corporations favour managers and employees in Germany and Japan in order that 
internal organisational structures may be created. 70 Jacoby quotes an American 
union official, who said,  
 
it is amazing to me that in Europe … the corporations feel that they have [an ethical] obligation to their 
employees. … Th[is] comes naturally from the European culture. 71  
 
O’Connor also suggests that the American system of corporate disclosure does not 
provide sufficient information about their employees. He believes that employees 
show up as payroll expenses rather than being considered as a potential source of 
value to the corporation. 72 The important point is that in order for corporate law to 
be able to protect employees while holding directors accountable, it must recognise 
that directors have enforceable fiduciary duties towards its employees. 73  
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Referring to another jurisdiction reinforces this point further. From an Australian 
context with regard to the question of having enforceable fiduciary duties to protect 
employees of the corporation, Hocking wrote a political biography on Lionel Murphy, 
whose professional life in Australia covered many fields, from labour lawyer to 
Senator to Attorney-General to High Court judge. He died in 1986. Regarding the 
question of company law, she notes that Murphy pointed out that under Australian 
company law, management owed no duty at all to employees. English judges 
continued to rule that company law provided no authority with which to support the 
contention that company directors had any obligation or duty to their employees, 
Murphy noted that whilst,  
 
such is not the law in Australia either … the question may fairly be asked, I think, whether it should be. 
Was it possible … to take the law in the direction  … to introduce ‘a new concept of social responsibility’ 
into the law? 74  
 
Moreover, Gulati points out that all corporations involve and affect many other 
groups other than the shareholders themselves and the members of the upper 
management team. These other stakeholders are the employees, the lower and 
middle management teams, the creditors, the suppliers, the customers and even the 
government and local communities. All of these groups play important parts in the 
decision-making processes of the corporation. Thus, 
 
(t)he puzzle, therefore, is why U.S. corporate law ignores them. … The thrust of O’Connor’s article is … 
that labour has an important part to play in the governance of corporations and that this role needs to 
be recognised within corporate law. 75  
 
Gulati notes that in Germany and Japan, employees are given a much greater role in 
running the corporation than in the United States. Gulati refers to O’Connor’s 
proposals for the incorporation of employees as a more integral part of the 
governance structure. Consequently, the law should recognise a fiduciary duty to the 
employees. 76 Such disclosures would greatly assist investors in deciding where they 
should allocate their funds. Gulati believes that 
 
… the primary asset of many companies is their human capital. … How a company hires employees, its 
promotion and wage practices, its training programs, its absentee and retention rates, etc., are all 
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likely to be crucial determinants of future economic prospects for many companies. This seems to be a 
good thing from a labour point of view. Further, from a social optimality point of view, everyone gains 
because both labour and financial capital will be better allocated”. 77 Furthermore, it is important that 
employees are owed fiduciary duties. “The rationale is that the presence of these duties will provide a 
protection against opportunistic conduct by management. 78  
 
It is also noteworthy that the Anglo-American share of the world’s outward foreign 
investment ‘pie’ has fallen from 66% in 1980 to about 50% in 1997. By contrast, 
French, German and Japanese investment rose sharply during this period. 79 This 
suggests that the US style of corporate governance, which emphasises the 
“shareholder” system, has waned considerably in popularity. Thus, the economic 
case for the superiority of Anglo-American governance and of the Anglo-American 
version of “free markets” is weak. 80  
Furthermore, Jacoby believes that the question of costs and benefits will force 
American workers in the position of being among the least influential group of 
employees in the advanced industrial world. Thus,  
 
… (n)ot a few journalists and even some respected academics are asserting that U.S.-style corporate 
governance promotes “rent extraction” – greed, in plain English – and is not, as was alleged back in 
the 1990s, a system of “optimal contracting. 81  
 
Thus, employees in the US have been restricted to workplace discussions concerning 
wages and working conditions. This allowed managers the opportunity to maintain 
control over strategic decisions. Thus, when the German economy began to perform 
better than that of the US, corporate law scholars reexamined the employees’ role in 
the German system of co-determination. This means that, under German law, 
employee representatives of the supervisory board may fully participate in the 
decision-making processes of the corporation. 82
 
A few mainstream corporate scholars agreed that labour board representation might 
be a good way to facilitate the tradeoff between worker commitment and firm 
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adaptability in a world of rapid technological change. However, unions in the United 
States have not supported any reform proposals for the German-style co-
determination, as labour is reluctant to challenge the “system” that established the 
managers as “thinkers” and the workers as “doers”. 83  
 
Davies believes that commentators and institutions in the 1980s began to take an 
interest in both the German and Japanese systems of corporate governance 
especially when the economies of these countries “out-performed” that of the US 
economy. 84 Sullivan also notes that in the 1980s and 1990s, there was a great deal 
of interest in the German and Japanese “insider systems of corporate governance”, 
as compared with the American shareholder model of corporate governance. This 
was due to the fact that the German and Japanese systems produced excellent 
returns economically and was hugely successful in achieving “social cohesion”. 85 
However, O’Sullivan believes that each country is different and, therefore, no one 
system of corporate governance can be applicable to all. Furthermore, there is 
inadequate attention to the question of what it is that makes each country different 
from another. 86  
 
However, in terms of corporate governance, the US unitary board structure is 
composed of committees, such as auditor committees, executive committees, 
compensation committees and nomination committees. Most companies have the 
first three types of committees attached to their unitary board structure. Thus, 
although executive committees and auditor committees are composed of internal 
appointments and are involved in the daily management and financial control 
operations of the corporation, compensation committees and nomination 
committees, which are composed of outside directors, supervise the executive 
directors and managers. This step towards a two-tier structure has improved the 
effectiveness and accountability of the US one-tier board. 87  
 
This thesis considers the possibility of attaching various types of committees to the 
present unitary board structure in South African to improve the governance of the 
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corporations. However, Wei notes that some have suggested that the USA may be 
better off if it adopts instead the German corporate model. 88  
 
Araki points out that ever since the 1970s, American employers tried to introduce 
the notion of employee participation schemes so as to enhance productivity and 
quality of work life. However, American law, as interpreted by the National labour 
Relations Board and Federal Courts, prohibits most such employee involvement. 
These bodies believe that such involvement amounts to illegal intervention into 
“labor organisation” through employers. In such situations, therefore, it would not be 
possible for labour and management to develop a corporate governance structure 
that respects employee participation. Thus, American law only allows adversarial 
labour relations through the involvement of representatives under collective 
bargaining systems, which have been certified under the National Labour Relations 
Act. 89 O’Connor believes that the Americans have taken this approach because some 
view employee representation on the German board as that which weakens the 
board’s monitoring function. Thus, O’Connor notes that the Americans believe that 
large blocks of shareholders are needed in Germany to counterbalance worker power 
on the board. Furthermore, stock markets depend on shareholder-focused boards 
and, accordingly, co-determination prevents this by including employee objectives in 
strategic decision-making. Moreover, some commentators suggest that employees 
have limited wealth and have differing interests in corporate decision making 
because they have different educational levels, race, class and sex. Capital hires 
labour in order to diversify their financial risks better and therefore maximise their 
wealth. 90  
 
These views, it is suggested, are not progressive. They do not address concerns 
about the system of corporate governance adopted in the US. They also do not 
encourage or direct the directors towards a consideration of the other stakeholders 
in the corporation other than the shareholders. Given this, the system appears 
outdated and fails to conform to modern global trends on corporate governance. 
O’Connor submits that 
 
(i)n analyzing the advantages and disadvantages that result from providing employees with a role in 
corporate governance, we cannot rely solely on empirical research. In the end, we must engage in an 
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honest discussion of the political issues involved – issues that do not lend themselves to precise 
mathematical testing. These political issues involve questions such as, “What kind of society do we 
want to live in?” In defining a “socially optimal” corporate governance system, we should talk about the 
quality of life, rather than just about gross national product and shareholder value. 91  
 
Furthermore, O’Connor provides a succinct overview in noting that Germany 
provides for co-determination, Japan permits directors to balance the competing 
interests of employers with shareholders and the United States does not provide for 
the participation of employees. The United States has a model, which is based upon 
shareholder primacy. This model defines the interests of workers through contract 
and governmental regulation. Thus, 
 
… (t)he absence of employee voice in corporate governance demonstrates a great deal about American 
corporate culture. … The free market position states that employees do not play a role in corporate 
governance because they are protected by contractual mechanisms, such as collective bargaining. … 
(However), corporate governance rights for workers are necessary because private contracts are 
inadequate; practical and legal hurdles prevent employees from negotiating against corporate 
opportunism. 92  
 
All of this suggests a real need to redesign American corporate governance 
structures in order to reallocate decision making to encourage investments in human 
capital. This approach is not widely accepted. However, its concerns are beginning to 
receive attention amongst influential people, which is a victory for those scholars 
who believe that employees deserve greater protection of their rights and interests 
through corporate law. The aim would be to provide employees with a voice in the 
new world of global corporate governance. 93  
 
 
VII. The preferred models of corporate governance 
 
The German, Japanese and French models have unique features, which, I argue, can 
be very advantageous in the formulation of an improved and workable model of 
corporate governance in South Africa for all stakeholders. 
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VII.I THE GERMAN SYSTEM OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
 
Germany has developed a system of corporate governance, which is quite different 
from the Anglo-American model. Because Germany has one of the most successful 
corporate economies in the world, it is possible that other countries can derive 
significant insights and advantages from the institutional structures of this type of 
governance system. Thus, it has been noted, 
 
(b)y virtually any standard, Germany has developed one of the world’s largest and most successful 
economies. Many of its companies are known internationally, particularly in the automative, 
manufacturing, and chemical sectors. Germany is renowned for its system of industrial and labour 
relations, high labour productivity, its cradle-to-grave social welfare system, and a modern 
infrastructure that is the envy of many nations. At least some of the success of Germany’s post-war 
“economic miracle” has been attributed to a system of corporate law governance that has historically 
differed markedly in many important respects from the Anglo-Saxon model. 94
 
The Germans operate an institutionalised stakeholder model, which is designed to be 
advantageous to all stakeholders in the corporation, not just shareholders and 
directors. 95 The German corporation is “to be managed in a very narrowly profit-
minded way”. 96
 
Germany has an economy consisting of practices and work councils. These features 
form the basis of German law and practice. 97 Thus, the “ground was laid” to shift 
away from the traditional theory of maximising profits for shareholders. 98
 
There has been little, if any, movement towards the establishment of a unitary board 
structure in Germany. 99 Thus, there is almost no likelihood that Germany would 
ever abandon its two-tier board structure and replace it with the Anglo-Saxon 
unitary structure. 100
 
Hence, according to German law, a mandatory two-tier board structure must be 
established in corporations, consisting of a supervisory board (Aufsichtsrat) and a 
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management or executive board (Vorstand). It was made compulsory in 1870. 101 
The term “two-tier” board system does not connote that one board “is superior to 
the other board”. It means rather that the two boards “function side-by-side, with 
different and very specific duties”. 102
 
Stock companies founded after 10 August 1994 and, which employ fewer than 500 
people, are exempt from the co-determination system. This does not apply to stock 
companies founded before this date (other than family businesses) where one-third 
of the seats on the supervisory board must consist of the employee 
representatives.103 Du Plessis notes that the supervisory board was only included 
into German Law “at a relatively late stage” through the General German 
Commercial Code in 1861. 104
 
The supervisory board is selected by and composed of shareholders and employees. 
It supervises the management of the corporation, whilst the management board 
manages the company. Consequently, this “division of responsibilities” provided the 
shareholders with a system, which could actively “check, supervise and correct” 
management. 105
 
In terms of the co-determination system a certain proportion of the supervisory 
board members must be elected by and composed of the employees of the 
corporation. Thus, du Plessis notes that the appointment and removal of members of 
the supervisory board is inextricably linked with the belief that employees should 
participate in the decision-making processes at board level. 106The Germans believe 
that companies have a human and personal component to it and will “produce a 
general benefit for the community as a whole”. 107 Thus, the interests of employees 
must be taken into account. This creates a climate of stability. Thus,  
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(t)he underlying ideology is that worker participation in the decision-making will promote trust, co-
operation and harmony. 108  
 
It has been suggested that Germany’s two-tier board system appears to be a more 
efficient system than the one-tier board system. 109 This point will be fully examined 
in this thesis. 
 
It has also been stated that the German government has played an important part in 
shaping German corporate patterns. Consequently, industrialisation in Germany has 
been a more organised process as compared to that of the UK. Thus, the German 
corporate system can be described as not only ‘cooperative’, but also as ‘organised’. 
110 The government has promoted German industry as a matter of national pride and 
German entrepreneurs relied heavily on the government for guidance. 111 Banks also 
play a very influential role. Furthermore, German legislation can be described as 
having a “broad social and economic” base. 112  
 
Independence of the supervisory board is maintained through the legislation, which 
provides the two boards with totally separate functions. 113 Thus, the system of co-
determination, operating through the structure and mechanisms of the supervisory 
board, ensures that a certain proportion of supervisory board members must be 
employees. It is thought that, through co-determination, participation of the 
employees in decision-making will promote sound working relationships. 114  
 
Araki further points out that there are two-types of co-determination processes, 
namely co-determination at the level of the supervisory board (Aufsichtsrat) and co-
determination between employer and works council (Betriebsrat) at establishment 
level, which is required by German legislation. 115 Thus, to take action relating to a 
co-determination matter in terms of the 1972 Works Constitution Act, employers 
must first obtain the consent required to do so from the works council. Any unilateral 
action on the part of the employer is thereby rendered void and unenforceable. 
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When the employer and the works council cannot come to an agreement on a co-
determination matter, the matter is then referred to an arbitration committee 
(Einigungsstelle). Any decision made by the arbitration committee is binding on both 
sides. 116  
 
Furthermore, Sadowski et al point out that the composition of the supervisory board 
depends upon the size and the type of corporation. Briefly, in terms of the German 
Co-Determination Act of 1976, the supervisory board may consist of either 12, 16 or 
20 members depending upon the number of employees employed within the 
corporation. 117  
 
Sadowski et al further state that a positive effect of co-determination is that 
dissatisfied employees may elect to communicate their dissatisfaction (“voice”), 
rather than choosing the option of leaving the company (“exit”). 118  
 
Furthermore, works councils, as a voice institution, provide employees with an even 
greater negotiating power and consequently with a disproportionately large part of 
an enlarged pie. 119 Thus, O’Sullivan notes that the Works Constitution Act of June 
2001 increased the formal power of work councils by strengthening their rights in 
training, employment security, work organisation, environmental matters and racism 
issues in the workplace. Consequently, a major aim of the new works council reform 
is to keep co-determination from deteriorating. 120  
 
Finally, another aspect that can enhance cooperation between shareholders and 
employees, are employee share ownership schemes, which have become common in 
Europe in the 1990s. Although the growth in employee shareholdings has been 
steady, it has not been spectacular and, as with stock options, penetration of 
employee shares in Germany is much lower than that of the United States and 
Britain. Consequently, what the future might hold for the relationship between 
employee shareholding and corporate governance depends to a large extent upon 
the employees and whether they decide to use their financial influence to shape 
corporate decision making. 121  
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VII.II THE JAPANESE SYSTEM OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
 
Unlike the Anglo-Saxon model of corporate governance, Japanese society believes 
that the corporate profits should not only go to the shareholders, but also to 
customers, the local and national community and to employees, who are termed the 
shain (“members of the firm”). 122 Araki notes,  
 
companies in Japan are administered for employees’ interests. … (P)riority of access to the companies’ 
assets is given in the following order: 1) creditors; 2) regular workers; 3) management; 4) 
shareholders; and, lastly, non-regular workers. … (W)orkers have priority over shareholders and even 
over management. … (This is because) the contributions and risk exposure of the core employees are 
greater than those of shareholders, and … employees invest a hidden contribution via the seniority 
based wage and retirement allowance system. 123  
 
The stakeholder model in Japan therefore relies more on customary practices than 
on an institutionalised legal system such as that found in Germany. 124 Importantly, 
it has been noted by Perry that sophisticated technology is not the primary source of 
competitive advantage for Japan. Japanese manufacturing instead emphasises 
aspects, such as devotion to the company and lifetime employment. A main feature 
of Japan’s approach to mass production is to manufacture only as and when needed. 
This approach contrasts with Western mass production, which generally keeps 
employees and machines in continuous production. By the 1980s, Western 
industrialists were eager to learn from Japan, as they believed that this was now 
imperative for their survival. Thus, Japanese work practices have been so important 
because Japanese businesses have been very successful. 125
 
Moreover, Jacoby identifies six main features of Japanese-style corporate 
governance. These are  
 
stable shareholders, an emphasis on steady payment of dividends, heavy reliance on banks for debt 
financing, internal labour markets for managers, managerial pay cuts to protect employee jobs and a 
stakeholder ethos that includes employees as a key bloc. … While Japan never went as far as Germany 
in giving employees a voice inside firms, nearly all large Japanese companies today continue to have 
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enterprise unions that are involved to varying extent in strategic issues such as restructuring and 
technological change. 126  
 
Araki believes that both German and US law has influenced Japanese corporate law 
and, as a result, displays unique features of each. He notes that the Japanese 
Commercial Code of 1899 adopted a monitoring structure based upon German law, 
which consists of both managing directors and auditors. In this way, the general 
shareholders’ meeting appoints the auditors and the board of directors, both of 
which supervise and monitor the directors that the board appoints. 127 The board and 
the representative directors have “real power” of governance. Furthermore, 75.6% 
of board members are promoted from within a company and not hired from the 
outside. The remuneration gap between employees and board members is narrow. 
Thus, the averaged annual remuneration paid to board members is only about nine 
times greater than those salaries paid to entrants who have graduated from 
universities. 128  
 
As Araki points out, however, there are major differences between the German 
supervisory board and the Japanese auditor system. The German supervisory board, 
depending upon the size of the company, consists of employee and shareholder 
representatives. However, the Japanese auditor component of the corporate 
governance system does not include employees. Secondly, although the German 
supervisory board may perform both auditing functions as well as being permitted to 
monitor its business administration, Japanese auditors may only carry out their 
auditing duties. 129  
 
Furthermore, according to Wei,  
 
the Japanese corporate economy has become an economic miracle within a short time. … The Japanese 
corporate system has developed by importing organisational models, managerial methods and 
production and distribution technologies from the West, with necessary adjustments and adaptations, 
into a fundamentally different social and economic environment. Considering the success of this 
process, the Japanese corporate system provides another significant model that is admired by other 
systems. 130  
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Almost every Japanese corporation has a ‘main bank’ relationship, which is not only 
its largest lender, but also one of its largest shareholders. 131 Consequently, banks 
play a central role in Japanese corporate governance. 132  
 
Jacoby believes that in Japan and Germany, enterprise unions and co-determination 
fit well with the stakeholder system of corporate governance. This is because this 
system does not elevate its shareholders to a privileged status. The long-term 
relations that the corporation has with banks, customers and suppliers encourage 
the establishment of permanent employees by, for example, promoting training 
programmes. In the United States, however, employer training investments are 
much less than in Germany or Japan. Thus, there is little involvement of employees 
in corporate governance other than in unionised firms. 133  
 
Araki refers to the Top Management Survey 134 to point out that only 8.5% of 
respondents support the notion that the corporation belongs to its shareholders 
whilst 85,8% believe that the shareholders are not the only stakeholders in the 
corporation. Araki suggests that in Japan this factor encourages cooperative labour 
and improved management relations. 135  
 
Additionally, in Japan corporations exist to advance the interests of the whole 
nation.136 Thus, Japanese companies maintain employment stability with lifetime 
employment. This encourages employees to be loyal. Through a policy of lifetime 
employment, the personal improvement and social status of employees are 
inextricably intertwined with the prosperity of their companies. 137 Therefore, the 
Japanese system has two characteristics. Firstly, nearly all the members of the board 
are insiders and the directors are appointed from the management ranks. Secondly, 
shareholders are passive owners. Thus, most of the shares of a company are held by 
banks and related companies with strong business ties to the company. 138  
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Thus, in Japan, shareholders tend to be more friendly and passive than their 
contemporaries in the West. This means that, in Japan, control exists not through 
hostile bids and the replacement of ineffective managers, but through career 
employment and a managerial promotion system. The best managers become the 
company directors with a seat on the board. They are the directors that are trusted 
by the other stakeholders of the corporation, including the banks, customers, 
suppliers and the employees. 139  
 
Jacoby, however, believes that Japan’s approach to corporate governance resembles 
the stakeholder system of governance, which characterises continental Europe. 
There is a preference for “voice over exit”. There are also expectations (and not 
regulations) that a company should be responsible to employees and suppliers, as 
well as its shareholders. Thus, these practices are not legally enforceable, but are 
regularly and widely applied. 140  
 
Araki endorses these sentiments, noting that job security is an important priority in 
Japanese corporate governance. Thus,  
 
(e)mployees in Japanese companies are not merely seen as a factor of production that can be adjusted 
in accordance with fluctuating economic needs. Instead, corporations treat employees as important 
constituents. … (Firstly) employment security is provided for not by legislation, but rather by case law. 
… (Secondly) … Japanese case law sets stringent restrictions on economic dismissals. … (Therefore) 
major companies refrained from resorting to employment adjustment through dismissals.141  
 
Furthermore, it can be said that the economic situation of a particular system can 
determine the basic appearance of its corporate governance system. 142Additionally, 
national culture is another factor that significantly influences the development of a 
corporate governance system. 143 Corporations comprise people of different cultures 
with different behavioural norms and values. For example, the group and cooperative 
approach of management existing in Japanese firms, have deep roots in Japanese 
culture. 144 Thus, there is a distinctive corporate group system in Japan and most 
Japanese companies survive collectively. 145  
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As noted previously, the Japanese board is a type of hybrid and is mainly composed 
of insiders. It has a statutory auditor (kansayaku), which has some of the functions 
of the supervisory boards of German companies. A listed company has from one to 
three statutory auditors who supervise the board and its management of the 
corporation.  
 
It can be suggested that the Japanese corporate system stands somewhere between 
a one-tier and a two-tier board system. Although it has one board and a “supervisory 
organ”, its “supervisory organ” is not the same as the supervisory board found in the 
German corporate system. 146  
 
Most members of the board of directors have come through to the board after 
holding lower ranks in the corporation. Other people joining the management board 
of directors are ex-employees of banks or ex-employees from affiliated companies or 
governmental ministries. Thus, 
 
(i)n Japan, there is a common understanding that companies, as social institutions, are actually owned 
by employees and run in their best interests. Employees join firms after school … and are supposed to 
stay with the companies until retirement. Their living, professional achievements and life 
accomplishments are all connected with the success of the companies. 147  
 
In Japan, rewards for employees tend to be calculated in accordance with their ages 
and their length of service. 148 Therefore, Araki believes that almost half of the board 
members are currently “directors-with-employee-function”. This means that 
Japanese companies have established a channel to allow employees an opportunity 
to voice their opinions to corporate management. 149  
 
Wei notes that Japanese corporate governance is characterized by having features of 
‘groupism’, ‘familism’, lifetime employment and national service rather than profit 
maximisation. 150 In this way, joint labour-management consultation has become  
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an established practice in Japanese industrial relations. … Japanese labour and management learned 
from their bitter confrontations that adversarial relations benefited neither party and found that by 
establishing cooperative relations and enhancing productivity, they could change a zero-sum game into 
a win-win game. 151  
 
Finally, Araki refers to the fact that from April 2003 it was possible in Japan for 
companies whose capital was more than five hundred million yen or whose debt was 
greater than 20 billion yen to adopt an American-style of corporate governance in 
place of the traditional Japanese corporate governance model. However, according to 
the survey of about 1100 companies conducted in April 2003, only four of them had 
sought to adopt this option. Therefore, most companies intend to keep the 
traditional corporate model firmly in place. 152  
 
 
VII.III THE FRENCH SYSTEM OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
 
France has unique features of corporate governance in terms of which the French 
government is linked to French business. There are various types of French 
companies in operation. The two main types are the Societés anonymes (SAs), which 
are public companies similar to the AG’s in Germany. Any French company with 
shareholders that exceed fifty in number must be incorporated as an SA company. 
These companies must have a capital base of at least FF 250,000. The other type of 
main company, which operates in France, is the Societés a responsibilité limitée 
(SARLs). There companies are limited liability companies similar to the GmbH in 
Germany. These companies must have shareholders, which do not exceed fifty in 
number and must have a capital base of at least FF 50,000.  
 
As mentioned previously, very uniquely in France there is a choice between two 
types of corporate governance systems. These systems comprise the unitary board 
or two-tier board structures. The unitary board structure, which characterises the 
traditional French system of corporate governance, consists of two main 
components: the président directeur-général (PDG) and the board (Conseil 
d’Administration). The PDG is elected by the board, which, in turn, is elected by the 
shareholders. The PDG has the only right to represent the company, a right, which 
cannot be delegated. The PDG has greater power than the CEO in the USA or in the 
UK.  
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The other type of governance system for companies is to have a system of corporate 
governance based upon the two-tier approach, which incorporates the additional 
supervisory board structure. This system, introduced by the French government in 
1966, is similar to the two-tier approach found in Germany comprising the Vorstand 
and Aufsichtsrat. However, it is arguable that German supervisory boards take a 
more proactive role than the French supervisory boards to ensure that the 
management board performs competently. Consequently, it seems that the 
supervisory boards of French Companies have less authority and power than the 
supervisory boards of German companies.  
 
A corporation may, at any time, change from the unitary board structure to the dual 
board structure and visa versa, provided that it calls an extraordinary general 
meeting and, at such meeting, acquires a two-thirds majority of votes in favour of 
the change called for.  
 
The main reason why another model of corporate governance was introduced into 
France was primarily due to the differing personalities of people. It was thought that 
the personalities that could not fit within the traditional, older structure would fit 
within the newer, more modern version. In this way, it is logical to offer alternatives 
to fit people rather than force people to fit a single type of structure. Thus, those 
problems that are associated with having problematic personalities in control with 
executive powers could be easily solved.  
 
 
VIII. A new model of corporate governance for South 
Africa 
 
As we saw in part VIII above, there are sound features of stakeholder participation 
that characterise the German, Japanese and French systems of corporate 
governance. These features are fully discussed in chapters 8, 9 and 10 in so far as a 
new model of corporate governance for South Africa is proposed. 
 
“While Anglo-American systems are moving to adopt a wider conception of 
stakeholder interests,” 153 a corporate governance model for South Africa is 
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proposed, which takes into account the rights and interests of the other stakeholders 
of the corporation. More specifically, in this model, a structure will be created, which 
will bring the employee into the decision-making processes of the corporation at 
board level. Thus, 
(c)orporate development has come to the stage where human capital or employees play an important 
role in creating and increasing corporate value. Employees physically own companies, the outcome of 
corporate performance directly concerns their interests. 154  
 
This provides additional recognition that South Africa needs to have a corporate 
system in place where employees are able to play a dynamic role in corporate 
governance. Jacoby endorses these sentiments. He notes, 
 
… many types of employee voice are associated with better firm performance, which is hardly 
surprising given that employees possess inside information about inefficient processes and ineffectual 
managers, and are at least as motivated as shareholders to see that the firm is run effectively. … Voice 
and civic values are associated with equity in the distribution of economic rewards and equity, in turn, 
is associated with higher long-term growth rates. … So, perhaps, this is one of those rare moments of 
modern global capitalism where the odds have shifted a bit to favour employees. 155  
 
However, it is to be noted,  
 
(e)ven after a sound model is adopted work is still needed, because there are always gaps between 
theories and practice. These gaps have to be filled by informal rules and norms shaped by tradition, 
culture and customs. In fact, peoples’ social relationships and behaviour are more greatly influenced by 
such informal rules and norms. Any law cannot completely reflect reality, cannot predict all foreseeable 
events and cannot extinguish language obscurity. Moreover, a law usually lags behind social 
development. 156  
 
Wei notes that two elements are required to determine the effectiveness of any 
model of corporate governance. Firstly, an institutional framework of economic 
efficiency is required. Secondly, institutional changes must take into account 
particular conditions, which include economic, political, cultural, historical and legal 
factors. Both elements must be balanced to have an effective model of corporate 
governance. It is also essential that the proposed model is efficient and effective. 
Different systems of corporate governance have developed distinctive characteristics 
based on different styles of capitalism and cultural and legal traditions. It is, 
therefore, important to identify and examine those economic, political and cultural 
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determinants that would play a significant part in shaping a corporate governance 
system. A sound system of corporate governance can only help to produce a sound 
outcome of economic performance. A desirable corporate governance system only 
works in a competitive economy. To adopt a model, which provides insufficient 
consideration to the special social conditions of a particular society would be 
undesirable (not to mention disastrous). Thus, the most desirable option is a model, 
which represents the best economic efficiency after balancing the economic benefits 
and the cost of introducing the new model. It is also highly recommended that the 
workers’ involvement in corporate governance be increased to a significant level. 157  
 
Thus, the most significant advantages of comparative corporate governance research 
are a consideration of the “best characteristics of alternative corporate governance 
systems”. These characteristics are then added to one’s own corporate governance 
system “taking into consideration tradition, history, culture and the local corporate 
law”. 158
 
It is along these lines that a new model of corporate governance for South Africa has 
been developed. The study concludes with an appendix discussing the 
recommendations and proposals of the Department of Trade and Industry. These 
proposals highlight the fact that corporate reform will commence in 2006 with the 
introduction of a new South African Companies Act. 159  
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CHAPTER 1:  
 
 
(1.0) THE COMPANY – A DISTINCT LEGAL PERSONA: 
TRADITIONAL THEORIES AND PRACTICES; PROBLEMS 
AND NEW STRATEGIES 
 
 
Debate about how South Africa should proceed to develop its corporate governance 
mechanisms to improve employee/employer and other stakeholder relations is 
increasing. However, very little has been translated into actual practice. This thesis 
sets out to develop a workable solution to South Africa’s corporate governance 
problems, especially in relation to employer/employee relations. Sources of useful 
information and examples of more progressive situations are drawn from various 
writers and international models of corporate governance. There will be inter alia 
politico-social and legal ramifications. Any destabilisation caused by these factors, 
however, is likely to be far outweighed by the benefits that would be achieved. The 
essential elements and functions of corporate governance, theories of corporate law, 
sources of power, various perspectives and conceptual frameworks distinguishing the 
different types of companies will assist directors in determining the basis of 
governance within any type of corporation. 
 
In this chapter I will examine the traditional conception and governance of the 
company in South African company law contrasting it with conceptions in other 
jurisdictions. It is seen that the South African model of corporate governance is 
anachronistic and needs to be reformed. As mentioned in the introduction, particular 
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attention should be paid to the advantageous features of the corporate governance 
systems of Germany, Japan and France in the design and formulation of a new 
model of governance for South Africa. In this way, South African company law would 
be able to leave behind its traditional concepts that plague it and which enshrine the 
primary goal of the corporation as one that maximises shareholder profits. In light of 
the above, this chapter discusses the problems associated with traditional company 
law doctrines, its classification of companies and sources of corporate power and its 
conceptual frameworks as applied to matters of corporate governance. 
 
Furthermore, with regards to the current problems of classification of company types 
in South Africa, it has long been argued that private companies should be abolished 
due to the introduction of the close corporation. It is therefore a concern that South 
Africa still retains the distinction between private and public companies even though 
close corporations now exist for small business entrepreneurs. Thus, the necessity to 
adhere to traditional statutory distinctions between private and public companies 
should be questioned. 
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(1.1) Introduction 
 
Since the mid-1980’s … corporate governance has been seen as a key element relating to the 
performance and economic efficiency of the enterprise system. 160  
 
Tricker in a personal interview captures a remark of Lord Caldecote, which 
establishes one of the most essential points of this thesis. He notes, 
 
(t)he trouble with British companies is that the directors mark their own examination papers. 161  
 
Directors, in many jurisdictions, still dictate the extent to which they run their 
corporations. They also dictate the extent to which the members or shareholders of 
the corporation, as well as the other stakeholders of the company, actively 
participate in corporate governance processes.  
 
Fleming emphasises the promotion of a sound corporate governance relationship 
between the various stakeholders of the corporation. Moreover, he states that 
relationships exist within the corporation between the management and other 
employees, depending upon the corporation’s organisational complexity. In addition, 
there are relationships that exist with other stakeholders, including the suppliers, 
customers and the community. Therefore, the corporation has a relationship with the 
community, which encompasses responsibilities in terms of it being a ‘good’ 
corporate citizen. 162  
 
Generally, regarding the methods used to run companies, there have been numerous 
proposals for change outlined in recent literature, which have been discussed in this 
thesis (see inter alia parts VII and VIII of the introduction section and 2.5, 4.3, 6.3, 
6.5, chapters 7, 8 and the appendix). This has led to significant re-evaluations with 
respect to corporate governance practices and therefore a rethinking of the 
traditional, conservative conceptual frameworks established by the Companies Act 
found in many countries, including South Africa. 
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As mentioned previously, corporate governance mechanisms exert significant 
direction and control over corporations. Wei suggests that the main aim of corporate 
governance is to improve the economic efficiency of the corporation. Different views 
exist on how this may be attained. In accordance with the Anglo-American system 
the corporation should exist only to maximise shareholder profits. However, other 
systems take relevant social interests into account, including the welfare of 
employees. Consequently, the approach of regarding the primary goal of the 
corporation as maximizing shareholders’ profits is subject to increasing scrutiny. 
Thus, the corporation must also give consideration to other goals such as gaining 
bigger market shares, long-term survival, satisfactory and secure profits, 
technological leadership and attaining a good image. Consequently, in addition, 
corporations must give attention to stakeholder groups such as employees, creditors, 
banks and consumers. Shareholder profits should not be obtained at the expense of 
social interests and should not allow an overall loss of wealth to exist for the 
community. This is because a corporation must be beneficial to the public as a 
whole. Therefore, the employees, the board of directors, management, consumers, 
creditors, suppliers, unions and the government are all to be regarded as 
stakeholders along with the shareholders. Consequently, the corporation should be 
seen as a “multipurpose organisation”, which balances the interests of the various 
stakeholders. Hence, the corporation cannot be in existence merely to maximise 
investors’ profits. It is important that the economic efficiency of the corporation is 
measured on a basis, which would ensure the long-term prosperity of the 
corporation and improved social wealth and welfare. 163  
 
Cannon, who notes that business, government, academia and the wider society 
shape corporate responsibility, further elaborates upon this concept. Consequently, 
in summary, the affairs of the corporation should focus upon five broad areas, which 
are: 
 
1. Its social, economic, ethical and moral responsibilities; 
2. Its compliance with the legal and voluntary provisions and practices for 
business;  
3. Its effects upon the environment;  
4. The challenges created for it by providing for the economically and socially 
disadvantaged groups; and 
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5. The management of its corporate responsibility activities towards other 
businesses. 164 
 
 
(1.2) Theories of corporate law 
 
Corporate law can be described in terms of four different theories: the organic, 
fiction, contract and economic theories. 
 
Succinctly stated, the organic theory describes a corporation as a “real being in 
society”. The theory is concerned with the question of how a corporation can be 
“real” and even attempts to define “the soul and the brain of the corporation”. On 
the other hand, the fiction theory describes a corporation as that which has been 
created by law and is therefore of an artificial and fictional design. It therefore 
possesses only those properties and rights, which have been conferred upon it by 
law or are incidental to its existence. Some people also described this theory as 
being evasive, as it does not provide any definition of a legal person. However, both 
theories are influential in Western systems, although neither has provided a 
definitive answer of what a corporation is. 165 Therefore, the two theories share a 
common theme, which both focus upon the corporation itself instead of on the 
shareholders. The contract theory, however, regards a corporation as a ‘nexus of 
contracts’. 166 Thus, the theory supports the view that the State should interfere with 
corporate activities in a minimal way. The law should only intervene when people act 
irrationally. 167  
 
This theory does not, however, provide a definition of what a corporation is. It is 
argued that a corporation cannot merely be a “collection of contracts”. 168 Thus, 
describing the corporation as a “nexus of a set of contracting relationships among 
individuals” is “seriously misleading” because “the firm is not an individual”. 
Furthermore, it has been noted that the “nexus of contracts” approach, which 
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suggests that the corporation is engaged “in a series of unrelated bilateral 
arrangements with various parties” having “no relationship with each other”, is 
inaccurate for two reasons. Firstly, this approach excludes the interests of 
involuntary and passive stakeholders who may not have a contractual relationship 
with the corporation. Secondly, this approach does not recognise that all 
stakeholders are in fact linked indirectly with one another. 169
 
On the other hand, however, Strikwerda believes that the corporation, as a legal 
entity, should be changed into one, which comprises a nexus of contracts. 170  
 
O’Connor points out, however, that in the “nexus of contract” approach, corporate 
law seeks to maximise shareholder profits. 171 O’Connor notes that this model is 
dependent upon various relationships, such as those between the shareholders, 
employees, suppliers, customers and the community. In this way, the focus is on the 
relationship between shareholders and managers. Therefore, management’s main 
duty would be to maximise the wealth of the shareholders that are the owners of the 
corporation. Thus, 
 
employees are assumed to lack the business acumen to participate in board decision making and are 
best left to provide information, if at all, on the shop floor within their teams. Thus, this model does 
not examine the possible efficiency benefits of worker participation under different corporate 
governance systems. 172  
 
Davies, however, believes that the nexus of contract theory is “more favourable” 
than a shareholder ownership theory where employees are given rights of control. 
He notes,  
 
control rights for employees constitute a challenge to the sanctity of property rights. Under the nexus 
of contracts theory, the company stands as a sort of central counter-party, through which each of the 
groups whose long-term commitment to the business is essential for its successful contract with each 
other. … The position of the shareholders is no longer automatically privileged as it is under the 
shareholder ownership approach. 173  
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Wei suggests, however, that the organic theory, which is widely accepted in 
continental Europe, treats a corporation as a social being with a life, in a similar 
manner to a human being with a body. This theory attempts to link particular 
“organs” of the corporation with certain physical organs of a human being. The main 
problem with the organic theory is its “unscientific approach”. Therefore, this theory 
does not deal with the issue pertaining to the nature of the corporation. However, in 
terms of the fiction theory, a corporation has the legal capacity as if it were a natural 
person. Thus, a corporation is analogous to a human being in some respects, but 
non-human in others. Thus, the common law only gives the rights of a real person to 
a corporation, as it deems necessary. Another approach is to treat a corporation as a 
contractual arrangement. In this way, the theory describes the corporation as a 
“private arrangement of individuals contracting with each other”. 174  
 
Additionally, according to the economics theory,  
 
… the firm exists because economic transactions use the price system and there are costs of using it 
and it provides a means of internalizing market transactions, which reduce transaction costs. 175  
 
In other words, companies with limited liability can raise funds from the public 
through share subscription. Such economic transactions make the separation of 
ownership and control possible. Consequently, to judge economic efficiency, it is 
important to decide in whose interests a corporation should be governed. Thus, in 
Anglo-American systems, such as the US and UK, it is believed that corporations 
should maximise shareholder profitability. In Germany and Japan, however, 
corporations are viewed more as entities, which have “social welfare” and the “public 
good” among their central aims. 176 Therefore, as noted by Wei, 
 
(i)f we see the corporation as a social or state creation, it should exist for the good of society. … If we 
see the corporation as a nexus of contracts, it is logical that attention should be given to the overall 
relationship among contractors including shareholders, managers, creditors, debtors, employees, 
suppliers and consumers. … From an economic point of view, efficiency should be aimed at an overall 
increase in the wealth of the community. The key is whether the increase in the owner’s wealth 
represents the overall gain of society. … 177  
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This suggests that the economics theory is arguably the most comprehensive and 
useful basis to describe the nature of the corporation. This is because it uses 
economic rationality to do this, which places “the theory on solid ground”. 178  
 
 
(1.3) Corporate governance applied to modern 
companies 
 
A joint-stock company is defined as 
 
(a)n unincorporated association of individuals possessing common capital, the capital being contributed 
by the members and divided into shares, of which each member possesses a number of shares 
proportionate to the member’s investment. (It is also) (a) partnership in which the capital is divided 
into shares that are transferable without the express consent of the partners. 179
 
The joint-stock company or association had an early development in English 
company law. The term was used to distinguish companies operating “on a joint 
stock account and with a ‘joint-stock’ (in trade) of their members” from those 
companies where each member traded in a “separate account (and) with one’s own 
stock in trade”. In America, the joint stock association is generally an unincorporated 
business entity “with ownership interests represented by shares of stock”. 180
 
Historically, the joint-stock company, with its limited liability for its shareholders, 
was a simple, yet highly successful concept that arose during the mid-nineteenth 
century. It facilitated the provision of capital, encouraged business growth, secured 
employment and created wealth. 181 Ownership was the basis of power and was 
exercised through meetings of the shareholders of the company. Incorporation of 
joint-stock companies was a special state privilege and only a few businesses would 
attain this status. Joint-stock companies, in effect, became an extension of the 
domestic guild to overseas trade. As such, their main purpose was to acquire a 
monopoly in a particular trade. Therefore, incorporation was not commonplace 
during this period. Nonetheless, important concepts in corporate law evolved, 
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including features of modern day corporations such as perpetual succession, 
separation of its acts from those of its members and the transferability of shares. 182  
 
Companies today, however, no longer incorporate joint-stock companies. Many 
companies are too small and are controlled by the owner who is often the manager. 
Others are vast, highly complex and operate internationally by having hundreds of 
subsidiaries and associate companies in their group. This suggests that, on the 
whole, the practices and structures of modern business can no longer reflect the 
underlying concepts that were characteristic of the joint-stock, limited liability 
company. Furthermore, it has been suggested that economic efficiency is a principle 
factor for measuring corporate performance. This is because a main objective of 
corporate governance is to improve the corporation’s economic efficiency. 183 Hence, 
joint stock companies are outdated because they are no longer economically 
efficient. 
 
Fleming observes that with regard to corporate governance in Australia over the last 
forty years, the question of the 
 
(s)eparation between ownership and control has been a relatively recent characteristic of firms in 
Australia. … Australian companies in the first half of the twentieth century were best described as 
‘family capitalism’ with important director and managerial positions held by a close-knit group. … The 
nature of the separation of ownership from control changed in the second half of the twentieth century. 
184  
 
This has precipitated a need to rethink the basic conceptual framework upon which 
companies in modern society are based. In the past there was little challenge to 
management's power to run the company. 185 There was virtually no demand for 
independent supervision or disclosure, no intervention in matters of accountability, 
no questioning of corporate power and legitimacy and little interest in the 
involvement of or the participation by other stakeholders in management decisions. 
Today, however, there is widespread concern in matters of corporate governance 
from all stakeholders from both within and outside the enterprise, especially with 
regard to corporate accountability, regulation and public policy.  
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According to Fleming, during the last forty years in Australia, there have been three 
noticeable changes in corporate governance mechanisms. These are the amount of 
share ownership by directors and managers, the structure, size and composition of 
the board of directors and the number of shareholders having more than five percent 
of the shares. 186  
 
These issues are taken into account in developing a model of corporate governance 
for South Africa, which allows and establishes effective participation in matters of 
concern by all of its stakeholders. Thus, 
… in a corporation there are other stakeholders who are also rational beings, and their interests may 
not coincide with those of investors. The fact that corporations cannot prosper if economic inequities 
imposed on certain interested groups persist suggests an unfavourable response (to the idea) that 
corporations exist only for shareholders’ interests. In reality, most corporations in developed countries 
pursue multiple goals. 187  
 
In this regard, because a corporation is comprised of individuals with different 
interests, 188 a model of corporate governance, which attempts to provide for the 
active participation of all the stakeholders within the corporation, especially the 
employees, in the enterprise’s decision-making processes, is needed. 
 
Tricker believes that issues of governance that might arise are considered to be 
external to managing businesses. 189 He submits that the management role has been 
primarily perceived as running the business operations efficiently and effectively. The 
governance role, however, is not concerned with running the businesses of the 
company but with controlling the executive actions of management and regulating 
interests beyond the corporate boundaries by focusing on corporate accountability. 
Therefore, as noted by Tricker, if management exists to run the business, 
governance should exist to ensure that the business is run properly. That is, all 
companies require governing as well as managing. 190  
 
In this regard, however, Tricker’s argument is not entirely convincing. Policies of 
corporate governance in today’s world are also concerned with management 
processes. This means that it is also concerned with the actual running of the 
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business itself, not only ensuring that the business is run properly. Corporate 
governance policies generally seek to ensure (or should seek to ensure) that 
adequate operating mechanisms in the corporation exist by which directors and the 
other participating stakeholders may effectively and profitably run the affairs of the 
enterprise. It is therefore difficult, if not impossible, to completely separate issues of 
management and governance, as propounded by Tricker. The two issues are 
inextricably linked and work in tandem. Thus, as emphasised by Wei, 
 
… attention must be given to corporate direction and management. This is a game of balancing power. 
Corporate direction and management play the key role in continuing the game. In this game, we need 
to identify the players, the rules of the game and the incentives for each player to continue the game. 
Strictly, corporate governance, as a system of directing and controlling the corporation, involves 
shareholders, the board of directors (or supervisory board) and managers. Generally, corporate 
governance should involve all stakeholders including shareholders, directors, managers, employees, 
creditors and consumers. ... The rise of the German and Japanese corporate economies has shown the 
importance of employee participation in corporate governance. 191  
 
 
(1.4) Processes of corporate governance 
 
According to Tricker, the processes of corporate governance entail four principal 
functions: 
 
1. Direction: Corporate governance policies must formulate the strategic 
direction for the future of the enterprise;  
2. Executive Action: Corporate governance policies must refer to any issues 
involving crucial executive decisions; 
3. Supervision: Corporate governance policies must monitor and oversee the 
performance of management; and 
4. Accountability: Corporate governance policies must recognise the 
responsibilities to those stakeholders who demand accountability. 192  
 
In line with the focus of this thesis, a fifth criterion could be added: 
 
5. Management: Corporate governance policies must seek to ensure that 
adequate operating mechanisms in the corporation exist (preferably at the 
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commencement of the business) by which directors and the other 
participating stakeholders may effectively and profitably run or manage the 
affairs of the enterprise. 
Corporate governance involves the use and limitation of powers and identifies rights 
and responsibilities, legitimises actions and determines accountability. Hence, 
corporate governance policies should not only be concerned with the direction and 
management of power, but also with the supervision, control and accountability of 
executive actions. As such, it needs to take into account the effect of the business on 
other parties, the acceptance of a duty to be accountable and the regulation of the 
corporation, which ensures that it complies with legislation and its internal corporate 
governance policies. 193  
 
Although scant attention had been paid to governance prior to the 1980s, the 
expectations and demands of modern corporations necessitated changes in 
traditional company law concepts. In effect, corporate governance has become a 
‘buzzword’ and is as important to companies as personal computers are to 
households.  
 
Furthermore, Tricker notes that there are two main reasons for adopting corporate 
governance policies: 
 
1. To regulate companies in society. In this way, corporate governance policies 
prevent abuses of corporate power without necessarily inhibiting flexibility. It 
allows innovation and entrepreneurial risk-taking; and  
2. It also improves the quality of board activities and for making the boards 
more effective. 194  
 
In the model of corporate governance developed in this thesis and presented in 
chapter 9, the manner in which the boards ought to be composed will be discussed.  
 
 
(1.5) The underlying concepts 
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It is a known precept of company law that the company has a separate legal 
persona, may sue and be sued and may also, in its own capacity, contract and own 
property. Consequently, Tricker believes that the corporation would  
 
(bear) … as much resemblance to the reality of the modern corporation as a hang-glider does to a 
Concorde. 195  
 
This view is very accurate. Thus, all business entities today, despite their size or 
composition, should have corporate governance processes in place, which seek to 
allow the participation of the various stakeholders in the running of the enterprise to 
varying degrees. Otherwise, business entities would be applying anachronistic 
governance policies, which would more than likely be ill-suited to real-world 
situations. In this regard, the extent to which employees should be permitted to 
participate in the corporate affairs by having seats on the board is significant. Thus, 
Fleming notes that the size and composition of the board is a significant factor of the 
governance process and that the corporation’s ability to perform effectively is 
dependent upon this factor. 196  
 
 
(1.6) Corporate governance applied to different 
companies 
 
(1.6.1) PUBLIC COMPANIES 
 
Tricker notes that with modern public companies, traditional legal models do not 
adequately reflect corporate governance processes. This is because shareholders 
may be geographically dispersed and have vastly differing shareholdings. Some 
shareholders may also influence matters directly without involving others. 
Furthermore, much power vests in the board and particularly its chairman, which 
means that boards become inadequately accountable. Hence, many of the 
stakeholders, including the member shareholders, suppliers, creditors, customers 
and even employees, are excluded from participating in the processes of governance 
of the company. 197  
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Thus, a suitable model of corporate governance for South Africa would allow 
shareholders to be viewed as part of the general group of stakeholders, rather than 
as the traditionally isolated separate class. In other words, the shareholders would 
then be seen as only one of the stakeholders that directors take into account when 
initiating and implementing corporate governance programmes. As well as 
shareholders, employees of the corporation would be able to participate in the 
decision-making processes of the organisation. All stakeholders in the corporation 
need to be able to co-operate for common and individual interests. A good system of 
corporate governance would be one that pursues the goal of increasing total wealth 
for all its stakeholders and avoids the emergence of any economic losers amongst 
the corporate participants. Moreover, 
(a)ny theory of corporate governance must have respect for the historical precedents and the 
economic, political and legal realities, as well as the social (that is the effects of the corporate entity on 
and in society) and the individual (that is the effects for and on people) implications. Otherwise it will 
be irrelevant. 198  
 
(1.6.2) SUBSIDIARY COMPANIES 
 
A subsidiary company in Australia is defined as 
 
(a) company under the control of another company. For the purposes of the (Australian) Corporations 
Act 2001, a body corporate is a subsidiary of another body corporate if the body corporate controls the 
composition of the board of directors of the subsidiary, or is in a position to cast, or control the casting 
of, more than one-half of the maximum number of votes that might be cast at a general meeting of the 
subsidiary, or holds more than one-half of the issued share capital of the subsidiary (excluding any part 
of the issued share capital that carries no right to participate beyond a specified amount in distribution 
of profit or capital) … A body corporate is also deemed a subsidiary of another body corporate if it is a 
subsidiary of a subsidiary of the body corporate. … The control of the board must be actual, rather than 
de facto, control. … The controlling company is known as the ‘holding company’. It may form a 
subsidiary by acquiring a controlling interest in an existing company, or by setting up a new company 
retaining a controlling interest. 199
 
Tricker notes that the rise of the large and complex groups of companies is an issue, 
which was not considered by the traditional company law theorists. Consequently, 
entities, capable of acquiring shares in other enterprises, were created. In the early 
days of corporate mergers, companies, which aggregated together to form a larger 
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corporation, largely disappeared as separate entities. These days, however, groups 
of companies can be vast and interconnected. There may be hierarchical levels of 
companies with many subsidiaries, or the company may comprise of interconnected 
holdings. Some may be wholly owned subsidiaries, while others may have minority 
outside shareholder interests. 200  
 
In Australia, a wholly-owned subsidiary is defined as 
 
(a) subsidiary of a holding company, none of whose members is a person other than the holding 
company, a nominee of the holding company, or a nominee of such a subsidiary. 201 (Furthermore), 
(f)or income tax purposes, (a wholly-owned group company is) a company where one of the 
companies is a subsidiary of the other company and all the shares in the subsidiary are held by the 
holding company or other 100 percent subsidiaries, or both companies are 100 per cent subsidiary 
companies of the same company. A wholly-owned group company may transfer a tax loss, a foreign 
tax credit, a net capital loss, or an asset to another group company. 202
 
Similarly, the British (UK) Companies Act of 1985 also defines these terms as 
follows: 
 
A company is a “subsidiary” of another company, its “holding company”, if that company – 
(a) holds a majority of the voting rights in it, or 
(b) is a member of it and has the right to appoint or remove a majority of its board of directors, or 
(c) is a member of it and controls alone, pursuant to an agreement with other shareholders or 
members, a majority of the voting rights in it, 
 
or if it is a subsidiary of a company which is itself a subsidiary of that other company. 203
 
A company is a “wholly-owned subsidiary” of another company if it has no members except that other 
and that other’s wholly-owned subsidiaries or persons acting on behalf of that other or its wholly-
owned subsidiaries. 204
 
In this section “company” includes any body corporate. 205
 
The English Companies Act of 1989 inserted the aforementioned provisions into the 
1985 Act as a new section 736. The original section 736 of the 1985 Act was 
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different. This definition of the holding/subsidiary relationship gave rise to two main 
problems. Firstly, it ignored “the fact that control is exercised through voting rights”, 
which did not require any relationship to the number of shares held. Secondly, the 
old section 736 was also different with respect “to the control of the board of 
directors”. Under the old section, a company was able to control the composition of 
the board by appointing or removing the majority of directors. Furthermore, even if 
a company was able to “appoint less than a majority of directors”, but were able to 
appoint those with “extra voting rights”, these directors could nevertheless “outvote 
the other directors”. Thus, the real intention of the legislation, which was to regard a 
group of companies as a single business, for example, for accounting purposes, was 
avoided. Hence, a new section 736 was inserted into the Act to avoid the previous 
shortcomings of its predecessor. 206
 
A holding company in Australia is defined as 
 
(a) body corporate that controls the composition of another body corporate’s board of directors, is in a 
position to cast, or control the casting of, more than one-half of the maximum number of votes that 
might be cast at a general meeting of another body corporate, or holds more than one-half of the 
issued share capital of another body corporate (excluding any part of that issued share capital that 
carries no right to participate beyond a specified amount in a distribution of either profits or capital). 
Through this control, the holding company may manage the activities of its subsidiaries. Holding 
companies are required to prepare accounts for all the companies in the group. 207
 
In terms of the South African Companies Act, the terms “subsidiary”, “holding 
company” and “wholly-owned subsidiary” are similarly defined as follows:  
 
(3) (a) For the purposes of this Act, a company shall be deemed to be a subsidiary of another company 
if – 
(i) that other company is a member of it and – 
(aa) holds a majority of the voting rights in it; or 
(bb) has the right to appoint or remove directors holding a majority of the voting 
rights at meetings of the board; or 
(cc) has the sole control of a majority of the voting rights in it, whether pursuant to 
an agreement with other members or otherwise; or 
(ii) it is a subsidiary of any company, which is a subsidiary of that other company;  
(iii) subsidiaries of that other company or that other company and its subdiaries together hold the 
rights referred to in subparagraph (i) (aa), (bb) or (cc). 
(b) … 
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(c) A body corporate or other undertaking, which would have been a subsidiary of a company had the 
body corporate or other undertaking been a company shall be deemed to be a subsidiary of that 
company. 208  
 
(4) For the purposes of this Act, a company shall be deemed to be a holding company of another 
company if that other company is its subsidiary. 209
 
(5) For the purposes of this Act, a subsidiary shall be deemed to be a wholly-owned subsidiary of 
another company if it has no members except that other company and a wholly owned subsidiary of 
that other company and its or their nominees. 210
 
Therefore, in South African company law, a company will be deemed to be a 
subsidiary of the holding company if the holding company is a member of the 
subsidiary company “and holds or controls a majority of the voting rights in it” or if it 
can appoint or remove directors who hold a majority of the voting rights at the 
meetings of the board. This “holding-subsidiary” relationship is significant, as it 
regulates any abuse of control that might arise and also ensures that a proper 
disclosure of the group’s financial position is made. 211 In this way, there is some 
control over the holding company using its controlling position to compel its 
subsidiary “to act to its own detriment”. According to the common law, however, 
directors of the holding company do not owe any fiduciary duties to the subsidiary 
company. Consequently, the shareholders, creditors and other stakeholders of the 
corporation would not have been able to hold directors of the holding company liable 
at common law for a breach of a fiduciary duty towards the subsidiary company. 
Only the directors of the subsidiary company have a fiduciary duty towards the 
subsidiary at common law. The current Companies Act has now amended the 
common law position to regulate the possible “abuse of control” of directors of the 
holding company. 212 Consequently, the main purpose of the group annual financial 
statements is to provide the members of the holding company with a fair 
representation of the state of affairs of the subsidiary companies at the end of the 
financial year. Thus, for the purposes of the group annual financial statements, the 
holding and subsidiary companies are not viewed as separate but rather as one 
corporate entity. 213 See also heading 2.1. 
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Chapter 13 of the South African Companies Act also discusses “external companies”. 
These are companies, which, although incorporated outside of South Africa, establish 
a business within South Africa. In terms of section 322, an external company must 
register its memorandum with the Registrar. It can then own immovable property in 
South Africa. 214 If it is a public company, it may also offer shares and debentures to 
the public. 215
 
In South African company law, a subsidiary company is a wholly-owned subsidiary of 
another company if it has no other members except those from that other company. 
In this way, a wholly-owned subsidiary company is treated differently in various 
respects from a subsidiary company, which is not wholly-owned. For example, in 
terms of section 117(4) of the Companies Act, a wholly-owned subsidiary may 
mortgage any of its property as collateral security for the issue of debentures of its 
holding company, whilst a subsidiary company, which is not wholly-owned, can not 
do this. Furthermore, in terms of section 288(1) of the Act, whereas a non-wholly-
owned subsidiary is obliged to disclose its group accounts before the annual general 
meeting, a subsidiary company, which is wholly-owned, does not do this. 216
 
Tricker also points out that in a wholly owned subsidiary, the holding company has 
both an ownership and a managerial function. Hence, the executive directors of the 
subsidiary, far from being independent, may be obliged to rely on the management 
structure throughout the group when making decisions. Consequently, a wholly 
owned subsidiary does not automatically enjoy the autonomy enshrined in the 
classical corporate theory except in those aspects relating to the limitation of liability 
on the part of the owners. 217  
 
However, Strikwerda notes,  
… that each corporation is a separate juridical person, even when owned and controlled by another 
corporation with which it conducts a common business enterprise. … Under this interpretation 
subsidiaries are legally independent firms and the formal relationship between the parent board and 
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the subsidiary is that of shareholder. This statutory approach enables parent boards to co-ordinate the 
activities of subsidiary firms as if the parent is the direct owner of the assets contained in the 
subsidiaries. 218  
 
(1.6.3) PRIVATE COMPANIES 
 
Many private companies are small and have minimal separation between their 
owners and managers. In owner-managed companies, the owners, themselves take 
part in the corporate governance programmes in regard to the management of the 
corporation. Hence, management are able to treat the corporation as its own. 
However, in other private companies, significant separation may exist between its 
owners and managers. In these situations, matters of governance would have to be 
determined especially where a major individual investor wishes to exercise some 
supervision over an investment. 219  
 
In South Africa a legal distinction is still drawn between private and public 
companies. Whether to retain this distinction or not has recently invited much 
discussion and debate in South African academic circles. In New Zealand, the 
distinction between these two types of companies has now been abolished. As a 
result, a new company Act was introduced, which treated these previous company 
types as one type only. However, prior to the 1990s, the situation was quite 
different. New Zealand corporate law was entirely based upon and followed closely 
English company law. Although it was suggested that the English acts should no 
longer be followed in New Zealand, this idea was initially dismissed on the grounds 
that uniformity within the British Commonwealth should be maintained. Thus, the 
decisions of English Courts would, at that time, still be applicable in New Zealand in 
the same manner as they were applied in England. 220  
 
New Zealand, however, could not maintain this position indefinitely, especially as the 
populace wanted New Zealand to comprehensively reform its corporate law and to 
break away from the traditional mould of English corporate law. This resulted in the 
enactment of the New Zealand Companies Act 1993. Under this new Act the 
traditional distinction between public and private companies was abolished. The aim 
was to provide a much simpler and cheaper method of incorporation and company 
organisation, which was flexible enough to meet the needs of many different groups. 
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The Act also needed to clearly identify the duties and powers of the various 
stakeholders within the corporate structure in such a manner that its use was 
comprehensible “by directors and shareholders and not just lawyers and 
accountants”. 221  
 
Later in this chapter, the question relating to the extent to which developments in 
South African company law have created a need to abolish the distinction between 
private and public companies and to thus reform the current voluminous company 
act, as has been done in New Zealand, will be examined in greater detail.  
 
In Australia the Corporations Act 2001 is one of the most complex and detailed in 
the world. It introduced small proprietary companies into its legislation and has 
allowed proprietary companies to raise funds from the public under certain 
conditions. 222 Its Corporations Act is voluminous and therefore very burdensome for 
the small entrepreneur to follow or apply. Therefore, it is not suggested that South 
Africa embarks upon the course of corporate reform that Australia currently follows. 
 
 
(1.7) Rethinking the traditional precepts of company 
law 
 
Some companies’ legislation, together with the demands of stock exchanges, has 
increased the demand on companies for the disclosure of information and the 
regulation of corporate behaviour. Designed to protect the interests of the 
stakeholders of the corporation including the creditors, potential investors, 
employees and others, this protective mechanism has led to the incorporation of a 
vast number of small companies and also of large international companies. The latter 
tend to operate through groups of companies with a significant number of 
subsidiaries at various levels. Hence, as discussed previously, the original, simple 
and successful traditional concept of wealth maximisation for shareholders no longer 
mirrors the reality of the modern day corporate world. 223  
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Thus, an alternative corporate framework has to be developed so that corporate 
governance programmes and policies can be properly implemented within all types of 
business entities.  
 
 
(1.8) Sources of corporate power 
 
Tricker states that four primary sources of corporate power may be identified. These 
are: 
 
1. Ownership power within the corporation; 
2. The balance of power between the shareholder members and the board of 
directors; 
3. Managerial power; and 
4. Institutional shareholders’ power. 224  
 
(1.8.1) OWNERSHIP POWER WITHIN THE CORPORATION 
 
As companies grow and increase their share capital, with more shareholders 
investing in shares, so the proportion of voting stock, held by the largest 
shareholders, decreases. Hence, the power of the shareholders to control large 
corporations effectively diminished. As a result, the interests of ownership and 
control have diverged and the balance of power has shifted from members to 
managers. 225 Additionally, the annual general meeting, in many cases, proved to be 
both inadequate and ineffective for exercising governance where there was a 
diversity of shareholders, most of whom generally did not attend. Other stakeholders 
of the corporation were not invited to attend the annual general meeting. Any 
concerns that they had were generally not heard, as there were no corporate 
governance policies or programmes in place to allow for this. 
 
Furthermore, disgruntled shareholders (other than the institutional shareholders 
themselves) seeking to change board policies, tend to be rare, particularly in 
countries such as South Africa. Even in the United States of America, where 
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members are generally more active at meetings of public companies, boards may 
still fail to respond to the wishes of shareholder members. 226 Consequently, 
 
(m)eetings should zero in on those primary issues of governance, not on issues of executive 
management. The distinction between governance and management domains is the most 
misunderstood facet of board conduct. 227
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(1.8.2) TESTING THE BALANCE OF POWER BETWEEN THE SHAREHOLDER 
MEMBERS AND THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS  
 
In both corporate and non-profit organisations, Chait believes that boards, which 
have sound and workable governance practices in place, generate successful 
organisations. 228 Thus, to achieve good governance practices, Tricker believes that 
the balance of power between the members of a public company and the board of 
directors needs to be correct. This factor is tested through a consideration of seven 
basic principles: 229  
 
(1.8.2.1) Board Membership 
 
Nominations to fill places on corporate boards of management typically originate 
from the incumbent chairman and are supported by the board. Because shareholder 
attendance at meetings is often poor, the appointment of new directors is 
determined by the existing board rather than by the owners (shareholders) 
themselves. Thus, 
 
(b)oard meetings are the critical event in which trustees … determine what impact an organisation will 
have on society. Robert Frost voiced perhaps the best perspective on board members. ‘The world is full 
of willing people,’ said the American poet, ‘a few willing to work, the rest willing to let them’. 230
 
Fleming notes that the board size and composition have always been regarded as 
important components of the governance process. 231 He states that the board 
should be composed of both executive and non-executive directors. Executive 
directors usually hold both a board and a senior management or executive position 
within the company and are able to bring their wide knowledge of the corporation to 
board meetings. However, their independence from management may be impaired, 
as they may be subject to greater influence by the company’s CEO than are outside 
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directors. Additionally, non-executive directors are usually appointed for their 
industry expertise and their decision-making abilities. 232  
 
Fleming also notes that during the last forty years in Australia, both board size and 
board composition have increased by about 30 to 40 percent while the number of 
share block-holders quadrupled. Additionally, most corporations maintained a 
majority of non-executive directors, due to the professionalisation of governance 
practices in large organisations. Fleming further suggests that the appointment of 
non-executive directors has contributed to an improvement in decision-making and 
governance practices generally. 233  
 
With regard to board size and composition, in August 2002, the Australian Stock 
Exchange Corporate Governance Council was formed to develop a framework for 
corporate governance, which would ‘provide a practical guide for listed companies, 
their investors, the wider market and the Australian community’. The council 
comprised representatives from 21 stakeholder groups including major investors, 
firms and professions and delivered a set of principles and best practice 
recommendations in March 2003. 234 These principles were ‘not prescriptions’ but 
designed to ‘produce an efficiency, quality or integrity outcome’. However, all 
companies listed on the stock exchange were encouraged to use the principles for 
‘re-examining their corporate governance practices’. These recommendations were 
not designed to be peremptory and companies may opt out of implementing them 
simply by indicating why they needed to do so. 235  
 
The Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) corporate governance council has indicated 
that board composition should in terms of its principle number 2 be structured as 
follows: 236  
 
1. A majority of the board should be independent directors; 
2. The chairperson should be an independent director; 
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3. The same person should not hold the roles of chairperson and chief executive 
officer; and 
4. The board should establish a nomination committee. 
 
The council, however, does not specify whether the boards could be composed of 
other stakeholders within the corporation, such as the employees. However, the ASX 
does provide a note on how independence should be assessed. Consequently, 
 
(a)n independent director is a non-executive director and … is free from any interest and any business 
or other relationship which could, or could reasonably be perceived to, materially interfere with the 
director’s ability to act in the best interests of the company. 237
 
Since these ASX principles of corporate governance and its recommendations are not 
mandatory, a company could, in terms of the “comply or explain” principle, attempt 
to make such an appointment and then explain it. The ASX does, however, in terms 
of principle number 10, recognise the rights and interests of all stakeholders by 
suggesting that corporations establish and disclose a code of conduct in order to 
facilitate ‘compliance with legal and other obligations to legitimate stakeholders’. 238  
 
Furthermore, Tricker’s comments suggest a possible way forward to improve 
shareholder attendance at board meetings. Principle number 6 of the ASX corporate 
governance council makes sound suggestions that the corporation should respect the 
rights of shareholders by designing and disclosing  
 
… a communications strategy to promote effective communication with shareholders and encourage 
effective participation at general meeting. … (Also the board should) request the external auditor to 
attend the annual general meeting and be available to answer shareholder questions about the conduct 
of the audit and the preparation and content of the auditor’s Reports. 239  
 
(1.8.2.2) Remuneration of Directors 
 
It is usually the board rather than the shareholders that determines the 
remuneration for the directors. 
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Principle number 9 of the ASX corporate governance council suggests that the 
corporation should remunerate fairly and responsibly and 240  
 
1. Provide disclosure of the company’s remuneration policies to enable investors 
to understand the costs and benefits of the policies and the link between 
remuneration paid to directors and key executives and corporate 
performance. 
 
2. Establish a remuneration committee. 
 
3. Distinguish the structure of non-executive directors’ remuneration from the 
other executive directors. 
4. Ensure that equity-based executive remuneration is made in accordance with 
shareholder-approved plans.  
 
Additionally, Principle number 8 of the ASX corporate governance council makes the 
suggestion that the corporation should encourage enhanced performance by 
disclosing the process for board performance evaluation, its committees, individual 
directors and key executives. 241  
 
(1.8.2.3) Raising of Capital 
 
Members in a general meeting do have to approve significant changes in the 
structure of capital or in any other significant matter. Such actions, which are 
required by the Companies Acts, seek to protect investors rather than supervising 
the management of the board. Hence, directors may not change fundamentally the 
nature of the corporation’s business. However, because objects clauses are written 
very widely for many modern companies, effectively, this frequently fails to act as a 
major constraint. 
 
(1.8.2.4) Allocation of Resources 
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The directors of public companies are able to allocate resources between subsidiary 
companies as they deem fit. Approval of its members is only sought when required 
by the Articles of Association or when the change would result in fundamentally 
restructuring the company. 
 
(1.8.2.5) Acquisition of Other Companies 
 
Directors have discretion to undertake the acquisitions of other companies provided 
any constraints indicated in the articles of association are complied with. At the same 
time no fundamental change in the financing or basic nature of the company must 
take place. 
 
(1.8.2.6) Appointment and Remuneration of Top Executives 
 
Many directors believe that a primary duty of the main board is to ensure that the 
management of its subsidiary companies is effective. In this way, appropriate 
subsidiary company management policies are formulated for the appointment and 
remuneration of top executives. 
 
(1.8.2.7) Oversight and Control of Management Performance 
 
Board members accept the responsibility for executive management performance. In 
large public companies, members’ knowledge of the corporation is often limited to an 
awareness of some of the corporation's products and services. Therefore, the annual 
general meeting is not regarded as an appropriate method for the supervision of the 
executive management team. 
 
Consequently, although members retain certain powers, significant power in public 
companies is placed in the hands of the board and its executive. In terms of the 
proposed model of corporate governance, power should be divested from the board 
and the executives and placed into the hands of other stakeholders, especially those 
of the employees. 
 
(1.8.3) MANAGERIAL POWER 
 
In a large public company with many subsidiaries operating in various businesses in 
different parts of the world, power is exercised in a range of roles and at various 
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levels. Corporate governance is not simply determining whether the board or the 
members exercise power. 242 It also involves an analysis of the functions and 
responsibilities of directors of subsidiary and holding companies, managers of 
businesses and its members, employees, creditors and other interested 
stakeholders. It is upon this understanding that a new and arguably workable model 
of corporate governance for South Africa has been designed.  
 
Furthermore, directors generally formulate corporate objectives. They ensure that 
sound strategies are formulated for their product development and for other 
business activities. They are not usually compelled to make such strategies explicit, 
as this might reveal valuable competitive information. 243 Thus, in many cases, the 
members themselves are unable to supervise the board's activities. 
 
(1.8.4) INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDERS’ POWER 
 
Tricker believes that it is usually only in extreme situations, for example when the 
company appears to be on the verge of collapse, that the votes of shareholders 
begin to count. On a day-to-day basis, however, members are more passive 
investors than active participants in the governance process. 244 This applies to 
institutional shareholders where financial institutions would rather incur small losses 
than allow members to become involved in the processes of corporate governance. 
Therefore, the actions taken by such institutions are not necessarily in the interests 
of all shareholders. By circumventing the corporate governance processes, the 
institutions may well be disenfranchising the legitimate rights of the other members. 
Hence, questions of accountability have become important issues in this regard. 
 
The model of corporate governance proposed in this thesis makes any such 
circumvention of corporate governance processes very difficult. This is because it 
gives the other stakeholders of the corporation, especially the employees, a very real 
joint decision-making role in very significant corporate affairs. Thus, the proposed 
model removes many powers from the board and places them in the hands of other 
interested stakeholders. 
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(1.9) Alternative methods for categorising companies 
– would these be of any value for advancing corporate 
governance programmes?  
 
Tricker believes that an alternative method for categorising companies may be 
permitted because the underlying sources of power to govern and the ability to 
exercise power over executive actions would differ in each type of business entity. 
Thus, an alternative basis for categorising companies for the purposes of corporate 
governance is listed as follows: 245  
 
1. Firstly, in the modern public company, investors may be private individuals, 
corporate bodies or financial institutions. Hence, the sources of power to 
govern can be derived from ownership exercised in meetings of the 
shareholders and through the board members themselves. Hence, the 
processes of governance must recognise the diversity of the source from 
which power can be derived. Furthermore, no other company should be 
allowed to dominate its affairs. Although many of these public companies are 
very large, some would be small with only a few investors. Tricker, however, 
does not specifically mention the extent to which the other non-shareholder 
interests and rights of the modern public company would be recognised. 
Therefore, it is arguable that this type of structure does not improve the 
current classification of modern public company law already in existence in 
South African law. 
 
2. Secondly, in the proprietary company (a definition not known to many 
company law systems, including South Africa, but resembling the close 
corporation structure that we have in South Africa) investors, directors and 
top management would all be synonymous. This is an owner-managed 
corporation. This means that ownership, governance and top management 
are effectively in the same hands. Membership could be limited so as to allow 
effective governance. Most importantly, no corporate body may be a member. 
Hence, the shares must be in the hands of individuals who must exercise 
governance. 246  
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Legislation, however, may require a formal distinction to be maintained 
between members and directors. This would be problematic if the member 
and director was the same person. Furthermore, members and directors are 
required to then hold meetings in each capacity. This, of course, would be 
again rather problematic when they happen to be the same person. In 
addition, resolutions should be formally passed, minuted and registered. 
These measures are designed to protect the interests of the members against 
dominating executive directors. This might mean that the owner would be 
protected from him- or herself. 247  
 
Questions of corporate governance relating to the rights and interests of all 
stakeholders would be less important in this type of corporate structure. The 
shareholders, managers and employees could very well be the same person in 
which case the extent to which each participant would be empowered in the 
decision-making processes of this business entity would not be an issue. 
Therefore, it is arguable that Tricker’s mention of the proprietary company 
would not advance corporate governance programmes under existing 
company law. 
 
3. Thirdly, in the subordinate company structure, one company would exercise 
the direction and control of another (see subheading 1.12.4). This domination 
may occur where the one company holds a major part of the undertaking of 
the subscribed capital of the other company. It may also occur where a 
company controls a majority of the voting rights attaching to the shares. 
Domination may also exist where the dominant company could appoint at 
least half of the members of the administrative, management or supervisory 
body where these members have the majority of the voting rights. 248 
Therefore, the basis of power is a managerial one either based on the whole 
ownership of a subsidiary company or on the partial ownership with outside 
minority shareholders thereby allowing the company to determine the 
processes of governance. Consequently, although a subordinate company 
could have considerable autonomy through delegated authority, it may still be 
dominated over by a public, proprietary or private company.  
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Furthermore, a contemporary issue is to determine how to devolve powers to 
subsidiaries as they develop in response to new technologies and changing 
markets. Directors must meet the needs of the new economy, while at the 
same time, parent boards must create proper conditions for their subsidiaries 
to expand and grow. Directors need to encourage subsidiaries to co-operate 
and to compete as if they were independent firms. The decision-making 
powers of subsidiaries must be adjusted continuously as business 
requirements change. 249  
 
Another factor is that companies must respond quickly to changes in 
technologies. Thus, international businesses are delegating discretion to 
subsidiaries. The need to delegate powers to subsidiary boards is necessary 
for three reasons. The first reason is to enable the corporation to quickly 
respond to local opportunities in the market. A second reason for 
decentralizing decision powers is based on ethics. A third reason is to develop 
managers. Individuals need opportunities to develop into managers and 
directors. Thus,  
 
little of what is needed to be a successful manager or director can be learned through books. 
250  
 
The corporate governance model proposed in this thesis would be able to 
determine the rights and interests of the stakeholders in the subordinate 
company in such a manner that they would enjoy some participation in the 
decision-making processes of the corporation. Furthermore, the employees 
would be invested with joint decision-making powers. 
 
4. Fourthly, the next proposed category could consist of the private company, 
which exists in South Africa. These companies obviously cannot invite public 
subscription for shares and are not dominated over by other companies. 
Individuals and/or corporate bodies own these companies. Generally, some 
separation of ownership from management and direction exists. The basis of 
power in a private company would be one of ownership. 251  
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The proposed corporate governance model could be applied to private 
companies in ensuring that the rights and interests of the owners, managers 
and especially of the employees are adequately recognised and protected. 
 
The existing conceptual framework for the corporation is rooted in nineteenth-
century theories and practices and treats ownership as the basis of power. In 
modern company law, however, it is vitally important that power is derived from the 
various sources that comprise the various types of corporate structures. These 
sources of power arise through the shareholders, the members of the board, the 
management in the group of companies or financial institutions and also from the 
other stakeholders, especially the employees.  
 
Hence, an alternative conceptual framework for the corporation is proposed, which is 
derived from the reality of the power-base existing in each case. It is arguable that 
these fundamental differences in ownership patterns and sources of power in the 
different corporate structures may well enable proper governance and thereby allow 
all stakeholders the opportunity of being involved in the processes of corporate 
governance in some meaningful and significant way.  
 
 
(1.10) Implementing the processes of corporate 
governance 
 
Having considered another approach for categorising companies, it will be necessary 
to establish how this may impact on the processes of corporate governance. 
 
Nader and Green note,  
 
(w)e must redesign the law to keep up with the economic and political evolution of giant corporations, 
which are tantamount to private governments. ... (Giant corporations) can spend decisive amounts in 
elections to determine which towns thrive and which gather cobwebs ... (which) develop technology 
that take lives or saves lives. ... The economic government (giant corporation) is largely unaccountable 
to its constituencies - shareholders, workers, consumers, local communities, taxpayers, small 
businesses, future generations. 252
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In this regard Tricker proposes that one must ‘redesign the law’ to develop a 
framework for considering the checks and balances on corporate power by 
considering the following perspectives, which are: 253  
 
1. Legal;  
2. Normative and Descriptive; 
3. Rational and Economic; 
4. Organisational; and  
5. Socio/Political. 
 
(1.10.1) THE LEGAL PERSPECTIVE 
 
It has been seen that the traditional classical theories and practices of a company 
are based on the notions of capitalism of the nineteenth-century rather than on 
modern business reality. Hadden is probably correct when noting that traditional 
company law ideology has ceased to reflect the realities of the commercial and 
industrial world. 254 These classical ideas do not reflect the complex ideology of 
modern companies and ignores many of the issues that face directors. Thus, 
traditionally, the company has a dual purpose: it is a corporation registered in terms 
of company law and it is a business in terms of which production and markets are 
organised. The main focus is the regulation of the relationships between the 
company and its member shareholders. Consequently, the main purpose of a 
company in terms of company law is the profitable growth of the corporation for the 
benefit of its shareholders. 255 Hence, in this way, the interests of other groups, such 
as the employees, creditors and customers are only relevant where they coincide 
with those of the shareholders. 256  
 
However, it is important for directors to conceptualize the objectives of the company 
in order to take into account the long-term interests of all of the principal groups 
who are associated with it. The model of corporate governance, which is proposed, 
takes into account the interests and rights of the other stakeholders of the 
corporation by recommending inter alia significant legislative changes. 
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(1.10.2) THE NORMATIVE AND DESCRIPTIVE PERSPECTIVE 
 
Contrasting with the legal perspective, this view establishes the task of directors by 
considering their practical experience. This is useful in establishing changing 
strategies and styles of direction for the modern corporation. However, although 
such experience may well lack the objectivity of independence, it may be useful in 
the sense that it could give rise to new trends in the corporate governance 
processes, which take into account the rights and interests of all stakeholders. 
 
In this thesis, the effects and significance of a normative view are considered. To this 
end, practical examples are discussed as to how some companies have achieved 
good or improved corporate governance programmes in the workplace. The 
introduction and maintenance of a system of organisational development within the 
corporation is a vital first step for any organisation. This would allow positive 
changes to be achieved in the workplace and, consequently, good models of 
corporate governance to be maintained. 
 
(1.10.3) THE RATIONAL AND ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 
 
This perspective takes into account the fact that only in the long run can a profitable 
company obtain funds from the capital market and provide a reliable source for the 
supply of goods and services for its customers, stable employment for its employees 
and a profitable business for its suppliers. 257 However, this would only be rational 
and economic if the decision of top management considers the needs of all the 
stakeholders. In addition, this perspective “makes strong assumptions about human 
behaviour without performing the hard task of observing people”. 258
However, the reality of business decision-making involves uncertainty in taking 
decisions and in recognising various constraints, which may not be of equal benefit 
to all stakeholders. Consequently, happier employees yield better productivity, 
which, in turn, yields improved profitability for the corporation. The suppliers and 
creditors are happier and so is the community, as the corporation would most likely 
have more funds to contribute to the environment. It is therefore important for all 
stakeholders to be involved in the decision-making processes of the corporation so 
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that informed and better decisions can be made. The traditional aim of company law, 
which is to maximise the profits for the shareholders, consequently becomes less 
important in modern day company law. It is therefore important to consider the 
rights and interests of the non-shareholder constituents. This, in turn, is likely to 
result in greater profitability for the company. The traditional methods of first 
maximising shareholder profits by excluding a consideration of all other stakeholder 
interests and rights is generally no longer workable in modern day company law. 
This is because the non-shareholder constituents now expect to be considered and to 
have a part in the joint decision-making processes of the corporation. 
 
(1.10.4) THE ORGANISATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 
 
Some writers believe that board attention should be focused rather on the running 
and the supervising of the internal structure of the corporation than on its 
involvement with longer-term strategies, opportunities or problems. Hence, 
“bureaucrats will care more for the routine than for results”. 259 Other writers 
believe, however, that directors should rather play an active role in determining the 
future direction of their companies. 260  
 
In modern companies these complex organisational structure and management 
styles are reinforced by the various corporate systems and procedures. This may 
well result in a lack of forward thinking and impinge upon the rights and interests of 
all stakeholders and thereby undermine the corporate governance process.  
 
Management and governance issues are, however, tightly interlinked in modern day 
company law. Indeed, the directors and the other stakeholders need to all play some 
role in promoting, directing and advancing the interests of the company on a day-to-
day basis. At the same time, they also need to bear the future in mind so that the 
company can actively progress as the future unfolds. Therefore, both forward 
thinking and an observance of daily affairs are necessary for the success and 
advancement of all stakeholders in the corporation.  
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(1.10.5) THE SOCIO/POLITICAL PERSPECTIVE 
 
Tricker convincingly states that interest groups, with power to influence corporate 
direction, exist both inside the company and in its external environment. Hence, the 
boundaries of the corporation are no longer simple - the strategic direction of the 
corporation can no longer be solely in the hands of the directors. Therefore, Tricker 
notes that there have been many calls for corporations to accept a wider 
responsibility to stakeholders beyond its members and thereby allow the 
participation of employees, minority interest groups, consumers, creditors and others 
in the managerial decision-making of the company. 261 However, Tricker believes 
that to ascribe beliefs and expectations about corporate behaviour to society in 
general, may be questionable. These interest groups, he notes, may not necessarily 
provide objective criteria for determining what is important for the responsibility of 
corporations. 262 Tricker’s argument, however, is not convincing when he notes that 
governance processes must involve some sort of negotiated agreement with all those 
who can exercise power both internally and externally. 263 Society may provide some 
insight as to how the corporation may advance in the future, but it may have a 
passive rather than an active participatory role in the affairs of the corporation. Its 
input, however, would still be of value. This point will be highlighted later in this 
thesis.  
 
 
(1.11) Checks and balances in corporate power 
 
People with ambitions and needs create businesses. Companies are simply the 
vehicles used to attain these. 264 Therefore, checks and balances are vital as they 
respond to human greed and error. They render the stakeholders accountable for 
their actions. Checks and balances have been considered and differentiated for the 
four proposed types of companies that were discussed earlier. These are the 
proprietary, the private, the public and the subordinate company. In all of the cases, 
there are external factors, which impose the checks and balances upon the particular 
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type of company. These are the societal factors, the market factors and the self-
regulatory factors. 265  
 
(1.11.1) THE PROPRIETARY COMPANY – CONTROLLING POWER 
 
In this type of company the owner-manager is at the head of the corporation who 
makes the over-riding decisions. Additionally, an approved auditor must be 
appointed and must file accounts on which he or she has reported. These are the 
self-regulatory factors. 266 Tricker notes that market factors and the reality of 
business provide the requisite checks and balances - the business must buy goods 
and services and sell them at a profit. Hence, the terms demanded by suppliers, the 
choices available to customers and the resultant competition in products and pricing, 
place onerous, yet challenging, checks upon the company. Societal factors in the 
form of local regulations (bye-laws, planning, health and environment), commercial 
and industrial law and policy, labour law and policy, tax law and company law all 
play an important role together in placing checks and balances on this type of 
corporation. 267 It has also been correctly said, though, that 
 
(i)n the United States, labour law and corporate law have long been radically separated both in practice 
and in scholarship. Today, however, there is growing consensus that, whatever may have been true in 
the past, this split is no longer desirable. 268  
 
Furthermore, even without considering the effect of legislation, there are many 
‘natural’ external factors that determine and control the actions of stakeholders in 
the proprietary company. These stakeholders are the ‘corporate driving force’ within 
the corporation. 269 Since the owner, manager and employee are generally the same 
person in this type of corporate setting, it is easier to control this type of power. The 
question of the extent to which each stakeholder should possess power and 
therefore be involved in the joint decision-making processes of the company become 
largely reduced and irrelevant.  
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(1.11.2) THE PRIVATE COMPANY – CONTROLLING POWER 
 
Private companies may not invite public subscription. The dominance of the owner-
manager over matters of corporate governance has been reduced. 270 The shift from 
the dominance of the owner-manager to a board of directors (some of whom may 
have minimal or no shareholding at all) is important here. The power of the 
shareholders is exercised through an annual general meeting and through the other 
processes of law, which give rights to its members. These are self-regulatory factors, 
which include the appointment of auditors and accountants. In addition to the 
societal factors noted with regard to the proprietary company, checks on the powers 
of the private company may also come from monopoly and competition legislation 
both domestic and foreign from which its revenue is generated. The company could 
also be constrained by national and local lobbying forces (pressures beyond those 
directly available from the law) such as environmental pollution, ecology, product 
safety and others. Additional business and market factors would also evolve while 
the roles of employees and their union representatives may emerge. Management 
may also disclose information to its employees and thereby encourage commitment 
and participation with the company. Formal channels of representation may be 
created. The collective bargaining process with the unions may also assist with the 
governance processes. 271  
 
In the proposed model of corporate governance, the question of co-determination is 
considered by recommending that employees take an active part in the decision-
making processes of the corporation. This aspect is discussed in great detail later in 
this thesis. 
 
(1.11.3) THE PUBLIC COMPANY – CONTROLLING POWER 
 
The greatest burden of checks and balances with regard to the exercise of corporate 
power is experienced by public companies. The checks and balances discussed with 
regard to the proprietary and private companies apply to public companies as well. 
However, stock market regulation and the protection of investor interests, provide 
further self-regulatory checks and balances with the securities market and stock 
exchange exerting control over the regulation of issuing, buying and selling shares in 
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companies. 272 Additionally, the ability of external shareholders to influence 
corporate governance is unpredictable. In the small public company, the external 
shareholding may be a minority group. This would encourage founder directors to 
retain the voting power of veto. In larger companies one or few shareholders may 
hold many shares and thereby exercise power over governance should they wish to 
do this. 273 Another self-regulatory factor would be the threat of a hostile bid by 
potential predators. 274 As with the private company, technological and competitive 
factors are important checks and balances. 
 
Furthermore, a trend evident in recent years has been to encourage employee 
shareholdings and to provide incentives to them when they use company services. 
This has increased the number of smallholdings in such companies. 275 The 
implications of this trend is significant with regard to governance processes, as it 
allows board actions to be influenced, thereby reducing the power of the members at 
meetings. 
 
It is sound practice to encourage employee shareholdings. It encourages loyalty and 
interest and contributes to the overall well being of the corporation. It is, however, 
only one method of inviting employee participation in the corporation. The model, 
which is proposed in this thesis, gives employees a considerable and very active role 
in the decision-making processes of the corporation.  
 
(1.11.4) THE SUBORDINATE COMPANY – CONTROLLING POWER 
 
The British Companies Act of 1989 states 
 
(1) The expressions “parent undertaking” and “subsidiary undertaking” in this Part shall be construed 
as follows; and a "parent company" means a parent undertaking which is a company. 
(2) An undertaking is a parent undertaking in relation to another undertaking, a subsidiary 
undertaking, if— 
(a) it holds a majority of the voting rights in the undertaking, or 
(b) it is a member of the undertaking and has the right to appoint or remove a majority of its board of 
directors, or 
(c) it has the right to exercise a dominant influence over the undertaking— 
(i) by virtue of provisions contained in the undertaking's memorandum or articles, or 
(ii) by virtue of a control contract, or 
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(d) it is a member of the undertaking and controls alone, pursuant to an agreement with other 
shareholders or members, a majority of the voting rights in the undertaking. 
(3) For the purposes of subsection (2) an undertaking shall be treated as a member of another 
undertaking— 
(a) if any of its subsidiary undertakings is a member of that undertaking, or 
(b) if any shares in that other undertaking are held by a person acting on behalf of the undertaking or 
any of its subsidiary undertakings. 
(4) An undertaking is also a parent undertaking in relation to another undertaking, a subsidiary 
undertaking, if it has a participating interest in the undertaking and— 
(a) it actually exercises a dominant influence over it, or 
(b) it and the subsidiary undertaking are managed on a unified basis. 
(5) A parent undertaking shall be treated as the parent undertaking of undertakings in relation to 
which any of its subsidiary undertakings are, or are to be treated as, parent undertakings; and 
references to its subsidiary undertakings shall be construed accordingly. 
(6) Schedule 10A contains provisions explaining expressions used in this section and otherwise 
supplementing this section. 276
 
Thus, a subordinate company has another company dominating its processes of 
governance. The holding company may be a public, proprietary or private company. 
The board in the subordinate company is subject to the decisions of the management 
of the holding company. Hence, where various companies jointly own the 
subordinate company, the board of the subordinate company has to find a 
compromise solution to governance that satisfies the various stakeholders. The 
checks and balances, which are likely to be found here, are the societal factors 
(including the legal and national regulations and the laws of the states in which the 
company operates), the business and market factors (including the technological and 
competitive factors in the business and markets of the company), and the self-
regulating factors (including the managerial power (controlled by the dominating 
company) and shareholder power (including minority interests)). 277  
 
Strikwerda lists the types of decisions, which are delegated to the boards of 
subsidiaries. 278 These include the following: 
 
1. Product innovation and product policy. 
2. Pricing and market positioning. 
3. Sales, distribution and marketing. 
4. Product development and process development. 
5. Manufacturing and procurement. 
                                                     
276  United Kingdom Legislation (1989), Companies Act 1989, section 21, available: 
<http://www.bailii.org/uk/legis/num_act/ca1989107.txt>, accessed 9 November 2005, 23-24. 
277  Tricker, above n8, 114. 
278  Strikwerda, above n 170, 45. 
Chapter 1 95
6. Hiring staff but not first level management of the subsidiary. 
7. Investments in equipment and some other assets (but not real estate). 
 
Additionally, the following powers are usually reserved for the board of the parent 
company: 
 
1. Setting the business scope of subsidiaries, product divisions, etc. 
2. Accounting standards, rules for consolidation. 
3. Financing operations, changes in share capital and international cash 
management. 
4. Corporate resources: patents and trademarks. 
5. Ownership of real estate. 
6. Official Reporting, annual Reports, fiscal Reports, government relations, 
relations with shareholders and capital markets. 
7. Changes in the legal system. 
8. Guarantees to third parties, pledges on assets. 
9. Cash management. 
10. Acquisitions and divestments, mergers and alliances. 
11. Management development policies. 
12. Appointing the top management of subsidiaries. 
13. Major restructuring and large volume lay-offs. 
 
These lists are based on observations of Strikwerda in his work as management 
consultant and on the research conducted for clients. They represent guidelines only 
and will differ from company to company, depending upon its size, nature of the 
business, the local legal system, the history of the corporation, the risk profile and 
the experience and the personality of the directors. In large and multinational 
companies, corporate governance, in most cases, is well established. It is in the 
smaller firms that directors and managers must develop a balanced system of 
delegated and non-delegated powers. 
 
 
(1.12) The corporate tomorrow 
 
As companies have changed in size and in complexity, they have also become 
remote from the communities in which they are established. This has led to demands 
for large companies to be more responsible to the needs of society in general and to 
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their employees. 279 Hence, for long-term profitability, directors must recognise their 
responsibilities to employees, creditors, customers, the local community and society 
in general as well as to the shareholders. 280  
 
Self-regulation is generally more desirable in overseeing and controlling corporate 
activities than state intervention and involvement. In order to preserve the nature of 
a free enterprise system, which does work well, care must be taken in affording the 
state opportunities to interfere with the way in which the company is operating. 
Giving the state the freedom to interfere with the free enterprise system, would lead 
to an information-providing bureaucracy where management’s power to take 
business risks would become seriously eroded. 281 However, because the company is 
a means to providing and using vast sums of capital, necessary controls must be 
imposed on it by society in the forms of environmental law, health and safety law, 
labour law, competition and securities regulations, consumer protection and many 
others. Hence, corporate accountability must exist where there is an accountability 
relationship between at least two parties, which involves certain rights and duties. It 
must not be confused with disclosure requirements established by the Companies 
Act or with socially responsible behaviour, which involves discretion by management. 
282 Hence, it can be argued that a notion of public accountability owed by a company 
to a wide range of stakeholders, including the general public, is a viable concept. 
Furthermore, Tricker points out that the ‘stakeholder theories’ of accountability 
argue that the company owes responsibility to customers, consumers, suppliers, 
creditors, local and other interests and the public generally. 283  
Hence, there is a need to provide a new conceptual framework to describe 
companies in modern societies. This should be based on the reality of corporate 
governance. By virtue of their constitution as independent legal entities, the nature 
of ownership, and the reality of the power of the board, companies need to be 
governed as well as managed. This would apply to both the simple corporation and 
to the vast complex groups of subsidiaries and holding companies. Hence, as 
discussed previously, the key elements of corporate governance would be the 
supervision of executive activity, accountability to legitimate interests, the 
establishment of corporate direction and management and the involvement in the 
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executive action. How these processes of corporate governance are carried out in a 
particular company, and how effective they are, vary considerably depending on the 
type and the nature of the enterprise. The governance processes reflect corporate 
reality. It is therefore not dependent on the nineteenth-century ideas of authority 
and ownership expressed through the owners acting together. Because fundamental 
differences exist in the way power is exercised in the various types of companies, 
the form of governance must reflect this. As discussed, any theory of corporate 
governance must take into account the economic, organisational, practical, political 
and legal realities as well as any social and individual implications that may exist. 
Otherwise it would be irrelevant and meaningless. 284  
 
The model of corporate governance, which is proposed for South Africa, can be 
applied to all types of companies where the stakeholders are able to be heard and 
take part in the running of the business. Fleming does, however, make a very sound 
practical point when he notes, 
… that structural change in itself will not lead to better outcomes for shareholders … or other 
stakeholders of the firm. Behavioural change is a longer-term process. … (Therefore), rules on the 
behaviour of senior executives and the board will encourage oscillation to a particular structural and 
behavioural equilibrium. Firms should not be penalised, however, if they find alternative solutions to 
solving coordination and governance problems associated with the separation of ownership and control. 
285  
 
(1.12.1) THE FUTURE GOVERNANCE OF PUBLIC COMPANIES 
 
Neither members themselves, nor the board with a majority of executive directors, 
can exercise adequate governance over a public company. Tricker argues that what 
is required is a body capable of exercising professional supervision over executive 
actions and thereby demonstrating the legitimacy of corporate activities to outside 
interests. He proposes that all public companies should have a governing body. 
However, this concept is not a new one.  
 
In the nineteenth-century, the Crown appointed governors to oversee the work of 
the trading corporations, and, even today, independent governors are found in 
various institutions. Hence, in this way, members would elect a group of governors 
who would be totally independent of the company's business and would neither have 
any financial nor any other interests at stake in the company. They would not be 
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employees, or past employees of the company. A governor cannot be a director of a 
company. He notes that governors should be paid reasonable fees but not an 
amount that is so great so as to prejudice the exercise of an independent judgment. 
286  
 
Furthermore, a chairperson of the governing body could be created - the chairperson 
could not also be the chief executive. His or her primary duty would be to ensure 
that the corporation exercised its duties of accountability. This task would be much 
wider than that of the chairperson of the board at present. In some existing public 
companies, where the roles of chairman and chief executive are separated, little 
change is required. However, in companies where these roles are combined, a 
change would be desirable to protect external investors. 287  
 
Tricker’s argument is convincing when he notes that an independent body is 
necessary to supervise the board of directors (including its chairperson) and the 
chief executive of the corporation in order to legitimise corporate decisions to both 
internal and outside interests. In this thesis, a model of corporate governance for 
South Africa has been proposed, which includes a supervisory board. This is based 
upon the German co-determination system and other approaches to corporate 
governance. 
 
Additionally, Tricker mentions the various dimensions that the proposed governing 
system would bring into play. 288 These dimensions can be listed as follows: 
 
(1.12.1.1) Direction 
 
Directors would be responsible for formulating strategies and for bringing 
fundamental proposals for shifts in policy to the governing body. The governing body 
would consider these strategic formulations and, when satisfied, approve them. If 
changes need to be made, the governing body would then simply make them. This 
involves formulating the strategic direction for the future of the corporation in the 
long term. 
 
(1.12.1.2) Executive Action 
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The board would be entirely responsible for executive action. Hence, the 
responsibility for running the business lies with the board. Delegation to various 
individuals or bodies is a matter of choice in management style and structure. 
 
In the proposed model of corporate governance, a two-tier board system is 
recommended for South Africa. One board would be the supervisory board consisting 
of the employees of the company, while the other would consist of the directors. 
 
(1.12.1.3) Supervision 
 
The responsibility for supervising the performance of the executive lies with the 
governors. The governors would set the objectives, review and approve plans and 
monitor aspects of corporate performance. Thus, the board would be continuously 
accountable to a separate and independent governing body that would ensure that 
the business is being run properly. This responsibility, therefore, involves monitoring 
and overseeing the performance of management. 
 
In the proposed two-tier board model of corporate governance, a supervisory board 
would supervise the board of directors. Therefore, the employees would have an 
important role in determining how the board of directors should be composed using 
their powers within the corporation. Thus, the German two-tier board system  
 
… provides a governance structure that delivers a strong monitoring function over managerial 
performance. By clearly dividing powers among corporate organs, this structure is somewhat superior 
to a one-tier board structure. Theoretically, a separate supervisory board, responsible for monitoring 
the executives and the financial affairs of the company, is … more effective … to ensure that 
supervision is exercised independently and effectively. … After the appointment, the supervisory board 
elects the members of the board to directors, which has a duty to submit its work Reports to the 
supervisory board. Hence … the supervisory board is not only a supervisory organ, but also a decision-
making organ of the corporation with authority over the board of directors. 289  
 
(1.12.1.4) Accountability  
 
The governing body would be responsible for demonstrating accountability to the 
members and thereby providing them with an independent assessment of corporate 
performance. The governors would have direct contact with the auditors. In this 
way, the firm would recognise the responsibilities of the corporation to those making 
legitimate demands for accountability. 
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This idea would be easily applied to the corporate governance model, which has been 
devised for corporate/labour relations within the South African enterprise. The 
supervisory board would be responsible for providing an independent assessment of 
corporate performance to the members and to the other stakeholders who have 
rights and interests within the corporation. 
 
Furthermore, Strikwerda notes that  
 
Tricker’s model immediately raises the question: How is … the strategy formulated by the board to be 
implemented? … First, the (directors) need to define the mission of the company, what it stands for in 
society, its contribution and its values. … This is the formative role of the board. A second role is the 
performance role, which is about developing strategies through which the mission will be accomplished. 
… This role also includes the creation … (of) … the “social capital” … of the corporation, i.e. its key 
relationships with customers, employees, suppliers, and the community. A third role is the 
conformance role. In this role the board performs its duties towards shareholders, … seeing to it that 
the integrity of the corporation is maintained. … These three roles, the formative role, the performance 
role, and the conformance role … (allows) a board … to determine whether it does a good job or not. 
290  
 
(1.12.2) THE FUTURE GOVERNANCE OF PRIVATE COMPANIES 
 
Tricker argues that with regard to private companies, some separation of ownership 
from management must exist in the form of external investors otherwise the 
company would be owner-managed (as in the case of the proprietary company). 
Such external shareholders could be dormant investors, non-executive members, a 
financial institution or others. 291  
 
The proposal for governance noted by Tricker is similar to existing arrangements in 
private companies, which consists of a board of directors, an independent auditor 
and meetings of shareholders from time to time. However, in addition to this, Tricker 
recommends that the boards should also consist of non-executive directors and an 
audit committee, and that the chairman and chief executive roles be separated. 292  
 
As with the public company, the various dimensions that the proposed governing 
system would bring into play are listed as follows: 293  
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(1.12.2.1) Direction 
 
The board as a whole would be responsible for establishing the direction of the 
company. The board would consist of the chairperson, the chief executive officer and 
the executive and non-executive directors. Non-executive external directors would 
be appointed. 
 
(1.12.2.2) Executive Action 
 
The executive members of the board together with top management run the 
business. 
 
(1.12.2.3) Supervision 
 
The board exercises supervision over executive actions. In addition, what is required, 
are non-executive directors and an audit committee of non-executives otherwise the 
executive directors will have to ‘wear two hats’, which would not be in the best 
interests of the corporation. 
 
The ASX Corporate Governance Council mentions this point as a suggestion for 
publicly listed companies in terms of its principle number 4. This proposes that the 
board should establish an audit committee, which consists of only non-executive 
directors, a majority of independent directors and an independent chairperson, who 
is not the chairperson of the board. It should have at least three members and have 
a formal charter assigned to it. 294  
 
(1.12.2.4) Accountability 
 
The shareholders, who have a closer interest in this type of corporation, need to 
question the board structure and processes at members’ meetings.  
 
In the model of corporate governance proposed for South Africa, the two-tier board 
structure would insist upon extensive supervision and very close observations of the 
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actions of the chief executive, the chairperson of the board and the executive 
directors. This will be discussed in detail later in the thesis. 
 
(1.12.3) THE FUTURE GOVERNANCE OF PROPRIETARY COMPANIES 
 
Tricker proposes that the proprietary company is entirely owner directed and 
managed. All the investors are insiders and involved in the business and there are no 
corporate members. Thus, anyone dealing with such an enterprise would know that 
the management was in the hands of those that both owned and ran the business. 
An audit would not be required. Since the members would also be the directors, 
formal meetings of members would not be required. 295  
 
Therefore, the question regarding the extent to which each stakeholder in the 
corporation would be involved in the joint decision-making processes would be 
become reduced or non-existent. 
 
(1.12.4) THE FUTURE GOVERNANCE OF SUBORDINATE COMPANIES 
 
A parent or holding company (also referred to as the controlling company) controls 
another company, for example, through the ownership of more than half of the 
voting stock. 296 A subordinate or controlled company can include either a wholly 
owned subsidiary, a subsidiary with other minority shareholders or an associate 
company over which the dominant (or holding) company can exercise managerial 
functions. 297  
 
For general purposes, this control would be established when the holding company 
has a majority of the voting rights attached to its shares (either because of its 
ownership of those shares or because of an agreement with the other shareholders) 
or because it has the right to appoint or remove a majority of its board of directors. 
Thus, if company A controls company B, which itself controls company C, then 
company C would be the subsidiary of both company B and company A. For the 
purposes of group accounts, even a wider definition applies. Thus, the subsidiary 
need not be incorporated and control can also be established in other ways, for 
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example, when the holding company has the right, under the subsidiary’s articles or 
memorandum of association, to exercise a dominant influence over it (see heading 
1.9). 298
 
An associate company is defined as  
 
(a) body corporate linked with another body corporate in terms of control of operations. Whether a 
person or company is an associate of another is relevant in determining entitlements to shares for the 
purposes of (the Australian) (CTH) Corporations Act 2001 Ch 6 … Wide definitions of ‘associates’ are 
provided in (CTH) Corporations Act 2001. For example, one company may be associated with another if 
certain types of agreements exist between the two bodies or if the companies are acting in concert. 
More generally companies may be considered to be associated when one company has an interest in 
another. 299
 
Since the directors of a dominant or holding company company can take decisions 
that could adversely affect the interests of minority shareholders and creditors in the 
subordinate company, such stakeholders should have the right to pursue their 
interests with the directors of the dominant company. To facilitate this proposal, 
Tricker submits that the ownership and organisational structure of groups of 
companies should be disclosed as a statutory requirement. This would supplement 
existing requirements to list subsidiaries. 300  
 
Governance of the subordinate company could also be affected by means of a 
management board consisting mainly of executive directors of the subordinate 
company, non-executive directors of the dominant company and external/outside 
directors of neither. In this way, corporate direction would exist through a 
management board subject to the approval of the dominant company. Supervision 
would be in the hands of the dominant company. If the dominant company wanted 
to give considerable autonomy to the subordinate company, non-executive directors 
could be appointed to the board of the subordinate company. 301 Accounts would be 
audited, published and filed by all subordinate companies. 302  
 
Interestingly, Strikwerda remarks that  
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(l)egally, when a parent company delegates … the delegation is normally restricted to the use of assets 
(ius utendi), the right is not delegated to the income from those assets (ius fruendi) nor the power to 
sell the assets (ius abutendi). … In many corporations the board of a corporation does not devolve 
powers to subsidiary boards. On the contrary, this main board must decide which powers to take from 
subsidiary boards in order to create a corporation with a clear centre for co-ordination and to exploit 
synergies between subsidiaries. 303  
 
It might be preferable, however, to consider the advantages of having a two-tier 
board structure in place rather than a unitary structure. 
 
 
(1.13) The issue of close corporations and whether 
private companies should be abolished in South Africa 
 
Problems with corporate governance in South Africa are also linked to the problems 
associated with the current classification of South African companies. Despite the 
introduction of close corporations for small businesses, private companies still exist 
even though it is currently in a form, which is almost indistinguishable from that type 
of corporate body created in the United Kingdom in the early 1900’s. Consequently, 
private companies have arguably become unnecessary and even perhaps redundant 
as a form of incorporation. 
 
(1.13.1) THE DEFINING CHARACTERISTICS OF CLOSE CORPORATIONS 
 
The Close Corporations Act No.69 of 1984 became operative on 01 January 1985. It 
catered for the small businessperson that ought not to have been subjected to the 
complex and extremely burdensome and voluminous Companies Act of 1973. 
Therefore, the Close Corporations Act was designed to legislate for small enterprises 
in such a way that easy compliance with the provisions could be achieved. In this 
way, the Close Corporations Act consists of only eighty-three sections, whilst the 
Companies Act contains four hundred and forty-three sections, five schedules and a 
number of additional regulations. Consequently, the Close Corporations Act has 
considerably simplified the rules of company law pertaining to small business close 
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corporations in South Africa. In close corporations, unlike in private and public 
companies, there is no separation between ownership and control. Therefore, every 
member is entitled to have a say in the decision-making processes in managing the 
close corporation. In terms of section 59 of the Close Corporations Act, a close 
corporation must appoint an accounting officer who must report on the annual 
financial statements. 304 Consequently, a formal audit, as in the case of private and 
public companies, is not required.  
 
Only natural persons can become members of close corporations. Close corporations 
may consist of only one member, which is currently the situation with about 
seventy-five percent of all close corporations. 305 Furthermore, because close 
corporations do not have shares or share capital, the interests of members in the 
corporation are expressed as agreed percentages. There are also provisions in the 
Close Corporations Act to allow the conversion of companies into close corporations 
and close corporations into companies. This is generally a simple procedure. 
 
Henning notes that small businesses play an extremely significant role especially in 
those countries where there are high rates of unemployment. This creates 
 
… new job opportunities, … stability, eliminat(es) poverty, improv(es) competitiveness, promot(es) the 
development of labour skills, and ensur(es) economic growth. … (I)n 1996 more than ninety percent of 
South Africa’s formal business entities could be classified as small to medium businesses, (which) 
provided employment to approximately seven million South Africans and … comprised almost forty-five 
percent of the South African Gross Domestic Product. … The recognition … that the small business 
sector forms the very backbone of a market-orientated economy gave added impetus to the 
introduction of the Close Corporations Act 69 of 1984. 306  
 
In England, however, close corporations, as a type of business enterprise, have not 
been created. Sugarman writes that since the mid-nineteenth to the mid-twentieth 
century, English company law was usually characterised as relatively flexible. Since 
1945, however, English company law has become very “complex, obscure and 
elephantine”. 307  
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The term “close corporation” has been derived from the expression “closely held 
corporation”, which refers to the close relationship of its members and to its limited 
numbers. 308 Henning notes that in 1984 South Africa became the first country with 
a British company law system to effectively provide for the legal needs of the small 
businessman. The Close Corporations Act is arguably one of the most remarkable 
and significant innovations in South African company law. The Act introduced a 
simple, inexpensive and flexible form of incorporation for the enterprise, which may 
consist of a single entrepreneur up to ten members inclusive. 309 The close 
corporation is designed to meet the needs of the member or members without being 
burdensome.310  
 
Section 63(c), which enforced the rule that a close corporation can consist of up to 
ten members with limited liability,311 has now been repealed. 312 Presumably, a close 
corporation can now enjoy unlimited membership with limited liability. It is important 
to note, however, that members of close corporations who fail “to observe the 
relatively few basic rules of the system” would incur “personal and concurrent 
liability with the close corporation” for its debts 313 in terms of section 63. 314  
 
The close corporation has a separate legal existence and can sue and be sued. It 
also has perpetual succession and limited liability and has the legal standing of a 
natural person of full capacity. There is no restriction on the size of a close 
corporation’s business or undertaking, the number of employees or creditors it may 
have, the size of the contributions of the members (which can be money, property or 
services), its turnover, value of assets or the types of business in which it may be 
engaged. 315  
 
The Close Corporations Act also contains important differences, as compared to the 
Companies Act. The more important of these features is the traditional capital 
maintenance rule in company law, which has been replaced with the solvency and 
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liquidity test in close corporations. Since 1994 this test has been adopted and used 
in New Zealand Company law. The New Zealand Companies Act 1993 came into 
effect from 01 July 1994. In New Zealand, there was a transition period and 
companies were given three years in which to register under the new act. 316 The 
new Act applies to all companies in New Zealand irrespective of their size or type. In 
this way, the traditional capital maintenance rule was abolished. Thus, in New 
Zealand, the basis for making a distribution is whether the ‘solvency test’ is met. The 
content of the test is set out in s 4(1) of the Act. There are two limbs to the test and 
a company must satisfy both. Firstly, the company must be able to pay its debts as 
they fall due in the normal course of business. This test is referred to as ‘trading 
solvency’. Secondly, the value of the company assets must be greater than the value 
of its liabilities including its contingent liabilities. In other words, the company must 
demonstrate ‘balance sheet solvency’. 317 Thus, in New Zealand, the legal concept of 
‘capital’ has disappeared under the 1993 Act. A share now represents not a fraction 
of the capital, but an entitlement to benefits including the dividends and voting 
rights. 318  
 
In South African close corporations, the solvency and liquidity test is used as a basis 
for regulating payments to members, the purchase by the close corporation of its 
members’ interests and financial assistance by the close corporation in the 
acquisition of its members’ interests. Furthermore, there is also a complete break 
with traditional company law in regard to shares and share capital, which do not 
exist in close corporations. 319  
 
(1.13.2) SHOULD PRIVATE COMPANIES BE ABOLISHED? 
 
The idea was advanced that since the close corporation has been introduced, this 
should result in the phasing out of the private company. 320 It is to be noted that the 
small private company is also subject to the voluminous sections of the Companies 
Act of 1973 in the same way it is applicable to large public companies. Thus, 
 
(t)he alternative of building further exemptions for small companies into the Companies Act was 
considered unacceptable. It would only have increased the overall complexity of the Companies Act 
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and would have aggravated the problem. The Companies Act had in effect become inappropriate for 
the needs of the bona fide small entrepreneur. … At the root of the new development is the conviction 
that a single Act can no longer present a satisfactory legal form for the giant as well as the small 
man.321  
 
Henning also notes that even though the introduction of the close corporation in 
South African has been very successful, the distinction between private and public 
companies has still been maintained. He writes, 
 
… it is … paradoxical that in the interim the (private company) is simply allowed to soldier on in South 
Africa in a form almost indistinguishable from that in which it was originally introduced in the United 
Kingdom in 1907. 322  
 
Sugarman notes that, in England, more defined distinctions between private and 
public companies are essential. Thus, the contracts governing the internal relations 
within the company may result in the boundaries between public and private 
companies becoming increasingly blurred. 323 Furthermore, in South Africa,  
 
(t)here is a massive failure of compliance with company law. Every person who works with company 
law knows this. … It is extremely complicated, but it falls flat on its face as far as actual application is 
concerned. … Indeed, the recommendations by one eminent authority on consumer protection was 
widely quoted in the press: “Scrap the Companies Act!” In essence what was said was that the 
Companies Act is out of touch with the needs of the country and should be repealed and replaced by 
legislation only in areas where it is considered to be absolutely necessary. The Act is too complicated 
and should be more easily and effectively enforceable. 324  
 
These sentiments echo beliefs about the former New Zealand Act, which has now 
been repealed. It was then said that,  
 
(in) New Zealand, the Companies Act 1955 was based substantially on the United Kingdom Companies 
Act 1948. … The imperial model was influential and it was inevitable, given the domination by the 
United Kingdom of New Zealand trade, that New Zealand should follow that trade. … (T)hat model, 
which has become increasingly inappropriate to modern conditions in the United Kingdom, is even less 
appropriate to conditions in New Zealand. 325
 
However, the introduction of the close corporation did not automatically result in the 
phasing out of the private company (or any other business entity for that matter). 
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326 Henning indicates that the whole process of considering a new form of business 
enterprise for the small entrepreneur commenced in 1981 when a proposal for the 
introduction of a new legal form was submitted to the Standing Advisory Committee 
on Company Law (SAC). 327 Cilliers et al note that the SAC issued a statement in 
1985 with the purpose of informing the commercial world of its objectives for 
company law reform. The overriding aims were to simplify the Companies Act of 
1973 and to ensure that South Africa keeps “abreast of developments in the 
European Community and in Anglo-American law”. At this time, the abolition of the 
distinction between public and private companies was ranked as the second priority 
in category A of the reform proposals. There were twenty reform proposals contained 
in categories A, B and C. The first priority in category A was the introduction of a 
takeover panel. 328  
 
The SAC also appoints the Standing Sub-committee on Close Corporations (SSCC). 
Its task is to advise the SAC on matters concerning the “operation and development 
of the Close Corporations Act”. It shapes “suggestions for reform” as well. 329  
 
In 1989 the SAC, which is also responsible for making recommendations for the 
amendment of the Close Corporations Act, considered again the issue pertaining to 
the abolition of the distinction between public and private companies. This time the 
phasing out of the distinction between public and private companies in South African 
law appeared third from the top in importance in a list of nineteen reform 
proposals.330  
 
In 1991 the SAC issued a statement on the review of distinctions between public and 
private companies. Henning writes that the SAC published proposals, which involved 
the removal of most of the distinctions between private and public companies. This 
related to the filing and disclosure of annual financial statements, maximum and 
minimum membership, minimum number of directors, quorum requirements for 
general meeting, special conditions in the memorandum providing for the personal 
liability of directors regarding the section 53(b) company, the number of proxies who 
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can be appointed by members at general meetings and the performance by an 
auditor of the duties of a secretary or accountant of the company. 331  
 
Furthermore, some privileges would need to be retained for private companies. For 
example, a private company would be allowed to load its voting rights. It need not 
restrict its rights to transfer its shares, although it could opt to do so if it so wished. 
A public company, on the other hand, is prohibited from limiting its rights to transfer 
its shares. However, the most significant traditional privilege of a private company to 
withhold its financial statements would have been abolished, whilst the obligation of 
public companies in this respect would have been relaxed. Under the SAC proposals, 
these two forms of companies would be treated more equally, which would have 
resulted in a substantial simplification of the Companies Act. 332  
 
Despite all this, the SAC decided in 1992, as a result of extensive submissions 
received by it and through its own research findings, not to recommend the abolition 
of the distinction between private and public companies. Therefore,  
 
(t)he wider issue of the place of private companies in company legislation is under consideration by the 
committee and a recommendation as to private companies will be made in that regard and after 
appropriate consultation. 333  
 
Since the democratic elections of 1994, it is interesting to note that certain issues 
received greater priority than before. These issues 
 
include worker participation in the managing organs of corporations (for instance, the board of 
directors); (and) facilitating the introduction of ESOPs (employee share-ownership plans). 334  
 
In 1997, after a meeting between the Minister of Trade and Industry and the SAC, 
the SAC issued a further press release with regards to the development of business 
law in South Africa. This called for a “strategic framework” of five principal statutes, 
which included a redrafted Companies Act, a new Securities Act, a new Bankruptcy 
Act, a new Business Enterprises Act and the Close Corporations Act (as amended in 
1997). 335 The new Companies Act would not abolish the distinction between private 
and public companies. The amendments to the Close Corporations Act were mainly 
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technical in nature with no substantial changes made. Thus, SAC considered that the 
Close Corporations Act was more than adequate for the purposes for which it was 
designed. Thus, it was not envisaged that significant changes would be made to it. 
336 The SAC further emphasised that until the new legislation had been drafted, 
existing statutes would have to be amended from time to time as the need arises. 337  
 
As Henning notes, 
 
… a three tier system presently exists or is provided for: Public and private companies formed under 
the Companies Act and a specialised new legal form of business enterprise, close corporation or private 
business corporation, formed under a separate enabling Act. … It may very well be that the private 
company will not survive such a reform in its present guise and with all the distinctions between 
private and public companies intact. The necessity for the continued rigid adherence to traditional 
statutory distinctions between private and public companies, such as presently exists in South African 
… company law, can be seriously questioned. … 338  
 
Henning writes that the Close Corporations Act is to be retained in its present form 
as one of five principal statutes. 339 Therefore, it is expected that the issue whether 
to abolish the distinction between public and private South African companies will 
receive further attention when drafting the newly proposed, leaner and simplified 
Companies Act. 340 Consequently, it is believed that it is time for corporate law 
reform in South Africa.341  
 
Finally, it is important to emphasise the developments in New Zealand. Although the 
New Zealand Companies Act 1955 recognised the concept of a “private company”, 
with a restricted number of members and certain privileges, this type of company no 
longer exists under the New Zealand Companies Act 1993. Thus, regardless of the 
number of shareholders, or the size of the company’s operation, all companies are 
treated by the 1993 Act in the same way. 342  
 
It will be advisable for South Africa to study the New Zealand corporate system. 
Although South Africa has the close corporation, which New Zealand does not have, 
the distinction between private and public companies in New Zealand was abolished. 
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More than a decade has now passed and the abolition of these company types 
remains in New Zealand. It is therefore a concern that South Africa still retains the 
distinction between private and public companies even though legislation has 
brought into existence the close corporation.  
 
 
(1.14) Conclusion 
 
The identification of the five essential elements of corporate governance - direction, 
management, executive action, supervision and accountability - assists with the 
assessment of board level competence, whether a unitary or two-tier board structure 
is ultimately adopted in South Africa in the future. At the same time, the proposed 
conceptual framework distinguishing the different types of companies assists a 
director in understanding the basis of the governance processes to be developed 
within any type of corporation. Such a typology could form the basis for any future 
legislation designed to regulate companies in society. Company law needs to reflect 
this role and facilitate the processes of corporate governance. In addition, Fleming 
sums up the position in Australia, which can be equally applied to future and present 
corporate governance mechanisms in South Africa. He writes,  
 
… an examination of some of the basic features of the governance mechanisms of large Australian 
firms over the last forty years shows that corporate governance has changed in nature but not 
necessarily improved. Data on ownership concentration, share ownership by directors, and the size and 
composition of the board of directors certainly suggest that by the 1990s Australian managers faced 
greater scrutiny by a market-based corporate governance system. However, structural changes by 
themselves do not imply improved governance. … 343  
 
It does, however, influence the context of the decision-making process. 344  
 
Corporate governance policies today expect all stakeholder interests and rights in 
any type of corporation to be fully taken into account when decisions are made. 
Additionally, there is a growing need and expectation that all of the stakeholders will 
have some role in the activities of the corporation. In many cases, there is a desire 
to be involved in the actual decision-making processes of the corporation. Thus, 
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(t)his … is particularly evident in the question of which groups have a legitimate stake in corporate 
governance, of whether employees are one of those groups, and, if so, what should be the employees’ 
role. Every nation has struggled with these questions and developed answers based on its particular 
legal and political traditions and its historical trajectory of labour relations. … The employee role in 
corporate governance has become an important yet controversial issue in recent years. 345  
 
Owen Young, leader of General Electric from 1922, rejected the idea that managers 
were ‘the paid attorneys of capital’ and that their task was to squeeze from labour 
‘its last ounce of effort and last penny of compensation’. 346  
 
Davies, however, questions whether there are any sound reasons for privileging 
employees over the other stakeholders in the company in respect to corporate 
governance, such as the suppliers, customers and creditors. Thus, 
 
… (i)t may be possible to distinguish workers from other stakeholders … on the basis that other 
stakeholders can effectively rely on other bodies of law, insolvency law or commercial law, for 
example, to protect them. However, … (the question is) … whether insolvency and commercial law 
contain effective governance mechanisms, which labour law lacks. … At first sight, the proposition 
carries … the argument … traditionally used to exclude employees from corporate governance, namely, 
that they are effectively protected by labour law. 347  
 
In this thesis, the extent to which the current labour and other legislation in South 
Africa effectively protects the employees and permits them to participate in the 
decision-making processes of the corporation will be considered in detail.  
 
Furthermore, the proposals for reconsidering the processes of corporate governance 
contain a vision for the future where companies could promote business and enhance 
societal needs. Corporate effectiveness cannot be achieved through legislation. The 
role of the law is only to facilitate and regulate. It is for the people themselves to act 
and produce success. DeMott believes that current times are interesting because so 
much that was once absolute is now open to change, including the nature of 
employment. Furthermore, the division between those who do work and those who 
provide capital are less categorical. Thus, corporate governance should reflect these 
changes. 348  
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Finally, O’Sullivan cites the aspiration of Young on the future of corporations. Young 
inspiringly states that  
 
I hope the day may come when these great business organisations will truly belong to the men who 
are giving their lives and their efforts to them, I care not in what capacity. Then … they will all be 
interested in working it to the highest economic advantage. Then an idle machine will mean to every 
man in the plant who sees it an unproductive charge against himself. Then we shall have zest in 
labour, provided the leadership is competent and the division fair. … Then, in a word, men will be as 
free in cooperative undertakings and subject only to the same limitations and chances as men in 
individual businesses. Then we shall have no hired men. … 349  
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CHAPTER 2:  
 
 
(2.0) THE INTERESTS OF THE CORPORATION VERSUS  
THE INTERESTS OF ITS EMPLOYEES 
 
 
In chapter 1, the difficulties associated with traditional company law conceptions, 
traditions, doctrines and classification were examined. In this chapter, we go one 
step further and discuss the difficulties created by company law, which have affected 
the relationship between the employer and the employee. This is necessary in order 
to determine the conflicts that arise between the said groups as a result of the 
influences of company law on labour law, and, as such, attempt to reduce such 
conflicting situations through various means. At the same time, we have seen in 
chapter 1 that there is no guidance provided by South African company law to 
directors for recognising the needs of company employees. Company law requires 
the directors to exercise their fiduciary duties and, up to now, this has generally 
meant acting only in the interests of the company. Thus, in this chapter, the issues 
are taken further by comparing and contrasting a company, which operates with the 
sole aim of maximising its profits, with a company, that is required to keep pace with 
developments in the employment relationship and to consider the welfare and 
interests of its employees. In this regard, this chapter will examine the traditional 
doctrines of piercing the veil as applied to modern circumstances, the interests of the 
company as compared to those of its employees and the participation of employees 
in corporate decision-making. In order to justify piercing, it is arguable that the facts 
must indicate either a misuse of the separate corporate existence principle or a need 
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to limit this in the interests of justice and equity. Such a test is far easier to apply 
than determining whether fraud has been committed or whether improper conduct 
exists. This approach is based on policies of justice and equity and the application of 
these fundamental principles of law, would promote the industrial rights of 
employees through the principles of fairness and equity. 
 
This chapter will also discuss the extent to which collective bargaining mechanisms 
have allowed employees to participate in the running and governance of South 
African companies. Reference will also be made to the English Cadbury, Hampel and 
Higgs Reports, which highlight the extent to which employee participation in UK 
corporate governance has been developed. In this regard, the corporate governance 
codes relevant to the European Union and its member states and the Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) will also be considered. A brief 
consideration of the South African 1994 King Report and section 309 of the UK 
Companies Act will also highlight the problems associated with recognising the 
participatory roles of employees in the corporation. The 2005 White Paper on English 
company law reform will also be considered in this regard. 
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(2.1) Introduction 
 
According to the classical approach to management, the relationship, which existed 
between shareholder and employee, was not, in any way, considered to be a joint 
venture between the company and the employee. In fact, the employee’s 
relationship to the company was simply that of servant and master and was 
dominated entirely by the necessity of producing a profit for the shareholders. 
 
Some examples of this approach follow.  
 
In Hutton v West Cork Railway Company, Bowen LJ stated that directors may only 
have regard to the interests of the company’s employees in so far as those interests 
may consequentially affect the interests of their company. 350  
 
Similarly, in Dodge v Ford Motor Company, Ostrander J noted,  
 
(a) business corporation is organised and carried on primarily for the profit of the stockholders. The 
powers of the directors are to be employed for that end. The discretion of directors is to be exercised in 
the choice of means to attain that end itself, to the reduction of profits or to the non-distribution of 
profits among stockholders in order to devote them to other purposes. 351  
 
In Re Lee, Behrens and Co., Ltd, Eve J noted that it could not be said that the 
interests of a widow were for the benefit of, or to promote the prosperity of the 
company, or that the assumption of liability in this regard was reasonably incidental 
to the carrying on of the company’s business. 352 Furthermore, in Parke v Daily News 
Ltd., Plowman J noted that it is not the duty of the board of directors to take into 
consideration the interests of its employees. 353 He suggested that, however laudable 
it might be to take into account the interests of employees from an industrial 
relations point of view, the law does not recognise the same. 
 
In Re W. & M. Roith, Ltd., Plowman J noted that the law was content to recognise 
that a company is an entity comprising simply of shareholders who have joined 
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together to make a profit. 354 He also noted that this is the main goal of companies 
and directors should constantly bear this in mind since employees have no rights in 
company law and, consequently, the law does not permit directors to take into 
account their interests other than in circumstances where there is evidence to 
suggest that the course adopted had been taken for the benefit of, or to promote the 
prosperity of the company, or that the assumption of liability is reasonably incidental 
to the carrying on of a company’s business.  
 
R v Smit noted that a company’s obligations towards its employees extend no further 
than its contractual obligations derived from the traditional employment contract.  355 
Thus, one of the main principles in South African company law, was enunciated in 
the Appellate Division case of Dadoo v Krugersdorp Municipal Council, where it was 
noted per Innes CJ that 
 
(a) registered company is a legal persona distinct from the members who compose it. ... This 
conception of the existence of the company as a separate entity distinct from its shareholders is no 
merely artificial and technical thing. It is a matter of substance; property vested in the company is not, 
and cannot be, regarded as vested in all or any of its members. 356  
 
Thus, its members could not sue to enforce its rights, nor could they be sued in 
respect of its liabilities. This veil of corporate ‘personality’ conceals the internal 
workings of a company. However, in South Africa, and elsewhere, the legislature has 
been compelled to “forge a sledgehammer capable of cracking open the corporate 
shell”. 357 Company law has accomplished this by the insertion of various sections 
into the South African Companies Act 61 of 1973. Sections to which reference can be 
made in this regard include section 344(h), which deals with the “just and equitable 
rule” with regard to the winding up of a company (see also heading 3.3), section 
252, which deals with a member’s remedy in cases of oppressive or unfairly 
prejudicial, unjust or inequitable conduct in managing the affairs of the company and 
section 424 (see parts 4.4, 4.4.1, 4.4.2 and 4.5.2), which gives a creditor or a 
member the right to apply to court for a declaration that any person, including a 
director, who was knowingly a party to the carrying on of the company’s affairs in a 
reckless or fraudulent manner, may be held responsible for the liabilities of the said 
company. 
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(2.2) Piercing the veil 
 
It is arguable that to justify piercing, the facts must indicate either a misuse of the 
separate corporate existence principle or a need to limit this in the interests of 
justice and equity. This approach, based on policies of justice and equity and the 
application of these fundamental principles of law, would promote the industrial 
rights of employees through the principles of fairness and equity. However, South 
Africa has preferred to embark upon a categorisation approach: if the situation 
complained of fits within the defined categories, the courts will pierce the veil; if not, 
the courts have been generally reluctant to do so even if this results in hardship to 
the employees or other stakeholders in the corporation. In this regard, several 
leading cases will now be considered. 
 
Several interesting South African case decisions have discussed the question of 
piercing the veil. In the case of Botha v van Niekerk it was noted per Flemming R 
that it is important to recognise the separate legal existence of a juristic person, 
including the rights to sue and be sued. 358 However, in some cases, where “special 
grounds” exist, this special charactistic can be ignored and the veil can be pierced or 
lifted and therefore shareholders and/or directors may be held personally liable on 
company contracts for the debts of a company. 359 These special grounds include 
showing that the defendant’s actions amounted to “unconscionable injustice and 
clearly improper conduct”. 360 The court did not find this to be so in this case and the 
company veil was not pierced. Accordingly, personal liability could not be attributed 
to Mr G (the first respondent). 361 The application was dismissed. 362
 
In Cape Pacific Ltd v Lubner Controlling Investments (Pty) Ltd and others the court 
per Smallberger JA disagreed with the test of “unconscionable injustice” put forward 
by the decision of the court a quo. 363 The court thought that the test was “too 
rigid”.364 The court indicated that the law had not settled the circumstances exactly 
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when the corporate veil could be pierced. 365 Each case is to be decided by 
considering its own unique set of facts. In so doing, it is important to consider the 
fundamental doctrine that the law regards the substance rather than the form of 
things. 366 Thus, a court does not simply have a general discretion to disregard the 
company’s separate legal personality whenever it regards it fair to do so. 367 Fraud, 
dishonesty and improper conduct would provide grounds to pierce the veil. 368  
 
Thus, a court should not lightly disregard the separate existence of a company. In 
this way, the need to preserve a company’s separate legal existence should be 
balanced against policy considerations in favour of piercing the veil. 369 The court 
decided that, based on fraudulent and improper dealings, policy considerations 
suggested that the veil of corporate personality should be pierced. 370 Accordingly, in 
this case, the appeal was allowed. 371
 
Furthermore, in the decision of Hulse-Reutter and Others v Godde the court 
reiterated the sentiments of the Cape Pacific decision 372. Thus, the court does not 
have a general discretion to disregard the separate legal existence of a company 
whenever it considers it fair or convenient to do so. 373 Furthermore, it remains 
unsettled in which circumstances exactly the court would be prepared to pierce the 
corporate veil. 374 The unique circumstances of each case, judicial judgment and 
policy considerations will be considered. 375 However, it is clear as a matter of 
principle that there must be a misuse or abuse of the corporate entity by those who 
control it. On the facts in this case, the court per Scott JA found that there was no 
such abuse. 376 There was no suggestion that the respondent was unfairly prejudiced 
by the distinction, which exists between the company and those who control it. 377 
Thus, the appeal in this case was successful. 378
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In South Africa, the legislature and the courts have disregarded the separate 
existence of the corporate entity in specifically defined and categorised cases. With 
regard to the legislature, it has disregarded the principles of separate corporate 
personality where: 
 
1. a director, officer or agent of a company signs a bill of exchange, a 
promissory note, a cheque or an order for money or for goods for the 
company, but does not mention the registered name of the company 
correctly, this person becomes personally liable for that debt; 379 
2. a public company’s membership remains less than seven for a period of more 
than six months, members become liable for the company’s debts; 380 
 
3. it appears “just and equitable” to wind up the company; 381 
 
4. it appears that any business of the company was or is carried on recklessly or 
with intent to defraud, the court may order any person to be liable for the 
debts of the company who knowingly carried out such business in that 
manner; 382 See also parts 4.4, 4.4.1, 4.4.2 and 4.5.2. 
 
5. a crime has been committed by its directors or servants in the performance of 
their duties or while furthering the interests of the company. The intention of 
the person is deemed to be the intention of the company and; 383 
 
6. an abuse of control arises between the holding and subsidiary companies. 
Thus, the “holding-subsidiary” relationship is significant, as it regulates any 
abuse of control that might arise and also ensures that a proper disclosure of 
the group’s financial position is made. 384 See also part 1.6. 
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The courts have also disregarded the separate legal existence of the corporation and 
have held directors, officers and agents liable for the debts of the corporation where 
the company was an enemy alien, the subsidiary company was used as a “device” to 
evade a director’s fiduciary duties to the holding company, fraud was used resulting 
in improper conduct, company tax is evaded or concealed or an underlying 
partnership intention existed even though the parties had formed a company. 
Additionally, in the UK, instead of having a separate legal existence, holding and 
subsidiary companies in a group have also been treated in some instances as one 
“economic entity”. 385
 
In France, Germany, Japan, the UK and the US, the courts pierce the corporate veil 
only “in extreme circumstances” in order to hold controlling shareholders, managers 
or directors personally liable for the debts of the company. Consequently, courts do 
not easily or readily pierce the corporate veil in these jurisdictions. However, the 
most successful cases of piercing the veil relate to “blatant misrepresentation or ex 
post opportunism by shareholders”. Additionally, the corporate veil is pierced when 
“controlling shareholders disregard the integrity of their companies by failing to 
observe formalities” or mix up their personal assets with those of the company. 
Courts will also pierce the veil when these shareholders fail to “capitalise the 
company adequately”. In all cases, there must exist “an element of fraud or 
‘injustice’”. 386
 
However, it is important to consider the approach used in the American case of 
Glazer v Commission on Ethics for public Employees. 387 The ‘balancing test’ for 
piercing the corporate veil was noted in this judgment. Thus, the test formulated in 
this regard is one, which balances the various policies in favour of recognising 
separate corporate existence against policies justifying piercing. In order to justify 
piercing, the facts must indicate either a misuse of the separate corporate existence 
principle or a need to limit the same in the interests of justice and equity. Such a 
test is far easier to apply than determining whether fraud has been committed or 
whether improper conduct exists. The approach in Glazer is based on policies of 
justice and equity and the application of these fundamental principles of law would 
go a long way in promoting the industrial rights of employees through the principles 
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of fairness and equity. Furthermore, Lord Wilberforce in Ebrahimi v Westbourne 
Galleries notes,  
 
... a limited company is more than a mere judicial entity, with a personality in law of its own ... there is 
room in company law for recognition of the fact that behind it, or amongst it, there are individuals, 
with rights, expectations and obligations inter se which are not necessarily submerged in the company 
structure. 388  
 
Domanski discusses the issue of piercing the corporate veil in South Africa and refers 
to the Glazer case. 389 He notes that the categorisation approach, which South 
African courts have used to pierce the corporate veil, is unsatisfactory. This approach 
has brought about “inconsistency and uncertainty” in South African law. He believes 
that the Glazer case has brought into existence 
 
a broad, unifying principle, which could well serve as a basis for deciding ‘piercing’ cases in a more 
logical and juridically satisfactory manner. 390
 
… So here at last come the winds of change: no categories for the judges of Louisiana! Instead, the 
court lays down a broad principle that requires an evaluation of competing policy considerations in 
order to determine whether or not the veil of incorporation should be pierced. This ‘balancing test’ 
represents a radical break with the past. … 391
 
Domanski also submits that Botha’s case for piercing the veil is clearly obiter. He 
submits that the court’s refusal to pierce the veil is “unconvincing”. On the basis of 
the test formulated by Flemming J, the court, submits Domanski, would have been 
justified in piercing the veil. 392
 
The balancing test laid down by the Glazer decision could perhaps be adopted in 
South Africa. In this way, policies behind recognising the separate corporate 
existence must be balanced against those policies, which would justify piercing the 
corporate veil. 393 Domanski submits that the Glazer principle may not resolve all the 
problems relating to the question of piercing the veil. However, it does “provide … a 
coherent principle”, which may be “applicable to any ‘piercing’ situation”. 394
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Thus, Domanski concludes, 
 
the application of this principle in … Botha v van Niekerk … might well have produced a different and 
more equitable result. … (I)t may prove capable of bringing order and clarity into an untidy area of 
law. 395
 
Thus, in recognising the rights and interests of employees and of the other corporate 
stakeholders, the courts should pay regard to the non-categorisation approach 
adopted in the Glazer case. In this way, policies of justice and equity would promote 
the industrial rights of employees through the principles of fairness and equity. This 
would allow company directors to keep pace with developments in the employment 
and stakeholder relationships and promote an improved model of corporate 
governance in South Africa. This would encourage and allow a greater representation 
and participation of these parties in matters pertaining to governance.  
 
 
(2.3) What are the interests of the company and those 
of its employees? 
 
Some writers argue that management should pursue not only profit maximisation 
but also other “noneconomic goals” that “enhance the welfare of employees or some 
segment of the public”. 396 Furthermore, corporate managers often do no not take 
into account the fact “that a company is only as good as its people”. Very often, 
employees “have a much greater stake in the company than most of the 
shareholders”, as “they depend on it for their careers, their livelihood and, 
eventually, their pensions”. 397
 
Venter notes that a company should be viewed as a separate entity wherein many 
conflicting interests need to be reconciled, such as those of its shareholders, 
creditors, employees, consumers and environmentalists. 398 Thus, one needs to 
examine the need for the modern day company to change its nature by moving away 
from its historical norm where its sole purpose is to attain as much profit as possible 
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to a system, which recognises the rights of other bodies other than only the rights of 
its shareholders.  
 
It needs to be recognised that, with regard to corporate law, ownership involves 
responsibilities as well as rights. This means that directors of companies need to 
discharge their social responsibilities to society and they therefore have a social 
obligation towards all with whom they deal including the employees of companies. 
These sentiments had already been expressed in The White Paper on Company Law 
Reform, published by the English Conservative Government, as far back as in 
1973.399 Subsequently in 1977, The English Committee of Inquiry on Industrial 
Democracy (Bullock Report) indicated that modern corporations needed to take into 
account the interests of its employees as well. 400 The view set out in the Bullock 
Report is that a corporation must balance all of its main goals, such as profit, 
growth, size and employment opportunities, so that each one of these goals does 
not, in any way, impinge upon the growth of the other. 
 
Since a company in law is an entity with its own legal personality and, as such, 
affects all of those persons who participate in it, it is worthwhile to consider some of 
the interesting statements taken from various systems in order to appreciate the 
views of courts and of academic writers. 
 
In Unocal v Mesa Petroleum Co, the Supreme Court of Delaware viewed a 
corporation as an enterprise, which consists not only of its shareholders, but also of 
its employees, creditors, customers and the community. 401 This means, therefore, 
that the court recognises that a corporation has more obligations than merely being 
a profit-making entity. Hence, the corporation has economic and sociological 
functions other than merely a business one. 
 
Furthermore, in Peso Silver Mines Ltd (N.P.L) v Cropper the court stated,  
 
(a) classical theory that once was unchallenged must yield to the facts of modern life. In fact, of 
course, it has. If today the directors of a company were to consider the interests of its employees no 
one would argue that in doing so they were not acting bona fide in the interests of the company itself. 
Similarly, if the directors were to consider the consequences to the community of any policy that the 
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company intended to pursue, and were deflected in the commitment to that policy as a result, it could 
not be said that they had not considered bona fide the interests of shareholders. 402
 
A concern started to be expressed by the courts as to how a company could possibly 
expect to prosper if its employees and other interested stakeholders were dissatisfied 
with the running of the corporation. Lord Wedderburn has noted, however, that in 
his opinion, the English courts in their application of equity, have generally remained 
very conservative in their approach by assuming that the only goal of corporate 
responsibility is that of profit-making. 403  
 
Furthermore, Schmitthoff notes,  
 
... a fundamental change has taken place in the concept of the company. The company is no longer 
regarded as an instrument of profit maximisation for the sole benefits of its shareholders. It is 
generally recognised that the company as an economic unit consists of a combination of several 
interests, namely those of the shareholders as providers of capital, of the employees as providers of 
labour, of the creditors and of the public as such. The concept of the company as an instrument of 
economic capitalism has thus developed into one of the enterprise as an instrument of a new social 
order. The modern concept of enterprise is founded on the theory of social responsibility. 404  
 
Consequently, in continental Europe, the company is not simply regarded “as a piece 
of financial real estate”. Its main aims are rather to ensure that employees are given 
the “scope and space to develop and to live useful, fulfilling and rewarding lives”. 405
 
In South Africa, Venter notes that it is important that corporations begin to 
acknowledge and discharge social as well as business responsibilities. 406 Thus, 
within modern South Africa, the social responsibility dimensions of a company must 
start taking firm root in order to assist in meeting the aspirations of the masses. 
Furthermore, Venter refers to Sullivan’s 1977 demand that certain companies direct 
considerable amounts of money towards social upliftment programmes in South 
Africa. 407 Sullivan stated that 
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(these principles) provide the most comprehensive standards for enlightened corporate behaviour in 
South Africa. Furthermore the implementing programme of reporting and task groups of companies 
has proven to be the most effective corporate change agent in South Africa. 
 
By obliging companies to direct monies towards social rather than business needs, 
Sullivan created a transition in the companies affected to the extent that those 
companies could never revert to the traditional perceptions for which they were 
designed to further only profit-making goals for the shareholders. 
 
Venter is of the view that the interests of the majority of large companies in South 
Africa have already changed from being those of solely profit-making enterprises to 
ones in terms of which there is recognition of their obligations towards the interests 
of employees and other interested stakeholders in the company and, as a result 
thereof, a new social order is being created. 408 In this regard, Innes CJ in 
O'Callaghan N.O. v Chaplin notes,  
 
(i)t is the duty of a court- especially of an appellate tribunal- so to administer a living system of law as 
to ensure- without the sacrifice of fundamental principles- that it shall adapt itself to the changing 
conditions of the time. And it may be necessary sometimes to modify, or even to discard, doctrines, 
which have become outworn. 409  
 
 
(2.4) The participation of employees in corporate 
decision-making 
 
In South African law, the powers of shareholders to make decisions for the company 
are entrenched through the mechanism of general meetings. 410 The shareholders 
then, in a general meeting, appoint a board of directors who act as fiduciaries of the 
company and must consequently exercise their powers in the best interests of the 
corporation. Generally, these interests are considered to be the interests of only the 
shareholders, both present and future. 
 
The question of whether “the interests of the company” can be interpreted to mean 
stakeholders other than shareholders has been an issue, which has been increasingly 
discussed by both academics and labour lawyers during the last decade. Thus, in 
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practice as noted supra, many large companies do acknowledge the fact that they 
have some responsibility to society other than being totally engaged in a scheme of 
profit-making for the shareholders. 
 
O’Regan notes that businesspeople should regard corporate social responsibility as 
“enlightened self interest “. 411 Consequently,  
 
(t)his means that business perceives appropriate social responsibility action to be an integral part of, 
and not in any way separate from its primary function of profitably producing and distributing goods or 
services. 412
 
Consequently, corporations should have a concern for all of its corporate 
stakeholders. This includes its employees, customers, suppliers and even creditors. 
Social responsibility means that corporations today should also take into 
consideration the impact of its functions and services on the environment and 
community. 
 
O’Regan notes further that, although traditionally the company’s power base consists 
of a three-levelled pyramid (authority originates from the general meeting of 
shareholders, is then passed on to the board of directors whom in turn passes this 
authority on to the officers of the company, such as the managing directors), in 
reality, power is rarely exercised in this way. 413 She cites Prentice’s critique of the 
Bullock Report. Prentice notes that,  
 
... in the large public company, the shareholders, except perhaps in a crisis situation, do not exercise 
any meaningful ownership powers. ... The underlying reasons for this shareholder apathy are … not 
difficult to unearth: (1) holdings are widely dispersed … (2) shareholders are relatively ignorant and on 
the whole lack the necessary skills ... (3) management enjoys liberal access to corporate proxy 
machinery ... (4) shareholders who are discontented with corporate management will vote with their 
feet and sell their shares (5) lastly, a lack of active shareholder involvement in corporate affairs may 
possibly be explained on the ground that on the whole, directors manage companies in the economic 
interests of shareholders. 414  
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As has been noted in chapter 1 of this thesis, where inter alia the distinction 
between ownership and actual control was discussed, shareholders may in fact not 
wield substantial control at all, which is contrary to the formal structures of power 
defined by the three-levelled pyramid approach of the legal system. Moreover, 
employees are traditionally given no direct control with regard to decision-making by 
the legal structures of authority within the enterprise. It is, however, important to 
evaluate the extent to which recent worker participation in each of the three levels 
(the shareholders or owners, the board of directors, and the management) has 
increased. 
 
(2.4.1) SHAREHOLDING/OWNERSHIP LEVEL 
 
O'Regan refers to Employee Share Ownership Plans (ESOPs) as the most widely used 
institution for changing the structure of corporate ownership in South Africa. 415 
These plans provide employees with an option to purchase shares and obtain 
dividends in the corporation. However, there has been much disagreement between 
management and unionists as to the value of such plans. Management has 
maintained that ESOPs have not only improved the economic growth and 
productivity of the corporation and of the country, but have also increased the 
employees’ share in the economy and thereby lowered the rate of unemployment. 
Unionists, however, maintain that ESOPs have done nothing more than increase 
slightly employee participation in a capitalist economy and have done very little, or 
anything, to change the patterns of control within the corporation.  
 
O'Regan is of the view that ESOPs do not in fact give employees any decision-
making role at all. She notes that   
 
(w)here ESOPs give shares to individual workers, as they mostly do in South Africa, there is no 
prospect that workers will gain any control in decision-making. 416  
 
O'Regan also refers to other ESOPs systems elsewhere, which seem to be working 
better. 417 She notes that in Sweden a wage-earner's fund (the Meidner Plan) was 
established, the purpose of which was to buy equity in Swedish companies. The Act 
governing this fund, the Employee Investment Funds Act of 1983, provided that a 
maximum amount of two billion Swedish Kronor be collected annually from 
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companies, which must contribute 20 percent of its net profit over a certain amount 
and also be collected by increasing employers’ contributions to the state pension 
fund by 0,2 percent. In addition, the boards controlling the funds are composed of 
the unionists themselves, which gives them some real control with regard to the 
decision-making processes of the corporation because ownership of the shares is 
vested in an institution (the wage-earner fund) rather than in individual employees. 
 
O'Regan also refers to the establishment of ESOPs in the United States and in the 
United Kingdom where they have become extremely widespread. 418 This is mainly 
because legislation in these countries has encouraged the formation of ESOPs by 
giving employers tax benefit incentives for doing so. In South Africa, however, there 
is a lack of tax or other incentives for establishing ESOPs. 
 
O'Regan also refers to the process of nationalisation as a possible means to affect 
employee participation. She notes, however, that   
 
... nationalisation merely makes the State the sole shareholder of an enterprise, and has no necessary 
implications for worker participation … Of course, should the State feel that as part of the process of 
nationalisation it must be responsive to the interests of workers within the enterprise, the possibility of 
worker participation will be greater. 419  
 
(2.4.2) BOARDS OF DIRECTORS LEVEL 
 
O’Regan refers to the most well-known system of employee representation at board 
level: the German model of co-determination (Mitbestimmung), which has been 
discussed and referred to throughout this thesis. 420 In this system, only a two-
levelled pyramid exists: a board of directors consisting of a supervisory board 
(Aufsichtsrat) and an executive board (Vorstand). In terms of the German Co-
determination Law of 1976, section 1 specifies that all companies employing more 
than two thousand workers must have worker directors. In terms of section 29 of 
this law, the board must consist of an equal number of worker and shareholder 
directors, although the chairman, who has the casting vote, must be a shareholder 
representative. O’Regan notes that the supervisory board must not only appoint the 
executive board, but must also supervise the general management of the enterprise, 
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inspect the books of account and receive performance reports and plans of the 
corporation. 421 However, O'Regan points out that 
 
...trade unions have been committed to establishing a vigorous union presence on supervisory boards, 
and this has led to many disputes and considerable litigation in the last 10 years. 
 
This model will be discussed in greater detail in chapter 8 in this thesis, which will 
deal with a consideration of various legal systems with regard to the question of 
constructing a new model of corporate governance for South Africa.  
 
The question of having ‘worker directors’ at board level in South African companies, 
has, however, met with some criticism. 
Thus,  
(t)wo places on the board of directors at best give workers access to information they can use during 
bargaining – if they are not barred by secrecy clauses. Decisions to retrench or implement 
rationalisation programmes stay firmly in the hands of management. 422  
Therefore, if workers are to be given greater access to information and increased 
participation in the decision-making processes of the corporation, O’Regan argues 
that any major restructuring of the board of directors will require major changes to 
company (and labour law) with regard to the appointment of directors and the 
exercise of their powers. 423 Thus, she notes further that 
 
(t)he company's interest will have to be redefined so as to incorporate the interests of workers 
effectively within that notion, and the rights of shareholders will have to be redrawn to accommodate 
worker rights. 
 
However, even if major changes are made, the question will still remain regarding 
the extent to which, if any, workers would in reality be able to represent their 
interests effectively on the board. Simits notes,  
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...the German commission on co-determination could trace no really important case where workers' 
representatives seriously opposed issues defended by the management notwithstanding differences of 
opinions on details. ... 424  
 
(2.4.3) MANAGEMENT LEVEL  
 
Another level at which industrial democracy may operate is at management level 
itself. An example of worker-participation at this level is the German works council 
(Betriebsrat). As O’Regan notes, the work council consists of employees who are 
elected by their peers but who are totally independent of trade unions (although 
many of these elected members may also be members of the trade unions). 425 
These works councils are involved in functions such as the regulation of social 
matters (including the conditions of work) and the health and safety of employees. 
Management must obtain the approval of the works council first, failing which the 
matter will be referred to arbitration where the worker representatives may veto any 
decisions held in this regard by management. 
 
These work councils are also involved in personnel matters where, procedurally, they 
must be informed of all dismissals, although management is not obliged to accept 
their view in this regard. However, a management’s failure to comply with these 
procedural obligations would invalidate the dismissal. In addition, the works council 
must be advised of any changes to the corporation, which could cause prejudice to 
the employees and has the power to demand some compensation to be paid to its 
employees as a result thereof. Otherwise, the matter may be referred to a 
conciliation committee and then to arbitration. Thus, the works council has much 
control with regard to the decision-making functions of the corporation. Works 
council members are, however, not permitted to initiate any strike activity, although 
they may participate in the same if the strike is called by the trade union itself. 
 
As O’Regan points out, plant-level worker participation in South Africa, has been 
achieved thus far mainly through union shop stewards who have been given certain 
rights by collective agreements. 426 These rights generally include the right to 
represent workers in disciplinary matters, to raise grievances and to represent 
workers in any bargaining matters. In this thesis, it is argued that such worker 
participation is insufficient in representing the rights and interests of employees. 
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O’Regan also cites Volkswagen South Africa as an example of a system that is similar 
to the German system and where various forms of worker participation has been 
adopted. For example, in addition to the ordinary collective bargaining structures, 
Volkswagen has established other joint union-management structures. The joint 
union-management executive committee consists of the managing director, the 
directors, the key production managers and the union shop stewards. In this case, 
the union is said to be able to influence company policy by their very participation. 
The company also discloses full details of its financial position. This example may be 
significant in so far as it may exemplify a company, which has been noticeably 
concerned about the shortcomings of the collective bargaining procedures employed 
in South Africa and has, as a result, taken measures to improve 
worker/management relations. 
 
However, there has to date been little worker participation in decision-making 
outside of collective bargaining in South Africa.  
 
 
(2.5) Collective bargaining in South Africa  
 
O’Regan points out that collective bargaining has been a process in terms of which 
trade unions and management have negotiated the terms and conditions of 
employment and of the workplace itself. 427  
 
The previous South African Labour Relations Act recognised three types of collective 
bargaining fora: industrial councils, conciliation boards and works councils. Industrial 
councils consisted of an equal number of employer and trade union representatives 
who negotiated the terms and conditions of employment. 428 When an agreement 
had been reached, the industrial council would usually send this agreement to the 
Minister of Manpower who might, in his discretion, bind all parties thereto. Section 
24 of the Act determined those matters that might be included within an industrial 
council agreement and notes that this is 
 
... generally any matter affecting or connected with the remuneration or other terms and conditions of 
all employees ... or ... any matter whatsoever of mutual interest to employers and employees. 
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However, few industrial council agreements embraced regulated conditions for 
employees within the workplace or imposed procedures for disciplinary, grievance or 
retrenchment matters. Thus, the scope of the duty to bargain had been very limited, 
as the courts were reluctant to expand the same. As a result of this, the Labour 
Relations Amendment Act of 1988 was enacted, in terms of which credibility was 
given to the establishment of the social contact where parties sought to regulate 
their own employment relationships thereby excluding the provisions of the Labour 
Relations Act and the Industrial Court. Disputes in cases were settled by agreement. 
However, despite these developments, most agreements still recognised that 
management would enjoy the upper hand in so far as investment and production 
issues of the corporation were concerned. Thus, although trade unions participated 
in collective bargaining to further their members’ interests, the relationship between 
employer and employee remained uneven. 
 
O’Regan notes,  
 
(collective bargaining) embodies an enclave of due process within an overall context of managerial 
domination. 429  
Thus, the problems associated with collective bargaining in South Africa were two-
fold: 430
 
1. Shortcomings with the system, which could be remedied; and 
2. Structural limitations in bargaining. 
 
With regard to the first issue, the Industrial Court has been unwilling to expand the 
scope of topics for bargaining through its unfair labour practice definition. These 
topics would include matters such as production processes, long-term planning and 
investment. Additionally, unions often had little or no access to confidential 
information, which curtailed their ability to bargain. Thus, where a dispute existed, 
management was generally able to give effect to its interpretation of a collective 
agreement. Where a union wished to oppose the same, it had to either declare a 
dispute and initiate an industrial action or launch proceedings in the Industrial Court 
or commence arbitration proceedings. In the USA, this is generally referred to as the 
work-now-grieve later rule. 
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With regard to the second issue, O’Regan notes that, although the unions’ main 
weapons in collective bargaining issues were strike actions, the same were only 
effective in certain circumstances. 431 In a depressed economy where unemployment 
is rife, strike action is not a very attractive alternative to the workforce whose jobs 
may be replaced by ‘scab’ labour. In addition, collective bargaining is only as 
effective as worker organisation. In regions where there is not a powerful union 
organisation, collective bargaining would not go very far in establishing workers’ 
interests. Importantly, collective bargaining does not challenge the rights of 
management to manage and therefore accepts that management is the decision-
maker. 
 
Thus,  
 
(collective bargaining) does not challenge the basic division of the enterprise into the managers and 
the managed. Indeed, it might be seen as supporting that division. ... In this sense the rights of 
management receive no major challenge from the process of collective bargaining. ... Checks in the 
way managerial authority is exercised do not affect the principle; rather they underwrite it. 432  
 
O’Regan also notes that collective bargaining institutionalised an adversarial 
approach to labour relations, which was not necessarily advantageous. 433 Therefore, 
co-operation within the corporation should not be excluded by collective bargaining. 
 
From the above arguments, it is evident that collective bargaining itself cannot fully 
recognise the interests of workers or lead to maximum economic growth. What is 
needed in South Africa is a system that increases worker participation in corporate 
decision-making in a meaningful way. It is therefore important to consider the 
Labour Relations Act, 434 which was brought into force and makes the industrial 
council (now referred to as the bargaining council) the main focus in the Act. Chapter 
V of the Act makes provision for the establishment of workplace forums for its 
employees by a representative union. Disputes must now be referred either to the 
Commission for Conciliation Mediation and Arbitration (CCMA) in the unorganised 
sector, 435 or to the bargaining council. 436 In 1997 the new Basic Conditions of 
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Employment Act (BCEA) also came into being, which attempts to entrench basic 
worker rights. 437  
 
In this thesis, sections of these Acts will be examined, which have made some 
inroads into allowing employees roles in participating in the affairs of the 
organisation (see parts 6.2 and 6.9-6.11). Arguably, these Acts have gone further 
than collective bargaining processes in recognising the rights and interests of 
employees and of the other corporate stakeholders in matters of corporate 
governance. 
 
In the next section, I will examine the extent to which British committees on 
corporate governance have addressed and recognised the rights and interests of 
workers who were previously denied the opportunity of participating in the 
governance of corporations. A consideration of these reports is both useful and 
significant, as they provide further guidance on the restructuring and reformulation 
of a new and improved corporate governance model for South Africa.  
 
 
(2.6) Corporate governance and the Cadbury, Hampel 
and Higgs Reports 
 
Du Plessis notes that various commissions set up the Cadbury Committee, including 
the accountancy profession in 1991, to address various corporate issues including 
the financial aspects of corporate governance. 438 He refers to the Draft Report, 
which states ,  
 
(t)he country’s economy depends on the drive and efficiency of its companies. Thus the effectiveness 
with which their boards discharge their responsibilities determines Britain’s competitive position. They 
must be free to drive their companies forward, but exercise that freedom within a framework of 
effective acceptability. This is the essence of any system of good corporate governance. 439
 
These objectives should not be regarded as being unique to the United Kingdom 
because recent political developments in South Africa have opened up various 
international markets to corporations. 
                                                     
437  Basic Conditions of Employment Act (BCEA) 75 of 1997. 
438  JJ du Plessis, “Corporate governance and the Cadbury Report”, (1994) South African Mercantile Law 
Journal, vol. 6, 81. 
439  Ibid 82, referring to the Draft Report, paragraph 1.1, 5.  
Chapter 2 137
 
Du Plessis further refers to the Draft Report, which states ,  
 
(c)orporate Governance (is) the system by which companies are directed and controlled. 440
 
Hence, the Code of Best Practice was formulated by the Cadbury Report, which set 
out to achieve a high standard of corporate governance between all the stakeholders 
of the corporation - the board of directors, the shareholders in general meeting, the 
managing directors, the non-executive directors, the managers, the audit 
committees and the other committees of the board of directors. Du Plessis notes 
supra that in this context, corporate governance is now relevant in South Africa 
because various groups were denied the opportunity of participating “in internal 
company law” because of the political system of the past. 
 
The Code of Best Practice was based on principles of openness, integrity and 
accountability. 441 Its basic purpose was to create a system of checks and balances 
within the corporate structure, particularly with regard to general aspects concerning 
the board of directors, the non-executive directors, the executive directors, and 
financial reporting. As Farrar et al note,  
 
(u)nderlying any discussion of company law and any rational debate about reform is the question of 
interests. The limited liability company does not simply represent one interest. It represents an arena 
in which there is a potential clash of many interests. We may identify the interests underlying it as: (1) 
investors share capital/loan capital; (2) outside creditors commercial finance/trade creditors; (3) 
employees; (4) consumers; (5) the public. 442
 
Thus, the Code requires a division of responsibilities to ensure a balance of power 
and authority. This is to ensure that no single individual has unfettered powers. It 
notes further that the role of the non-executive directors should be to bring an 
independent judgment and, in so doing, maintain the relevant standards of good 
conduct of the corporation. With regard to the issue of employee representation on 
the board, however, the commissions of the Cadbury Report did not specifically 
address this aspect. This is most likely due to the very controversial nature of the 
various parameters surrounding this issue from a United Kingdom context.  
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The Hampel Report 443 followed the recommendations of the Cadbury Committee to 
review their findings on corporate governance in the UK. 444 The Cadbury Committee 
recommended that the “institutional investors should encourage regular, systematic 
contact at senior executive level to exchange views on strategy, performance, board 
membership and quality of management”. In this way, investors should develop their 
communication channels with management. 445
 
The purpose of the Hampel Committee was to review the roles of directors, 
shareholders and auditors in corporate governance. 446 The remit of the Hampel 
Committee was as follows: 
 
The committee will seek to promote high standards of corporate governance in the interests of investor 
protection and in order to preserve and enhance the standing of companies listed on the Stock 
Exchange. The committee’s remit will extend to listed companies only. 447
 
The Committee noted that corporate governance mechanisms do differ from country 
to country depending upon local economic and social factors. 448 It further believed 
that high standards of corporate governance are just important for smaller listed 
companies as they are for the larger companies. 449 Thus, corporate governance is 
not just about applying “hard and fast rules”; “broad principles” need to be 
considered as well. Thus, rules should be applied “flexibly and with common sense” 
in accordance with the needs of individual companies. This follows the intended 
recommendations of the previous Cadbury Committee. 450 The Hampel Committee 
endorses the recommendation that companies need to develop relationships 
“relevant to its success”. This includes relationships with “employees, customers, 
suppliers, credit providers, local communities and governments”. 451
 
The Hampel Committee on corporate governance has recommended the retention of 
the unitary board structure. They believe that the “unitary board offers considerable 
flexibility”, as it may delegate matters to various board committees, such as audit, 
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remuneration and nomination committees. However, the Committee does 
acknowledge the fact some “operational decisions” are remitted to an “executive 
committee” and therefore “adopt some of the features of the two tier board”. 452 One 
commentator did, however, acknowledge the fact that the previous Cadbury 
Committee, in its suggestions on the strengthening of the role of the non-executive 
members of the board, noted that this was 
 
… a step towards a more independent control of the executive directors and starts to approach the 
thinking behind the separate German supervisory-board system. 453
 
Regarding the question of board composition, the Committee notes that large 
companies have boards, which are composed of “equal numbers of executive and 
non-executive directors”. The Committee further acknowledges that non-executive 
directors have an important role in corporate governance. 454 Additionally, non-
executive directors come from technical backgrounds or have overseas or political 
connections, which are very significant to the company. Thus, the Committee 
believes “that there are people from other fields who can make a real contribution to 
the board”. 455 The Committee proposes that for boards to be effective, they need to 
be composed of at least one-third of non-executive directors. 456 These directors 
must also come “from a wide range of backgrounds”. 457
 
The Hampel Committee acknowledged the criticisms of the previous Cadbury Report 
with respect to its “box ticking” approach to governance. Although many companies 
were observed to be “in good condition” through this approach, it was well known 
that this was not in fact the case. The Hampel Committee sought to move away from 
this box-ticking approach by requiring companies to state in their annual reports how 
they applied the 18 “Principles” formulated by the Committee and whether they 
complied with the 42 “Provisions”, which underpinned the Principles. Any non-
compliance with the Provisions must be explained. Hence, the approach adopted was 
to “comply or explain”. The combination of the Provisions and Principles are referred 
to as “The Combined Code”. 458
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The UK Higgs Report on non-executive directors was released in 2003. 459 It 
suggested an “extensive enlargement of the Combined Code”. The revised Combined 
Code is comprised of 17 main principles, 26 supporting principles and 47 
provisions.460 The Higgs Report recommended that the “comply or explain” approach 
of the Listing Rules be adopted, which the previous committees (Cadbury and 
Hampel) had endorsed. 461
 
The most important recommendation was that the board should be composed of at 
least 50% independent non-executive directors (excluding the chairman). 462 In the 
ideal world, boards of directors would consist of a “diverse group of experienced and 
talented individuals”. Thus, the aim of the Higgs Review with respect to the role and 
effectiveness of non-executive directors was “to provide benchmarks and guidance 
so as to enable boards to achieve as near to the ideal as is practicable in the real 
world”. 463
 
Prior to appointment, “new non-executive directors should carry out due diligence on 
the board and on the company” in order to ascertain that they do have the 
necessary “knowledge, skills, experience and time to make a positive contribution to 
the board”. 464 The Report provides a definition of an “independent non-executive 
director”. Thus, 
 
(a) non-executive director is considered independent when the board determines that the director is 
independent in character and judgment, and there are no relationships or circumstances which could 
affect, or appear to affect, the director’s judgment.  
 
These relationships would include the situations where the director has been, within 
the previous five years, an employee of the company, or, within the previous three 
years, has had a material business relationship with the company either directly or 
indirectly, or has received or receives additional remuneration from the company in 
any form (other than a director’s fee), or has close family ties with any of the 
company’s senior employees, or holds cross-directorships or has significant links with 
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other directors in other companies, or is a significant shareholder or has served on 
the board for more than 10 years. 465
 
The Committee also recommends the establishment of a nomination committee of 
the board (to conduct board appointments) and audit and remuneration committees 
(to set the remuneration for the executive directors, the chairman and senior 
executives). 466 Non-executive directors should not sit on all of the three board 
committees simultaneously. 467 This recommendation does not apply to smaller listed 
companies. Other than this exception, the Committee recommends that there should 
be “no differentiation” in the corporate governance provisions between larger and 
smaller companies. 468
 
It has been suggested that the Review’s “concept of independence is difficult to 
reconcile with” the need for non-executive directors to have the requisite knowledge 
and to be qualified. 469 Furthermore, even in a two-tier board structure, it would be 
very difficult to ensure that non-executive directors are really independent in the 
true sense. 470 Thus, there are problems with the Review’s definition of 
independence. However, nothwithstanding the above, the Review 
 
will make a welcome contribution to the improvement of the corporate governance of listed companies 
in the United Kingdom. … (T)he effectiveness of board and non-executive directors depends above all 
on the experience, skill, integrity and judgment of individual directors. Therefore, an open, fair and 
rigorous appointment process is the key to a significantly improved corporate governance. 471
 
In summary, the Higgs Report recommended significant developments: 472
 
1. Half of the board (instead of only one-third) should be composed of non-
executive directors, all of whom should be independent; 
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2. “A more explicit definition of independence should be provided”. This would 
exclude anyone who had been an employee of the company during the 
previous five years or someone who had a “material business relationship” 
with the company during the previous three years; 
 
3. Non-executive directors need to “meet regularly as a group without the 
executive directors (being) present”. They should also meet “at least once a 
year without the chair of (the) board (being) present”; 
 
4. The chair and chief executive should not be the same person. A retiring CEO 
should not become the chair of the board; 
 
5. The functions of the appointments committee and of the independent 
executives should be “strengthened”. Non-executive directorships should be 
extended to a wider range of people; and 
 
6. A “senior independent director” should be “available for shareholders to 
contact” if “contact through the CEO or chair … would be inappropriate”. 
Senior directors should attend meetings, which are held between the 
management and the shareholders. 
 
(2.7) Corporate governance codes relevant to the 
European Union and its Member States 
 
The 2002 European Commission Report on corporate governance was undertaken to 
determine the “commonalities and differences in corporate governance practices 
among the European Union (EU) (fifteen) Member States”. The member states are 
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. 473 
In this regard, corporate governance codes, which are non-binding sets of 
“principles, standards or best practices” were studied and compared. 474 Thirty-five 
codes were studied and every Member State had at least one code except for Austria 
and Luxembourg. 475
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The Commission found that 
 
(t)he greatest distinctions in corporate governance practices among EU Member States appear to result 
from differences in law rather than from differences in recommendations that emanate from the types 
of codes analysed in this Study. … (T)he trend towards convergence in corporate governance practices 
in EU Member States appear to be both more numerous and more powerful than any trends towards 
differentiation. … (T)he Codes … appear to serve as a converging force, by focusing attention … on 
governance issues, articulating best practice recommendations and encouraging companies to adopt 
them. 476
 
However, the greatest difference in corporate governance practice amongst the EU 
Member States relates to the role of the employees. In Austria, Denmark, Germany, 
Luxembourg and Sweden, employees could elect some of its members to the 
supervisory board. In Finland and France, however, only the company articles may 
provide employees with this right of election. Furthermore, in France and in the 
Netherlands, although employee representatives may have the right to attend the 
board meetings, they may not vote. In all the other EU Member States, only the 
shareholders may elect the members of the supervisory board. Thus, the strength of 
“shareholder influence” differs fundamentally in the EU Member States. 477
 
Whilst some of the EU Member States “emphasise broad stakeholder interests”, 
others “emphasise ownership rights of shareholders”. However, most of the Codes of 
the EU Member States recognised “that corporate success, shareholder profit, 
employee security and well being, and the interests of other stakeholders” are 
inextricably intertwined and dependent upon each other. 478
 
Another important legal difference in corporate governance amongst the EU member 
States relates to the structure of the board. Although the one-tier board structure 
could arguably offer a closer relation and better information flow between the 
supervisory and management functions of the board, the two-tier system allows for 
a “clearer, formal separation between the supervisory body and those being 
“supervised”. 479
 
It is important to emphasise that the Codes are “flexible and non-binding” even 
where a “comply or explain” structure exists. Thus, a company may not follow the 
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Code provided it explains why it is not doing so. Another important point is that 
companies are free to choose whatever Code in any of the EU Member States they 
wish to follow provided that the Code does not conflict with the company law of the 
country governing the incorporation of the companies concerned. 480
 
Thus, the Commission notes that the “code movement is a positive development”. 
Codes are beneficial because they 481
 
1. Stimulate discussion of corporate governance issues; 
2. Encourage companies to adopt widely-accepted governance standards; 
3. Explain both governance-related legal requirements and common corporate 
governance practices to investors; 
4. Benchmark supervisory and management bodies; 
5. Prepare … for changes in securities regulation and company law. 
 
Thus, the Commission believes that variation within the Code does not impose any 
“impediment to the formation of a single European equity market”. The Codes, if 
anything, have supported “a convergence of governance practices” between the EU 
Member States. 482
 
 
(2.8) Corporate governance principles of the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) 
 
The member countries of the OECD are Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, 
Germany, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, 
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United States, Japan, 
Finland, Australia, New Zealand, Mexico, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Korea 
and the Slovak Republic. The OECD came into existence on 30 September 1961. Its 
main functions are to. 483
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1. Achieve the highest sustainable growth and employment and an improved 
living standard in member countries whilst maintaining financial stability; 
2. Contribute to economic expansion in member and non-member countries; 
and 
3. Contribute to world trade expansion on a multilateral, non-discriminatory 
basis. 
 
The OECD notes that today, the principles of corporate governance go “beyond that 
of shareholders in the performance of individual companies”. 484 The Principles of 
the OECD offer non-binding standards and good practices of corporate governance 
as well as guidance on the implementation thereof. 485 The OECD Principles of 
Corporate Governance were agreed upon in 1999 and “formed the basis for 
corporate governance initiatives in both OECD and non-OECD countries”.486 
Subsequently, these 1999 Principles were revised “to take into account new 
developments and concerns”. 487
 
The Principles are intended to assist OECD and non-OECD governments in their efforts to evaluate and 
improve the legal, institutional and regulatory framework for corporate governance in their countries, 
and to provide guidance and suggestions for stock exchanges, investors, corporations, and other 
parties that have a role in the process of developing good corporate governance. 488
 
These principles are mainly directed at publicly traded companies. However, they 
might also be of some use for improving corporate governance processes in privately 
held and state-owned companies. Furthermore, the OECD Principles acknowledge 
that corporate governance “involves a set of relationships between a company’s 
management, its board, its shareholders and other stakeholders”. 489 Thus, corporate 
governance “is affected by the relationships among participants in the governance 
system”. Employees and other stakeholders contribute “to the long-term success and 
performance of the corporation”. 490
 
Regarding the role of the stakeholders in corporate governance, the OECD Principles 
state: 
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The corporate governance framework should recognise the rights of stakeholders established by law or 
through mutual agreements and encourage active co-operation between corporations and stakeholders 
in creating wealth, jobs, and the sustainability of financially sound enterprises. … Performance-
enhancing mechanisms for employee participation should be permitted to develop. … Where 
stakeholders participate in the corporate governance process, they should have access to relevant, 
sufficient and reliable information on a timely and regular basis. 491
 
A corporate governance framework should consist of “legislation, regulation, self-
regulatory arrangements, voluntary commitments and business practices”, which are 
unique to each country. 492 Furthermore, various branches of law often influence 
corporate governance processes. These include company law, securities regulations, 
accounting and auditing principles, insolvency, contract, labour and tax law. It is 
important for companies to be aware of the fact that, from time to time, some of 
these branches of law may overlap or even conflict. This may “frustrate the ability” 
to carry out significant corporate governance objectives. Thus, measures should be 
taken to minimise this risk. 493
 
The contributions of stakeholders in the corporation are directly related to “building 
competitive and profitable companies”. It is therefore important for corporations “to 
foster wealth-creating co-operation among stakeholders”. Consequently, it is in the 
interests of corporations to recognise “the interests of (its) stakeholders and their 
contribution to the long-term success of the corporation”. 494
 
In all OECD countries, the rights of the different stakeholders are either created 
through legislation, contract or other commitments. Mechanisms for employee 
participation include representation on the boards and in governance processes such 
as on work councils. 495 Consequently, according to the OECD, whether a country has 
adopted a two-tier or unitary board system, the Principles will apply where boards 
must “take due regard of, and deal fairly with”, the interests of employees, creditors, 
customers, suppliers, local communities and the environment. 496
 
In some countries, the board must legally act in the interests of the company and 
thus consider the “interests of the shareholders, employees and the public good”. 
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This principle comprises the duty of care and the duty of loyalty. The duty of care 
entails “board members to act on a fully informed basis, in good faith, with due 
diligence and care”. The duty of loyalty relates to the “equitable treatment of 
shareholders, monitoring of related part transactions and the establishment of 
remuneration policy for key executives and board members”. 497
 
The revised Principles “reinforce OECD’s contribution and commitment … to 
strengthen the fabric of corporate governance around the world in the years ahead”. 
This has contributed towards the development of a sound system of professional and 
ethical values upon which an efficient world market depends. 498
 
 
(2.9) Corporate governance, the King Report (1994) 
and section 309 of the United Kingdom Companies Act 
 
The effectiveness of the two King Reports (released in 1994 and in 2002) is 
discussed in detail elsewhere in this thesis (see parts 6.3-6.6) where it is concluded 
that, although these Reports will assist in the design and construction of a model of 
corporate governance for South Africa, they have have not gone far enough in 
ensuring that worker participation exists in the corporation. For example, the King 
Reports do not support the development and implementation of the two-tier board 
system. Although the Reports acknowledge the success of this type of system in 
Germany, it encourages the unitary board system to be retained in South Africa. This 
is one of the most unsatisfactory aspects of both of the King Reports. Also, no other 
alternatives to the unitary board system are even considered. Furthermore, the King 
Reports cannot be construed as enforceable legal documents, although they have 
arguably considerable persuasive value. They have to rely on other factors and “self-
regulation” to encourage compliance therewith. 499 Thus, the rights of workplace 
forums under the South African Labour Relations Act to be involved in the joint 
decision-making processes of the corporation have not been increased or improved 
in any significant manner as a result of the recommendations of the latest King II 
Report. 
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In the same way, although section 309 of the UK Act notes that directors of the 
company are to have regard in the performance of their functions to the interests of 
the company's employees and its members, the Companies Act does not indicate 
how the interests of the shareholders and the employees are to be weighted. 
Consequently, the directors need to decide themselves how to balance these 
interests, which then generally makes this duty unenforceable in practice. Thus, 
having regard to the interests of employees becomes merely a procedural duty and 
one that has no substantive content. 
 
I will now discuss briefly the effectiveness of the first King Report and of section 309 
of the UK Companies Act. 
 
Firstly, I will deal with the 1994 King Report briefly here in order to highlight the 
problems associated with recognising the participatory roles of employees in the 
corporation. It comprised a set of recommendations and also The Code of Corporate 
Practices and Conduct. The Code is essentially a set of principles recommended as 
being integral to corporate governance practices. 
 
The Code was to apply to all companies listed on the main board of the JSE, large 
public entities as defined in the Reporting by Public Entities Act 93 of 1992, banks, 
financial and insurance institutions as defined in the various financial services Acts 
and large unlisted, dependent public companies with a total shareholders' equity 
greater than R50 million. 
 
The King Committee was formed under the direction of the Institute of Directors in 
Southern Africa, with support from the South African Chamber of Business, the 
South African Institute of Chartered Accountants, the JSE, the South African 
Institute of Business Ethics and the Institute of Chartered Secretaries and 
Administrators in South Africa. Although the first King Report had its origin in the 
Cadbury Report of the United Kingdom, the King’s Report had to have regard to 
circumstances unique to South African corporations. 
 
Armstrong notes that the King Report places a burden on non-executive directors to 
maintain standards of good conduct. 500 Thus, emphasis is placed on non-executive 
directors functioning as partners in providing a guiding influence to the executive 
directors rather than ‘watchdogs’. In addition, he notes that the King Report 
recommended that directors have a responsibility and duty to the wider society, 
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termed the ‘dynamic participation’ approach, rather than the traditional, 
conservative approach that the directors were only responsible and accountable to 
the shareholders who elected them to office. 501 Thus, with South Africa’s new socio-
political climate, the code expected greater accountability to be made from 
companies to its stakeholders with regard to its financial and non-financial affairs.  
 
To this extent, matters that needed to be addressed included: 
 
1. Negotiations with and involvement of employees; 
2. Environmental issues; 
3. Social responsibility activities and programmes; 
4. Customer interest matters; and 
5. Supplier interest matters. 
Armstrong notes further that the Code required, as part of the corporate governance 
processes, 502  
 
1. A commitment by the organisation to standards of good conduct; 
2. An infusion of the company's culture in all of its stakeholders; 
3. A total commitment by the board and its chief executive officer; and 
4. The formulation of a detailed set of guidelines for the benefit of its 
employees. 
 
Pretorius, however, in his unpublished work on the nature of the first King Report 
and on its application to the various corporate stakeholders states,  
 
(s)hareholders own the company. If shareholders do well, the employees of the company do well, as 
does the community in which the company operates and, in turn the general economy. But the 
shareholders are at the top of the list. Otherwise the foundation of our economy weakens, the system 
falls apart, and the public interest is not served. 503
 
 
Pretorius notes that, traditionally, shareholders’ interests were regarded as being 
exclusive in the sense that the other stakeholders in the corporation may be 
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benefited only to the extent that this would further the interests of its members 504. 
Thus he notes, 
 
... the interests of employees, customers, or the local community, for example, may be served only as 
a means of increasing shareholder wealth and may not be treated as ends in their own right. 
 
However, Pretorius also observes that  
 
(a) different approach to company law may start by noticing that the way companies are run affects 
not only their members and creditors, but also their customers, suppliers, employees and neighbours, 
and also society in a more general sense. 505
 
Thus, although company law has traditionally focused on the rules and principles, 
which safeguard the interests of shareholders, it is now being forced to adapt to 
modern circumstances and, in so doing, recognise the position of the employees 
within the corporation. The first King Report attempted to recognise this factor more 
comprehensively than had been done previously. 
 
In addition, the United Kingdom Companies Act states that  
 
the matters to which the directors of the company are to have regard in the performance of their 
functions include the interests of the company's employees in general, as well as the interests of its 
members. 506  
 
Pretorius argues that it is now the duty of the directors to operate the business so as 
to further the interests of the employees in addition to those of the members. He 
notes further that the traditional approach to company law is to be rejected for one 
that does not explain company law in terms of the rights of owners, but rather 
regards its members and employees as stakeholders, each with legitimate demands. 
Furthermore, he notes that “there is a substantial community of interest between the 
shareholders and employees” because any increase in the wealth of the company 
may lead to higher dividends or share values, which may result in increased wages 
and job security. However, there may also be a conflict of interests where each of 
the stakeholders has a competing interest in maximising its share of the surplus 
funds generated by the company's business activities. Thus, shareholders have an 
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interest in maximising their profits, whilst the employees prefer lower profits if this 
would prevent “plant closures or the introduction of job-destroying technology”. 507  
 
Additionally, there is a further concern that section 309 of the United Kingdom 
Companies Act does not indicate how the interests of the shareholders and the 
employees are to be weighted; rather it is left to the directors themselves to balance 
these interests. However, this duty is generally unenforceable in practice. 
 
Pretorius argues that, although the directors are required to take employee interests 
into account, they can never subordinate the shareholders’ interests to them. 508 
Thus, ‘having regard’ to the interests of employees is merely a procedural duty and 
one which has no substantive content. 
 
Pretorius notes that section 309(1) of the UK Companies Act is  
 
either one of the most incompetent or one of the most cynical pieces of drafting on record. A supposed 
legal duty, which is not matched by a remedy is a nonsense. 509  
 
To this end, Pretorius suggests that the King Report should be welcomed, as it must 
be seen as the start of a restructuring process of some of the main components 
comprising our company law. 510  
 
The King Report formulates nineteen guidelines for directors. Amongst these 
guidelines is the recommendation that directors  
 
must act with enterprise and always strive to increase shareholder’ value while having regard for the 
interests of all stakeholders. 511  
 
Chapter 4 of the King Report, which is concerned with the issue of worker 
participation in the governance of corporations, recommends inter alia that  
 
corporations should evolve their own system of worker participation whether by way of workers’ 
committees or at management, executive committee or board level. 512  
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Furthermore, chapter 1 of the King Report notes that the stakeholders of a company 
include the  
 
shareholders, employees, bankers, suppliers, customers, environmentalists, the community or country 
in which it operates and the State. 513  
 
while chapter 12 of the King Report notes,  
 
... a stakeholder is any person, entity or interest group that has some association with the company. 
There are three classes of stakeholders: shareholders, parties who contract with the company and 
parties who have a non-contractual nexus with the company. 514  
 
Pretorius, however, notes that, although the employees of the company are included 
as stakeholders by way of definition, it is possible that “the term ‘having regard’ to 
the interests of the stakeholders’ (employees) will … suffer … the same fate as that 
of section 309 of the United Kingdom Act”. However, in South Africa, the directors 
will be faced with “a considerably larger spectrum of potentially conflicting interests”. 
Furthermore, the proposal in the King Report is not likely to have much affect on the 
way companies operate because the duty is “effectively unenforceable and … 
subjective”. 515  
 
This is especially so if one considers the following aspects: 
 
1. Various diverse groups would exist who might qualify as the ‘stakeholders’ of 
the corporation; and 
2. The directors must act in accordance with what they believe to be the 
appropriate balancing of interests. Thus, the court cannot merely intervene 
on the basis that it disagrees with the way in which the directors have 
decided to have those interests weighed. Furthermore, the court would not be 
able to review the substantive merits of the directors’ decision. 
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(2.10) English Company Law Reform: the 2005 White 
Paper 
 
In 1998, the Government commissioned the Company Law Review (CLR), an 
independent group of experts, practitioners and business people, to conduct research 
into ascertaining how the UK Companies Act could be updated and modernised. 
Many of the CLR proposals for legislative change (together with the proposals 
contained in the government’s subsequent White Paper of 2002) are contained in the 
2005 Company Law Reform White Paper. 516 The CLR “is part of a wider programme” 
to “encourage investment, (and) promote long-term company performance”. 517
 
Consequently, the English Government published a White Paper, the “Company Law 
Reform” in March 2005. The White Paper sets out the Government’s proposals for a 
comprehensive reform of the English Company Law so as to bring it into line with the 
needs of modern business. Public consultation closed on 10 June 2005 and the 
various responses are being considered. 518
 
The White Paper sets out measures for the Company Law Reform Bill. The draft 
Company Law Reform Bill proposes four major changes: 519
 
1. Enhancing shareholder engagement and a long-term investment culture. The 
view is that “shareholders are the lifeblood of a company, whatever its size”. 
Thus, the Bill wishes to encourage and promote a “wide participation of 
shareholders”. Decisions should be “based on the longer-term view and not 
just immediate return”. Directors must promote the company for its 
shareholders. However, to do this, it must take “due account” of “wider 
factors such as employees, effects on the environment, suppliers and 
customers”. 520 To allow companies to work best, the roles and responsibilities 
of directors “need to be clearly defined”. These changes ensure that the 
directors and shareholders can work and function in such a manner that 
“promotes long-term company performance”. 521 
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2. Ensuring better regulation and a “Think Small First” approach. Most of the UK 
companies are small, with more than “90% of companies having five 
shareholders or fewer”. 522 Traditionally, however, company law was written 
in reference to large companies. Consequently, this balance needs to be 
“reset” to “make the law easier for all to understand and use”. In this regard, 
the decision-making processes for private companies will be simplified as well 
as the rules pertaining to their share capital. Furthermore, the requirement of 
private companies having a company secretary will be abolished. Better and 
more appropriate advice and guidance will also be available especially to 
smaller firms so that all may “understand the options available … and the 
requirements placed upon them”. 523 The government wishes the new 
legislation “to recognise smaller private companies not as the exception, but 
as the rule”. Consequently, unnecessary burdens on small firms will be 
removed and the law made more accessible to them. 524 
 
3. Making it easier to set up and run a company. The idea is to “remove 
unnecessary burdens to directors and to preserve Britain’s reputation as a 
favoured country in which to incorporate”. Consequently, the requirement for 
a company to have authorised share capital will be abolished. A single person 
may also be able to form a public company. 525 Thus, it is “relatively easy and 
cheap” to establish a company in the UK. 526 
 
4. Providing flexibility for the future. A “new reform power” must be introduced, 
which would allow the legislation to be updated and amended as required, 
subject to “full consultation and appropriate parliamentary scrutiny”. “Some 
measure of flexibility” should be “built into the company law framework to 
ensure that it can be kept up-to-date in (the) future”. 527 
 
The government is of the view that these four measures would allow company law to 
fit better with the business reality of today. Consequently, this “should create 
improved performance across the economy as (a) whole, as well as reducing direct 
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compliance costs for business and producing cost savings which could amount to 
some 250 million pounds a year”. 528 A “modern and effective” system of corporate 
governance “can promote enterprise, enhance competiteveness and stimulate 
investment”. However, “an ineffective or outmoded” system “can inhibit productivity 
and growth and undermine investment confidence”. Consequently, “a modern, 
enabling and robust framework for … companies”, would allow the UK to maintain its 
position “as one of the most attractive places in the world to set up and run a 
business”. 529 To achieve this aim, the government has “worked alongside 
businesses, professionals and investors”. 530 For example, the new Combined Code 
on Corporate Governance was published in 2003. This Code (the Higgs Report) also 
contains some of the changes recommended in the 2005 White Paper with regard to 
the “independence and effectiveness of non-executive directors”. 531 These 
developments have contributed towards the creation of “a modern, enabling 
framework, which facilitates enterprise and market confidence”.  
 
The Company Law Reform Bill will amend and restate provisions of significance for 
the day-to-day business operations of small companies. The “revised provisions” will 
be set out “in a new, more logical and easily accessible way”. “The Bill will also 
include new provisions” to establish “the duties of directors”. 532
 
 
(2.11) Further comments regarding the range of a 
company's interests 
 
As previously alluded to, it is clear that public policy no longer shares the view that 
directors should always be compelled to act in the interests of the company, which 
are capable of feathering the nests only of the shareholders. 
 
Dodd notes,  
 
... (t)here are three groups of people who have an interest in that institution. ... a group of ... people 
who have put their capital in the company, namely, its shareholders. Another is a group of ... people 
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who are putting their labour into the business of the company. The third group is of customers and the 
general public. Customers have a right to demand that a concern so large shall not only do its business 
honestly and properly, but, further, that it shall meet its public obligations and perform its public 
duties. … One no longer feels the obligation to take from labour for the benefit of capital, nor to take 
from the public for the benefit of both, but rather to administer wisely and fairly in the interests of all. 
533
 
These sentiments, as Beuthin points out, have been echoed by many leading 
businesspeople in different parts of the world. 534 Moreover, Beuthin notes that when 
the board of an Australian company was being attacked by shareholders, who 
thought that they, as the shareholders, had a right to a greater portion of the profits 
than that which the corporation intended to give them, the board responded by 
stating that  
 
(w)e have four sections of the community to whom we are responsible: shareholders, employees, 
customers, and the public in general. 535  
 
As Beuthin puts it, this “growing sense of trusteeship” has been reflected in South 
African corporations as well. 536 Sir Ernest Oppenheimer defined the aim of the 
corporation, in his fifty-first annual report in 1967, as being  
 
to make profits for its shareholders, but to do so in such a way as to make a real contribution to the 
welfare of the countries where it operates. 537  
 
Beuthin conducted a survey in South Africa in 1969 and concluded that 
approximately 57% of public and private companies had acknowledged that they 
needed to balance the group interests of shareholders, employees, consumers and 
the general public and, in addition, might have even, in appropriate circumstances, 
advanced the interests of certain groups at the expense of shareholders. 538 
Furthermore, these companies were of the view that the general public would agree 
that this was in fact the directors’ duty. 
 
Beuthin refers to a commentary taken from The Times, which stated,  
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(w)e start from the fact that the company has duties to the community. At least we must not pollute 
the river or cause too much smoke. Then we go a step further and argue that we should promote 
developments of benefit to the community, which tends to be a geographical responsibility. ... 
Extending the logic again we hope to go further than to give money and liked to be involved in the way 
in which the money is spent. 539  
 
In addition, Beuthin refers to the views of Seymour, who seems to think that 
maintaining a service to the shareholders, to the employees and to the public, are 
three legs of a tripod supporting the existence and success of a business. 540 Each of 
them must be rigid if the business is to prosper. Hence, the object is to ensure a 
proper balance in the pursuit of all these purposes and to continually improve the 
method for their attainment. Thus, Beuthin maintains that all stakeholder interests 
must be recognised. Firstly, the shareholder has invested and risked his or her 
money in the company. Secondly, the existence and life of the employees is even 
more closely linked with the company that that of the shareholder. With each day 
that passes, employees invest more of themselves in the company. Thus, the 
relationship between employer and employee in modern companies can no longer be 
described as merely a master/servant relationship. Management must have the 
loyalty of the company’s employees to be successful. Thirdly, directors owe duties to 
consumers not to extort excessive prices or to manufacture poor quality products. 
Thus, directors should not “ride roughshod” over interests of stakeholders, including 
that of the nation. Management is also finding it more difficult to avoid a 
consideration of the interests and rights of the non-shareholder constituents, as 
these groups have been placing “increasing pressure” on directors to consider them. 
 
Beuthin points out, however, that no matter how desirable it may be that the board 
should consider the interests of all the groups when planning its overall policy, it 
may not be practical for it to do so rigidly on a day-to-day basis. 541 That is, it is 
arguable whether any board could be expected to weigh each competing interest 
against the others and then assess with satisfactory accuracy the extent to which 
some should, on that particular occasion, give way to the others.  
 
He notes furthermore that  
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(i)n a competitive market the lesson has always been that profit is the key criterion. In the process of 
making profits the directors will find that they have at the same time successfully protected the 
interests of all groups. ... By devoting their attention to profit the directors will ensure that the 
company is being served by well-paid employees who are contented in their jobs, and that quality 
goods or first-rate services are being made available to its customers at low prices. (However), 
directors will indeed find it impossible to maintain optimum profit for any length of time if they sacrifice 
the interests of any one of the groups. 542  
 
Many would agree that the directors should be entitled to take into consideration the 
interests of all groups; there are also some who would go much further and would 
wish to compel directors to take same into consideration. Thus, many believe that all 
the interest groups, and particularly the employees, should be given an opportunity 
of ensuring that their interests are in fact considered. This can only be achieved by 
employees being placed in a position where they may exercise some degree of 
control over directors and managers. Goyder succinctly notes,  
 
(o)ne can no longer expect the employee to be satisfied with mere ‘hand-outs’ from a benign board. It 
is not ‘free ice cream’ he wants, but the opportunity of participating in the creation, direction and 
expansion of industry. 543  
 
 
(2.12) Conclusion 
 
Competition in a competitive labour and supply market will probably be the strongest 
factor in ensuring that corporations acknowledge the rights and interests of 
stakeholders other than merely those of the shareholders. Thus, the traditional 
concept of the corporation cannot be maintained in the changed social and economic 
conditions embracing South African corporate policy. The function of the corporation 
is no longer set merely to provide maximum profits for its shareholders. 
 
Hence, companies cannot escape being influenced by political, economic and 
sociological factors. In response to these pressures, changes are taking place within 
companies and sometimes independently of any law. In any event, it is now timely 
for the legal system in South Africa to catch up with developments in the commercial 
and industrial world. In this regard, however, Gower’s arguments are convincing and 
                                                     
542  Ibid 173. 
543  Ibid, referring to George Goyder, The Future of Private Enterprise (1951), 28-9. 
Chapter 2 159
arguably correct when he notes that he is against any legislation, which would 
envelop the law in a “legislative strait-jacket”. 544 Gower therefore maintains that 
 
(o)n the whole it may be better to leave a penumbra of uncertainty from which intriguing questions can 
occasionally emerge, rather than to paint a clearly defined line to which all may step but which must 
not be crossed. 
 
In addition, collective bargaining, although effective at some levels, did not 
challenge, but probably strengthened, traditional structures of authority within 
corporations. Systems of worker participation in decision-making in capitalist 
economies have been more successful where strong trade union movements have 
existed. However, final control over decision-making has still rested with 
management and/or shareholders. Nevertheless, trade unions regard participation 
on company boards and at management level to be beneficial to worker interests, 
even if it does not fundamentally alter any social or economic interests in industry. 
The reason for this support is that worker participation is able to address some of 
the shortcomings, which existed with collective bargaining. Therefore, Baskin has 
concluded that  
 
(there) are signs of a trend towards greater, structured, involvement by unions in a range of issues. 
The trend towards active engagement is also noticeable at industry level. Unions are engaged in … 
issues more complex and far-reaching than anything with which they have previously dealt. At plant-
level, a significant number of companies are introducing worker participation schemes, in the hope of 
winning greater co-operation from their employees … hoping the carrot will work where the stick has 
failed. The shift by unions away from adversarialism and towards engagement with a broader range of 
issues has been widely noted. Some have spoken of a new “strategic unionism” emerging, others of a 
shift “from resistance to reconstruction”. … But, for the first time, greater co-operation with both state 
and employer is now possible. Unions have the chance to influence the macro-environment, which 
fundamentally determines what happens to their members at home and at work. 545
In addition, the first King Report seems to advance the rights and interests of other 
stakeholders in the corporation. For the purposes of this chapter, selected 
paragraphs were discussed, which arguably deal for the first time in South African 
corporate history, with the issue of worker participation in the governance processes 
of companies. The ‘bottom line’ is that the employees of the company should qualify 
as one of the ‘stakeholders’. However, whether the King Reports will have a major 
effect on the way companies operate in practice is questionable, simply because the 
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duties envisaged are effectively unenforceable. Thus, although Codes of Conduct are 
used in many countries, the main challenge is to devise an effective method of 
ensuring and enforcing compliance. If a company fails to observe the terms of the 
Code and it is not backed by legal sanction or does not provide an available remedy 
to a particular individual or interest group, the effectiveness of the same is then to 
be doubted. In chapter 6, the King Report will be discussed in greater detail. The 
effectiveness of the King II Report in considering the issue of stakeholder interests in 
the corporation will also be discussed. 
 
Additionally, Botha, frowns upon the King I Report and states that  
 
(t)he Report was commissioned and supported mainly by the South African corporate community. The 
composition of the King committee, the objectives of some of the task groups, and the terms of 
reference for the Report provide circumstantial affirmation for the submission that the motivation for 
the undertaking was primarily for institutional considerations. I submit that the main incentives were to 
protect vested interests of the corporate groups in the South African economy and to avoid direct 
governmental involvement in issues of corporate governance. It should also be noted that the Report 
was prepared at a time when the social fabric of South Africa was exposed to a process of significant 
and swift reforms arising from a combination of adjustments and changes in a number of issues 
relating to culture, customs, traditions, and politics. As far as corporate South Africa was concerned, 
these adjustments revealed, inter alia, the tensions between the liberal individualism of a refined form 
of efficient capitalism and the more socially directed concerns of ‘social capitalism’. The Report has 
emerged from these submitted initiatives and an environment of these ... conflicting influences. 546  
 
The King Report, however, should be viewed as a continuing initiative in a dynamic 
socio-political environment as South Africa enters a new era of democracy. 
Accordingly, it may be appropriate for corporations to monitor developments and 
define a course of conduct relevant to their particular business. In this way, guidance 
needs to be provided to corporations in the application and interpretation of the King 
Committee’s recommendations. Berle & Means succinctly sum up this position in 
noting that  
 
the … shareholder in the modern corporate situation has surrendered a set of definite rights for a set of 
indefinite expectations. The whole effect of the growth of powers of directors and “control” has been 
steadily to diminish the number of things on which a shareholder can count; the number of demands, 
which he can make with any assurance that must be satisfied. The stockholder is therefore left as a 
matter of law with little more than the loose expectation that a group of men, under a nominal duty to 
run the enterprise for his benefit and that others like him, will actually observe this obligation. 547  
 
                                                     
546  Derek Botha, “Confusion in the King Report”, (1996) SA Mercantile Law Journal 8, 26. 
547  Pretorius, above n 503, 12. See also Adolf A Berle & Gardiner C Means (1991), The Modern 
Corporation and Private Property, 3rd edn, 244. 
Chapter 2 161
Thus, although the classical style of management has thus far been evidenced in 
various legal systems (including the South African Companies Act), there is growing 
support for the view that this practice is not the pattern followed in boardrooms 
today. Many officials, including directors, contend that any law that supports such a 
classical approach to management, has not kept pace with society, which generally 
seems to acknowledge that the modern corporation today, should function not 
simply as an economic entity designed to maximise profit-making, but rather as one 
which, in addition, owes social responsibilities to a wider circle of interests. Thus, it is 
arguable that it is the duty of directors to consider and satisfy not only the interests 
of shareholders, but also the interests of its employees, customers, trade partners, 
the local community and the nation. 
 
In referring to the comments of Henry Ford, Beuthin notes,  
 
(m)y ambition is to employ still more men to spread the benefits of this industrial system to the 
greatest possible number, to help them build up their homes. To do this we are putting the greatest 
share of our profits back into the business. 548  
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CHAPTER 3:  
 
 
(3.0) COMPANY CONTRACTS OF SHAREHOLDERS 
VERSUS EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS OF EMPLOYEES:  
A COMPARISON OF THE STATUS OF THE 
SHAREHOLDERS AND THE EMPLOYEES WITHIN THE 
CORPORATION 
 
 
In this chapter an analogy will be sought between the position of shareholders with 
respect to their company contracts and that of employees in terms of their 
employment contracts with the company. These contracts arise from very different 
sources of legal creation. 
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(3.1) Introduction 
 
The South African Companies Act creates a legal relationship of a contractual nature 
between a corporation and its shareholders (members). The employment 
relationship is no longer solely based upon the Roman law master and servant 
principle. It is based nowadays upon various sources, which include the common 
law, legislation, customs and uses and international conventions. Thus, although 
company contracts between the company and its shareholders are created by 
legislation alone, the contract of employment, is nowadays developed by the courts 
to a significant degree. Consequently, in the development of a new corporate 
governance model for South Africa, it needs to be recognised that the employment 
contract is not completely governed by legislation, as is the case with shareholder 
contracts. Based upon the traditional Roman law concepts of employment, the rights 
and interests of employees could easily be ignored especially in so far as this might 
pertain to their participation in matters of corporate governance. There is arguably, 
however, some legislation, which could assist employees in safeguarding their rights 
and interests and thereby afford them with an opportunity of some means of 
participation in matters of corporate governance. In this chapter reference is made 
to two sections of the Companies Acts, which have, to date, generally not been 
utilised by employees. These sections include section 252, which encompasses the 
situation where any particular act or omission of a company is unfairly prejudicial, 
unjust or inequitable. The court could make an order bringing to an end the matter 
complained of on the basis of it being just and equitable to do so. Furthermore, in 
terms of section 344(h) of the South African Companies Act a court may order a 
company to be wound up if it appears to the Court to be just and equitable to do so. 
Thus, employees ought to have the right, as do creditors, to intervene by using 
these sections to assist them in their grievances. 
 
 
(3.2) The contract between a corporation and its 
shareholders in South African company law 
 
Section 65(2) of the South African Companies Act creates a legal relationship of a 
contractual nature between a corporation and its shareholders. It provides,  
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(t)he memorandum and articles shall bind the company and the members thereof to the same extent 
as if they respectively had been signed by each member, to observe all the provisions of the 
memorandum and of the articles, subject to the provisions of this Act. 549  
 
Furthermore, leading case decisions have expressed the same views. 
 
Trollip JA in Gohlke and Schneider v Westies Minerale (Edms) Bpk notes,  
 
(t)he company and its members are bound only to the same extent as if the articles had been signed 
by each member, that is, as if they had contracted in terms of the articles. The articles, therefore, 
merely have the same force as a contract between the company and each and every member as such 
to observe their provisions. 550  
 
Furthermore, in Clark v Workman, Ross J notes,  
 
(it) is a contract of the most sacred character, and it is on the faith of it that each shareholder 
advances his money. 551  
 
 
This suggests that a contract is created which entitles the shareholders to receive 
dividends in the company.  
 
 
(3.3) The employment contract 
 
In respect to employment the South African common law contract is based upon the 
Roman law principle of locatio conductio operarum. This is a common law principle in 
terms whereof a person voluntarily provides his or her services for a certain time for 
a specific salary. 
 
Venter notes, however, that the courts are  
 
shifting the contract of employment towards a more substantial and lasting relationship between 
employer and employee. 552  
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Thus, in Media Workers' Association of S.A. and Others v Perskor John AM notes,  
 
(a)t common law a contract can be brought to an end by the employer’s acceptance of the striker’s 
repudiation of his contract, evidenced by his refusal, in concert with others, to fulfill his obligations to 
work. The question in labour law, however, is whether it is fair for the employer so to do. 553  
 
Venter notes, however, that although John AM refers to the common law, by having 
added principles of fairness and justice to it, the contact has been extended to such 
a degree, that its common law elements have become “barely recognisable”. 554  
 
Hence, the various types of contracts governing the relationships between the 
company and the shareholder on the one hand, and the employer and employee on 
the other, are significantly different. 
 
Venter notes that, although the company contract to which the shareholder becomes 
a party is created by legislation, more specifically section 65(2) of the Act referred to 
above, the contract of employment, as developed by the courts, has, as its basis, the 
common law contract. 555 He further notes, however, that  
 
the quid pro quo, whether it be in the form of a dividend or in the form of wages, is derived from “ 
contract” and the ability of the company (employer) to pay either will depend on the financial well-
being of the company. … The employee is, in accordance with his contract with his company, compelled 
to tender his services in exchange for his wages. … This relationship, inter alia, includes concepts of 
fidelity and obedience. The position of the shareholder is different. The courts have affirmatively held 
that shareholders owe no duty of care to the company or to other shareholders and have traditionally 
defended the free exercise of the individual’s right to vote. Thus the respective duties of shareholder 
and employee remain far removed from one another. 556
 
Because both the shareholder and the employee derive rights from and incur 
obligations against the company by contract, both parties should be afforded the 
protection required to safeguard their rights and interests. Thus, the rights and 
interests of the employee should not, in any way, be treated by legislation as inferior 
to those rights and interests of the shareholders. Xuereb notes that no particular 
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right or interest, whether that is of the employee or shareholder, is entitled to 
predominate always. 557  Furthermore, Gower notes,  
 
(n)ow, however, the time is past when our blood can be made to run cold at the thought of crossing 
the wires of company law and ‘master and servant’ law. 558  
 
Hence, industrial democracy is demanding that the traditional master and servant 
relationship of the Victorian era is terminated. Thus,  
 
... it remains true that if the South African lawyer ignores the demands and aspirations of the 
workforce in the era of the new South Africa, he will find himself overtaken by events. 559
 
 
(3.4) Various sections of the South African Companies 
Act to provide relief to employees 
 
Various sections of the South African Companies Act 61 of 1973 may further assist 
employees in asserting their rights in the participation of corporate governance 
matters. 560 These include sections 252 and 344(h). 
 
It is necessary to consider the possible extension of relief envisaged in section 252 to 
employees of the corporation. 
 
For example, section 252 provides that 
 
(1) Any member of a company who complains that any particular act or omission of a company is 
unfairly prejudicial, unjust or inequitable, or that the affairs of the company are being conducted in a 
manner unfairly prejudicial, unjust or inequitable to him or to some part of the members of the 
company, may, subject to the provisions of subsection (2), make an application to the Court for an 
order under this section. 
 
(2) … 
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(3) If on any such application it appears to the Court that the particular act or omission is unfairly 
prejudicial, unjust or inequitable, or that the company’s affairs are being conducted as aforesaid and if 
the Court considers it just and equitable, the court may, with a view to bringing to an end the matters 
complained of, make such order as it thinks fit, whether for regulating the future conduct of the 
company’s affairs or for the purchase of the shares of any members of the company by other members 
thereof or by the company and, in the case of a purchase by the company, for the reduction 
accordingly of the company’s capital, or otherwise. In this way, section 252 permits the court to assist 
a member or members of the corporation who complain about the way the affairs of the company are 
being conducted where the same is unfairly prejudicial, unjust or inequitable. 
 
In Donaldson Investments (Pty) Ltd and Others v Anglo-Transvaal Colliers Ltd, Preiss 
J notes,  
 
... the applicant must establish a lack of probity or fair dealing, or a visible departure from the 
standards of fair dealing or a violation of the conditions of fair play on which every shareholder is 
entitled to rely. 561
 
Venter submits that the standards of fair dealing referred to above, should apply to 
employees as well. Thus, 
 
... that if sub-section 1 were to be amended to provide for the inclusion of similar rights to employees, 
this could have a profound effect on the employment relationship between companies and their 
employees because in accordance with sub-section 3, the court may make such order “as it thinks fit” 
in the circumstances. … (An amendment) will make a considerable contribution towards lessening the 
tensions between a company and its employees particularly if one anticipates a demand for some form 
of workers’ democracy in the new South Africa. 562
 
This indicates that the time is opportune for labour to erode the foundations of 
company law so that employees of the corporation do in fact have their interests 
protected in such a way that it does become meaningful to them. This idea will be 
more fully explored in this thesis where the birth of a new model of corporate 
governance will be proposed. 
 
An aggrieved employee should be able to rely on the provisions of sub-section 3 in 
terms whereof the court could make an order bringing to an end the matter 
complained of on the basis of it being just and equitable to do so. Thus,  
…it is suggested that where the company is conducting its affairs as described in sub-section 1, an 
employee could obtain rights in addition to those to which he may be entitled under existing law. The 
employee could also protect his rights in cases of unfairness, which may be more extensive under the 
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section than any rights he may enjoy in unfairness situations in labour law. Where the matter 
complained of is of a nature that will seriously impair the well being of a company’s employees or their 
relationship with the company, the situation could be prevented by the intervention of an employee or 
employees in terms of the section. 563  
 
There are sound reasons to extend the provisions of section 252 to include the 
interests and of employees as well. This is primarily due to the fact that neither the 
employee nor the corporation could abuse the provisions of section 252 because the 
right to grant relief at all times vests in the court. 
 
Furthermore, section 344(h) of the South African Companies Act pertains to one of 
the circumstances where a court may order a company to be wound up. See also 
heading 2.1 above. It provides that 
 
A company may be wound up by the court if: 
... 
(h) it appears to the Court that it is just and equitable that the company should be wound up. 564  
 
In a discussion of section 111(g) of the now repealed Companies Act of 1926, which 
is very similar to the present 344(h), Trollip J in Moosa N.O. v Maujee Bhawan (Pty) 
Ltd and Another notes,  
 
... just and equitable ... postulates not facts but only a broad conclusion of law, justice and equity, as a 
grounds for winding-up. ... In its terms and effect, therefore, sec. 111(g) confers upon the Court a 
very wide discretionary power, the only limitation arguably being that it had to be exercised judicially 
with due regards to the justice and equity of the competing interests of all concerned. 565
 
Furthermore, Meskin et al note,  
 
... an applicant must come to court with clean hands and a creditor may apply provided that if the 
creditor is not also a member, or entitled to be registered as a member, he must have a legitimate 
interest. 566
 
With regard to the competing interests of all concerned, two important issues arise, 
which are: 
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(a) Where conduct by the directors or the members is fraudulent or otherwise wrongful, oppressive or 
unfair, then the competing interests of all the stakeholders (including the employees) in the 
corporation ought to be considered. With regard to employees themselves, this is significant because of 
the fact that their existence depends on the company’s affairs being managed properly; and 
 
(b) Where a company is not properly managing its affairs, and as a consequence of which is forced into 
liquidation, employees ought to have the right, as do creditors, to intervene.  
 
In Sweet v Finbain, it was noted that  
 
... there are individuals with rights, expectations and obligations, inter se, which are not necessarily 
submerged in the company structure. One such individual must surely be an employee for if a creditor 
is able to rely on section 344(h) to protect his debt, there is no reason in law or in logic why an 
employee should not indulge in the same privilege so as to protect his vital interests. It seems that 
employees have been timid or reluctant in applying the provisions of this subsection towards protecting 
their interests but this is no doubt due to a lack of knowledge of the internal workings of the company. 
... 567  
 
Finally, Simitis notes,  
 
... The law must replace the unilateral decision of the employer by an increasingly objective decision-
making process. ...The legislature must increasingly intervene … with the aim of steering economic and 
social developments in a direction, which … control social conflict. … (J)uridification is an inescapable 
consequence of industrialisation … to achieve … a democratic society. A study of the process and 
effects of juridification cannot simply concentrate on ‘labour law’ in the narrow sense, but must see 
labour law as part of a wider ‘social law’ convening the whole employment relationship. 568  
 
It would appear, therefore, that there are sound reasons for the introduction of 
legislation, which would allow employees in companies the opportunity to have a 
more equal treatment in law with shareholders. Thus, this principle would enable 
directors to satisfy the interests of employees, but would be subordinated to those 
interests of its shareholders where this is reasonably required or necessary in long-
term shareholder and employee interests, but not otherwise. 569  
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(3.5) Conclusion 
 
Section 65(2) of the South African Companies Act creates a legal relationship of a 
contractual nature between a corporation and its shareholders. However, the courts 
have shifted the contract of employment towards a more substantial and lasting 
relationship between employer and employee. The employment relationship is no 
longer solely based upon the Roman law locatio conductio operarum (master and 
servant) principle. It is composed of and based nowadays upon the common law, 
legislation, customs and uses and international conventions. This is due to the fact 
that the employee/employer relationship is no longer based solely upon the 
traditional master and servant relationship. The employment relationship is further 
shaped and developed by inter alia economics, sociology and political science. 570  
 
There are good reasons for extending the provisions of section 252 to include, in 
addition, a consideration of the rights and interests of the employees as stakeholders 
of the corporation. This is primarily because neither the employees nor the 
corporation would be able to abuse the provisions of section 252, as the right to 
grant relief would remain fixed in the hands of the courts. 
 
Furthermore, regarding section 344(h), if a creditor is able to rely on this section to 
protect his or her debt, there is no reason in law or in logic why an employee should 
not be able to do the same in order to protect his or her rights and interests. 
Consequently, where the conduct of a director or member is fraudulent or otherwise 
wrongful, oppressive or unfair or where a company is not properly managing its 
affairs, then the competing interests of all the stakeholders (including the 
employees) in the corporation ought to be considered. 
 
Further to this, Xuereb notes,  
 
(i)t is submitted that the answer lies in the law’s demanding that directors act in continuing interests of 
the hypothetical shareholder and hypothetical employee, balancing short-term interests against long-
term interests so that short-term demands of either group will be met … provided these are compatible 
with long-term interests (… a continuing reputation for taking employee interests into account). 571  
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By extending the practical application of these two provisions of the Companies Acts 
to employees, a movement in the right direction towards an improved model of 
corporate governance for South Africa can be achieved. 
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CHAPTER 4:  
 
 
(4.0) THE IMPACT OF DIRECTORS' DUTIES ON THE 
INTERESTS OF THE CORPORATION’S STAKEHOLDERS 
 
 
In this chapter a closer consideration will be undertaken in respect to the duties of 
directors and to whom these currently apply and should in the future apply. In this 
regard, various considerations and views will be noted and discussed. The directors’ 
duties towards its shareholders, employees, creditors, bondholders/debenture 
holders and the community and environment will also be documented and compared 
in different legal jurisdictions. It is significant to determine the scope of the duties of 
directors and to whom they should or could apply in the formulation of a new 
corporate governance model for South Africa.  
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(4.1) Introduction 
 
This is a period of major change for company law in South Africa. It was argued in 
chapter 1 of this thesis that the traditional rules and concepts enshrining the 
doctrine of profit maximisation for shareholders and which may have served their 
purpose well a century ago when companies brought their disputes, are now 
anachronistic and can no longer cope satisfactorily today even with the same 
problems. Procedures, remedies, concepts and fact-situations have been modified or 
altered completely, and thus we must expect the law to respond and adapt 
accordingly thereto as well. 
 
Consequently, regarding the fiduciary duties of directors, the courts do not recognise 
the validity of articles, which release directors from their duties towards the 
company. However, although the articles confer powers upon directors, they do not 
themselves constitute a contract between the company and director. Thus, the 
articles cannot alone impose duties or confer rights on directors. However, a director 
and a company could enter into a contract to confer these rights and impose these 
duties. Usually, when a directorship is accepted without such an express contract 
having been created, an implied contract is deemed to exist to the extent that the 
director is entitled to such rights and subject to such duties as the articles purport to 
confer and impose upon its directors. However, the courts do recognise that the 
articles of a corporation allow a director to fulfil his or her duty of disclosure to the 
company through a disclosure to the board rather than to the general meeting. 
Furthermore, the articles permit a director to retain an “incidental profit” and to act 
in matters in which he or she may have a corporate interest. 572  
 
From the above, it is clear that directors’ duties may not always be clearly defined in 
terms of the articles or an agreed contract. Thus, the question to be determined is 
how to best define the director’s fiduciary duty and, more specifically, whether it 
should be cast narrowly to maximise shareholders’ wealth or whether it should be 
extended to non-shareholder constituencies as well. Consequently, although 
directors in the performance of their duties stand in a fiduciary relationship to the 
company alone, it is unclear as to what precisely these fiduciary duties entail.573 It is 
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argued that directors should be under a duty to have regard to the interests of the 
other groups – for example, the employees, customers, suppliers, bondholders and 
the community and environment. Thus, many writers have challenged the traditional 
rules of company law regarding directors’ duties applying only to the shareholders 
and to the company itself. It is only with creditors that sentiments have been 
expressed through the courts and writers that the fiduciary duties of directors need 
not necessarily be extended. Some writers argue that creditors’ interests are 
sufficiently safeguarded by the law as it currently stands. 
 
Whatever is decided by our courts in the future or whatever legislation on directors’ 
duties is enacted, a director must act reasonably to the stakeholders at all times. 
Thus, in conducting the affairs of the company, a director must act reasonably in 
accordance with the uniqueness of that company. In other words, the kind of 
company it is and its nature of business are subjective elements against which the 
question of reasonableness has to be assessed. 574
 
 
(4.2) Background 
 
Much of the English company law adopted by South Africa reflects the Victorian 
perception of the company including the notion that the director acts as an agent or 
trustee for his or her constituents, the shareholders and the company itself.  
 
Sealy notes,  
 
(i)t is (the shareholders) who have chosen him, warts and all; they who can remove him; they who can 
ratify his acts in excess of authority and forgive his sins; even, for many decades, they who could 
dictate to him and his co-directors how to run the business. His duties of care and skill can properly be 
assessed by subjective criteria, since he has been elected for whatever qualities he has. And in fixing 
his duties to the company it is right to take account of the particular terms of the members’ social 
contract (i.e. the memorandum, including the objects clause, and the articles of association), since all 
concerned are party to it. 575  
 
Additionally, in the decision of Re Smith v Fawcett Ltd Lord Greene MR recites the 
traditional company law principle that directors owe their duties only to the company 
and they do so individually:  
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(d)irectors must exercise their discretion bona fide ... in the interests of the company, and not for any 
collateral purpose. 576  
 
In addition, Ford notes,  
the members is the membership as a continuum: directors are to “balance a long term view against 
the short term interest of the present members”.… (T)he members’ “capacity as associated persons” 
requires their particular social contract to be taken into account: ... the position ... is that the company 
is the totality of members viewed in the light of their association and corporate objects.  577
 
Sealy notes that, traditionally, directors owe no legal duties to any of the non-
shareholder constituents, including the employees and creditors. 578 Hence, with 
regard to the traditional rules of company law, directors’ duties were regarded as 
being owed to the company and to the company alone. Directors were not bound to 
consider the interests of other groups including the employees, creditors, customers 
and suppliers, or to have any concern for the community, the environment, welfare 
or charity unless, by doing so, this would have derivative benefits for their 
shareholders. Indeed, in Australia as well, although directors should be obliged to 
consider the interests of its employees, customers, contractors and the community 
“when making decisions for the company, there is no case law or corporations 
legislation in Australia that imposes that obligation”. 579
 
Sealy notes that there are widely-held views, however, that the law on directors’ 
duties should be modified, extended, substituted or altered so as to recognise the 
role played in modern business by groups other than shareholders, and particularly 
by its employees. The view has also been expressed that directors should be under a 
duty to have regard to the interests of these other groups.  
 
It is against this background that many practitioners and academics have challenged 
the traditional rules and concepts of company law regarding directors’ duties. 
Indeed, the traditional rule that the directors of a company owe their duties to the 
company and to the hypothetical individual shareholder has been subject to such 
significant pressure for change  
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over the last twenty five years that it is not surprising to see other “attempts” to wear away this 
hallowed rule of law. 580
 
 
(4.3) The traditional concepts of the directors' duties 
under challenge 
 
As noted previously, the law, having until now generally concentrated on the 
interests of shareholders to the detriment of other groups, is thought to be too 
narrow. It has been contended by many groups that the law ought to oblige directors 
to have regard to the interests of other stakeholders in the corporation as well.  
 
Thus, 
 
those who manage our business corporations should concern themselves with the interests of 
employees, consumers, and the general public, as well as of the stockholders … . [Those acting for the 
corporation should] employ its funds … imbued, with a sense of social responsibility. 581  
 
There have even been demands for the recognition of interests of the corporations’ 
employees, their customers, suppliers, creditors and even the local community and 
environment. This problem has been the subject of debate at different times in 
different contexts. This chapter focuses on some of the main debates in this regard 
and will be highlighting the problems associated therewith. Additionally, the view 
that there is lack of clarity as to the role of the board of directors, a question, which 
arguably precedes any discussion of duty, is explored. 582
 
(4.3.1) VARIOUS CONSIDERATIONS AND VIEWS 
 
A useful starting point in considering the views of others with regard to the ambit 
and extent of the duties of directors is Sealy’s contention. He notes,  
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... what goes for employees would probably apply also to the case of any other interest group, such as 
local residents, customers, and so on. It should be stressed that the issue is not whether any of these 
“wider” interests merits recognition and protection, but whether this can be satisfactorily achieved 
within the framework of company law as we know it, through the conceptual and remedial vehicle of 
directors’ duties. 583  
 
However, this view may be too narrow, as it would, most likely, not provide 
interested stakeholders, other than the shareholders themselves, with an 
opportunity of participating in the decision-making processes at board level, or, 
perhaps, in representing themselves in a manner that is meaningful to them and to 
the corporation. It may be necessary to break away from the confines of traditional 
company law. 
 
Furthermore, Sealy’s statement does not conform to the modern day view in 
allowing participatory or decision-making roles to all stakeholders in the corporation. 
He notes,  
 
(t)o extend directors’ duties so as to embrace the interests of employees and similar groups … is to 
deny any effective role for the law and the courts. The concept of “duty” ceases to be justiciable, and 
company law lacks proper enforcement procedures. At best, these enlarged “duties” can only provide 
directors with a defence against self-centred claims brought by shareholders. 584
 
With regard to the traditional model of the corporation, directors’ duties are 
perceived entirely in terms of the members, present and future. However, this 
simple model is inadequate when the interests of the other stakeholders, such as 
employees, are taken into account. If directors are to be required to have regard to 
the same, it is then no longer appropriate to regard the membership (shareholders) 
alone as the constituent body and to entrust it with an unfettered power to do as it 
pleases. Thus, it can be argued that, in this way, objective criteria ought to be used 
to measure the directors’ standards of care and skill, since these “new” stakeholders 
have had no say whatsoever in appointing them to office. 
 
It is also argued that the position of shareholders is not “inherently special” and 
therefore the company should not only be run to maximise shareholder profits. There 
are three classes of stakeholders: shareholders, parties who contract with the 
company and parties who have a non-contractual nexus with the company (see part 
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2.8). All stakeholders (whether they have some contractual interests in the company 
or not) are, therefore, entitled to complain if the company has failed to deliver (see 
chapters 2,3 and 4). Stakeholders with contractual interests would include 
employees, customers, suppliers, business partners, subcontractors and creditors 
(see part 6.5.3). Stakeholders with usually no contractual interests would include 
neighbours, local authorities and communities and the government (see part 6.3.3). 
Furthermore, an independent, non-executive director, who is not a representative of 
a major share owner or nominated by such share owner and is not a professional 
advisor or significant supplier or customer to the company or its group, has no 
significant contractual relationship with the company or group and is free from any 
business or other relationship that could materially interfere with his or her capacity 
to act in an independent manner (see part 6.5.2).  
 
Nowhere is there an explicit promise to maximise shareholder profits. Furthermore, 
this promise cannot be implied from shareholders property rights. All that can be 
said is that there is a promise to run the business in accordance with certain 
objectives, which were established at such time when the shareholders invested. The 
traditional models currently in use do not provide compelling justification for the 
adoption of a rule of shareholder primacy. Thus,  
 
it seems there is no such rule and nor should there be. 585
 
Sealy does concede, however, that there is a sound argument by some that, for the 
future, it will be necessary  
 
for the law to conceptualise “the company” not as the corporate membership but as the corporate 
enterprise, … to formulat(e) new rules of director’ duties … where interests other than purely 
membership interests are affected. … Such an approach would … more accurately reflect the modern 
director’ own attitudes: … they are conscious that their company has shareholders, but they are … 
aware that it has customers, a workforce, goodwill, a product, a brand-name and logo, possibly even a 
company flag and anthem. 586  
 
Sealy, however, notes unconvincingly that this duty, which is formulated, raises a 
justiciable issue. That is, where duties are owed to stakeholders who have potentially 
opposed interests, the duty “bifurcates and fragments” and becomes only a vague 
obligation to be fair, which then becomes non-justiciable. Thus, argues Sealy, it is 
impossible to impose co-existing duties towards all of the stakeholders in any 
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situation of conflict. If legislation does this, it would then abandon all control over 
the decision-maker. 587  
 
However, in Ngurli Ltd v McCann it was noted,  
 
the powers conferred on shareholders in general meeting on directors by the articles of association of 
companies can be exceeded although there is a literal compliance with their terms. ... Voting powers 
conferred on shareholders and powers conferred on directors ... must be used bona fide for the benefit 
of the company as a whole. 588  
 
Sealy refers to the meaning of “the company as a whole” and notes that the phrase 
has an elusive meaning. Some commentators believe that it should include all 
stakeholders, including the shareholders, employees and creditors. The better view, 
notes Sealy, is to say that it could “mean different things in different contexts”, 
provided that the company is regarded as a commercial entity. 589  
 
Modern corporations must, however, acknowledge that it should and does have 
obligations of social responsibility. That is, times have changed and therefore the 
interests of employees and of other interested stakeholders must be furthered by 
amendments to company and labour legislation in terms of which the fiduciary duties 
of directors in respect of these groups are placed alongside (and with equal 
enforcement) to those duties shown to the shareholders. Hence, there is a demand 
for a shift in emphasis in order that company and labour legislation can address the 
day-to-day problems of employees in the employment relationship, including the 
interests of other stakeholders, rather than exclusively concerning itself with 
traditional legal concepts and institutions. Thus, although the corporate entity has 
been used more and more in most economies, company law has, to some degree, 
remained fixed in the nineteenth century. Thus, any “new” company and labour 
legislation that comes into existence must permit directors to act in such a manner 
that the corporation’s interests are equally directed towards a consideration of its 
employee’s interests and the interests of other stakeholders. 
 
Furthermore, Venter notes that in England, prior to the enactment of section 309 of 
the English Companies Act of 1985, which was referred to in chapter 2 of this thesis, 
the interests of employees could only be taken into account by the directors of a 
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company insofar as a decision in this regard would contribute towards the profit-
making goals of the company. 590 Thus, Bowen LJ in Hutton v West Cork Railway Co 
notes,  
 
(t)he law does not say that there are to be no cakes and ale, but there are to be no cakes and ale 
except such as are required for the benefit of the company. Charity has no business to sit at boards of 
directors qua charity. There is, however, a kind of charitable dealing, which is for the interest of those 
who practice it, and to that extent and in that garb (I admit a not very philanthropic garb) charity may 
sit at the board, but for no other purpose. 591  
 
However, Venter notes that in relation to the rights and interests of the employees, 
directors are under a duty to comply with the objects of the company, in a way that 
is not ultra vires. 592 Thus, directors, in reaching their decisions, should take into 
account the interests of employees without acting ultra vires. Therefore, a company 
can no longer be viewed as one that only maximises shareholder profits. It should be 
regarded rather as an entity in terms of which the shareholders are the “providers of 
capital” and the “employees the providers of labour”. 593 Consequently, company law 
can no longer ignore the interests and rights of employees. If this view were 
adopted, South African company legislation would then become “legitimized” through 
the recognition of the rights and interests of employees. This is important in the 
transitional period, which South Africa is currently going through. Employees would 
then play a significant role in determining their futures, which would lessen any 
impacts in respect of the “social, political and economic future” of South Africa. Thus, 
 
(l)awyers cannot continue wearing blinkers in their application of laws, which have become unsuited 
and are unable to cope with the realities of current corporate life. ... If one assumes that a remedy 
ought to lie where there is a legitimate interest of the employee and, which is worthy of protection, 
then company law ought to recognise, not necessarily that directors owe a duty to employees, but that 
the employees have a legitimate interest in enforcing the duty owed by directors to the company to act 
in the interests of the company as a whole. 594  
 
Likewise, Botha argues for the need for corporations to take into account the rights 
and interests of the non-shareholder constituents and to develop and implement 
social responsibility concepts. 595 Thus, Botha notes that there is “a continuum”, 
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which stretches from a broad to a strict interpretation. The groups at either end of 
this continuum are the “social reformers” and the “free-market proponents”. Social 
reformers extend the responsibility of business to include social responsibility. 596 
Thus, the company accepts social values, which places constraints on behaviour and 
thus guides directors towards “socially-responsible directions”. Free-market 
proponents, however, focus solely upon the maximisation of profits for shareholders. 
Levitt, however, notes that welfare and society are not the company’s business. 
Thus, its business was to “make money, not sweet music”. 597  
 
Furthermore, Friedman notes that it is not for a business to  
 
rectify social ills, which burden a society. ... A doctrine of social responsibility subverts the ends of a 
free society: it is the objective of company officials to make as much money as possible for their 
shareholders - these officials have no authority to spend shareholders’ money on projects, which the 
officials deem to satisfy socially-responsible needs. 598  
 
However, Botha notes that the South African corporate economy is shifting along the 
continuum fairly rapidly from a “mixed economy” at the free-market end to social 
reformation, as companies and stakeholders focus upon societal issues. 599  
 
Although the South African corporate-management strategy had once been 
determined essentially by the primary profit-making function of maximising 
shareholders’ wealth, with the recent repeal of repressive laws, which formed the 
cornerstone of apartheid policy, the socio-political goals of corporations will surface 
and will result in a form of legal ideology characteristic of a social democracy. 600 In 
addition, “future corporate philosophy” in South Africa will be influenced by the 
implementation of programmes of “social responsibility”. If the two main objectives 
of improving the economy and social welfare are to succeed, both the government 
and the private sector need to be aware of their responsibilities towards the 
community.  
 
Changes in socio-political attitudes in South Africa have allowed pressure groups to 
expect changes from corporations. These changes reflect a significant responsibility 
towards its employees and the community. Additionally, investment programmes 
                                                     
596  Ibid 91. 
597  Ibid 91. See also T Levitt, “The dangers of social responsibility” in T Beauchamp & N Bowie (1983), 
Ethical Theory and Business, 2nd edn, 91. 
598  Ibid 91, referring to M Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom, 1962, at 133. 
599  Ibid 91. 
600  Ibid 92. 
Chapter 4 182
have been launched, which do not necessarily focus upon maximising shareholders’ 
wealth, but instead upon the “secondary, socio-economic goal”. 601 Thus, the political 
structures in South Africa in the future will need to have significant economic 
dimensions - a change from the primary goal of corporations to maximise 
shareholder’s wealth to one that includes a much higher level of corporate social and 
community responsibility. 
 
It should also be remembered that many shareholders do not regard themselves as 
charity organisations - they want good returns on their investments. If a corporation 
is heavily engaged in providing facilities for communities in order to demonstrate to 
the world their social responsibilities and the corporation is seen to be doing this at 
the expense of the shareholders, there will be little reason for many shareholders to 
invest their hard-earned monies within that organisation. In this regard, a vital 
balance needs to be struck in terms of which the shareholders’ interests are well 
looked after, but, at the same time, the corporation is assisting its communities and 
the environment (and perhaps the country itself) in a socially meaningful and 
significant manner.  
 
 
(4.4) Directors' duties to creditors 
 
The traditional view of company law was that the interests of the company were 
closely, if not exclusively, identified with those of the members (shareholders). A 
consequence of the fact that the interests of the company were so closely linked with 
those of the shareholders meant that, in the past, directors would generally not take 
into account the interests of anyone else having a stake in the company, such as the 
company’s employees or its creditors. Furthermore, it was also mentioned that, 
provided some benefit can be found to the company, it seems to have been accepted 
that directors may consider and even advance interests other than those of the 
company’s members. 
 
Regarding the question of the rights and interests of creditors, Ziegel believes that 
many creditors cannot protect themselves adequately. Sometimes, creditors have no 
option but to extend credit and the debtor is either unwilling or unable to offer any 
security. This raises the question of whether it would not be unreasonable, in 
exchange for the benefit of limited liability, to impose a duty on directors to consider 
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the interests of creditors when this becomes necessary. 602 Additionally, as far back 
as 1939, it was stated in the US decision of Pepper v Lutton that directors owe a 
fiduciary duty to both shareholders and creditors. 603 Thus, it was noted, 
 
(t)he standard of fiduciary obligation is designed for the protection of the entire community of the 
interest in the corporation creditors as well as the stockholders. 
 
There have been positive changes in the attitudes of the courts towards company 
“outsiders”, such as creditors, consumers, employees and the State. The courts are 
taking social values into account and are therefore moving away from the traditional 
company law concepts enshrining maximum profits for shareholders. 604 Dawson, for 
example, notes that during the past twenty to thirty years, modern companies have 
been, to a greater extent, obliged to take into account the rights and interests of 
stakeholders other than the shareholders. This signals a greater concern regarding 
the “appropriateness” of a company law model that considers that its primary goals 
would be to only make profits for its shareholders. 605 Hodes, therefore, notes that it 
is important to determine whether company legislation has developed to meet the 
new social demands, which are imposed by society. 606 Nowadays, directors are 
expected to take into account the interests and rights of all the stakeholders in a 
“socially useful” way. Then, the courts will not interfere. 607 Thus, it has been argued 
that, in developing principles in recent years, the courts have not considered the 
company as an entity distinct from its creditors or employees, but have included 
these groups within the definition of a “company”. 608  
 
In the Australian High Court decision of Walker v Wimbourne, Mason J notes,  
 
it should be emphasised that the directors of a company, in discharging their duty to the company, 
must take account of the interest of its shareholders and its creditors. Any failure by the directors to 
take into account the interests of creditors will have adverse consequences for the company as well as 
for them. 609  
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This was the first case in Australia to establish that directors should consider the 
consequences of their actions towards creditors. Thus, it was stated in this case that 
directors must, when discharging their duty to the company, take into consideration 
the interests of its shareholders and its creditors. Failure by directors to take 
creditors’ interests into account would result in unfavourable consequences not only 
towards the creditors, but to the company as well. However, Mason J did not indicate 
whether, what he had decided, applied only to insolvent companies, or whether it 
applied equally to solvent corporations as well. Had he intended his statement to 
apply only to insolvent companies, it is expected that he would have made this very 
clear. It can therefore be assumed (unless shown to be otherwise) that he intended 
the position to apply to solvent companies as well. This judgment would therefore 
extend the notion of fiduciary duties in such a manner that it would include the 
rights of creditors as well. 
 
In Lonrho Ltd & Another v Shell Petroleum Co Ltd & Another the House of Lords also 
suggested that the company’s interests could include those of the creditors. No 
prerequisite was mentioned that special circumstances, such as insolvency, would be 
necessary for such a duty to exist.  610  
 
However, in England, in the case of Multinational Gas and Petrochemical Co. v 
Multinational Gas and Petrochemical Services Ltd, Dillon LJ indicated that a company 
does not owe a duty of care to creditors and neither do they owe a fiduciary duty to 
present or future creditors. 611  
 
A later decision in New Zealand of Nicholson v Permakraft did not set out the duties 
of directors towards its creditors in such broad terms. 612 Cooke J held that the 
duties of directors might include a consideration of the interests of creditors. This is 
so, notes Cooke J, if the company is insolvent, nearly insolvent, doubtfully solvent, 
or if a payment would jeopardise its solvency. Cooke J supra restated the principle 
that the directors’ duties are owed to the company, although this may require them 
to consider the interests of creditors. In addition, it was held that the duty to 
consider the interests of creditors arose only when the solvency of the company was 
in question. It was also indicated that this duty was owed to existing rather than 
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future creditors. Thus, insolvency was a condition to be satisfied before directors 
could take the interests of creditors into account. 
 
In the Australian Court of Appeal judgment of Kinsela and Another v Russel Kinsela 
Pty. Ltd (in liquidation) Street CJ held that in a solvent company the interests of the 
shareholders entitle them to be regarded as the company when questions of the duty 
of directors arose. The directors could therefore authorise or ratify a particular action 
without any challenge to the validity of their actions. Where a company is insolvent, 
however, the interests of creditors become significant, as they become entitled, 
through liquidation proceedings, to deal with the company’s assets. This is because 
the assets now belong to the creditors and not the shareholders. 613 Thus, Street CJ 
indicated that members could not validate an act, which amounted to a fraud on the 
creditors. Street CJ held that where the interests at risk are those of creditors, 
shareholders would not be able to authorise any breach of action against them. 
Thus, the shareholders do not have the power or authority to absolve the directors 
from breach against the creditors. Thus, the director’ duty to a company as a whole 
extends, in insolvency cases, to not prejudicing the interests of its creditors. 614
 
Thus, although the court did not formulate a general test, which could be imposed 
upon directors to oblige them to consider the interests of creditors, the court did 
accept that, at the very least, the duty does arise when a company is insolvent, as it 
is the creditors money, which is now at risk in contrast to the shareholders’ 
proprietary interests. Hence, this judgment identified that the duty to consider the 
interests of creditors arises, at the very least, in insolvent circumstances, which is to 
be seen as part of the duty of directors to act in the interests of the company. 
 
However, in the English decision of Winkworth v Edward Baron Development 
Company Ltd and Others Lord Templeton noted,  
 
a company owes a duty to its creditors, present and future. … (T)he company owes a duty to its 
creditors to keep its property inviolate and available for the repayment of its debts. … A duty is owed 
by the directors to the company and to the creditors of the company to ensure that the affairs of the 
company are properly administered and that its property is not … exploited for the benefit of the 
directors … to the prejudice of the creditors. 615
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In this context, Lord Templeton noted that a company owed a duty to its creditors, 
both present and future. The court seemed to contemplate distinct duties owed by 
the directors to both the company and to its creditors. Hence, although the dicta in a 
decision such as Walker v Wimbourne supra, were expressed rather cautiously and 
narrowly, the dicta of Lord Templeton are, according to Sealy,  
 
couched in more extravagant terms, which strike at the very foundations of that policy. 616
 
The “policy” referred to here are the principles of company law requiring directors to 
act in the interests of the company and the company alone. Therefore, the inference 
to be drawn is that a duty to creditors exists at all times and not only in insolvency 
circumstances. 
 
The suggestion that duties are owed to present and future creditors is arguable. It 
may be impossible for the directors to take risks then. What would be the position if 
directors entered into a transaction resulting in a loss? Would this then imply that 
the directors had disregarded the interests of its creditors? It may well be 
unreasonable to place a burden on directors to maximise the profits of the 
corporation by undertaking risks, yet at the same time, cast a duty upon them “to 
keep its property inviolate and available for repayment of its debts”. Consequently, it 
may well be quite difficult, if not impossible at times, for a director to strike a 
balance between the interests of its shareholders and those of its creditors.  
 
In a further English decision of the Court of Appeal, Nourse LJ in Brady and another 
v Brady and another examined the expression “in the interests of the company” and 
held that this phrase may have different meanings in different contexts. 617 He noted 
that when a company is solvent, the interests and rights of the shareholders, both 
present and future, are to be considered first. Thus, in the situation where the 
company has many assets and the debts are few, “the interests of the creditors 
ought not to count for very much”. However, where the company is insolvent, nearly 
insolvent or doubtfully solvent, the interests of the company would then become 
solely the interests of existing creditors. 618 This decision is significant because it 
recognises the wider concept of the “company” as one that would include groups 
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other than the shareholders. The decision also attempts to provide guidelines as to 
when the duty to creditors arises. 619  
 
As stated in the Permakraft case any proposed course of action, which would 
prejudice the company’s solvency and thereby impact directly upon the interests of 
creditors, would require due consideration by the directors. 620 This may well have 
far-reaching implications for directors, as most ventures that are undertaken by 
them will be of some risk to creditors.  
 
It is through the extension of the concept of the company to include those groups, 
which traditionally have been considered outsiders, that the courts have been able to 
state that directors, when complying with their duties to the company, need to 
consider the interests of stakeholders other than the shareholders themselves. This 
indicates that there has been a movement away from identifying the interests of the 
company with the financial interests of its shareholders to a situation where the 
courts have ordered directors to consider the interests of other stakeholders. Thus, 
the duty to consider the interests of creditors is owed to the company. 621
 
The decision of Jeffree v National Companies and Securities Commission considered 
the question of the duties towards creditors. 622 In this case, proceedings were 
brought against Jeffree on the basis of section 229(4) of the Australian Companies 
Legislation, which provides that 
 
(a)n officer or employee of a corporation shall not make improper use of his position as such an officer 
... to gain, directly or indirectly, an advantage for himself or for any other person or to cause detriment 
to the corporation. 
 
Jeffree was found liable on the basis of this section. The court also based its decision 
on Walker's and Kinsela's cases supra where it was noted that, in certain 
circumstances, especially where a company is in financial difficulties, directors owe 
an obligation to their creditors. The court a quo's decision was confirmed on appeal 
where it was noted that the duties of directors extend to both creditors and to 
prospective creditors. 
 
                                                     
619  Newham, above n 604, 31. 
620  Nicholson v Permakraft, above n 611, at 250. 
621  Ibid 45. 
622  Jeffree v National Companies and Securities Commission (1989) 15 ACLR 217, 7 ACLC 556. 
Chapter 4 188
Hence, the learned judges did not restrict their statement only to companies, which 
were in the process of being liquidated, but adopted rather a more general approach 
as laid down by Lord Templeton in Winkworth's case supra where it was specifically 
noted that directors owe a duty to present and future creditors. 
 
The approach of the court in Jeffree was the same as that adopted by the Court of 
Appeal of New South Wales in Ring v Sutton where it was held that directors owe a 
duty to creditors even when the company is solvent. 623 However, the opposite view 
was held in Re Horsley v Weight, where the court held that the directors’ duty to 
creditors arose only when the company is insolvent. 624  
 
In a more recent Australian decision of Spies v The Queen the court held per 
Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ that directors do not owe an independent 
duty to, nor is it enforceable by, creditors of the company. 625 This is so even though 
such creditors may also be directors of the company. 626 The court refers to the 
Walker decision and notes, 
 
(i)t is “extremely doubtful” whether Mason J “intended to suggest that directors owe an independent 
duty directly to creditors”. To give some unsecured creditors remedies in an insolvency, which are 
denied to others would undermine the basic principle of pari passu (my italics) participation by 
creditors. 627
 
Thus, the court noted that any suggestion that directors owe an independent duty to 
creditors, by reason of their position as directors, “are contrary to principle and later 
authority and do not correctly state the law”. 628
 
Hargovan discusses the decision of Spies v The Queen. 629 He focuses on whether 
the majority judgment in Spies was significant in confirming whether directors owe 
an independent duty to creditors to consider their interests.630 Hargovan submits, 
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the context, explicit language and the strength of the majority’s statements makes Spies the strongest 
authority on the Australian position concerning directors’ fiduciary duties to creditors. 631
 
Thus, Hargovan maintains that the decision in Spies affirmed the position that 
directors do not owe an independent duty directly to creditors. 632 He notes that the 
“deliberate and emphatic language used” clearly indicated that the Spies case was 
“an authoritative judicial statement”, which rejected independent fiduciary duties to 
creditors. 633
 
He also notes that the judges in casu expressly rejected the decision in Nicholson v 
Permakraft (NZ) Ltd, which indicated that directors owe an independent duty to 
creditors. 634 However, Hargovan does note that the majority in Spies confirmed that 
directors owed a duty of imperfect obligations to creditors, which creditors cannot 
enforce except through the company itself or appointed liquidator. This recognises 
the rights of creditors in the interests of the company in insolvency situations. 635
 
The term “imperfect obligation” was traditionally used in contract law to describe 
arbitration agreements. It was only used recently in company law to describe the 
relationship between directors and creditors. In describing imperfect obligations, this 
means that directors must take into account the interests of creditors, but creditors 
cannot seek action against those directors who act contrary to their interests. 636 
Thus, rather than the directors owing a direct duty to creditors, an indirect duty is 
owed to creditors to consider their interests through the company. 637
 
Thus, although the decision in Walker in its own right will remain influential for 
future cases, it can no longer stand alone as influential authority regarding the 
question of an independent fiduciary duty to creditors. It needs to be considered 
along with the decision in Spies. 638 Thus, 
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the prospect of judicial development of an independent fiduciary duty to creditors is without strong 
foundation. 639 … Whilst a future Australian High Court is always free to depart from its previous 
judgments, it is submitted that based on the detailed analysis of Spies … it is unlikely to lightly 
disregard the unanimous and reasoned statements of four High Court judges and resuscitate the issue 
of independent fiduciary duty. 640
 
McConvill, on the other hand, still believes that despite the decision in Spies, there is 
still “a degree of uncertainty” regarding the relationship between directors and 
creditors. More specifically, he writes that the decision in Spies, regarding the duties 
of directors towards its creditors, was “merely obiter”. 641 Accordingly, he writes, 
“there is a possibility” that “Australian company law” would support the view that the 
directors owe a separate fiduciary duty to creditors. He notes that there are policy 
reasons for recognising this fiduciary duty. That is, if creditors are owed merely a 
duty of imperfect obligations, creditors would need to rely extensively upon the 
Corporations Act 2001 to adequately protect their rights and interests. 642
 
Thus, McConvill maintains that the decision in Spies does not depart from the 
comments of Mason J in the Walker case. In this way, the decision in Spies “no way 
changes or clarifies” this relationship. If anything, he states that the Spies decision 
has encouraged “greater use of remedies under the (Australian) Corporations Act 
2001”. 643 However, he notes that whereas the insolvent trading provisions of the 
Australian Corporations Act 2001 are only triggered when the company is insolvent, 
an independent fiduciary duty to creditors would become available even prior to 
insolvency. 644 Creditors, under section 588R(1), must first obtain the consent of the 
liquidator or be granted leave by the court before they can enforce the duty of 
directors under section 588G not to trade during insolvency. 645 Thus, the “utility” of 
section 588G and the other “insolvency trading provisions for creditors is not as 
substantial as some commentators (particularly Hargovan) have suggested 
recently”.646 Thus, McConvill sums up that  
 
(t)here is no question that following the High Court’s decision in Spies, directors, when exercising their 
powers, owe a duty to consider the interests of creditors of the company when the company is 
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insolvent or in the vicinity of insolvency. Despite the decision in Spies, however, the long-standing 
question concerning the nature and extent of this duty to creditors remains unresolved. … (T)he 
decision in Spies, unfortunately, raises more questions than it resolves. The High Court did not make 
any authoritative determination on … a director’s fiduciary duties to creditors, and it cannot be said 
that the Spies decision provides any real indication of the approach, which the court may indorse if and 
when the issue is raised for determination in a future case. All that can be said for certain at present is 
that the … statement of Mason J in Walker … remains the strongest authority on the Australian position 
concerning directors’ fiduciary duties to creditors. 647
 
There are, as noted above, commentators that disagree with the reasoning and 
interpretation of McConvill regarding the Spies Case.  
 
In a later article, McConvill again addresses the director’s duty to company 
directors.648 In this regard, he analyses the decision of Geneva Finance Ltd v 
Resource & Industry Ltd. 649
 
McConvill notes that the Geneva Finance case was the first decision in Australia since 
the case of Spies to deal with the nature of the directors’ duties towards its creditors. 
Heenan J reaffirmed the principle in the Spies decision that directors’ duties to 
creditors amounts to no more than an imperfect obligation. 650 Thus, the duty is not 
owed directly by directors to or enforceable by creditors. It is rather to be described 
as an indirect duty owed not to the creditors, but to the company to consider the 
interests of creditors. This imperfect obligation will “spring into action” on insolvency 
or when a director suspects this. In such circumstances, the creditors “become the 
main stakeholders in the company” because they would then be entitled to those 
funds, which the company is using to trade. 651
 
McConvill also believed that section 1324 of the Australian Corporations Act 2001 
remains “under-utilised”. Section 1324 allows a person whose interests are affected 
by a breach of the Act to apply for injunctions and/or damages. 652 In this way, 
McConvill believes that creditors may take action against directors when their 
interests are affected. The parties in the Geneva Finance case did not use section 
1324. 653 McConvill notes, however, that some writers, including Hargovan, believe 
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that because the Spies decision states that the interests of creditors are not directly 
enforceable by them, the courts are likely to state that section 1324 would be 
unavailable to creditors as well. 654
 
Keay has also recently pondered over the issue as to whether fiduciary duties should 
be extended to creditors. 655 From a British point of view, he writes that 
commentators “are sharply divided” as to whether such fiduciary duties should be 
extended to creditors as well. Thus, those commentators that adopt a contractarian 
approach believe that there are already sufficient factors in play, such as the market 
itself and freedom to contract, to protect the rights and interests of creditors. The 
communitarians, however, believe that creditors are amongst the stakeholders of 
companies and are therefore in as vulnerable position as anyone else. Thus, 
creditors should be protected by mandatory rules. 656 Keay submits that fairness 
must be considered and thus directors need to consider the interests of creditors 
when companies hit hard times. This is because creditors are in vulnerable positions 
(especially the employees, customers, involuntary creditors and trade creditors) and 
have expectations that their interests will be considered at this stage. 657 Also, a duty 
to creditors can be substantiated on the basis of efficiency. 658 Keay explains that 
whilst a duty to creditors might increase some transactions costs, other costs, such 
as those associated with drafting contracts, would be reduced. 659 Thus, 
 
… it seems fair that directors should be under a responsibility to consider creditor interests where 
financial difficulty exists, in order to reduce ‘information asymmetries between companies and their 
creditors’. … (T)he contractarian arguments alone are not sufficient to reject the imposition of a duty to 
take account of the interests of creditors. 660
 
Havenga, however, believes that the fiduciary duties of directors should only be 
“owed to the company as a whole and not to individual shareholders, creditors or 
other stakeholders”. 661 She believes that legislation, which is aimed specifically at a 
particular stakeholder, provides “better protection” than a simple extension of a 
director’s fiduciary duty. For example, in the South African context, she is of the 
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opinion that section 424 of the South African Companies Act provides “substantial 
protection to company creditors”. 662 In this section, the court may impose personal 
liability on any person who knowingly and in a fraudulent or reckless manner carried 
on business to defraud creditors or other persons. 663 See also parts 2.1, 4.4.1, 4.4.2 
and 4.5.2. 
 
(4.4.1) STATUTORY PROTECTION OF CREDITORS AND OTHER INTERESTED 
STAKEHOLDERS 
 
The English Companies Act of 1948 contained a provision similar to section 424 of 
the present South African Companies Act 61 of 1973 except that the former was only 
applicable with regard to fraudulent conduct, whilst the latter was also applicable 
with regard to reckless conduct. 664 The subsequent recommendations of the Cork 
Committee led to the enactment of section 214 of the English Insolvency Act. 665 This 
section imposed liability on directors for conduct similar to negligence. 666 This Act 
provides that a director may, in certain circumstances, be held liable for a company’s 
wrongful trading. Thus, the courts may declare a director liable to contribute towards 
a company’s assets if 
 
(a) The company has gone into insolvent liquidation; 
(b) At some time before the commencement of the winding up of the company that person knew or 
ought to have concluded that there was no reasonable prospect that the company would avoid going 
into insolvent liquidation; and 
 
(c) That person was a director of the company at that time. 
 
This section is therefore clearly intended to benefit creditors. However, the court will 
not make a declaration of personal liability if it is satisfied that the director 
concerned, at the earliest opportunity, “took every step with a view to minimising 
the potential loss to the company’s creditors as ... he ought to have taken”. 667 
Likewise, it needs to be noted that section 424 of the South African Companies Act, 
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1973 provides such a powerful statutory remedy for creditors that, because of it, the 
common law duty to creditors has not yet been developed in South Africa. 668 (See 
also parts 2.1, 4.4, 4.4.2 and 4.5.2 above.) 
 
Section 424 provides that, 
 
(1) When it appears, whether in the winding-up or judicial management of a company, or otherwise, 
that any business of the company concerned was or is being carried on recklessly or with the intent to 
defraud creditors of the company or any other person, or for any fraudulent purpose, the court may, 
on application, declare that any person who was knowingly a party to the carrying on of the business in 
such manner be personally responsible, without any limitation of liability, for all or any of the debts or 
other liabilities of the company as the court may direct. 669
 
The Master, the liquidator, the judicial manager, any member or creditor or 
contributory of the company may bring the application. 
 
It is important to establish the extent to which section 424, which is aimed at the 
protection of creditors and other interested parties, actually achieves this objective. 
 
In terms of South African law, a civil sanction applies to both fraudulent and reckless 
carrying on of the business of the company. 
 
Havenga notes, 670  
 
Du Plessis regards s424 (1) as one of the most powerful instruments in the hands of creditors. ... But 
its effectiveness will depend largely on cost implications and the likelihood that the particular creditor's 
claim against the company will be settled if her application under the section is successful. 671
 
Section 424, compared to section 214 of the English Insolvency Act, is a very 
powerful legislative enactment. In addition, the application of the section to 
circumstances other than those where the company is in the process of being wound 
up, are indicative that it is intended to provide a meaningful remedy. It can be 
argued that creditors are, as a result of section 424, “adequately protected against 
misuse of their powers by company controllers”. Because of uncertainty as to 
whether fiduciary duties owed by directors to the company can be extended to 
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creditors, creditors may well have to rely on section 424. However, uncertainty may 
arise because it is unclear to whom the court may order the payment under the 
section. Thus, the section should be interpreted or amended to permit payment 
directly to the applicant creditor if it would not prejudice other parties. 672  
 
South African law has accepted that section 424 confers a wide discretion on the 
court. The words “or otherwise” in this section are broad and are therefore not only 
applicable in liquidation or judicial-management proceedings. Thus, unlike the 
previous Companies Act, 673 which contained very restrictive wording, the present 
Act extends the scope of the section admirably. Thus, de Kok J in Gordon No. and 
Rennie No v Standard Merchant Bank Ltd noted,  
 
(t)he new Companies Act of 1973 ... expressly extends the section to apply to reckless, as well as 
fraudulent trading and it is made applicable to circumstances other than those where the company is in 
the process of being wound up. 674  
 
It can therefore be suggested that the section has been deliberately phrased in wide 
terms so that the courts may bring to account fraudulent and reckless directors for 
their actions towards their creditors even before the company becomes insolvent.  
The fact that the words “or otherwise” were adopted implies that, at all material 
times, creditors are entitled to expect that the affairs of the company are conducted 
properly. Thus, should directors commit fraudulent or reckless acts even prior to 
insolvency, the creditors would have the right to institute legal action against the 
directors. The provisions of section 424 provide a meaningful remedy against the 
abuse contemplated by the legislature. A creditor of the company may make the 
application or, where the company is being wound-up or has been placed under 
judicial management proceedings, by its liquidator or judicial manager. 
 
However, creditors may decide not to use section 424 if payment, in the event of a 
successful application, is likely to be ordered to the company. There would be 
uncertainty as to whether they would actually receive payment, and whether they 
may have to make a contribution towards the costs of the application or even furnish 
security for it. Thus, the court should be able to order that payment be made directly 
to creditors. Thus, it is only through an amendment to this section, that the position, 
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with regard to the order for payment, will be clarified. Only at that stage, would 
section 424 become a totally effective remedy for the creditors. 
 
In addition to section 424 of the Companies Act, creditors’ interests are also 
protected in terms of section 135 of the Insolvency Act, which provides that a 
director will be held criminally liable if he or she is found to have preferred one or 
more creditors above the other. 675 Thus, a possible argument may arise that, by 
virtue of these provisions, an extension of the directors’ duties towards its creditors, 
is unnecessary because the interests of creditors are sufficiently safeguarded, both 
during and prior to the company becoming insolvent. 
 
Section 354(2) of the Companies Act also allows the court to take into consideration 
the wishes of the creditors in all matters relating to the winding up of the 
company.676 The purpose of issuing a provisional winding-up order is to afford 
creditors an opportunity to show cause why it would serve no benefit to them and 
why it should not be made a final order of liquidation. In this regard, Stegmann J in 
the decision of Ex Parte Clifford Homes Construction (Pty) Ltd noted,  
 
(t)he reason for the practice (of ordering a provisional winding-up order) would appear to be that the 
provision in the Companies Act empowering the court to have regard to the wishes of creditors as to all 
matters relating to a winding-up applies not only to matters arising after the winding-up has begun, 
but also to the question whether there should be a winding-up by the court at all. 677  
 
The court may further protect the interests of creditors by permitting an already 
insolvent company to continue trading, and the court does this by postponing the 
winding up order. Thus, in the decision of SAA Distributors (Pty) Ltd v Sport en Spel 
(Edms) Bpk, the respondent filed an affidavit in terms of which it was stated that the 
liquidation of the company would have an adverse effect on creditors. 678 The 
creditors, who were in the majority, supported the respondent and requested 
postponement of the winding-up order for financial reasons. The court held that the 
wishes of the creditors should be taken into consideration. 
 
Finally, section 20(5) of the Public Accountants’ and Auditors’ Act also has the effect 
of protecting creditors. 679 This section provides that an auditor is required to 
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intervene if he is satisfied or has reason to believe that a material irregularity has 
taken place in the conduct of affairs of the company, which has caused or is likely to 
cause financial loss to the undertaking or any of its members. 
 
Shareholders, however, are deemed to have authorised the directors to expose the 
company’s capital to risks when embarking upon trading ventures potentially in the 
interests of and for the benefit of the company. Thus, should a director’s actions in 
these circumstances result in financial loss to the company, the same would not 
constitute an irregularity as contemplated under section 20(5) of the said Act since 
the actions of the director were lawfully authorised. However, had the company been 
insolvent at that time, and notwithstanding this, the directors decide to expose the 
company to further risks, this conduct would then constitute a material irregularity in 
terms of the said section. 
 
(4.4.2) THE CURRENT POSITION OF DUTIES TOWARDS CREDITORS IN SOUTH 
AFRICA 
 
Newham notes that the duty to creditors has not been developed in South Africa 
because of the protection enjoyed by creditors under Section 424 of the Companies 
Act. 680 See also parts 2.1, 4.4, 4.4.1 and 4.5.2. The basis for the proposition that 
there is no direct fiduciary duty relationship between directors and creditors is based 
upon the proposition that the company is a separate legal entity and therefore has 
its own rights and duties. Consequently, the director has a fiduciary relationship 
towards the company primarily and creditors must protect their interests “by 
bargaining with the company”. When the company is being wound up, various 
statutory provisions ensure that creditors are treated fairly. 681
 
In referring to the additional remedies arising from an application of the common law 
principles of fraud, Stegmann J in Ex Parte Lebowa Development Corporation Ltd, 
notes that for a company to obtain credit without it disclosing a known risk to the 
creditor or that payment may not be made, would amount to fraud on the creditor. 
Furthermore, the fact that the company director may not have intended to cause a 
loss and may have honestly believed that the debt would be paid, does not 
exonerate the actions of the director. Thus, any dishonest exposure to a known and 
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undisclosed risk of loss would amount to fraud on the creditor. 682 The conduct of the 
company in taking goods on credit when it knows that it is, or is likely to become, 
insolvent, is labelled as a serious wrong and against public policy. Consequently, the 
extent to which the courts would be willing to protect the interests of company 
creditors would determine whether the courts recognise that fiduciary duties are 
owed to creditors. This could be achieved by including the rights of creditors within 
the concept of “the company” or in some other way. 683  
 
In addition, in the decision of Ex Parte Lebowa Development Corporation Ltd, 
Stegmann, distinguishing at length between claims, which creditors may enjoy 
against directors at common law arising from their fraudulent conduct and their 
statutory remedy contained in section 424, noted that there was a fundamental 
distinction between exposing a company’s capital to the risks during the course of its 
business and exposing a company’s creditors to those risks. The former exposure is 
authorised by the company’s members and is therefore lawful. However, there is 
frequently no authorisation for the latter and is therefore unlawful. 684  
 
The decision of Singer NO v M J Greeff Electrical Contractors (Pty) Ltd Stegmann 
noted that trading in insolvent circumstances might not be always unlawful. Thus, an 
insolvent company might still be able to trade lawfully in insolvent circumstances by 
ensuring that it always pays cash for all goods and services it receives or by always 
disclosing its insolvency to a supplier before receiving any credit. However, such 
open and honest conduct of an insolvent company is not generally expected. Thus, 
to use an insolvent company to trade and bring risk to suppliers may result in either 
personal liability for the company’s debts or in criminal liability or both. 685Therefore, 
a court may recognise a possible claim by the creditors against the directors based 
either on negligence or fraud or both. Although Stegmann did not hold specifically 
that directors had a fiduciary duty towards the creditors, he did indicate what 
sanctions could result if directors unlawfully caused the creditors to expose 
themselves to risk. 686
 
In the landmark decision of Ex Parte De Villiers & Another N.N.O: In Re Carbon 
Developments (Pty) Ltd (in liquidation) Stegmann J noted that if the directors 
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permitted the corporation to trade whilst its liabilities exceeded its assets, then the 
directors neglected their duties either to restore its solvency or to wind it up. 687 
Thus, directors, in this way, would have operated outside the legal framework of the 
Companies Act and the memorandum and articles of association and would, 
therefore, be unable to claim protection from personal liability, which would attach to 
those directors who conduct the business within the legal framework of the company 
legislation. Stegmann notes that there may be liability in terms of an Aquilian action. 
This is based on the fact that, in accordance with the reasonable man test, the 
directors negligently failed to perform their duties either to raise the capital of the 
company to restore its solvency or to wind it up. As a consequence, this has caused 
the trade creditors, who have remain unpaid, to suffer foreseeable loss. 688  
 
In Re Carbon Developments case, Stegmann, J suggested that the directors had a 
duty to either raise funds to restore the solvency of the company or to wind it up in 
the event of insolvency. If directors neglected their duty they would be operating 
outside the law and would therefore not be protected by the benefits of limited 
liability. This might indicate the possible “germination of the seed of a duty to 
creditors”. However, it is clear that Stegmann J was referring only to a “duty of care” 
owed to creditors, and not the company, which, if breached, would give rise to a 
delictual action. This is nothing new in South African law. Thus, Stegmann J  
 
has not taken our law any further along the road ... in formulating and developing a common law duty 
to creditors. He has rather … examined … the various ways in which creditors have always been able to 
obtain relief from the directors of debtor companies. … This is not to say that there is no need or place 
for a duty to creditors in our law. ... 689  
 
 
 (4.4.3) CONCLUSION 
 
Until recently, little attention has been paid to the interests of creditors forming part 
of directors’ duties because the duties of good faith and that of care and skill, were 
seen to be owed to the company alone. Consequently, the director is seen to be 
under a duty to exercise that degree of care and skill to the company that can 
reasonably be expected of a person with this knowledge and experience. The director 
                                                     
687  Ex Parte De Villiers & Another N.N.O: In Re Carbon Developments Pty Ltd (in liquidation) 1992 (2) SA 
95 (W), 136I-137B. 
688  Newham, above n 604, 75. See also Stegmann J in Ex parte De Villiers, above n 687, at 144. 
689  Ibid 76. 
Chapter 4 200
therefore stands in a fiduciary relationship to the company embracing duties of 
loyalty, confidence and trust. 
 
Prentice notes,  
 
(i)t has long been a central tenet of company law that directors owe their duties to the company and 
not the company’s shareholders or its creditors. 690  
 
The philosophy and logic behind this submission was that when the company’s 
financial position was sound, the main objective was to advance the shareholders’ 
interest by maximizing the profits of the company. The creditors’ interests only 
became significant when the company was in a state of insolvency. Hence, this 
reasoning takes cognisance of the fact that a heavy burden would be placed upon 
directors if they were bound to consider the interests of creditors when venturing 
into transactions. Directors might then be reluctant to take risks, which could affect 
the company’s financial position. However, if directors needed only to consider the 
interests of shareholders when the company is solvent, they would be able to 
exercise an independent decision without fear of being sanctioned by the creditors 
should such decision prove to be erroneous or prejudicial to the interested parties. 
Thus, this submission argues that the interests of the shareholders and those of the 
creditors must be mutually exclusive and should not be reconciled to allow both 
groups to be entitled to duties of good faith and care and skill from directors. 
Moreover, the creditors’ main concern is to receive payment for any debts incurred 
to them by the corporation (unlike the shareholders). It is further argued in this 
submission that should directors be obliged to show duties of good faith and care 
and skill to creditors, a conflict of interest and duties would then exist between the 
shareholders and creditors, which would thereby place directors in untenable 
positions, as they would not know which group’s interests should take precedence 
when making a decision. 
 
It is apparent from the various cases and discussions, that much uncertainty and 
conflict remains with regard to the question as to whether directors’ duties to the 
company extend to its creditors as well, or whether the interests of the creditors 
should only be considered during the period of insolvency. There may well be room 
for the argument that there is no need for the fiduciary duties of directors to be 
extended to creditors because of the fact that the latter’s interests are sufficiently 
safeguarded by the law as it currently stands. Thus, the extension of such duties to 
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creditors may well create a conflict of interests between the shareholders and 
creditors - the former being interested in maximising its profits, while the latter 
interested in being paid by the company for its debts. The Companies Act, the 
Insolvency Act and the Public Accountants’ and Auditors’ Act may well be sufficient in 
safeguarding the interests of creditors. In addition, creditors may always resort to 
civil litigation while the company is solvent when payment of debts to them by the 
company is outstanding. Thus, arguably, the only period during which the company 
should be obliged to consider the interests of creditors, may be at that time when 
the company is insolvent or approaching a state of insolvency. Furthermore, one 
could argue that the interests of creditors could also be considered in a situation 
where directors embark upon a venture, which could threaten the solvency of the 
corporation. Thus, the interests of creditors should be primarily considered in 
insolvent circumstances and in solvent circumstances when the proposed transaction 
to be entered into by the directors may indeed affect the solvency of the corporation. 
 
Furthermore, Sealy succinctly sums up the position when he notes,  
 
(c)reditors are more favourably placed, in that they have a statutory class available through their 
representative, the liquidator; and it is almost certainly only in a liquidation that any claim in respect of 
their interests would arise. … For this reason, it is probably unsound … to formulate the directors' duty 
with reference to any stated category of creditor ... (as) the proper object of any duty ... should be the 
corporate estate. It would also run counter to established insolvency policy considerations if the law 
were to give remedial advantages to particular creditors. And if individual creditors are put by the law 
into a position where they may use threats to sue directors personally, as a form of pressure to have 
the company pay their debts in priority, the object of the insolvency law is undermined. In the light of 
these considerations there should be some resistance to any extension of the traditional directors’ 
liability. … 691  
 
This is perhaps the reason why Stegmann J in Carbon Developments’ case has 
decided not to take South Africa any further in formulating and developing a 
common law duty to creditors. 692 Thus, there is no South African case law, which 
explicitly indicates that directors have a fiduciary duty towards creditors when a 
company is solvent and a going concern.  
 
Consequently, if South African courts were to decide to eventually follow the trends 
in the decisions in some of the foreign cases noted supra and thereby recognise a 
fiduciary duty towards creditors when then company is solvent and a going concern, 
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the question arises as to the likely areas of conflict between the interests of 
shareholders and creditors. In other words, if our courts were to protect the interests 
of each group and, in this way, legally recognise the directors’ fiduciary duty towards 
creditors, the nature and extent of the interests of creditors, which could be 
prejudiced, would have to be determined. 
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(4.5) Bondholders and debenture holders 
 
(4.5.1) DEFINITIONS 
 
A bond is a “(f)inance certificate of debt issued to raise funds”. 693 It is also  
 
(a) deed by which one person (the obligor) commits himself to another (the obligee) to do something 
or refrain from doing something. If it secures the payment of money, it is called a common money 
bond; a bond giving security for the carrying out of a contract is called a performance bond. (It 
includes) a document issued by a government, local authority, or other public undertaking to repay 
long-term debt with interest. 694  
 
Furthermore, a debenture is a 
 
(a) document that states the term of a loan, usually to a company, including the date of repayment 
and the rate of interest. The debt, which is usually long-term, may be secured by a charge on company 
property. … A debenture may be issued to an individual creditor (a debenture holder) or a debenture 
trust deed may be drawn up in favour of trustees for a large group of creditors (debenture stock 
holders). 695
 
(4.5.2) DIRECTORS’ DUTIES TO BONDHOLDERS/DEBENTURE HOLDERS 
 
It can be argued that bondholders and debenture holders may suffer economic loss if 
the company, in which they have invested, is subject to risky borrowing. Thus, these 
groups may be exposed to risks in the value of their bonds. The question arises as to 
whether directors have fiduciary duties to bondholders (or debenture holders). 
 
In practice, any loss in the value of the bondholders’ investments would accrue to 
the benefit of the shareholders, as share prices increase. This factor enables 
management to transfer wealth from bondholders to shareholders. Contractual 
constraints are generally inadequate in protecting the interests of bondholders 
because, predicting the future developments of a company, are difficult. Thus, it 
remains to be determined whether the interests of bondholders require further 
protection, and, if so, what the nature of such protection should be in relation to 
                                                     
693  Collins Gem English Dictionary, 1995, HarperCollins Publishers, UK, 57. 
694  Oxford Reference: A Concise Dictionary of Law, 2nd edn, 1990, Oxford University Press, UK, 44. 
695  Ibid 115. 
Chapter 4 204
corporate governance issues. The question is whether or not directors should have a 
fiduciary duty to protect both shareholders’ and bondholders’ interests. 696  
 
Bondholders and debenture holders are creditors and traditionally contract law 
protects their interests. Thus, in cases of conflict, contract law protects creditors’ 
rights against shareholders. Botha notes, however, that South African law has 
attempted to protect creditors’ interests statutorily. 697 In section 102 of the 
Insolvency Act the rights of the creditors are given precedence over the rights of the 
shareholders in terms whereof the creditors become the owners of the corporation 
and are permitted to deal with the assets of the company on insolvency. 698  
 
As noted above (see parts 2.1, 4.4, 4.4.1 and 4.4.2), section 424 of the Companies 
Act holds the directors personally liable in favour of the creditors, as the directors 
have been involved in conducting the business fraudulently or recklessly. 699 
However, this protection is only available in specific instances and creditors do not 
receive such protection whilst the firm is a going concern. A problem manifests itself 
at this point, as the interests of the creditors are often violated by managerial action, 
which cannot be construed as being either of a fraudulent or reckless nature. Thus, 
the potential for conflict exists between bondholders/debenture holders and 
shareholders because bondholders/debenture holders have prior, but fixed, claims to 
the assets of a company, which crystallise upon insolvency, whilst shareholders have 
limited liability with regard to a company’s debts during its solvency. Thus, as Botha 
notes,  
 
as the ratio of debt to equity increases, so does the probability and magnitude of an actual conflict 
between these two interest groups. ... The fruits of success ... will accrue to shareholders in that the 
increase in market value of the company will mainly benefit shareholders’ interests. Failure of such 
risky projects will be borne by the debt holders as the market value of the company will decline and 
will impact accordingly on their interests. ... A conflict arises as the duty to maximise shareholders' 
wealth is pursued to the prejudice of bondholders’ interests. 700  
 
Botha argues that this conflict will be resolved, inter alia, by directors functioning as 
agents of the company whose function is to maximise ‘the value of the company’. He 
notes that this entails maximising its net present value for the benefit of all providers 
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of long-term capital regardless of their personal wealth. Thus, in this way, 
bondholders (and debenture holders) and shareholders would have ‘first and residual 
claims respectively on the corporation’s assets and cash flow’ and are therefore 
equitable owners of it. This means that directors and officers would owe fiduciary 
duties to the equitable owners of the corporation’s assets - the 
bondholders/debenture holders and shareholders. Furthermore, however, in spite of 
the rule to maximise shareholder profits, directors may transfer wealth from 
bondholders to shareholders. 701 This means that the company’s shareholders and 
bondholders/debenture holders must be free to compensate one another for the 
effects of operating decisions that increase the wealth of one group, but not the 
wealth of the other. This, in effect, “neutralises” any such wealth transfers. Botha 
notes, 
 
the theories of financial economists have ... had an impact on resolving the conflict between 
bondholder and shareholder interests. Their approaches … have been the bases for recasting the 
traditional objective of the company from the maximisation of shareholders’ wealth to the 
maximisation of the net present value of the company, accompanied by neutralisation of wealth 
transfers. This objective in modern financial theory is consistent with fiduciary duties to both 
bondholders and shareholders and allows the market value of their investments to be maximised 
without one party benefiting at the expense of the other. 702  
 
According to Botha, however, these “conflicts” between shareholders and 
bondholders (and debenture holders) have, thus far, not received much attention at 
all in South Africa, unlike in other overseas countries where it has been addressed 
rather vigorously. Hence, it may be necessary to review the existing system of debts 
contracts in South Africa, as the only form of bondholder protection. This would be in 
line with other western capitalist-orientated countries where fiduciary duties to 
bondholders exist. A failure to do so would be to ignore the fact that, internationally, 
fiduciary duties to bondholders are being recognised. This is because it is regarded 
as being  
an overdue development in the twentieth century expansion of fiduciary law. 703  
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(4.6) Directors' duties to the community and to the 
environment 
 
It is important to determine the extent of the directors’ duties in modern 
corporations to the environment. As Winstanley notes,  
(t)he message is clear: although development is essential for the country’s economy, no future 
government will wish it to prevail without consideration for environmental integrity. And growing public 
awareness of environmental issues will probably increase pressure on corporate bodies to clean up all 
potentially polluting operations. 704
 
As public concern about the environment is growing, environmental audits have 
become commonplace. This has become an accepted management tool to assist 
directors preventing the degradation and exploitation of the environment. 705The 
International Chamber of Commerce states that an environmental audit can best be 
defined as a   
 
management tool comprising a systematic, documented, periodic and objective evaluation of how well 
environmental organisation, management systems and equipment are performing with the aim of: (1) 
facilitating management control of environmental practices; (2) assessing compliance with company 
policies, including meeting regulatory requirements. 706  
 
Moreover, when an environmental audit has been completed and referred to the 
directors of the corporation, it is expected that they will take cognisance of and 
seriously consider implementing any recommendations noted therein. If directors do 
not and harm results, the Environmental Conservation Act allows courts to order that 
the costs of any damages to the environment, which results from the commission of 
an offence as defined in the Act, be borne by the party so convicted. In this case, 
the person so convicted will be the director of the company, whether executive or 
non-executive. 707  
 
In a similar situation, Raney refers to the Appellate Division decision of Howard v 
Herrigel & Another NNO where it was noted that a director of a company has a duty 
to observe the utmost good faith towards the company and to exercise reasonable 
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skill and diligence. 708 Thus, a director may not be indifferent or hide behind 
ignorance or a failure to understand the affairs of the company. A director, who has 
been aware of an environmental audit report, cannot therefore simply ignore the 
contents of it and thereby allow environmental degradation to continue. He or she 
has a duty to safeguard and protect the affairs of the corporation. If he or she does 
not do so, either in his or her capacity as an executive or a non-executive director, 
he or she could be viewed as having contravened the Act, and, consequently, be 
convicted. In this way, directors may be held liable for failing to act on the report of 
the environmental auditor, either at the instance of the State, where criminal 
charges could be proffered against them, or at the instance of the shareholders, who 
could institute a civil action against them, as a result of the corporation having had 
to pay over monies to restore the environment. In addition, should the company be 
placed in liquidation, the liquidator may hold the directors personally liable where it 
is clear that they had disregarded the recommendations contained in the 
environmental audit and, as a result, recklessly continued to conduct the business of 
the company.  
 
Environmental auditors have an important function in regulating the control of the 
environment, which, to a large extent, has been placed in the hands of company 
directors. Environmental auditors must therefore develop standard procedures for 
the conduct of the audit. Additionally, they will need to establish minimum-
qualification requirements to gain respectability. However, environmental auditing 
can be seen as a positive step in regulating and controlling the exploitation of the 
environment. Furthermore, environmental audits must be conducted openly and 
their results publicly disclosed. Thus, companies that damage the environment 
should be forced to observe less environmentally damaging business practices. Thus,  
 
the environment will ultimately be the beneficiary of successful and thorough editing. 709  
 
In addition, the prospect of litigation and growing public concern will greatly 
pressurise companies to have due regard to, and also to adhere to, the 
recommendations contained in environmental audits and, in so doing, evolve and 
maintain environmental standards. 
 
Moreover, Williams, refers to the question of environmental issues in commercial 
transactions and the possible liabilities that may result. 710 He notes, 
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(a)n item that has recently attained increasing importance in due diligence investigations, particularly 
in commercial transactions involving American or European parties, is environmental issues. There is a 
high awareness of these issues in the United States of America and the European Union countries, 
which has been accompanied by an understanding of the civil and criminal liabilities that may arise 
where the nature of a business is potentially hazardous to health or the environment. 
 
Williams submits that the exposure of parties to environmental claims, should be 
investigated as part of a legal “due diligence” investigation, and then, if necessary, 
by the environmental auditing procedure discussed supra. This “due diligence” 
investigation, he notes, should have regard to the following environmental issues: 
 
1. Any liability, both civil and criminal, that could arise from activities, which 
have detrimental effects on the environment; and 
 
2. Any liability, both civil and criminal, that could arise from an infringement of 
or threat to the right of every person to an environment, which is not 
detrimental to his or her well-being in terms of the Constitution of South 
Africa; and 
 
3. Documentation relating to any environmental impact assessment, 
environmental audit or any other reports or documents concerning any 
environmental issues received or sent during the past five years; and 
 
4. Details of any criminal convictions pertaining to any environment-related 
charges during the past five years. 
 
The exposure of parties to claims arising from environmental issues is becoming an 
important issue in commercial transactions in South Africa. These issues should be 
investigated in the first instance as part of a legal “due diligence” investigation, and 
then, if necessary, by means of an environmental audit. 711 Thus, it is evident that 
“due diligence” investigations and “environmental audits” are seen to be critical tests 
in safeguarding the environment against abuse by directors of corporations. 
Furthermore, the safeguarding of the environment using these means could be best 
achieved where at least two of the following three components are included within 
the constitution. These components are: 712  
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1. The right of all citizens to a clean environment; and 
2. The duty on all citizens, and probably the State, to protect the natural 
environment. This duty, which is stated either expressly or impliedly, would 
entitle citizens to go to court when they believe that the environment is being 
degraded. This right will resolve the problem with regard to the right to sue, 
which currently exists in South African law. Thus, at present in South Africa, 
unless someone has a direct interest (which usually means the right to use 
and enjoy property) in the environment, he or she is not entitled to approach 
the court for relief with regard to environmental degradation. If this right 
were given, however, anyone would be able to litigate to prevent 
environmental degradation, even though he or she neither owns, nor rents, 
the property that is, or may be, degraded. This would open up the flood gates 
to a multiplicity of claims being launched against companies, however remote 
these claims might be; and 
 
3. The establishment of a land or environmental court to deal with 
environmental degradation caused by corporate abuse. In New South Wales, 
Australia, the establishment of courts of this kind, have proven to be very 
effective. In this regard, the court does not award costs against the plaintiff 
unless it considers the action brought by the person to be frivolous or 
unreasonable. Thus, any concerned person would be able to approach the 
courts for relief confidently knowing that an adverse order of costs against 
him or her is not likely. 
 
Thus, these developments would have important and far-reaching effects on 
business and industry. Winstanley notes that as a result  
 
... the prospect of litigation and growing public awareness will increasingly pressure companies to ... 
publicize environmental policies and maintain environmental standards. To show their compliance with 
these policies and standards, they will have to begin environmental audits. 713  
 
Logically, although there is “clearly a need for tight environmental accountability”, 
there is also a need to work with businesses (rather than to fight them) in order “to 
clean up corporate practices”. Companies should also “do the same”. Companies are 
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realising more and more today “that no matter how justified their decisions are, they 
have to react, and be seen to act, very quickly to public feelings”.  
 
Thus, “ethical issues are being absorbed into the corporate governance system from 
top down”. Companies need to incorporate “ethics and morals” “into their way of 
life”, otherwise they “will get their fingers burnt”. 714
 
We have placed a lot of emphasis on the Green/ethical issue because we believe it will be one of the 
most significant influences on corporate governance in the years to come. … (T)he finger is no longer 
being pointed just at senior executives, but also at the shareholders, and as pressure to the make the 
company more socially responsible increases, it will surely be in this direction. 715
 
 
(4.7) Conclusion 
 
Traditionally, South African company law assumes that the directors’ role is to run 
their company for the benefit of its shareholders alone and to maximise profits for 
them. It can be argued, however, that this view is too narrow and outdated; that is, 
directors should have regard to the rights and interests of a broader range of 
corporate stakeholders. More specifically, directors should have concern not only for 
their shareholders, but also for employees and customers. This idea, by extending its 
application, also refers to and includes the natural environment and the community 
at large. Hence, the question is whether we should change our perception of the 
corporation from one run by directors dedicated exclusively to serving the interests 
of shareholders to that of a corporation whose main purpose is to bring benefit not 
only to its owners and creditors, but also to its employees, the community and the 
environment. Furthermore, given that reforms concerning directors’ duties in light of 
the above have found their way into legislation across the globe, the core issue to be 
considered is how and to what extent legal rules and policies should develop in South 
Africa to place directors under a positive duty to take account of the interests of 
bodies other than shareholders.  
 
It is argued that directors should be under a duty to have regard to the interests of 
these other groups. Thus, many writers have challenged the traditional rules of 
company law regarding directors’ duties. It is only with creditors that sentiments 
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have been expressed through the courts and writers that the fiduciary duties of 
directors need not necessarily be extended. Some writers argue that creditors’ 
interests are sufficiently safeguarded by the law as it currently stands. If South 
African courts, however, decide to eventually follow the trends in some of the foreign 
cases and recognise a fiduciary duty towards creditors, questions will arise as to the 
likely areas of conflict between the interests of shareholders and creditors.
Chapter 5 212
CHAPTER 5:  
 
 
(5.0) CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN SOUTH AFRICA:  
AN IMPROVED MODEL OF WORKPLACE 
PARTICIPATION FOR EMPLOYEES 
 
 
In the next four chapters of this thesis four major building blocks or steps, which will 
promote the creation of a new and highly improved corporate governance model for 
South Africa, are examined in greater detail. It has been argued that the current 
unitary board structure operating in South Africa is unsatisfactory, as it does not 
provide employees with rights enabling them to engage in the decision-making 
processes with their employees at an adequate level. To this end and based upon 
discussions and arguments in the preceding chapters of this thesis, the four building 
blocks are considered as essential steps in the process of designing an improved 
system of corporate governance for South Africa. These steps should all be viewed 
by the legislative, governmental, judicial and business powers in South Africa as 
being instrumental to the attainment of an improved system of corporate 
governance. Consequently, an improved system of corporate governance in South 
Africa would be a very significant and decisive factor in bringing about a wealthier 
and economically brighter South Africa in the future. These steps or building blocks 
are: 
 
1. The introduction and maintenance of a system of organisational development 
within the corporation (see chapter 5): 
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This is a vital first step for any organisation. A corporation’s desire to affect 
positive changes in the workplace is cardinal if the introduction of a new 
model of corporate governance is to be successful. Businesses should, 
therefore, become passionate about introducing effective organisational 
developmental systems; and 
 
2. The introduction of new legislation in South Africa, which promotes an 
improved and more meaningful system of worker participation in the 
corporation: 
 
In chapter 6 below I provide a detailed critique of the shortcomings in and 
deficiencies of the major South African legislative enactments and of the 
policy initiatives of the King Reports, which have attempted to provide 
employees with some rights of participation in the decision-making processes 
of the corporation. Changes to the relevant legislation and to the King 
Reports will be suggested in chapter 9 below; and 
 
3. The introduction of changed patterns of corporate thinking and a rejection of 
antiquated principles of company law (see chapter 7 below): 
 
It is necessary to seriously consider the views of authors who support the 
contention that employees should have greater rights in the decision-making 
processes of the corporation at all levels. This is significant, as it establishes 
greater insight into the reasons why this has become necessary in businesses 
today. Thus, in this way, it is necessary for those people in power or those 
who have strong business influence to suggest and to advise corporate South 
Africa that it should rid itself of the traditional shareholder maximisation 
theory, as it can no longer be applicable today; and 
4. The introduction in South Africa of some of the favourable features of 
successful international corporate governance models (see chapter 8 below): 
 
Three international models of corporate governance have been considered – 
German, Japanese and French - each of which have unique features that 
could be used as building blocks in the design of a new and improved model 
of corporate governance for South Africa. 
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At the end, the four building blocks, which are considered as the essential steps, are 
cemented together in chapter 9 to create a much improved and very workable model 
of corporate governance for South Africa.  
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The First Step or Building Block: Organisational 
Development Within The Corporation 
 
In this chapter in discussing organisational development within the corporation, we 
will examine how behavioural changes amongst employees are to be managed by 
the corporation, the various steps that are required for changes in the workplace to 
be successful and the means that can be used to achieve employee empowerment. 
 
 
(5.1) INTRODUCTION 
 
Corporate governance is based on the premise that boards of directors should 
oversee compliance as a matter of law. Thus, boards are required to interact with 
management to ensure that the corporate objectives are achieved. Consequently, 
corporate governance has two main functions. Firstly, it involves the day-to-day 
operation of a corporation by its senior executives and, secondly, it involves the 
monitoring and control of those continuous management functions. 716 Hence, good 
organisational development in any organisation or company is vital for good 
corporate governance generally. Furthermore, it has been said that  
(i)f you don’t know where you are going, anywhere will take you there! 717  
 
Effective customer service, which provides good value and support to customers, is 
generally accepted as an instrumental factor in the future success of any 
organisation. Many customers are prepared to pay more for goods in exchange for 
good service, which is convenient to them. Likewise, there are many organisations 
worldwide that endorse the view that staff development and empowerment are key 
attributes of the most successful organisations and companies. Consequently, 
employees who are better rewarded are generally more satisfied with their jobs. This 
has two main benefits for organisations. Firstly, employee job satisfaction is directly 
related to customer satisfaction. Thus, satisfied customers are more likely to remain 
loyal, become repeat purchasers of goods and services and recommend the company 
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to other customers. Secondly, employees who are satisfied with their pay are less 
likely to be absent from their workplace. Thus, in monitoring the satisfaction reports 
of employees, this could serve as an early warning for any organisational problems 
that may arise later in the corporation. 718
 
Robbins et al argue that staff can play a vital part in the success of the business. 
Thus, “empowerment” or an authorisation conferring specified powers on staff 
members is essential to employee satisfaction and in improving customer service. By 
empowering their employees, the organisations are actively promoting their training 
and development “so that they keep up to date”. Empowerment also provides job 
security for employees so that they do not fear losing their jobs if they make 
mistakes. It also encourages employees to try new and different methods of 
improving their outcomes. The authors note, for example, that Chrysler Corporation 
has been empowering its employees and has, as result, attained excellent results in 
this way. Consequently, Chrysler Corporation has encouraged their employees to use 
their initiatives to save the organisation money annually. Interestingly, in this way, 
employees have “designed a self-calculating branch cash system” on home personal 
computers saving the organisation US$525,00. Other employees have created “a 
sound deadener” for car and truck doors saving the organisation US$2 million per 
year. They have also improved the quality of vehicle paint saving the company 
US$115 million per year. Additionally, Robbins et al say that empowerment can also 
work even in small organisations. Consequently, empowering employees has 
positively affected the performance of corporations both small and large. The authors 
note further that even the public sector is responding to the empowerment of 
employees. In this regard, one state government in the United States has a 
programme, which involves a shift of power to teachers. Teacher-dominated 
governing councils in each school are given the authority to override a wide range of 
state and union rules. Reformers hope that empowering teachers would allow better 
ideas in education to be produced. Such empowerment allows organisations to 
become more efficient and more effective so that they are able to do more with less. 
In this regard, to be successful, Robbins et al note that corporations must focus on 
three areas. These are business strategy and improvement, staff development and 
empowerment and customer service. All three of these areas have to be managed 
well, or the corporation will experience difficulties. 719  
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Thus, organisational development is a planned, long-range improvement process, 
based on democratic values, which seeks to improve organisational effectiveness and 
the welfare of employee. 720  
 
This chapter will focus on one of the three areas noted above, namely staff 
development and empowerment. Robbins et al strongly endorse the view that staff 
empowerment and the participation of employees in the organisation in those affairs 
that are significant, are critical to the future success of that organisation. This gives 
organisations enough leverage to respond and adapt to changes in its environment, 
especially if those changes prove to be debilitating.  
 
Robbins et al note,  
 
(s)ince an organisation’s success or failure is essentially the result of the things that its employees do 
or fail to do, planned change is also concerned with changing the behaviour of individuals and groups 
within the organisation. 721  
 
A necessary first step in achieving effective employee participation in the workplace 
and in gaining employee job satisfaction as a result is through appropriate 
organisational development. The more that the employees are involved in the 
decision-making processes surrounding proposed changes, the more likely those 
employees will respond positively to those changes. This is likely to lead to 
improvements in productivity and, in the long-term, economic success. It is now an 
issue of national importance. However, growth in productivity cannot happen at a 
“national” level or even regionally. It is in the workplace that an improvement in 
productivity must occur if it is to happen anywhere at all. 722 Thus, in South Africa, 
strategies must be developed to ensure that the enterprise has competent and 
committed people who are able to meet the targets set by the corporation. Thus, 
principles and practices must be developed to improve performance and reduce 
operating costs, while enhancing motivation and the satisfaction of employees. Thus,  
 
every business has hidden treasure waiting to be uncovered in the form of its employees and its 
procedures. Any effort directed towards uncovering these treasures will be rewarded. 723
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Organisations that run well “de-emphasise hierarchical authority”. Thus, employees 
and managers should be empowered to be responsible for their development. 724 
Organisational development is therefore a “road to empowerment”. Consequently, it 
provides “the change vehicle” to ensure that people are comfortable with 
empowerment. 725  
 
Before one considers how legislation in South Africa can contribute to or has 
contributed to achieving greater organisational stability and well being amongst the 
employees, it is necessary for the organisation to firstly consider its own solution 
that will achieve greater economic productivity for itself. This can be achieved 
through staff development and empowerment. 
 
 
(5.2) HOW ARE BEHAVIOURAL CHANGES MANAGED? 
 
Change agents are those persons who act as the “catalysts” to manage change 
within the corporation. They can be managers, employees of the corporation or even 
outside consultants. The four categories of changes encompass the structure, 
technology, physical setting and people in the corporation. In changing the structure, 
this involves making alterations to factors such as the authority or job specification 
given to employees. In changing the technology, this involves modifications in the 
way that work is processed and also in the methods and equipment that are used. In 
changing the physical setting, this involves an alteration to the physical 
arrangements in the workplace, such as the space given to employees to perform 
their work. Changing people involves changing the employee attitudes, skills, 
expectations, perceptions and behaviour. 726  
 
Thus, through change agents affecting the ‘feel’ of the workplace, employee 
satisfaction may be enhanced with a resulting increase in overall employee 
productivity. For example, the organisation could become less bureaucratic simply by 
change agents combining departmental responsibilities, which would give employees 
the opportunity to communicate with one another and to work more effectively 
together in a team-building structure, or by reducing and eliminating rules and 
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procedures, which frustrate rather than promote employee productivity. Employee 
satisfaction could also be improved by introducing greater flexibility into their 
working schedules or by introducing a system of incentives based on their work 
performance. Introducing modern equipment and tools into the workplace would also 
promote greater workplace satisfaction amongst the employees.  
 
 
(5.3) WHAT STEPS ARE REQUIRED FOR CHANGES IN THE WORKPLACE TO BE 
SUCCESSFUL? 
 
Robbins et al have identified seven steps to implement a successful change in the 
workplace. 727 These steps focus on what managers need to do to show the various 
stakeholders of the organisation that they are flexible enough to introduce 
progressive changes to the workplace and to adapt to a changing environment. 
These steps are critical in establishing not only effective employee participation in 
the workplace, but also in enhancing a system of improved employee satisfaction in 
their jobs.  
 
It is to be noted that all of these seven steps need to be complied with in order for 
any successful change to be implemented. Each one of these seven steps will be 
briefly discussed. 
 
(5.3.1) Pressure for Change 
 
This is a very significant factor, as employees will not place a high priority on change 
without it. Usually, without pressure, any suggested change in the workplace would 
become a “bottom-of-the-box, low-priority change”. It may also eventually become 
shelved due to no or low activity in implementing it.  
 
Pressure to perform can arise from customer or employee dissatisfaction, 
government intervention through the introduction of new legislation, increased 
competition, changes in the financial status of the organisation or through any other 
of the many catalysts that could trigger the desire to change.  
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(5.3.2) A Clear, Shared Vision 
 
Employees need to be able to understand clearly and share in the vision that is being 
communicated to them by their managers. If the employees fail to understand 
clearly or to share in a vision, more often than not, the vision may never become a 
reality. It is vital that employees are permitted to participate and express their ideas 
and views in a vision rather than having a set of ideas being thrust upon them by 
management.  
 
(5.3.3) Capacity for Change 
 
This refers to the resources, such as the budget, and the skills, such as the training, 
which are necessary to bring about the changes required. It is important for 
management to ensure that they give the employees enough time to participate in 
the changed activities rather than expecting them to automatically adapt to them 
and to be able to cope with changes on top of their existing workloads. 
 
 (5.3.4) Actionable First Steps 
 
Actionable first steps, which are sometimes referred to as the process of 
“encouraging small wins”, allow employees to feel positive about their achievements, 
especially in the beginning phases of a new order. This inspires them to achieve even 
greater and better results, as the programme progresses. Without “encouraging 
small wins” employees soon lose interest in the vision, which ultimately ends up as 
another failed, and often costly, initiative. A frequently supervised and encouraging 
hands-on approach by management is preferred rather than management allowing 
several years to pass by before they scrutinize the success or failure of the vision. 
Thus, without actionable first steps, employees may make “false starts”.  
 
(5.3.5) Model the Way 
 
This is the step in terms of which the manager of the organisation puts into practice 
those characteristics that would endorse and support the new initiative. It is vital 
that the manager acts in an exemplary fashion so that the employees can see for 
themselves that the organisation is serious about the vision that they are striving to 
achieve. 
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(5.3.6) Reinforcement of the Change 
 
Processes and procedures are modified so that the changed initiative becomes 
etched into the working environment of the employees. Encouragement for obliging 
employees in this regard may be in the form of a reward or some other type of 
recognition from management. It could also be discouraging for those employees 
who resist change, as this may result in their transfer or demotion. 
 
(5.3.7) Evaluate and Adapt 
 
It is important to evaluate new initiatives once it has been going for some time, 
usually 12 to 18 months. The evaluation has to be accurate and meaningful, as it 
need to be determined whether improvements are required, or whether it may no 
longer be in the interests of the organisation to pursue it. After the initiative has 
been going for about 12 to 18 months, managers, owners and employees need to 
ask whether the empowerment programme has really improved anything at all. 
Thus, establishing “before-and-after measures” is necessary in order to judge the 
effectiveness of the value of the change programme. 728  
 
Robbins et al have produced an interesting diagram, reproduced as table 1 below, 
which illustrates the symptoms that may appear in each case if one of the seven 
aforementioned steps is not brought into play during the change process. The 
authors have indicated that organisations, such as the Water Corporation of Western 
Australia and Australia Post, have used this approach. 729  
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Table 1: Varying Symptoms Associated With Each Of The Missing Steps That 
Affect Successful Change In The Workplace Of A Corporation (Robbins et al, 
page 689)  
 
X + Clear, shared vision + Capacity for change + Actionable first steps + Model the way + 
Reinforce and solidify change + Evaluate and improve = Bottom of the box 
Pressure for change + X + Capacity for change + Actionable first steps + Model the way + 
Reinforce and solidify change + Evaluate and improve = A quick start that fizzles 
Pressure for change + Clear, shared vision + X + Actionable first steps + Model the way + 
Reinforce and solidify change + Evaluate and improve = Anxiety, frustration 
Pressure for change + Clear, shared vision + Capacity for change + X + Model the way + 
Reinforce and solidify change + Evaluate and improve = Haphazard efforts, false starts 
Pressure for change + Clear, shared vision + Capacity for change + Actionable first steps + X 
+ Reinforce and solidify change + Evaluate and improve = Cynicism and distrust 
Pressure for change + Clear, shared vision + Capacity for change + Actionable first steps + 
Model the way + X + Evaluate and improve = Go back to old ways 
Pressure for change + Clear, shared vision + Capacity for change + Actionable first steps + 
Model the way + Reinforce and solidify change + X + = Skepticism and stagnation 
(X indicates the missing step in each situation) 
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(5.4) WHAT MEANS CAN BE USED TO ACHIEVE EMPLOYEE EMPOWERMENT? 
 
In order to succeed in the empowerment of employees, Robbins et al identify various 
means to accomplish this. 730 They are listed briefly as follows: 
 
1. Group feedback sessions develop a greater willingness to understand the 
problems at work encountered by employees. Through the process of 
unstructured group interaction in a free and open environment, employees 
develop the skills to listen to and to become more tolerant of individual 
differences. 
 
2. Feedback questionnaires provide the means to pin point various problems 
encountered by the employees in the organisation. Employees could be 
involved in deciding which issues should form part of the feedback 
questionnaire. The data obtained from them can then be used to remedy 
discrepancies and provide solutions to improving employee satisfaction. 
 
3. Process consultation employs the services of an external consultant who steps 
into the firm temporarily in order to assist management in identifying issues 
that are causing problems and grievances in the workplace. In cooperation 
with management, a joint effort is made to suggest changes that would be 
more acceptable to the workforce. The consultant is therefore a guide who 
advises management on the best processes it can use to solve its own 
problems. The consultant does not solve the problems for management. 
 
4. Team-building processes allow employees in an organisation the opportunity 
to work together in order to achieve a common goal. This would ultimately 
lead to improved employee productivity through greater employee job 
satisfaction. It can also lead to a greater understanding amongst individual 
employees as to what their individual roles are in the whole process, which, in 
turn, affords them with a greater appreciation of their individual significance 
and value in the organisation. These processes may improve the overall team 
effort. 
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5. Intergroup development focuses on improving the relations between various 
groups and how they perceive one another. 
 
6. Organisational restructuring allows greater employee participation in the 
workplace. It does so through the development of employee assistance 
programmes and bodies, which are designed to give employees greater 
empowerment in the organisation. 
 
7. Total quality management is a specific type of organisational development 
process that deals with issues such as customer responsiveness, continuous 
improvement, empowering teams to find solutions to problems and a central 
organisational philosophy to perform quality work as economically as possible. 
731 It often focuses on quality standards and ensures that such standards are 
maintained. 
 
 
(5.5) CONCLUSION 
 
Organisational development endorses the principles that employees are generally 
responsible people and should be treated with respect. Employees should, as far as 
possible, be able to participate in the decision-making processes, which would affect 
the organisation and ultimately themselves. Employees are more likely to respond 
positively to changes if they had a role in the decision-making processes affecting 
them. A healthy organisation is one that acknowledges trust, honesty and openness 
amongst its employees. It de-emphasises hierarchical authority and control while 
encouraging change agents to use their knowledge and suggest improvements to the 
workplace. This can result in improved employee productivity. The change options 
can be a selection or combination of aspects dealing with the structure, technology, 
physical setting or the very people within the organisation. 
 
Seven steps were identified that need to be complied with in order to ensure 
successful changes in the workplace. It is interesting to note that different symptoms 
result in each case, if one of the seven steps is not present. Finally, various 
organisational development means were discussed to bring about the changes 
resulting in greater employee empowerment. Thus, by empowering employees and 
allowing them to participate in the decision-making processes, which would lead to 
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changes in their working environment, and, by promoting the sense of well-being of 
its staff members, organisations would generate greater job satisfaction, improved 
customer service and enhanced profitability.  
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CHAPTER 6: 
 
 
(6.0) THE SECOND STEP OR BUIDING BLOCK: 
SOUTH AFRICAN LEGISLATIVE ENACTMENTS AND 
THE KING REPORTS 
 
 
In this chapter of the thesis, the most significant South African legislation 
governing the rights and interests of employees in their participation of the affairs 
of the corporation will be reviewed. In this regard, the effectiveness of workplace 
forms created by the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 will be thoroughly 
discussed. The rights of employees to freedom of association under the Act will 
also be considered. Additionally, what will be examined is the extent to which the 
1996 Constitution facilitates and advances the rights of employees under the 
Labour Relations Act.  
 
The two King Reports of 1994 and 2002, which provide guidelines on corporate 
governance, will be analysed in detail to determine whether either or both of 
these Reports have influenced positively or negatively the development and 
growth of worker participation in the decision-making processes of the 
corporation in South Africa. Examples of companies in South Africa applying 
corporate governance principles based upon the recommendations of the first 
King Report will be provided. KMPG corporate governance surveys will be 
discussed and analysed with regard to worker participation and corporate 
governance practices in South Africa. The significance of the Ethics Institute of 
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South Africa is considered in so far as it facilitates the development and 
implementation of a code of ethics within corporations for its employees and 
other stakeholders.  
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(6.1) INTRODUCTION 
 
Corporate failures occur because of subtle failures in the decision-making process – in how boards 
and managers make decisions and monitor corporate progress. Power-based reforms are not the 
key to correcting the problem. To be sure, the balance of power is important. But, at its core, 
corporate governance is not about power; it is about ensuring effective decision-making. Corporate 
governance reform should seek ways to create and maintain an efficient decision-making process. 
732
 
The manner in and extent to which South African legislation has thus far 
responded to the need to empower employees in the workplace and to provide 
them with a statutory right to be involved in the decision-making processes of the 
organisation, will now be discussed. Participative practices should ensure that 
everyone in the corporation understands what the goals of the business are and 
that employees are able to participate in the decision-making processes.  
There are three basic forms of employee participation. The first form is shopfloor 
participation, which affords employees with an opportunity of having a direct say 
about the decisions affecting their immediate work environment. For example, 
these types of decisions would include participation affecting the reduction of 
costs, improvement of efficiency, work methods, work quality, job design, 
physical layout of the workplace, health and safety and training. The second form 
of employee participation is based upon representative consultation. This allows 
employee representatives the opportunity of being involved in decisions that 
govern the operation of the organisation. The third form of employee participation 
involves financial reward, by providing employees with an opportunity to 
participate in the financial success of the corporation. The main types of 
representative participation would be based upon the formation of “specific issue 
committees”, which would be designed to deal comprehensively with issues 
affecting the corporation widely. The composition of this committee would consist 
of representatives of those stakeholders directly affected by any issue. 
Furthermore, “joint consultative committees” would allow regular, formal 
meetings to be held between employee representatives and senior levels of 
management. “Board representation of employees” involve an employee 
representative to be elected onto the company’s board of directors. Additionally, 
the main types of financial participation are based upon “profit sharing schemes” 
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where, in addition to their usual salaries, employees would receive special 
payments, which would be based upon the corporation’s profitability. Moreover, 
“productivity-sharing schemes” would be based upon an individual or a group’s 
productivity performance, rather than upon the performance of the company as a 
whole. “Employee share schemes” would permit employees to buy company 
shares at cheaper rates than that set by the market. 733
 
The extent to which employee participative practices have thus far developed in 
South Africa through the requisite legislation will be thoroughly examined in this 
chapter. It is important to note that historically, Acts of Parliament were not 
subject to substantive judicial review. However, in terms of the Constitution of 
the Republic of South Africa, 734 courts now had the power to test legislation 
against the provisions of the Bill of Rights that governed labour relations and 
unfair labour practices. 735  
 
On 4 February 1997, the Constitution came into force. 736 In addition, the Labour 
Relations Act (LRA) was introduced, making the industrial council (now referred 
to as the bargaining council) the main focus in the Act. It is not obligatory to 
participate in the council. 737 Employees, however, may then be subject to a 
Wage Board or statutory council meeting, which the Minister may impose upon 
them. 738
 
Chapter V of the LRA makes provision for the establishment of workplace forums 
for its employees by a representative union. Disputes must now go either to the 
Commission for Conciliation Mediation and Arbitration (CCMA) in the unorganised 
sector, 739 or to the bargaining council. 740  
 
In addition, in 1997, the new Basic Conditions of Employment Act (BCEA) came 
into being, which attempts to entrench basic worker rights. 741 Consequently,  
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(a)t plant-level, a significant number of companies are introducing worker participation schemes, in 
the hope of winning greater co-operation from their employees. … For the first time, greater co-
operation with both state and employer is now possible. Unions have the chance to … determine 
what happens to their members at home and at work. 742
 
In this chapter, relevant sections of those acts, which attempt to provide 
employees with a participatory role in the running of the organisation, will be 
discussed. 
 
 
(6.2) WORKPLACE FORUMS 
 
(6.2.1) Introduction 
 
It is useful to note that 
 
(t)he (New Zealand) Law Commission has taken the view that a Companies Act is not the 
appropriate vehicle for the imposition of general social reforms such as the requirement of worker 
participation in management or the imposition of environmental goals upon companies – ‘[t]hese 
matters should be pursued through specific legislation imposed upon all employers and business 
enterprises’. 743
 
In South Africa workplace forums, created by the Labour Relations Act, 
attempted, for the first time, to legally involve employees of corporations in the 
decision-making processes. 744 The extent to which this ideology became a reality 
will be carefully examined and analysed. In this regard, it is argued that the best 
method of thoroughly examining the features of workplace forums is to consider 
the relevant sections one at a time. In each case, a key question is asked and 
suggested answers have been provided (together with commentaries and 
critiques where applicable). Thus, this process of evaluation and discussion, will 
clearly define the purview, limitations and effectiveness of workplace forums in 
South Africa.  
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(6.2.2) The Major Features of Workplace Forums 
 
(6.2.2.1) Who is an Employee? 
 
(An) ‘employee’ means any person who is employed in a workplace, except a senior managerial 
employee whose contract of employment or status confers the authority to do any of the following 
in the workplace … represent the employer in dealings with the workplace forum or determine 
policy and take decisions on behalf of the employer that may be in conflict with the representation 
of employees in the workplace. … 745
 
(6.2.2.2) What is a Representative Trade Union? 
 
(A) ‘representative trade union’ means a registered trade union, or two or more registered trade 
unions acting jointly, that have as members the majority of the employees employed by an 
employer in a workplace. 746
 
It is noted that if employees work outside of the workplace, they will not be 
deemed to be an employee in terms of the section. 747 There can only be one 
workplace forum established per workplace. A ‘senior managerial employee’ is 
defined in the BCEA as an employee who has the authority to hire, discipline and 
dismiss employees and to represent the employer internally and externally. 748  
 
(6.2.2.3) What are the General Functions of Workplace Forums? 
 
Under section 79 of the LRA, 
 
A workplace forum established in terms of this Chapter –  
 
(a) Must seek to promote the interests of all employees in the workplace, whether or not they are 
trade union members; 
 
(b) Must seek to enhance efficiency in the workplace; 
(c) Is entitled to be consulted by the employer, with a view to reaching consensus, about the 
matters referred to in section 84; and 
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(d) Is entitled to participate in joint decision-making about the matters referred to in section 86. 
749 
 
Non-statutory forums do not fall within the purview of section 79 of the LRA. 750  
 
However, Brassey et al note, 
 
the content … that the Act gives the forum is almost infinitely adaptable … which the parties are 
free to depart (from) whenever they choose by the conclusion of a collective agreement. 751
 
Section 79, however, does not go far enough for employees. The question to be 
asked is whether the Act should be modified in such a way so as to provide its 
employees with the right to participate in decision-making processes at all levels 
in the organisation, including board level. Brassey et al note that South African 
workplace forums, unlike those that operate in Germany, do not provide 
employees with a two-tier board structure that would achieve this. However, they 
note that workplace forms are set up to be beneficial to all of the organisation’s 
stakeholders, including the employer, employees, creditors, debtors, the public 
and the economy.752
 
(6.2.2.4) How Can Statutory Workplace Forums be Established? 
 
Subsection 1 of section 80(1) of the LRA states that a workplace forum may be 
established in any workplace in which an employer employs more than 100 
employees. 753 Subsection 2 states that any representative union may apply to 
the Commission in the prescribed form for the establishment of a workplace 
forum. 754 There must also be no functioning workplace forum already established 
at the workplace in question. 755 If these requirements are met, the Commission 
must then appoint a commissioner who would then assist the parties in 
establishing a workplace forum either by collective agreement or in terms of this 
chapter. 756 The commissioner must convene a meeting with the applicant, the 
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employer and the registered trade union having members in the workplace to 
facilitate the conclusion of a collective agreement between the parties, or at least, 
between the applicant and the employer. 757 If a collective agreement is 
concluded, the provisions of this Chapter do not apply. 758 In this event, the 
commissioner must meet with the parties to facilitate agreement between them, 
or at least between the applicant and the employer, with regards to the 
provisions of a constitution for a workplace forum, which takes into account the 
guidelines referred to in Schedule 2. 759 If no agreement is reached in this regard, 
the commissioner must establish a workplace forum and thus determine the 
provisions of the constitution in accordance with this Chapter and Schedule 2. 760 
After the establishment of a workplace forum, the commissioner must set a date 
to elect the first members of the workplace forum and to appoint an election 
officer to conduct the election. 761 Section 80 does not apply to the public service, 
as workplace forums here will be regulated in a Schedule promulgated by the 
Minister for the Public Service and Administration in terms of section 207(4). 762
 
An important point to be noted is that even if a corporation employs more than 
100 employees, a workplace forum may be established. Consequently, there is no 
mandatory requirement to do this. This greatly dilutes the significance and 
effectiveness of workplace forums under the LRA. This section should therefore 
be amended in such a way that the establishment of workplace forums becomes 
a statutory requirement under the Act where more than ten employees are 
employed in a given workplace. In close corporations with ten or less employees, 
it is suggested that an employee representative must be nominated and elected 
to office by the employees. 
 
Brassey et al note that a union, or unions acting jointly, having more than 50 per 
cent of its employees as members must make an application for the 
establishment of a workplace forum. 763 If parties do not meet the requirements 
of section 80, they may still establish non-statutory workplace forums, but the 
provisions set out in this Chapter will not protect these structures. An immediate 
shortcoming of the Act is that it requires more than 100 employees to be 
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employed at a workplace before a statutory workplace forum can be established. 
Statutory workplace forums should be available to all types of organisations, 
especially to the smaller private companies and close corporations (where the 
number of employees exceed ten). This would ensure that employee participation 
in the decision-making processes of the organisation and, consequently employee 
job satisfaction, are not only confined to and regulated by larger organisations.  
Another issue that deserves to be questioned is why the Act insists only upon a 
registered trade union being able to apply for the establishment of a workplace 
forum, and why a majority of its members is required to do this. Surely, it would 
be in the best interests of employees for them to be able to apply for the 
establishment of a workplace forum themselves either collectively or individually? 
Similarly, it may be in the better interests of employees for their trade union to 
be able to apply for the establishment of a workplace forum even in those 
situations where it has less than 50 per cent of its employees as members, or 
where the unions are unregistered or where the employee organisation does not 
qualify as such to be a union. If, for example, a workplace has 120 employees of 
whom 100 employees wish its trade union to apply to the Commission for the 
establishment of a statutory workplace forum, in terms of the Act, the trade 
union in this situation would not be able to do so. This is because the Act insists 
upon “more than 100 employees” being employed by any one employer. This is 
so despite the great majority of employees in the workplace wishing the 
establishment of a workplace forum. This limitation appears not to be in the best 
interests of employees in South Africa. In this case “more than 100 employees” is 
simply an arbitrary determinant that bears no real connection to the needs of 
employees in any given situation. It should therefore be abandoned, as employee 
participation in the decision-making processes of the company promotes greater 
job satisfaction for its employees, improved customer service and increased 
profits for the employer.  
 
It can further be argued that more than one workplace forum can be established 
at the same time in any workplace, provided that such workplace forum is not a 
“functioning” one. 764 This may become an issue at a later stage if the non-
functioning workplace forum becomes a “functioning” one and exists alongside 
the newly established workplace forum. Brassey et al note that the section makes 
no provision for the termination of a workplace forum, which is “a serious 
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shortcoming in the statute”. 765 This is especially so if the two workplace forums 
operate in opposition to one another. For example, where one workplace forum 
argues for the maximum participation of employees in the decision-making 
processes of the organisation, and the other, opposes it, for some reason, this 
would not be very constructive in determining, negotiating and safeguarding the 
rights of its employees. 
 
If the CCMA determines, however, that the requirements for the establishment of 
a workplace forum are met or are not met, its decision is reviewable to the 
Labour Court in terms of section 158(1)(g) read with section 157(1) on the basis 
of its irregular and irrational nature. 766
 
It is clear from section 80 that a statutory workplace forum can either be 
governed by collective agreement or by the provisions of the Chapter. 767 The 
collective agreement would govern issues such as its composition of members, its 
powers, including the detailing of its procedures and processes to resolve issues, 
and its termination. Brassey et al note that once agreement is reached, the CCMA 
loses its powers to interfere with it and can therefore not solve any deadlocks for 
the parties. 768 Minority unions may be a party to the collective agreement 
between the employer and the union, but they do not have any rights of veto. 769 
On the other hand, a workplace forum established in terms of the provisions of 
the Chapter would mean that the Act would have to govern. Then, there must 
also be an adherence to the guidelines set out in terms of Schedule 2. 
 
(6.2.2.5) What is a Trade Union–based Workplace Forum? 
 
The LRA states that if a collective agreement by an employer recognises a 
representative trade union for the purposes of collective bargaining regarding all 
employees in its workplace, the trade union may apply to the Commission in the 
prescribed form for the establishment of a workplace forum. 770 The applicant 
trade union may choose its members of the workplace forum from its elected 
representatives in the workplace. 771 The provisions of this Chapter will then 
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apply, except for sections 80(11) and 82(1)(b) to (m). 772 The applicant’s 
constitution governs the nomination, election and removal from office of elected 
representatives.773 A workplace forum constituted in terms of this section will be 
dissolved if either the collective agreement is terminated or the applicant is no 
longer a representative trade union. 774 The provision of this section does not 
apply to the public service. 775
 
It is arguable that the application of this section is very limited. This is due to the 
fact that it would be an exceptional situation to find that all the employees in the 
workforce subscribe to the views of the representative trade union and, 
consequently, allow it to promote itself as their sole bargaining agent. Equally, it 
is in very limited circumstances that the employer would be willing to give a 
union-based workplace forum “exclusive collective bargaining rights”. 776 
Furthermore, to fall within the purview of this section, in addition to a workplace 
needing to have more than 100 employees, a union must have more than 50 per 
cent of the employees in the workplace and in the bargaining group as members 
and be recognised as the collective bargaining representative of all the 
employees. 
 
(6.2.2.6) What are the Requirements for the Constitution of a Workplace Forum? 
 
The LRA details the requirements for the constitution of every workplace forum. 
777 Some of the more important subsections that deal with these requirements 
will be discussed. Section 82 should be read with Schedule 2 of the Act, which 
provides the guidelines for the constitution of a workplace forum. 
 
The constitution of every workplace forum must establish a formula to determine 
the number of seats and the distribution of seats, 778 which reflect the 
occupational structure of the workplace. 779 It must also provide for the direct 
election of its members by employees, 780 the appointment of an employee as the 
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election officer, 781 and the election of members within 24 months of the 
preceding election. 782 If another registered trade union becomes representative, 
it may demand a new election within 21 months of the preceding election. 783  
 
The constitution must also establish the terms of office of members and the 
circumstances in which they must vacate their office, 784 the circumstances and 
manner of removal of members from office, 785 and the manner in which 
vacancies may be filled. 786 It must also provide that the employer must allow the 
election officer reasonable time off with pay during working hours to conduct the 
elections. 787 It must also allow each member of the workplace forum reasonable 
time off with pay during working hours to perform the functions as member and 
to receive training relevant to those functions. 788 The constitution also requires 
the employer to take any steps reasonably necessary to assist the election officer 
with the elections. 789 The employer must also provide facilities to enable the 
workplace forum to perform its functions. 790 The constitution must also designate 
full-time members of the workplace forum if more than 1000 employees are 
employed in the workplace. 791 It must also provide that the workplace forum 
may invite any expert into its meetings, and that such expert is entitled to 
receive, inspect or copy any information that the workplace forum is entitled to 
receive, inspect or copy. 792 It must also provide that office-bearers or officials of 
the representative trade union may attend meetings of the workplace forum, 
including meetings with the employer or the employees. 793 The representative 
trade union and the employer may, by agreement, change the constitution of the 
workplace forum. 794
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In terms of subsection 2(a) the constitution of the workplace forum may establish 
a procedure for the conciliation and arbitration of matters of which the employer 
and the workplace forum do not agree. 795 It may also include provisions 
departing from sections 83 to 92, which deal with the forum’s composition and 
the manner and type of business it can involve itself with or engage in. 796 
Subsection 3 makes it plain that the constitution of a workplace forum binds the 
employer. 
 
It is noted that the provisions contained in section 82, and this Chapter, do not 
apply to workplace forums established under a collective agreement. 797 Section 
82 only applies to those situations where there is no collective agreement and a 
workplace forum is established by the Commissioner who then takes into account 
the guidelines contained in Schedule 2 of the Act. 798
 
(6.2.2.7) When are the Meetings of Workplace Forums to be Held? 
 
In terms of section 83 of the LRA, there must be regular meetings of the 
workplace forum 799 and also regular meetings at which the employer must 
present a report on its financial and employment situation, its performance since 
the last report and its anticipated performance in the long and short terms. 800 
The employer must also consult the workplace forum on any matter arising from 
the report that may affect its employees. 801 Additionally, at regular and 
appropriate intervals, there must be meetings between the workplace forum and 
the employees. 802 The workplace forum must report on its activities generally, 803 
on matters in respect of which the employer has consulted it, 804 and on matters 
in terms of which it has participated in joint decision-making processes with the 
employer. 805 Every year, at one of the meetings with employees, the employer 
must present an annual report of its financial and employment situation, its 
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performance and its future prospects and plans. 806 Meetings of employees must 
be held during working hours at a time and place agreed upon by the workplace 
forum and the employer with no loss of pay to the employees. 807
 
It is emphasised that section 83 provides for the convening of four types of 
meetings. 808 These are meetings between members of the workplace forum, 
members of the workplace forum and the employer, members of the workplace 
forum and the employees and, finally, between members of the workplace forum, 
the employees and the employer. 
 
Section 83 is important because it makes provision for all parties to come to the 
negotiating table, and to do so at “regular and appropriate intervals”. The 
meaning that is to be given to “regular” or “regular and appropriate intervals” 
could, however, become rather problematic in the sense that what might be 
“regular and appropriate” for one organisation, may not necessarily be the same 
for another. Employers, employees and workplace forums may not agree on what 
should be meetings at “regular and appropriate intervals”. Additionally, the 
employers might be very involved in the day to day running and administration of 
the organisation, whilst it employees may feel frustrated. They may feel that they 
are not receiving information or having meetings, as outlined in this section, on a 
“regular” enough basis. Thus, the extent to which “regular intervals” might 
become “not so regular” in the minds of the workplace forum or employees is an 
issue that needs to be resolved. Because of the wide and vague nature of this 
wording, employers may take advantage of this fact and downplay the 
importance of having “regular” meetings. Furthermore, the section does not state 
how many meetings should be held between the workplace forum, the employees 
and the employer. Section 3(b) simply states “(e) ach calendar year, at one of 
the meetings with the employees …”. Does this mean that only one meeting 
needs to be held in this way? This phrase is ambiguous, as it could refer to other 
meetings to be held between the workplace forum and the employer. Hence, it 
could be read to mean, ‘at one of the meetings that includes the employees (the 
other meetings not having included the employees)’. The wording of the Act 
should therefore be amended in such a way in order to ascertain with more 
precision the periods during which the meetings should be held with the 
workplace forum, the employer and the employees. This clarification would assist 
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in achieving greater industrial democracy in the workplace. Thus, Brassey et al 
note,  
 
the employer should give the forum enough information” to determine the future prosperity of the 
organisation, the aim being “… to make the forum a partner in the fortunes of the enterprise. 809
 
To what extent organisations will reveal all the facts of its “financial and 
employment situation, its performance generally and its future prospects and 
plans” to the workplace forum and employees is a key question that workplace 
forums will be faced with. This includes the question of the degree to which the 
employer will regularly consult the workplace forums on matters that may affect 
employees in the workplace in terms of subsection 2(b). 
 
(6.2.2.8) What Matters Must the Employer Consult a Workplace Forum on? 
 
Section 84 of the LRA states that unless a collective agreement is in force with a 
representative trade union, a workplace forum is entitled to be consulted by the 
employer on various proposals, the more important ones of which will be 
discussed below. 810
 
A workplace forum must be consulted on those proposals dealing with 
restructuring the workplace, including introducing new technology and work 
methods, 811 changes in the organisation of work, 812 partial or total plant 
closures, 813 mergers and transfers of ownership that would affect employees, 814 
the dismissal of employees for operational requirements, 815 job grading, 816 
criteria for merit increases or the payment of discretionary bonuses, 817 and 
education and training. 818
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Subsection 2 states that a bargaining council may confer upon a workplace forum 
the right to be consulted about other matters that fall within its registered scope.  
819 Subsection 3 gives a representative trade union and employer the right to 
conclude a collective agreement permitting the workplace forum to be consulted 
on other matters. 820 The section is further broadened by subsection 4, which 
states that any other law may confer on the workplace forum the right to be 
consulted on other matters. 821 Subsection 5 states that a representative trade 
union and employer may agree that the employer must consult with the 
workplace forum to initiate, develop, promote, monitor and review measures to 
ensure health and safety at work. 822
 
It should be noted that collective agreements that establish workplace forums do 
not fall within the scope of this Chapter. 823 This section contemplates those 
collective agreements facilitated by the Commissioner, which take into account 
the guidelines set out in Schedule 2. 824 Thus, the collective agreement must 
regulate all the consulting matters in terms of section 84, otherwise the collective 
“agreement will have to be read in tandem with this subsection … and (t)he terms 
of the collective agreement will take precedence when there is a clash”. 825 It is 
open for workplace forums to try and extend the parameters of those matters 
upon which they may be consulted. This can occur either through the bargaining 
council or by direct agreement with the employer or through the operation of any 
law. It would then be incumbent upon the workplace forum to show cause why 
the bargaining council or employer, as the case may be, should give the 
workplace forum the right to be consulted on a matter not falling within the 
purview of section 84. The workplace forum would be inclined to argue that this 
consultation would be in the best interests for all concerned, including the 
organisation, its employees and other stakeholders and that it would democratise 
the industry even further for all parties concerned.  
 
It is also important to note that the section specifically uses the word “proposals”. 
It is arguable that “proposals” are something different from established or settled 
issues, or issues requiring immediate attention and, therefore, the workplace 
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forum has the right to be consulted only over those matters amounting to 
“proposals” and not over the other. However, in practice, it may, in some of the 
more difficult cases, be a rather onerous and complicated task to decide where 
the line should or should not be drawn between the two. That is, what might be 
viewed as a “proposal” for the employees or the workplace forum at that point in 
time, might have already been viewed by the employer as a settled issue and 
therefore not falling within the provisions of the section and is therefore not a 
matter for consultation. This may then result in dissatisfaction amongst the 
employees and bring about a sense that the organisation is using legal loopholes 
to legitimately apply undemocratic values through its organisation. Thus, the 
section should be amended in such a way that it does not simply restrict itself to 
matters that are only “proposals”. This would ensure that pertinent matters in 
terms of the section are consulted upon expeditiously. 
 
The list of “proposals” set out in subsection 1 is long and fairly exhaustive. 
However, a deeming provision should be added to the subsection. In terms of 
this, the workplace forum would be given the autonomy to insist upon the fact 
that it is consulted by the employer on matters that do not ordinarily fall within 
the provisions of the section if it deems it so urgent that, if not dealt with 
expeditiously, it would cause severe hardship to the employees or to the 
organisation concerned. Additionally, there should be disclosure of information if 
the workplace forum deems this to be in the best interests of the corporation. 
That is, the workplace forum would not need to have the rights conferred upon it 
either by the bargaining council or through the operation of some law or by 
entering into an agreement with the employer in terms of the provisions of the 
section.  
 
(6.2.2.9) How do the Workplace Forum and Employer Reach Agreement on a 
Proposal? 
 
Section 85 expands the duty to consult set out in section 84. 826 The employer 
must consult the workplace forum in order to reach consensus on a proposal 
under section 84(1) before it can implement it. 827 The employer must allow the 
workplace forum an opportunity to make representations and to advance other 
proposals. 828 The employer must consider these and respond thereto and, if the 
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employer does not agree with them, the employer must state the reasons for 
disagreeing. 829 If the employer and the workplace forum cannot agree, the 
employer must invoke any agreed procedure to resolve any differences before 
implementing the employer’s proposals. 830
 
This provision affords the workplace forum and employer the opportunity to come 
to the negotiating table and to negotiate proposals made by one another in order 
to try and reach consensus on various issues. The provision imposes duties on 
the employer to try and reach consensus in the best interests of all parties 
concerned. An obvious possibility in this regard is that the parties would reach a 
deadlock situation. Therefore, a further provision should be added into this 
section that deals with this possibility. That is, in the event that any agreed 
procedure cannot be reached between the employer and the workplace forum, 
the Commission through conciliation should in the first instance, resolve this 
dispute. If the dispute remains unresolved, the matter must be resolved through 
arbitration. This would take into account the specific types of issues that could 
typify a deadlock situation of this nature. 
(6.2.2.10) To What Extent are Employees Legally Entitled to Have a Part in the 
Decision-making Processes within the Organisation? 
 
Regarding any contention in law and practice to maximise the rights of employees 
in the decision-making processes of the organisation, section 86 of the LRA falls 
at the heart of the matter. 831 This is significant, as it expressly provides for the 
first time in South African labour law that employees have some rights in the 
decision-making processes of their employ. Certainly, the provisions in the 
section are arguably groundbreaking in that previous labour legislation has not 
come close to expressly providing these rights to employees. A key question, 
however, is whether the legislation goes far enough. It is arguable that it 
probably does not, as these rights, which are given to employees under section 
86, are confined to line management level, and, therefore, unlike the two-tier 
board system operating in a country such as Germany, do not give employees the 
right to be involved in decision-making processes at board level. Furthermore, the 
provisions in the subsection themselves are very limited and give very little 
support to the workplace forum and, in turn, to the employees of an organisation. 
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Section 86(1) states that unless matters for joint decision-making are regulated 
by a collective agreement with the representative trade union, 832 the employer 
must consult and reach consensus with a workplace forum before any proposal is 
implemented relating to disciplinary codes and procedures, 833 rules for the 
proper regulation of the workplace that apply to conduct not connected to the 
work performance of employees, 834 measures to protect and advance persons 
who are disadvantaged by unfair discrimination, 835 and changes by the employer 
or its appointed representatives on trusts or boards of employer-controlled 
schemes to the rules regulating social benefit schemes. 836  
 
A representative trade union and an employer may conclude a collective 
agreement that confers upon the parties the right to participate in joint decision-
making on other workplace matters and remove any matters listed in subsections 
(1)(a) to (d) from the matters requiring joint decision-making.  837 Any other law 
may confer on a workplace forum the right to participate in joint decision-making 
on other matters.838 If no consensus is reached with the workplace forum, the 
employer may refer the dispute to arbitration in terms of an agreed procedure, 839 
or, if there is no agreed procedure, refer the dispute to the Commission, 840 which 
must try and resolve the dispute through conciliation. 841 If the dispute remains 
unresolved, the employer may request that the dispute be resolved through 
arbitration. 842
 
It is arguable that section 86 gives limited rights to the workplace forum, and, in 
turn, to the employees that are to be involved in the decision-making processes 
at line management level. As in section 84, the section immediately limits its 
purview, by confining itself to “any proposal” rather than including an issue that 
has become an immediate concern and, consequently, one which is not deemed 
                                                     
832  LRA, section 86(1). 
833  LRA, section 86(1)(a). 
834  LRA, section 86(1)(b). 
835  LRA, section 86(1)(c). 
836  LRA, section 86(1)(d). 
837  LRA, section 86(2)(a). 
838  LRA, section 86(3). 
839  LRA, section 86(4)(a). 
840  LRA, section 86(4)(b). 
841  LRA, section 86(6). 
842  LRA, section 86(7). 
Chapter 6 245
to be a “proposal” in terms of the section. Although section (1)(b) is rather vague 
and applies to “conduct not related to the work performance of employees”, it is 
unlikely that employees would be able to argue that they were entitled to be 
involved in any decision that relates to the directors of the organisation choosing 
to take on business ventures or to take business risks in what they believe to be 
in the best interests of the organisation. It might also be difficult, in some cases, 
to reach agreement on what is in fact “conduct not related to the work 
performance of employees”. Some conduct might be very remotely or indirectly 
related to the work performance of employees. It would therefore be, in many 
cases, an arduous task on the part of the workplace forum or employees to be 
able to show or to prove that a proposal relates to “conduct not related to the 
work performance of employees” in order to fall within the purview of the 
subsection.  
 
The other three parts to subsection 1 are plain. These parts have very limited 
scope and apply to “disciplinary codes and procedures”, “persons disadvantaged 
by unfair discrimination” and “changes … to the rules regulating social benefit 
schemes”. The other limiting factor is that it remains in the hands of the 
employer to decide, if consensus is not reached with the workplace forum, 
whether it will drop the proposal completely or refer it to arbitration or to the 
Commission. Thus, the employer has overriding power in terms of this section to 
dismiss the proposal or take it further. Therefore, better dispute resolution 
practices would arise and greater industrial democracy would be evident if the 
word “may” in subsection 4 is replaced with the word “must”. In this way, if the 
employer does not reach consensus with the workplace forum regarding a 
proposal, it must then refer the dispute either to arbitration or to the 
Commission, as the case may be. This would better balance this subsection and 
would remove its current one-sided nature, which is configured expressly in 
favour of the employer. Therefore, it is arguable that section 86 is 
groundbreaking in the sense that it forces the parties to be involved in joint 
decision-making ventures on various, but limited, proposals. However, it could 
ultimately bring about limited, if any, results, especially if the employer decides 
to pull away from the process at the stage when consensus is not reached with 
the workplace forum. It is likely that the legislature had fully intended this to be 
the case when this legislation was drafted. It ensured that the power and 
sovereignty of the workplace remains deep-seated in the hands of the employer.  
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Arguably, this section is simply a device to make employees believe that they are 
being involved in the joint decision-making processes of the organisation. In fact, 
employees are getting very little out of this section. As long as the employer has 
a legal entitlement to opt out of the process when consensus is not reached with 
the workplace forum, it would have the power to dictate to the other parties, as it 
deems fit. Employees could then declare a dispute in terms of section 134 of the 
LRA and strike over the disputed issues, but this would defeat the whole object of 
this provision, which is to have a collective process of joint decision-making. So, 
although subsection 1 states that “an employer must consult and reach 
consensus with a workplace before implementing any proposal”, subsection 4 
waters down subsection 1 by allowing the employer to abandon the process and 
leave matters as they are, if it does not reach consensus with the workplace 
forum. This is not satisfactory and, as noted above, needs to be revisited by the 
legislative draftsman as soon as possible.  
 
(6.2.2.11) When May a Workplace Forum Request Review Procedures to Take 
Place with the Employer? 
 
In terms of section 87 of the LRA, 843 a newly established workplace forum may 
request a meeting with the employer to review the criteria for merit increases or 
the payment of discretionary bonuses, 844 disciplinary codes and procedures, 845 
and the rules to properly regulate the workplace for conduct not related to the 
work performance of the employees. 846 Employers are obliged to submit in 
writing the criteria, codes and procedures and rules it has to the workplace 
forum. 847 A review of the criteria must be conducted in terms of the provisions of 
section 85. 848 A review of the disciplinary codes, procedures and rules must be 
conducted in terms of the provisions of section 86(2) to (7) except that, in 
applying section 86(4), either the employer or the workplace forum may refer a 
dispute between them to arbitration or to the Commission. 849
 
However, unlike those provisions contained in section 86, the Act provides that 
the workplace forum may bring two of the previous four proposals stated in 
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section 86 to arbitration or to the commission under subsection 4. It was 
specifically barred from doing this under section 86. The words “and rules” 
presumably refers to “the rules” for “the proper regulation” of the “conduct not 
related to work performance of employees in the workplace”. These matters deal 
with the same “disciplinary codes and procedures” and rules to regulate “conduct 
not related to the work performance of the employees” detailed under section 86. 
This is because the wording of these two subsections (86(1)(a), (b) and 87 (1)(b) 
and (c)) in each of the two sections is identical. However, subsection 3 deals with 
a “review of the criteria” that “must be conducted” in terms of “the provisions of 
section 85”. This presumably refers to the “criteria for merit increases or the 
payment of discretionary bonuses”. This means that workplace forums would be 
barred from referring matters dealing with subsection (1)(a) to arbitration or to 
the commission, as the review of the “criteria” must be conducted in terms of 
section 85 that deals with the consultation procedures to be engaged in between 
the employer and the workplace forum.  
 
The employer may also, in terms of section 86, refer the two matters detailed in 
subsections (1)(b) and (c), dealing with “disciplinary codes and procedures” and 
“the rules” for “the proper regulation” of the “conduct not related to work 
performance of employees in the workplace” to arbitration or to conciliation 
through the commission. Consequently, there is an overlap on two of the matters 
in terms whereof the employer has the right to refer matters to arbitration or to 
the commission. This amounts to unnecessary duplication and the Act needs to 
be amended in such a way that either the two sections are consolidated as one 
section, or the duplication is removed through a streamlining of the two sections. 
This would lead to greater understanding by the various parties as to what their 
rights are under the Act.  
 
The section, in its short title, also refers to a “newly established workplace 
forum”. Does this mean a workplace forum that has just been constituted under 
the Act, or one that has been established for a few months or even a year and, 
consequently, one that a party or the parties may still argue is “newly 
established”? This is vague and may cause problems at a later stage if there is a 
dispute between the parties or between the parties and the commission or those 
conducting the arbitration as to whether the workplace forum is a “newly 
established” one or not. If it is deemed to be “newly established”, in the event of 
a dispute arising, either the workplace forum or the employer, may decide to 
refer the matter or matters detailed in subsection 1(b) and (c) to arbitration or to 
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the commission. If not, presumably the workplace forum or employer would not 
have these rights.  
 
Further vague wording within the section suggests that another problem can 
arise. Subsection 1 refers to “after the establishment of a workplace forum. …” 
The obvious question is how soon after the establishment of a workplace forum, 
may the workplace forum request a review on the matters stated in subsection 
(1)(a) to (c) with the employer. That is, does a request for review as noted in 
section 1 have to be made immediately, within a month or months or within a 
year or at a period even longer than this? Brassey et al believe that the 
workplace forum must request a review with the employer within a reasonable 
time after its establishment otherwise it will lose the right of review envisaged in 
terms of the provisions of this section. 850 Accordingly, the Act has, once again, 
not gone far enough in this section in protecting, balancing and equalising the 
rights that the workplace forum has, as against the rights of the employer. The 
Act should amend this section in such a way that its purview should be extended 
to those workplace forums which are clearly not, or, which are deemed not to be, 
“newly established” ones. Thus, if employers can decide whether to take certain 
matters or proposals under dispute to arbitration or to conciliation, workplace 
forums should also have equal rights to do this in this regard. It makes little 
sense not to do this. Depriving workplace forums, and, in turn, the employees of 
equal bargaining power, would not, in the long run, achieve employee job 
satisfaction and acceptable industrial democracy. This is the case when 
employees have no need to strike and employers have no need to lockout its 
employees from the workplace. A good point about subsection 2, though, is that 
it requires the employer to submit in writing its criteria, codes, procedures and 
rules stated in subsection 1. There is a good, old saying that ‘if it is not in writing, 
it has not been said’. This ensures that there is no ambiguity, confusion and 
misunderstanding at a later date between the respective parties.  
(6.2.2.12) To What Extent Must the Employer Disclose Information to the 
Workplace Forum? 
 
In terms of section 89 of the LRA, 851 an employer must disclose to the workplace 
all relevant information that will allow the workplace forum the opportunity to 
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engage effectively in consultation and joint decision-making processes. 852 An 
employer is not required to disclose information that is legally privileged, 853 or 
that the employer cannot disclose without contravening a prohibition imposed on 
it by law or an order of court, 854 or that is confidential, and, if disclosed, would 
cause substantial harm to an employee or employer, 855 or that is private 
personal information relating to an employee, unless that employee agrees to the 
disclosure thereof. 856 The employer must notify the workplace forum in writing if 
it believes that the information is confidential. 857 If there is a dispute about the 
disclosure of information, any party may refer the dispute in writing to the 
Commission, 858 which must attempt to resolve the dispute through conciliation. 
859 If the dispute remains unresolved, any party may request that the dispute be 
resolved through arbitration. 860 The commissioner must decide whether or not 
the information contemplated in subsection (3) is relevant. 861 If the 
commissioner decides that the information is relevant, but is that which is 
contemplated in subsection 2(c) or (d), the commissioner must balance the harm 
that the disclosure is likely to cause to the employer or employee against the 
harm that the failure to disclose the information is likely to cause in the ability of 
the workplace forum to engage effectively in consultation and joint decision-
making. 862 If the commissioner decides in favour of disclosure, the commissioner 
may order the disclosure thereof on terms designed to limit the harm likely to be 
caused to the employer or employee. 863 The commissioner may, however, take 
into account any breach of confidentiality and thus may refuse to order the 
disclosure of information for a period specified in the arbitration award. 864  
 
It would appear from this section that the obligation of the employer to disclose 
information to the workplace forum is qualified by various conditions and is 
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restricted in certain situations. It is foreseeable that a dispute may arise between 
the workplace forum and the employer about the disclosure of information. It 
might be convenient and easy for the employer to assert that information, which 
it does not wish to disclose, is confidential and could, if disclosed, cause 
substantial harm to it or to an employee. One test to determine whether 
information of this nature should be disclosed or not, is based primarily upon the 
question of relevance, which is determined by the commissioner. Thus, it would 
be far more difficult for the commissioner to try and ascertain whether 
information is in fact confidential or not. This is because what might be 
confidential in the view of employers may not be similarly viewed as confidential 
information by the workplace forum. Thus, even though the commissioner may 
decide that the information legitimately falls within the parameters set out in 
subsections 2(c) or (d), the commissioner may nonetheless order such 
information to be disclosed and in such manner as would be likely to minimise the 
effects of such disclosure. Hence, there is no safe haven for employers in so far 
as confidential information is concerned. This is a fairly broad-ranging section of 
the Act and provides the workplace forum with effective means to have 
information disclosed to it, which it might otherwise not have had access to. Over 
and above the remedies obtainable through conciliation, the aggrieved party may 
refer the matter to arbitration. 
 
(6.2.2.13) To What Extent May Documents be Inspected and Copied by the 
Workplace Forum? 
 
Section 90 of the LRA is self-explanatory. It provides that any documented 
information that must be disclosed by the employer in terms of section 89, must 
be made available on request to the members of the workplace forum for 
inspection. 865 The employer must provide copies of this to the members of the 
workplace forum on request. 866
 
It is important to note that this can be a powerful section in the hands of the 
workplace forum. The request is tantamount to a demand. This is due to the fact 
that once the members of the workplace forum have requested this 
documentation from the employer it must provide it and must do so immediately. 
The wording of the section also suggests that each and every member of the 
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workplace forum is entitled to inspect and to receive a copy of the documentation 
from the employer, as is required. 
 
(6.2.2.14) When May the Workplace Forum Designate to its Office a Full-time 
Member? 
 
In terms of section 92 of the LRA, where 1000 or more employees are employed 
in a workplace, the members of the workplace forum may designate one full time 
member. 867 The employer must pay the full-time member of the workplace 
forum the same remuneration that that member would have earned in the last 
position before becoming a full-time member. 868
 
It should be noted that there is some inconsistency between section 92(1) and 
section 82(1)(s). Firstly, although section 92(1) couches the designation of a full-
time member to the office of a workplace forum, where 1000 or more employees 
are employed in a workplace, in wording that is voluntary, section 82 (1)(s) is 
peremptory. Section 82(1)(s) notes that the constitution of every workplace 
forum must provide for the designation of full-time members of the workplace 
forum if there are more than 1000 employees in a workplace. Secondly, although 
section 92(1) envisages one full-time member being designated to the office, 
section 82(1)(s) prescribes “the designation of full-time members. …” Thirdly, 
although section 92(1) provides for the designation of a full-time member once 
“1000 or more employees are employed”, section 82(1) provides for the 
designation of more than one full-time member only once there are 1001 or more 
employees in a workplace. 
 
In order to avoid confusion, the Act needs to amend or delete either of these 
sections to bring about consistency. It is suggested that the more onerous of the 
two provisions, section 82(s), should be deleted. In line with achieving greater 
industrial democracy, it should be the option of the workplace forum to decide 
whether or not to appoint a full-time member to its office. Additionally, section 
92(1) should be amended so as to afford the workplace forum with the 
opportunity to appoint more than one full-time member if it so wishes. 
Furthermore, the Act should not restrict itself only to the situation where 1000 or 
more employees are employed in the workplace, but should be wide enough to 
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cover the designation of a full-time member or members in any circumstance that 
the workplace forum may be faced with. 
 
(6.2.2.15) How May a Workplace Forum be Dissolved? 
 
Section 93 of the LRA states that a representative trade union may request a 
ballot to dissolve a workplace forum. 869 At this point, an election officer must be 
appointed in terms of the constitution of the workplace forum. 870 Within 30 days 
of the request in subsection 1, the election officer must prepare and conduct the 
ballot. 871 If more than 50 per cent of the employees having voted in the ballot 
support the dissolution of the workplace forum, then it must be so dissolved. 872
 
Read in conjunction with section 81(5), a trade union based workplace forum will 
only be dissolved if its collective agreement is terminated or the applicant is no 
longer a representative trade union. These two provisions set conditions for the 
dissolution of a trade union based workplace forum, which are arguably onerous 
to fulfill. Thus, it may be difficult to dissolve a workplace forum that meets these 
conditions, even if such workplace forum is not really working in practice to the 
advantage of its members. This is so despite section 93, which does not oblige 
the representative trade union to request a ballot to dissolve a workplace forum if 
it does not wish this. Furthermore, under this section, even if a large minority of 
voting employees wish the workplace forum to be dissolved, say 49,9%, it would 
still remain in existence if 50,1% of them decide this to be the case. If there were 
more than 1000 employees employed in the workplace, this could be disastrous 
for all parties concerned. In this situation, a workplace forum would be kept alive 
but would most likely enjoy insufficient support to be effective or to be a 
significant bargaining tool against the employer. As mentioned previously, the Act 
really does not provide sufficient mechanisms for the dissolution of workplace 
forums.  
 
(6.2.3) Conclusion 
 
From the analysis and discussion of the provisions relating to the establishment, 
functions and operating mechanisms of workplace forums, it is evident that these 
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provisions are inadequate in protecting and equalising the rights of employees. 
This is the case for three main reasons.  
 
The first reason is that it is fair to say that ex facie the legislation there are 
provisions in the sections that are ambiguous, vague or in conflict with one 
another. Examples of this have been discussed and referred to. As a result, in 
many cases, this factor would delay the parties in reaching the settlement or 
finalisation of issues. Consequently, in this way, the parties would need to first 
ascertain the intention of the legislature before the provisions can be 
implemented. This may occur in its simplest form through the process of 
negotiation, or, if this cannot work, through the processes of conciliation and 
arbitration.  
 
Various provisions in the legislation should therefore be modified, amended or 
deleted so as to bring about consistency and greater understanding and clarity for 
all the parties concerned.  
Secondly, it is important that the establishment of workplace forums is made a 
mandatory requirement under the Act for those corporations that have more than 
ten employees. In those corporations with ten or less employees, an employee 
representative must be nominated and elected to office by the employees. As it 
currently stands, only those workplaces with one hundred or more employees 
may establish workplace forums.  
 
Thirdly, the legislation only allows for joint decision-making between the 
workplace forum and employer at line management level and, then, in only very 
limited and defined circumstances. The provisions are groundbreaking in this 
regard, but have not gone far enough in equalising the bargaining rights of all 
parties. Legislation needs to capture the spirit of industrial democracy in a greater 
and more meaningful way for all the parties concerned, especially for the 
employees. Thus, it needs to expand in such a way that it opens the doors for 
workplace forums to be involved in many more matters as part of the joint 
decision-making processes. This means allowing the workplace forum and its 
employees a joint decision-making role in those matters decided even at board 
level. If the employees were happy and satisfied, this would most likely lead to 
improved customer satisfaction, and, through this, improved profitability of the 
organisation.  
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(6.3) THE KING I REPORT 
 
(6.3.1) Introduction 
 
The chairman of the King Committee on Corporate Governance, Mervyn E King, 
launched the first King Report on 29 November 1994. The King Report on 
Corporate Governance consisted of 23 chapters, notes, appendices and a code of 
ethics for enterprises and also a set of affirmative action guidelines.  
 
In this section, it will be considered whether these chapters of the Report have 
influenced, either positively or negatively, the development and growth of worker 
participation in the decision-making processes of the organisation in South Africa.  
 
The King Report is of the view that in modern companies  
 
employees have become far more involved in decision making. 873  
 
Unfortunately, the King Committee does not take the matter any further at this 
point and therefore omits to explain on what basis, and especially to what extent, 
the Committee believes this to be the case. It therefore remains necessary for 
interested parties to sift through the entire Report of 70 pages to establish the 
reason or reasons for the King Committee having made this statement. 
 
The King Report further states,  
 
the interests of customers, suppliers and the community are now far more relevant to corporate 
decision making. 874  
 
This time, however, the King Committee does elaborate further on this 
statement. The King Committee correctly asserts that other interested 
stakeholders have become a part of the corporation in its governance processes. 
Therefore, the interests of all of the stakeholders, not just the shareholders, need 
to be considered. 
 
The King Report echoes these sentiments further by stating, 
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modern corporations can be described as a link where the interests of the mutual rights and 
interests of the various stakeholders are brought together. … In their own interests these different 
groups should co-operate to further the well being of the corporation. … The concept of directors’ 
reports being directed solely to shareholders is changing into a report to all stakeholders. Society 
now expects greater accountability from companies in regard to their non-financial affairs, for 
example, in relation to their employees and the environment. 875
 
However, the King Report then reduces the effects of these sentiments by 
stating,  
 
enterprise and profitability must be among two of the important driving forces” (and) “if 
shareholders cannot earn an acceptable return on their funds, they will not invest, and there will 
be no growth in commercial or industrial activity. 876  
 
Thus, whilst the King Report mentioned two important considerations that 
contribute towards and create good corporate governance, these latter 
considerations are diametrically opposite in nature, content and application. 
Therefore, the King Report should have emphasised and thoroughly explained in 
detail at this point that a system needs to be created by the organisation by 
which all these considerations may work and flourish well together in harmony. 
Unfortunately, the King Report only states, 
 
whilst striving for growth … the corporation must deal with its stakeholders fairly. … (E)mployees 
have a large interest in the company’s operations and activities. Of vital concern to … modern … 
South African companies … is a well-balanced mechanism in which employees can participate in 
management. … 877
 
And  
 
in the context of corporate governance, a proper balance needs to be achieved between freedom 
to manage, accountability and the interests of the different stakeholders. 878
 
Furthermore, although the King Report asks the important question whether 
companies should include in their annual statements a report relating to the 
social endeavours of the corporation and the opportunities and benefits available 
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to employees, it does not attempt to answer the question. 879 The value and 
significance of this view then becomes reduced as a result of it not being 
discussed any further. This is just but one example in the King Report of 
important concepts being diluted through a lack of continued and thorough 
discussion. 
 
Chapter 3 of the King Report highlights the application of the recommendations. 
More specifically, the recommendations of the King Committee are directed only 
at “the affected corporations”, which include companies listed on the main board 
of the Johannesburg Stock Exchange, the large public entities as defined in the 
Public Entities Act, banks, financial and insurance entities, as defined in the 
various Financial Services Acts, large unlisted dependent companies and large 
quasi-state entities, such as control boards and co-operatives.  
 
The King Committee believes that “large” entities should include companies with 
shareholders’ equity of 50 million Rand or more. It is arguable that this view is far 
too restrictive. The King Report’s recommendations should be applicable to all 
sizes of companies, both public and private, and also to close corporations. There 
are far more private companies and close corporations constituting the South 
African corporate world than the number of “affected corporations”. Furthermore, 
it is far too vague and uncertain a statement for the King Report to note, 
 
it may be that companies with an equity base of less than R50m have very large turnovers and/or 
employ thousands of people and their successful functioning is important to the wider community. 
These companies should adhere to the recommendations but it is difficult to formulate a definition 
of such corporations. 880
 
It is not easy to understand the reason for the King Report having made this 
statement. It is arguably incorrect to categorise corporations in accordance with 
the approach used by the King Report. The King Report does not state the basis 
upon which it decided that 50 million Rand would be the threshold amount in 
order to distinguish between “large” companies and those that are less than 
“large”. The list formulated by the King Report as to what constitutes “affected 
companies”, makes little sense and should be rejected. To ensure enforceability, 
it is arguable that the King Report’s recommendations should be more than mere 
recommendations. They should be peremptory in nature. The recommendations 
would then become legislation and would be applicable to all sizes and types of 
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corporations making up the South African business world. In this way, marked 
and useful changes in the workplace for employees would be generated. To this 
extent, employees would have a very real, and not fictional, role in the running of 
the corporation and in its decision-making processes. The way in which the King 
Report has chosen to formulate only recommendations to “affected corporations” 
means, in practice, that all of the non-affected corporations need not apply the 
recommendations of the King Report. It also means that since the King Report 
only formulated recommendations, they are not mandatory and, therefore, even 
“affected corporations” need not apply them if they do not wish to. The 
recommendations of the King Report are, therefore, arguably legally 
unenforceable. 
 
(6.3.2) Worker Participation According to the King I Report 
 
The King I Report indicates that,  
 
… the focus must be on a participative entrepreneurial approach rather than a dominant one. 
(However), … the participation process must not become so dominant that it stifles or obstructs the 
notion of business risk for reward in a free enterprise system. 881
 
Unfortunately, the King Report does not explain this statement any further. It is, 
however, clear that the King Report supports worker participation, but only to the 
extent that it does not affect the “reward” of the company. Thus, difficulties 
would arise in establishing conclusively that worker participation does “stifle or 
obstruct” the gaining of rewards for the company. Presumably, the King Report, 
in using the term “reward”, is referring to the profitability of the corporation. 
Additionally, when the King Report uses the phrase “a dominant one”, it is 
probably referring to the issue of shareholder dominance, which it does not 
sanction. 
 
Chapter 4 refers to the issues governing the board of directors, making it very 
clear that the King Report does not support the German two-tier board structure, 
consisting of a supervisory and management board. 882 This is so despite the fact 
that the King Committee acknowledges that the two-tier board structure, with 
employee and shareholder representatives dominating the supervisory board and 
managers the management board, has succeeded in Germany. The reasoning of 
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the King Committee, which is unconvincing and arguably incorrect, is based upon 
the belief that 
 
the question must be asked whether there is any advantage to be found in a two-tier structure, 
which cannot be attained, in a unitary structure. There are, moreover, distinct advantages in a 
unitary board structure. It is the Committee’s view that every objective of the two-tier structure 
can also be attained in a unitary structure. The significant advantage of a unitary structure in 
contradistinction to a two-tier board is that it avoids the artificial compartmentalisation that occurs 
in a two-tier structure. 883  
 
The King Report then continues this discussion by stating,  
 
in South Africa the unitary board structure has always been adopted. With appropriate enterprise, 
integrity and controls in a company a newcomer learns much in a unitary board structure. Also 
there are few management tools better than personal interaction. Whether there is a two-tier or a 
unitary board management will meet separately. We believe that the interaction present at a 
unitary board is vital for the progression of corporate governance in South Africa. 884
 
Unfortunately, referring to the quotation above, the King Committee does not 
refer to any of the advantages found in the two-tier board system. The 
advantages of the German two-tier board system will be discussed in this thesis 
under a separate heading. At the very least, the two-tier board system obliges 
the corporation to involve its employees and shareholders in the decision-making 
processes at board level. This is because a structure it set up right from the 
onset, which caters for the involvement of employee and shareholder 
representatives on the supervisory board. Employees are thus endowed with the 
status as board members. This, however, is not the case with a unitary board 
system. As it is currently run in South Africa, employees, under the unitary board 
system, do not acquire the status of board members and therefore do not sit on 
the board. The most that has happened in South Africa at this juncture is the 
involvement of representative employees through the establishment of workplace 
forums under the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995. Through this process, as we 
have seen, employees are afforded very limited rights in the decision-making 
processes of the corporation. They are certainly not entitled to be involved in the 
decision-making processes at board level, and certainly not to the extent that 
they would be entitled to do so if they were sitting on a supervisory board under 
the two-tier board system. However, it is arguable that this degree of employee 
involvement at board level is unachievable, as suggested by the King Committee, 
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through the current unitary board system. Generally, South African corporations 
are not about to open their doors to permit worker participation in the decision-
making processes at board level through the current unitary board system. 
Worker participation at board level in South African corporations will only be 
achieved in the near future if the structure of the unitary board system is 
changed, which compels the employers to admit worker representatives to its 
boards, or, if the two-tier board system is adopted, which caters for the creation 
of supervisory boards right from the onset. The latter option is more viable and 
has a greater chance of being successful, as it has been in Germany. A two-tier 
board system is unlikely to be an “artificial compartmentalisation” as suggested 
by the King Committee. However, what may in fact be described as an “artificial 
compartmentalisation” is the King Committee distinguishing between those 
corporations that are “affected corporations” and those that are not.  
 
South Africa should take cognisance of those systems developed in other 
countries, which have worked well. For example, in Germany, the two-tier board 
structure has been successful. There is no reason to believe that it cannot work in 
South Africa. The fact that South Africa has always adopted a unitary board 
system should not be a reason to dismiss a change of system that could work 
better. It is also arguable that the unitary system has not been too successful in 
South Africa. It is possible that many companies may not have been liquidated if 
employees were treated better and, as a result, were more loyal towards the 
corporation. Happier employees result in greater turnover and productivity and 
increased profitability of the corporation. A good way to achieve greater respect 
and loyalty from employees is by affording them a voice in the joint decision-
making processes at board level. The King Committee does not specifically state 
whom “the newcomer” may be that “learns much in a unitary board structure”. It 
is, however, very unlikely that the “newcomer” will be an employee sitting at 
board level. Thus, “personal interaction” is good and can be achieved through a 
two-tier board structure, as the two board groups cross communicate in matters 
that are common to each group. The King Report unfortunately does not advance 
their argument any further on why they believe “… that the interaction present at 
a unitary board is vital for the progression of corporate governance in South 
Africa”. 885
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Note 12 forms a central part of the King Report regarding worker participation in 
matters of corporate governance. 886 It is not absolutely clear as to what extent 
these proposals were the actual recommendations of the King Committee. This is 
because the King Report notes, “many submissions were received on the 
subject”. This is then followed by various contentions governing this issue. The 
more significant proposals will be highlighted. 
 
Firstly, 
 
… a company is a nexus of inter-relations between its various stakeholders and the board is really 
representing these stakeholders. Consequently, the various stakeholders of a corporation are 
entitled to representation on the board. 887
 
This contention makes good sense if defined correctly. The traditional approach to 
company law, which endorses almost exclusively the rights of its shareholders 
and the maximisation of their wealth, has been severely eroded in modern times. 
Thus, today, the board of directors needs to consider the rights and interests of 
other stakeholders in the corporation. Additionally, employees should be 
represented at board level. However, it would be illogical to allow customers, 
suppliers or even the State to representation at board level. This does not mean 
that the interests and rights of these parties should be ignored. Directors should 
be seen to have taken an active role in considering the interests of these 
stakeholders. The King Report captures these sentiments when it notes, 
 
logically, this would result in an entitlement to representation on the board for customers, 
suppliers and the State – with patently unacceptable conflicts of interest. 888
 
However, the King Report convincingly asserts, 
 
while a company is a nexus of stakeholders’ interests it is a separate legal entity. Its assets belong 
to the company and to no one else. It is, therefore, incorrect to say that the assets belong to the 
shareholders or any or all of a company’s stakeholders. The stakeholders, however, all have an 
interest in the operation of the company’s business and the deployment of its assets. 889
 
Additionally, as mentioned above, 
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there are … three stakeholders who have an identity of interest and they are the shareholders, 
managers and workers. That identity of interest is to pool resources and skills for the purpose of 
ensuring that the corporation survives and thrives. It is for this reason that we believe that 
workers should participate in the governance of corporations. 890
 
Unfortunately, the King Report does not state how this may be achieved. It also 
does not specifically state that it believes that workers should be permitted to 
occupy positions or be represented at the board level of corporations. It merely 
mentions, in very broad terms, that workers should be able to participate in 
corporate governance issues. The Report is unfortunately silent on the extent to 
which and the way in which the King Committee believes that this may be 
achieved or be useful to a corporation. 
 
The King Report acknowledges the fact that worker participation is important. 891 
However, the King Report does not attempt to suggest how this may be 
practically achieved in a corporation or, put another way, how worker 
participation should become a reality. Therefore, the King Report simply 
indicates, 
 
the question of worker participation is of vital importance in South Africa. …  
(U)ltimately a system suitable to each corporation will have to be found to permit worker 
participation in governance of that corporation. It does not necessarily mean that there will be one 
system. What may be a workable system in one corporation may not be workable in another 
corporation. 892
 
The King Report reiterates this point by emphasising, 
 
the system of worker participation in governance decisions should grow out of the nature of the 
corporation’s business, the culture of the corporation, the culture of management and the workers’ 
organisation. 893
 
The King Report finally does attempt to give some pointers to corporations as to 
how worker participation may be achieved. 894 However, these pointers tend to be 
general and vague and do not provide much assistance to those corporations 
wishing to adopt a system of worker participation. These pointers are not 
mandatory and are therefore unenforceable from a legal point of view. They also 
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do not indicate clearly whether employees ought to be involved in the joint 
decision-making processes of the corporation or the level(s) at which worker 
participation systems ought to be adopted. What the King Report ought to have 
suggested instead was the creation of a mandatory system that obliges the 
corporation to admit worker representatives to board level so that they can 
legally be involved in the joint decision-making processes of the corporation. It 
could then be the responsibility of the interested stakeholders, management and 
workers to design a system of internal rules and procedures to regulate worker 
participation. Any point of conflict between the interested parties in designing the 
rules and procedures, based on the “corporation’s business, the culture of the 
corporation, the culture of management and the workers’ organisation” could be 
addressed in terms of the current Labour Relations Act. This is the case with the 
establishment of workplace forums under the Act where a conciliation board or an 
arbitrator can resolve issues of dispute in this way. This mandatory system of 
admitting employee representatives to board level should be applicable to all 
types and sizes of corporations, including close corporations. The manner in 
which this note in the King Report is written is such that it does not capture these 
sentiments. In fact, the “affected corporations” could simply choose to disregard 
the recommendations in their entirety without any fear of reprisal.  
 
The recommendations in the King Report are listed as follows: 
 
Corporations should evolve their own system of worker participation whether by way of workers’ 
committees or at management, executive committee or board level. Whatever the system it should 
develop: 895
 
12.8.1 Practices that lead to the effective sharing of relevant information, to enable employees to 
gain a better understanding of the corporation for which they work; 
 
12.8.2 Effective consultation by management with the workforce before taking decisions that affect 
the workers; 
 
12.8.3 Speedy identification of conflict and its effective and prompt resolution. 
 
Regarding the issue of the “effective sharing of relevant information”, there are, 
unfortunately, many unanswered questions that arise from this phrase through 
the loose and vague wording of the King Report. 896 These are: 
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1. Is the King Committee prescribing, through the use of this phrase, that 
employees should be permitted to participate frequently in the governance 
of the corporation, and, if so, to what extent and at what level(s)?  
 
2. What does “effective sharing” mean?  
3. When does the corporation have to share “relevant information” with its 
employees?  
 
4. What is meant by “relevant information”?  
 
5. When is information deemed not to be “relevant” and who decides?  
 
Furthermore, although Chapter 5 deals with aspects relating to directors, the King 
Report refers again to the question of disclosure, 897 but does not add any further 
details of a significant nature to this issue. It gives rise to more questions than 
answers and the contents are therefore of not much use. That is,  
 
directors must ensure that all interested parties are fully informed of any material matter affecting 
the company’s business with openness and substance over form being their guideline. 898
Questions arising from this statement are: 
 
1. When are the “interested parties” deemed to be “fully informed”? In other 
words, how much information and what depth of information should be 
disclosed before this requirement is satisfied? 
 
2. How do the parties decide whether a matter is a “material” one or not?  
 
3. What happens when the “interested parties” disagree over the materiality 
or otherwise of a matter(s) affecting the company’s business? 
 
4. How do directors “ensure that all interested parties are fully informed of 
any material matter affecting the company’s business”? In other words, 
what procedures or rules must the directors follow to ensure that this 
factor is adequately satisfied? 
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5. In the context of worker participation and disclosure and to enable a 
better understanding by corporations, what does the King Report mean in 
ordinary language by its use of the phrase “openness and substance over 
form being their guideline”? 
 
6. At what point could interested parties claim that the corporation is not 
acting in an open and transparent way? 
 
Chapter 19, in discussing the recommendations of the King Report, refers to the 
issue of disclosure and stakeholder communications. 899 These are:  
 
19.1 It is the board’s duty to present as simple a report as possible to stakeholders, but the quality 
of the information must be based on the guidelines of promptness, relevance, openness and 
substance over form. 
 
19.2 Reports and communications must be made in the context that society now demands 
transparency and greater accountability from corporations in regard to their non-financial affairs, 
for example, their workers and environmental issues. 
 
19.3… 
 
19.4 In any communication with stakeholders the directors should ask themselves the following 
four questions: 
19.4.1 Is the communication open or transparent? 
 
19.4.2 Is the communication prompt? 
 
19.4.3 Is it relevant and substantial or merely a communication of form? 
 
19.4.4 Does it fairly set out the position? 
 
19.5 If the answer to any of the above four questions is in the negative, the directory must amend 
the communication properly. 900
 
It is worth noting that the recommendations of the King Report in 19.1 add a 
further set of criteria to the issue governing the disclosure of information. That is, 
note 12.8.1 in chapter 4 above emphasises only the relevancy of such 
information. Therefore, in note 19.1, issues of transparency, openness, 
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promptness, fairness and substance are added to the list for the disclosure of 
information during stakeholder communications. It does not, however, mention 
the issue of the materiality of such information, which was noted in 2.8 of chapter 
5. It is therefore clear that the King Report has inconsistently attempted to define 
how, when and what type of information needs to be disclosed to the 
stakeholders of the corporation during stakeholder communication. In this way, it 
is clear that the various recommendations outlined above have to be read 
together and thus a version adopted, which takes into account all the criteria 
mentioned in the various notes of the King’s Report. 
 
In addition, the following questions arise out of note 19: 901  
 
1. What factors need to be taken into account in deciding whether the 
communication is “open”, “transparent”, “prompt”, fair, “relevant and 
substantial”? 
 
2. What happens in the situation where there is a dispute between the 
stakeholders, especially one arising between the employees and 
management, as to whether the communication is “open”, “transparent”, 
“prompt”, fair, “relevant and substantial”? 
 
3. What is envisioned by the word “prompt” in the context of the report 
being made available to the stakeholders – a day, a week, a month or 
some other time period? 
 
The statement in 12.8.2 also gives rise to unanswered questions for the same 
reasons as those noted in 12.8.1 above. 902 These are: 
 
1. When would consultation by management in the eyes of the workers be 
deemed to be “effective?” 
 
2. If a dispute arises as to whether there was “effective consultation by 
management”, which process is used to decide whether this was the case 
or not? 
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3. How is it to be decided in difficult cases whether a decision could “affect 
the workers”? 
 
4. Does a decision have to “affect the workers” only directly, or does 
“consultation by management” even have to take place in those situations 
when this would only “affect the workers” indirectly or very remotely. It is 
arguable that any decisions that management takes would, at least, 
impact upon workers in the most remote of ways.  
 
Additionally, chapter 16 of the King Report, which deals with stakeholder links, 
suggests that with regard to contractual stakeholders,  
 
employees in particular should be entitled to be not only motivated and led, but to be as fully 
informed as possible about the company for which they work. Communication should be on a 
regular basis and include written information on employee rights, benefits and obligations as well 
as on company plans, targets and policies. … 903
 
Questions arising from this are: 
 
1. At what point can the corporation claim that employees have been “as 
fully informed as possible about the company for which they work”? 
2. If a dispute arises as to whether the employees have been “as fully 
informed as possible about the company”, which process is used to decide 
whether this was the case or not? 
 
3. What is meant by “a regular basis”? 
There is a difference in meaning between the words “prompt” and “regular”, 
which denotes further inconsistencies in the length of periods recommended by 
the King Committee in stakeholder communications. That is, although note 19.1 
above, dealing with stakeholder communications, requires a report to be 
presented to stakeholders in communication that is “prompt”, note 2.1 above, 
dealing with contractual shareholders, requires that communication with 
“employees in particular should be … on a regular basis”. 904
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The word ‘regular’ is defined as “conforming to a rule of equal disposition in space 
or time, …frequently received over a long period. …” On the other hand, the word 
“prompt” is defined as “quick to respond and act without delay … immediate, 
instant …”. 905
 
One question that needs to be asked is whether the King Report intended that 
communication that is to be made to employees should be made on a “prompt” 
basis or only a basis that is something less than this, which is on a “regular” 
basis. In the interests of efficient communication between management and the 
various stakeholders, the word “prompt” should be preferred. 
 
Furthermore, note 12.8.3 also gives rise to unanswered questions. 906 These are: 
 
1. When would the “identification of conflict” be deemed to be “speedy” – a 
week, a month, six months, a year or longer? 
 
2. What factors need to be taken into account in assessing whether the 
“identification of conflict” has been a “speedy” one or not? 
3. When can we say that there has been an “effective and prompt resolution” 
of conflict? 
 
4. What factors need to be taken into account in assessing whether there has 
been an “effective and prompt resolution” of conflict? 
 
It is also useful to point out that generally speaking note 9 (stakeholder 
communications), 907 dealing with the Code of Corporate Practices and Conduct, 
is similar to note 19 (stakeholder communications). 908 However, note 9.1 is quite 
different from note 19.1 in content. Note 9.1 reads, 
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it is the board’s duty to present a balanced and understandable assessment of the company’s 
position in reporting to stakeholders. The quality of the information must be based on the 
guidelines of openness and substance over form. Reporting should address material matters of 
significant interest and concern to all stakeholders. 909
 
Thus, comments on the three versions of the King Report on stakeholder 
communications (including the version found in chapter 12) can be noted as 
follows:910
 
1. The King Report has found it necessary to change what it had said in a 
different part of the Report. Should one of the versions then not have 
been deleted? As it stands, there is once again inconsistency as to what 
the King Report is actually recommending. For example, reading the King 
Report as a whole, the question arises as to whether the board is duty-
bound in 19.1 to “present as simple a report as possible to stakeholders”, 
or duty-bound to present a report that is not necessarily as simple, but 
one in 9.1 which is only “a balanced and understandable assessment of 
the company’s position … to stakeholders”? Surely, this does make a 
difference as to what the stakeholders can expect regarding the question 
of disclosure by the board? 
2. Regarding the question of the “quality of the information”, note 9.1 only 
mentions two of the four criteria referred to in note 19.1, this being only 
the criteria of “openness” and “substance over form”. It does, however, 
insert the question of materiality of matters into the discussion, which is 
lacking under note 19.1 and note 17. The criteria not raised under 9.1, 
being that of “promptness” and “relevance”, is, however, raised under 
note 9.4, which is almost identical to note 19.4. It is also identical to the 
note repeated in the King Report in chapter 12 in note 17. Therefore, 
taken as a whole, these four criteria are stated under notes 17, 19.4 and 
9.4. In this way, these notes take into account all of the four criteria 
regarding the basis upon which the quality of information is disclosed. The 
difference in meaning between the notes on this aspect is therefore only 
academic except in so far that note 9.1 includes as well the question of the 
materiality of such information. Also, note 17 includes the criterion of 
“truth”. That is,  
 
                                                     
909  Ibid 33, n. 9.1. See also Blackman et al, above n 499, paragraph 208, 8-16-8. 
910  Ibid, ch. 12, 18, n. 17. 
Chapter 6 269
the guidelines of information to stakeholders must be promptness, relevancy, 
openness, substance over form, truth and fair presentation. The company must 
constantly strive for transparency. … If there is any doubt about the content of the 
communication, the directors, having transported themselves into the shoes of the 
uninformed shareholders, should ask … the following questions: 
 
17.1 Is the communication open or transparent? 
 
17.2 Is the communication prompt? 
 
17.3 Is it relevant and substantial or merely a communication of form? 
 
17.4 Does it fairly set out the position? 911
 
3. It is of some concern as to why the King Report decided to include in its 
Report variations of the statements it proposed. Why did the King Report 
change the criteria regarding the disclosure of information at different 
junctures? Why did it drop the criterion of “truth”? Surely it would have 
been simpler and more preferable for the King Report to state its remarks 
only once and in terms that were positive and encouraging, yet directory 
in nature?  
 
4. Note 19.5 reads, “if the answer to any of the above four questions is in 
the negative, the directors must amend the communication properly”. 912 
This question was dropped in note 9. It is not clear why this was so, as 9.5 
has been replaced with a series of statements on what the directors 
should report on in their annual report. 
 
The above recommendations of the King Report regarding the system(s) that 
corporations should develop with respect to worker participation models are 
riddled with problematic uncertainties and inconsistent statements. This is 
arguably not the way forward in ensuring that effective worker participation takes 
place within the corporation. Furthermore, it does not oblige the corporation to 
take account of the workers’ views in any legal way nor does it provide the 
workers with a admission ticket enshrined in legislation to engage in the joint 
decision-making processes of the corporation either at board level or otherwise. 
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The King Report in 12.9 reinforces its ideology that “…each corporation will have 
to evolve a system of such participation. …” 913 As mentioned previously, 
although the stakeholders in the corporation should get together and agree on a 
set of rules and procedures for worker participation, the King Committee in its 
Report should have set out to achieve this by obliging corporations to engage in 
this process. This could then become legislation with which corporations would 
have to comply.  
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(6.3.3) Further Comments on the King I Report 
 
Chapter 9 deals with nomination committees, which should constitute only non-
executive directors of whom the majority must be independent, and the 
composition of the board. In this regard the King Report notes,  
 
in the Business Quarterly of summer 1993, the authors opine that there are three keys to a good 
board. The members understand and agree on what are the proper functions of the board; the 
board is composed of people of integrity who bring a blend of knowledge, skills, attitudes, 
experience and commitment to the job; and finally the board is led by a capable chair who brings 
out the best – individually and collectively – in the directors. 914
The King Report further notes that to achieve these three key qualities, it is 
crucial to have a proper director selection process, 915 where “…the selection of 
the board must be managed. …” 916
 
The King I Report acknowledges that boards need to be composed of people from 
diverse backgrounds. In this, the King I Report may be implying that employees 
should also be involved in worker participation processes at board level and that 
it is possible for directors to admit employees to the board. Employees would 
bring with them knowledge, skills, attitudes and experience not found elsewhere. 
It is a pity, though, that the King Report does not expressly recommend the 
inclusion of employees at board level. 
 
Another revealing comment is made in Chapter 11 of the King Report, which 
deals with board sub-committees. At the very least, it would be a useful exercise 
for the corporation to allow employees to form employee sub-committees of the 
board. Although the King Report does not specifically recommend the formation 
of sub-committees, it does note that 
 
the board of directors might find it useful to establish sub-committees such as an agenda or a 
chair’s committee. 917
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In this way, the board could delegate some of its functions that deal with 
employee issues to the employee sub-committee of the board. Precisely which 
issues would be delegated to the employee sub-committee would probably have 
to be discussed between management and the employee representatives in the 
various corporations. Thus, having employee sub-committees of the board would 
be a positive development towards greater industrial democracy and certainly 
would give employee representatives more credibility and power than they have 
under the existing model of workplace forums. Furthermore, this sub-committee 
should consist solely of employee representatives nominated and elected to the 
sub-committee of the board by interested stakeholders, including fellow 
employees, shareholders and directors and officers of the corporation. At this 
stage, it is best to involve management in the nomination and election process 
governing the appointment of employee representatives to a sub-committee of 
this nature. This process would contribute towards increasing the likelihood that 
such sub-committees of the board become a reality. However, management 
should not have a similar role in the election process in the event that a two-tier 
board structure develops, which would consist of a supervisory board.  
 
Consequently, through the development of employee sub-committees, decisions 
could be taken by the employee sub-committee of the board without having to go 
through the processes of organising a board meeting. Any employee-related 
matter that requires the input of the board itself could then be discussed at a 
scheduled board meeting with representatives of the employee sub-committee 
being present. An employee representative, who has been nominated and elected 
to this position by the interested stakeholders in the corporation, should chair the 
sub-committee.  
 
Referring to a chair’s or executive subcommittee, the King Report further 
believes, 
 
the authority of such a committee should be in writing from the board setting out the parameters 
and context within which such powers are conferred. Strictly, this authority should also be 
incorporated in the corporation’s Articles of Association. 918
Likewise, these terms of reference could easily be applied to employee sub-
committees of the board once formed. Certainly, if South Africa intends to retain 
the unitary board system then the next best option would be to consider the 
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formulation of a system allowing the creation of employee sub-committees of the 
board. This is so assuming that the current unitary board system does not modify 
itself in such a way that it admits employee representatives to the board itself 
and thereby permits employee representatives to participate in the decision-
making processes at this level. 
 
Furthermore, the King Report endorses good corporate relationships with the 
non-contractual stakeholders, which include its neighbours, local authorities and 
the government. It recommends, 
 
companies should be encouraged to view themselves as residents in a particular area, to act in a 
spirit of good neighbourliness and to reach out to and be sensitive to the needs of their local 
communities.919  
 
These are attributes to which all corporations should aspire. Certainly, today, with 
many carefully designed environmental initiatives taking place, there is a greater 
likelihood that corporations will move in this direction than ever before. 
 
In this way, the King Report properly asserts that the directors and all of the 
stakeholders of the corporation are expected to act in good faith and in the best 
interests of the corporation. In the context of stakeholder relations, especially 
employee-management relations, this is of cardinal importance. In this regard, in 
chapter 18, which deals with the question of ethics, the King Report recommends,  
 
the essence of corporate governance is based on enterprise and integrity. The fiduciary duty of 
directors is paramount. The duty to act in good faith in the interests of the company does not stop 
with the board. All stakeholders should deal with the company in good faith. After all the company 
is the link between the stakeholders. The relationships between the stakeholders require honesty, 
openness and fairness. 920
 
However, the duty of good faith needs to be shown in the first instance by the 
directors, who need to be exemplars of good conduct. If this is lacking, this may 
give rise to a situation where there is an absence of conduct in good faith by the 
other stakeholders. The King Report echoes these sentiments further when it 
emphasises, 
 
directors have a responsibility as part of corporate governance to create and to lay down guidelines 
for the moral and ethical conduct of the business of the company. It is management’s responsibility 
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to ensure that the guidelines are embraced by all in the company – every stakeholder must 
become a party to the guidelines. 921
 
It would be very useful to receive input from the other stakeholders as well, 
especially from the employees, as to how these ‘guidelines’ could be formulated 
to suit the interests of all of the stakeholders and not only of the interests of the 
directors and of management. The King Report does recommend that  
 
a code should be developed in such a way as to involve all employees from union management 
down so that ethical culture is infused into the organisation. 922
 
Unfortunately, the King Report does not formulate an ethical model for 
corporations. It believes that the needs of corporations are uniquely different and 
therefore, 
 
no strict model should be laid down … and … companies (must develop) their own codes. 923
 
It does, however, lay down very brief and rather vague guidelines, which are: 
 
(1) Responsibilities to shareholders and financial community; disclosure, accounting practices, 
insider trading and conflicts of interest, etc; 
 
(2) Relations with customers and suppliers; marketing issues, use of market power, pricing 
practices, description of goods and services, quality and safety of goods, recall and related 
practices, etc; 
 
(3) Employment practices, equality of employment opportunity, occupational health and safety, 
and other principles relating to employees and employment; and 
 
(4) Responsibilities to the community, including support for community activities, and attention 
to neighbourhood impacts. 924 
 
Unfortunately, it appears as if the King Report dealt with the aforementioned 
guidelines hastily. The guidelines are generally superficial in nature and content 
and do not give a clear indication to corporations as to their ethical and moral 
responsibilities and obligations. Being so vague in content, the guidelines do not 
give adequate attention to the issues raised, which, for the most part, remain 
unexplained in the context of ethical and moral considerations. It is arguable that 
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after reading these guidelines, the King Report, from an ethical and moral 
perceptive, has not recommended or added anything new or groundbreaking to 
the issues governing moral and ethical obligations and responsibilities of 
corporations. 
 
Furthermore, chapter 19 deals with the recommendations of the King Committee. 
Of interest is note 6, especially paragraphs 6.1 and 6.2. According to paragraph 
6.1, 
the unitary board structure is appropriate in South Africa especially with affirmative action 
programmes as the unitary board results in new board members interacting with experienced 
board members dealing with matters such as enterprise, intellectual honesty, strategy, planning, 
communicating with stakeholders, etc., rather than having a monitoring function only as 
supervisory board members. 925
 
Furthermore, paragraph 6.2 recommends,  
 
the unitary board should have a balance of executive and non-executive directors. 926
 
Reasons based primarily upon affirmative action policies contained in note 6.1 
above were almost certainly actuated by the terms of reference section contained 
in Appendix II of the King Report. Note 1.4 thereof states, 
 
in applying its terms of reference the committee should have regard to the special circumstances 
existing in South Africa, more particularly the entrance into the business community of members of 
disadvantaged communities. 927
 
This is further supported by a lengthy discussion on affirmative action guidelines 
(a summary of the SACOB proposals on affirmative action). 928 Unfortunately, 
because the committee was mandated to take cognisance of affirmative action 
policies in such an overwhelming manner, it can be argued that the King Report 
has lost track of other more significant issues that affect labour and business, 
such as those factors that stimulate the economy through overall stakeholder 
satisfaction when dealing with corporations.  
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Additionally, notes 6.1 and 6.2 above, 929 bring to mind the following important 
questions: 
 
1. Would there be any meaningful differences, which would impact upon and 
directly affect the corporation, if affirmative action programmes were 
introduced under a two-tier board system rather than a unitary board 
system, and, if so, what would these differences be and how would they 
impact upon the way in which the company conducts its affairs? 
 
2. Are affirmative action programmes then the main (or only) reason why the 
King Report does not support the introduction of a two-tier board system? 
 
3. If a two-tier board system were to be put into place in South Africa and 
new members were placed on the supervisory board, rather than on the 
management board, how would this reduce or limit the interaction that the 
new members would have with experienced board members (as implied in 
the King Report)? 
 
4. Since labour in South Africa is generally not involved in the decision-
making processes at board level, is the King Report, by endorsing the 
retention of the existing unitary board structure, suggesting that 
employees should not be admitted to board level? 
 
5. Does the King Committee not believe that the two-tier board system is 
necessary to create a structure to allow employees to be involved in the 
decision-making processes at board level, through the establishment of, 
for example, a supervisory board? 
 
6. What does the King Report mean exactly by the phrase “intellectual 
honesty”? 
 
7. Why should supervisory board members only be entrusted with “a 
monitoring function”? Surely, in a unitary board structure, the board itself 
has also a “monitoring function”? 
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8. Is the King Report implying that by having “a balance of executive and 
non-executive directors”, other stakeholders should not be admitted to the 
board, such as the employees?  
These questions raise uncertainties concerning the sentiments expressed by the 
King Committee regarding the board structure of corporations. In this way, it also 
creates uncertainties about the ultimate intention of the King Report. Surely, 
affirmative actions reasons cannot, and should not, be the main or only reason 
for the King Committee deciding that a unitary board structure should be retained 
in South Africa? A system implemented to achieve greater employee satisfaction 
and greater industrial democracy, which would, in turn, yield greater economic 
productivity for corporations and generally for South Africa as a whole, together 
with improved customer relations, is more important than a system that is based 
upon affirmative action policies.  
 
Affirmative action policies could still be implemented successfully under a two-tier 
board structure. Consequently, new board members would, in this way, be able 
to interact successfully with more experienced board members. It is conceivable 
that the supervisory and management board members would be obliged to cross-
communicate with one another within the corporation at regular intervals. This 
would ensure that the board groups not only act bona fide in the best interests of 
the company at all times, but also that a system of good corporate governance is 
created and maintained. Thus, ‘Chinese walls’ cannot, and should not, be created 
between the supervisory and management boards of corporations.  
 
Chapter 20 of the King Report deals with the Code of Corporate Practices and 
Conduct. 930 Although the previous chapters of the King Report are written, for 
the most part, in terms of recommendations, and, as such, are arguably 
unenforceable against the corporation from a legal point of view, the Code of 
Corporate Practices and Conduct contained within the King Report appears to be 
more directory in nature towards the “affected corporations”. Whether this fact 
changes the status of the King Report from a document merely giving advice to 
one requiring “affected corporations” to comply with the parameters set out in 
the whole Report, is arguable. In viewing the King Report as one unit, it is 
doubtful whether its status can be construed as anything more than a document 
providing suggestions, advice and recommendations to “affected corporations”. It 
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is only the JSE that later required “affected corporations” to disclose their 
compliance or non-compliance with the Code of Corporate Practices and Conduct 
contained within the King Report. That is, the JSE endorsed the King Report and 
required that all “affected corporations” must provide a statement in their annual 
reports, which comments on the extent of their compliance or non-compliance 
with the Code of Corporate Practices and Conduct. This requirement became 
effective for all financial years ending on or after 30 June 1996. Thus, in the 
financial year of 1995/1996, corporate governance reporting was not mandatory 
in so far as the JSE was concerned. The JSE required disclosure from the 
“affected corporations” as from the beginning of the financial year 1996/1997. It 
did not, however, require that the corporations actually comply with the Code of 
Corporate Practices and Conduct. It only required that the “affected corporations” 
disclose the extent to which, if any, they had so complied or not.  
Thus, relevant portions of the Code of Corporate Practices and Conduct read as 
follows: 
 
Note 1 states (and repeats): 931
 
1.1 The Code will apply to the following business enterprises: 
 
1.1.1 All companies listed on the main board of the Johannesburg Stock Exchange; 
 
1.1.2 Large public entities as defined in the Public Entities Act; 
 
1.1.3 Banks, financial and insurance entities as defined in the various Financial Services Acts; 
and 
 
1.1.4 Large unlisted public corporations. 
 
1.2 In the South African context, large companies are those with a total shareholders’ equity 
greater than R50 million. 
 
1.3 All companies should, however, be encouraged to adopt the Code. 
 
1.4 The Code is a set of principles and does not purport to determine the detailed course of 
conduct of directors on any particular matter. 
 
In the Foreword section of the King Report, signed by the Chairman of the King 
Committee, Mervyn E King S.C, it is noted, 
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at times certain points are repeated in this Report. This is because we found it necessary to make 
the same point under different chapter headings and believed it would aid in the application of the 
recommendations to distil them into a code of governance. 932
 
It can be argued, however, that it would have been preferable for the King 
Committee not to repeat their points across the Report. Rather than aiding the 
reader it has, in many cases, confused the points of recommendation being 
made. Many of the points of recommendation that are repeated are inconsistent 
in content, nature and especially in application. A shorter, more succinct and less 
vague Report, expressed in terms that are undeniably directory in content, nature 
and application, would have been preferable. Additionally, the entire Report 
should have been written as one unit. As it currently exists, chapter 20, dealing 
with the Code of Corporate Practices and Conduct, stands almost as an 
independent and separate part of the King Report. This is because it is written 
using directive terms, for example, “the code will apply to the following business 
enterprises. …” Chapter 3, on the other hand, dealing with the application of the 
recommendations, is written in non-directory terms, for example, “the 
recommendations of the King Committee are directed at … the affected 
corporations. ...” Again, in chapter 19 under the heading “The recommendations”, 
note 2.1 expresses this same point. 
 
It is arguably insufficient for the King Report to merely “encourage” all companies 
to adopt the recommendations and the Code. It should have required all 
corporations, whatever their nature or size, to engage in corporate governance 
processes, especially those that related to worker participation matters.  
 
Note 2.1, dealing with the board of directors, states,  
 
the unitary board structure is appropriate in South Africa rather than a management and 
supervisory board structure. The unitary board structure provides greater interaction among all 
board members when dealing with matters such as strategy, planning, performance, resources, 
standards of conduct and communication with stakeholders. 933  
 
The King Report has provided its sentiments for the retention of the unitary board 
structure within the corporation. Other than ascribing its reasons for this view to 
affirmative action policies and those that it believes would assist new members 
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that are introduced to the board through ‘personal interaction’, the King Report 
has not provided any further reasons, which, are arguably of any substance or 
merit. 
 
Notwithstanding the above rejection of the two-tier board structure, in notes 6 to 
8 of Chapter 1, the King Report mentions good reasons why the German model of 
the two-tier board system was developed. That is, 
 
… the Anglo-American model is predicated upon shareholder democracy. … In Germany and Japan 
the shareholder gets closer to management. The banks and the institutions are major shareholders 
in most large German and Japanese companies and they are also significant lenders to the 
companies. … With shareholders in Germany and Japan owning larger stakes in companies, they 
have taken a closer interest in the management of the businesses. The German banks sought to 
control the funds, which they had invested in corporations. In time they accepted that they could 
not manage the businesses. This factor, as well as the efforts, which were made to resolve clashes 
between management and the labour Unions, resulted in the development of the German model of 
the two-tier board, using the supervisory board and the management board. Employees and 
shareholders enjoyed and still enjoy representation on the supervisory board. 934
 
Additionally, the King Report accepts that a change from the current unitary 
board structure is inevitable and arguably necessary and appropriate. In note 9 of 
the same chapter, the King Report writes, 
 
the global economy is ‘shrinking’ and becoming more competitive and managers are consequently 
more frequently involved in cross border activities. As a result managers come into contact with 
different forms of corporate governance. In doing so they become exposed to the advantages and 
disadvantages of the three systems described above. Inevitably, this will result in an evolution of 
the three systems and the development of a model combining the elements of all three systems. 
Each country will place a greater or lesser emphasis on each of the elements having regard to its 
own peculiar circumstances, laws, institutional and other structures. 935  
 
The following comments can be made with regard to the above: 
 
1. Other than mentioning the “three systems” (as the King Report notes), the 
King Committee has not attempted to develop a new workable corporate 
governance model for South Africa; 
2. Although the King Report has listed some of the advantages in developing 
the German model of the two-tier board system, it does not attempt to 
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evaluate in its Report how these factors may also be advantageous in the 
South African context; 
 
3. The King Report acknowledges that an evolution of the three systems is 
inevitable, but it does not attempt to provide any formula, which departs 
from the style of the unitary board system currently operating in South 
Africa; 
 
4. The King Report casts an overall impression that it does not want to 
interfere with the status quo and that, if any changes do occur in South 
Africa regarding the type of board structure implemented and developed, 
that this would evolve on its own at a much later stage.  
 
5. The King Report unfortunately does not take South Africa any closer to 
achieving a system based on a two-tier board structure. Consequently, 
South Africa has not been encouraged to develop this into their corporate 
structures or to appreciate the advantages that are associated therewith. 
This is so despite the suggestion in note 10 of chapter 4 that 
 
in the committee’s deliberations it was suggested that a two-tier board structure with a 
supervisory and management board may be desirable in South Africa. The reasoning 
was that the two tier structure with employee and shareholder representatives 
dominating the supervisory board and managers the management board, had succeeded 
in Germany. 936
 
6. Consequently, the two reasons provided by the King Report rejecting the 
two-tier board system are unconvincing. It has been discussed that the 
King Report was incorrect in ascribing this view to reasons based upon 
affirmative action and “personal interaction” policies. Additionally, there is 
arguably further inconsistency in the King Report regarding the question of 
“personal interaction”. This is so despite the fact that it acknowledges,  
 
modern corporations can be described as a link where the interests of the mutual rights 
and interests of the various stakeholders are brought together, for example, 
shareholders, creditors, managers, workers, customers, suppliers, and so forth. In their 
own interests these different groups should co-operate to further the well being of the 
corporation to which they are tied. 937  
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The King Report, however, remarks, “whether there is a two-tier or a 
unitary board, management inevitably will meet separately”. 938 Moreover, 
“(a) Code of Ethics should … (b)e developed in such a way as to involve all 
its stakeholders to infuse its culture”. 939 Thus, the reasons of the King 
Report, which reject the implementation and development of the two-tier 
board structure, are not convincing if South Africa’s future success in the 
labour and business world is to be assured. 
 
Note 11 in chapter 20 of the King Report deals with worker participation. It 
repeats verbatim the points that are expressed in note 12.8 in chapter 4. 940 It is 
therefore not necessary to repeat this. 
 
Furthermore, the King Report recommends, 
 
… that the affected corporations reporting in respect of years commencing after 30 June 1995, 
should state in the report whether they comply with the Code and identify and give reasons for any 
reasons of non-compliance. 941
 
In accordance with the wording used by the King Committee, there is arguably 
nothing to suggest that their proposals are anything more than mere 
recommendations or advice. These statements cannot be construed as being 
directory in nature and application. Ex facie the Report, the recommendations are 
legally unenforceable. This is further indicated in note 1 of chapter 22 on 
“compliance”. 942 Thus, according to note 1, 
 
recommendations for the Code of Corporate Practices and Conduct are valueless unless they are 
implemented. 943  
 
Furthermore, note 4 echoes these sentiments when the King Report writes,  
 
it is recommended that the Code should be adopted by all of the affected corporations. It follows 
that large mutual societies, parastatals and public entities should also comply with the code. 944
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A further indication that the King Report is unenforceable from a legal point of 
view is found in notes 5 to 7. In this regard,  
 
associations should endorse the Code and obtain undertakings from their members to adopt the 
Code. … It is proposed that the adoption of the Code be achieved mainly via the support of 
prominent associations, which should bind their members to comply with the Code, by 
incorporating the principles in the listing requirements for main board companies on the 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange and by peer pressure. All corporations should, however, be 
encouraged to adopt the Code. 945
 
In order to ensure compliance with the Code, the King Report has called upon the 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange for assistance by noting  
 
the Johannesburg Stock Exchange should make such a statement a listing requirement for 
companies listed on the main board of the Johannesburg Stock Exchange” (by them including in 
their annual financial statements the extent of compliance with the Code by the board). 946
 
Finally, in the section of the King Report entitled “Code of ethics for enterprises 
and all who deal with enterprises” (dated 29 November 1994), note 9.1 of 
chapter 3 deals with the obligations of managers to employees of the enterprise. 
947 Unfortunately, this note does not refer specifically to any requirement that 
permits or encourages worker participation in the corporation. Thus, a non-
repetitive statement endorsing these sentiments should have been included 
within this paragraph. 
 
(6.3.4) Conclusion 
 
1. The first King Report has not gone far enough in ensuring that worker 
participation exists in the corporation for the following reasons: 
2. The King Report cannot be construed as an enforceable legal document. It 
has to rely on other factors to encourage compliance therewith. Some of 
these factors may be viewed as unreliable, especially those that encourage 
compliance with the Code through peer pressure. 
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3. The King Report has made recommendations that ought to be applied to 
only “affected corporations”. Hence, the majority of corporations in South 
Africa, whatever their nature, size or type, are generally not expected to 
comply with the recommendations contained within the King Report, 
although they may if they wish to. This is wholly unacceptable. 
 
4. The King Report does not support the development and implementation of 
the two-tier board system. Although the Report acknowledges the success 
of this type of system in Germany, it obdurately encourages the unitary 
board system to be retained in South Africa. The reasons it provides for 
this, those being based upon affirmative action policies and greater 
personal interaction for new board members, are unsound and 
inconclusive. 
 
5. The King Report repeats various points throughout the text with variations 
in content and application, which can cause much confusion to the reader. 
A more succinct and concise text would have been preferred in terms 
whereof the points are made but once and which endeavours to be 
directory in content and application. Therefore, the King Report suffers 
from too much disorganisation in structure and content to be entirely 
useful to corporations.  
 
 
(6.4) OTHER COMMENTARIES ON THE KING I REPORT 
 
In discussing the King Report, Botha notes that 
(t)he King Report has produced confused statements and recommendations in regard to corporate 
governance in South Africa. The reason is that it has failed to state clearly its philosophy in regard 
to the nature and role of the corporation in the South African setting. Only when this has been 
done – when it has been well explained and understood what is to be governed – can coherent 
pronouncements be made about corporate governance. 948
 
This suggests that the King Report is riddled with confusing and conflicting 
statements, but, as Botha notes, for different reasons. Botha’s reasons for this 
confusion are, however, arguably unconvincing. He explains this confusion on the 
basis of the two models, which describe whether the limited liability corporation in 
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South Africa is based upon the contractarian or stakeholder (managerialist) 
model, a discussion of which is referred to elsewhere in this thesis. According to 
Botha, the King Report has given a set of recommendations, which draw upon 
“…different governance requirements applicable to different models of the 
corporation”. 949
 
The contractarian model is based upon the ideology that corporations are private 
and exist as a result of contracts between the directors and the shareholders (the 
owners of the corporation). Therefore, under a contract-based model, mandatory 
rules are not necessary. The main aim of this model is to maximise shareholder’s 
wealth. As a result, this will indirectly benefit the environment, society and the 
other stakeholders as well. In this way, Botha points out, 
 
the contractarian model principles are clearly evident in the King Report where … reference is made 
to directors acting in the best interests of the corporation … to achieve profitability. … The Report 
also refers … to the fiduciary duties of directors (to) … shareholders. … (This) supports the view 
that the interests of the shareholders are paramount in the corporation. … Therefore, … the Report 
… appropriated characteristics of the contractarian model. … The nature of the Report and its 
recommendations were influenced by the perspective of the corporation as an entity of private 
concern, with the shareholders’ rights and interests being paramount. 950
 
The stakeholder model, on the other hand, takes into account directly the rights 
and interests of all of the stakeholders, not just the shareholders. In this way, 
directors do not owe duties exclusively to the shareholders. The corporation is 
viewed as a public concern. As Botha points out,  
 
… (a)nother interest group is the employee group, which has a different claim on the corporation 
assets than the shareholder. … The financial contribution of this group to the corporation is in the 
form of human capital. This model regards it appropriate to have employees’ interests protected as 
well. … This model regards the communities where the corporations operate as indirect 
contributors to the corporation’s capital. … The King Report draws heavily on this model. … It 
seems that the Report felt duty bound to ‘lay down guidelines for ethical practices in businesses in 
South Africa’. Furthermore, the King Committee was mandated to ‘have regard to the special 
circumstances existing in South Africa, more particularly the entrance into the business community 
of members of disadvantaged communities’. 951
 
The stakeholder model therefore recognises the need for the existence of a 
framework, which includes social, moral and ethical values. The King Report has 
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created guidelines and recommendations for corporate governance in this way 
and it is clear that it has taken into account those attributes, which characterise 
both the stakeholder and the contractarian models. The question can therefore be 
asked whether the King Committee set out to create a hybrid model for South 
Africa, which draws upon the appropriate characteristics of each type of model? 
Botha is incorrect when he attempts to force a set of characteristics and 
circumstances prevailing in South Africa into one or other of the two traditional 
models. By him not being able to do so and then suggesting that there was 
confusion in the King Report as a result, is unsound. Surely, if two models have 
been created, a third, a fourth or, as many models as are required, can be 
created in the same way? Confusion in the King Report was not created because 
its Report drew on the distinction characterising the features of the stakeholder 
and contractarian models. The King Report created confusion because its 
recommendations were repeated, but varied in content and application. It was 
not a sufficiently concise, succinct and organised Report, which allowed an 
entirely useful application by the corporation. 
 
Botha further states, 
 
the composition of the King Committee, the objectives of some of the task groups, and the terms 
of reference for the Report provide circumstantial affirmation for the submission that the 
motivation for the undertaking was primarily for institutional considerations. I submit that the main 
incentives were to protect vested interests of the corporate groups in the South African economy 
and to avoid direct governmental involvement in issues of corporate governance. 952
 
Botha’s argument, however, remains unconvincing on this point. He does not 
explain the basis upon which he has made this statement. Therefore, 
 
1. In what way does the ‘composition of the King Committee’ provide for a 
belief of this nature? 
 
2. How do the ‘objectives of some of the task groups and the terms of 
reference for the Report’ add to this belief?  
 
3. What do these ‘institutional considerations’ refer to? 
 
4. What are the ‘vested interests’ that need to be protected? 
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One of Botha’s further criticisms of the King Report, which has been discussed, is 
that 
 
(t)he Report floundered when it incorporated elements of both the enabling and mandatory 
approaches to the Code of Corporate Practices and Conduct. … This conflict between enabling and 
mandatory rules in the Report is clear. … Although it appears that the Report has adopted a cogent 
attitude towards compliance issues, it has floundered when wrestling with the problem of how to 
enforce compliance, or how to provide proposed recommendations to ‘legislate’ in regard to value 
systems and ethics. 953
 
Botha’s assessment of the King Report regarding the enforceability thereof is 
correct. Thus, the Report on the whole, with few exceptions, is couched in 
language, which is non-directive in nature. The Report provides recommendations 
as advice to corporations, which they can simply choose to accept or reject. The 
Report is not legally enforceable. However, there are some expressions contained 
within the King Report that are directory in nature, for example, the King Report 
states that “the code will apply to the following enterprises. …” 954 For the most 
part, the King Report relies on other factors to ensure compliance. These include 
initiatives through peer pressure, the media (drawing attention to examples of 
poor and good corporate governance), the JSE (making a listing requirement for 
companies listed on the main board of the JSE) and associations (obtaining 
undertakings from members). 
 
 
(6.5) THE KING II REPORT 
 
(6.5.1) Introduction 
 
In July 1993 the Institute of Directors in Southern Africa established the King 
Committee on Corporate Governance. The first King Report was published on 29 
November 1994. The King Committee on Corporate Governance launched the 
King Report on Corporate Governance for Southern Africa – 2002 (King II Report) 
on 26 March 2002.  
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The Code of Practices and Conduct contained in the King II Report replaces the 
Code contained in the first King Report of 1994 with effect from 1 March 2002. 955 
There are 6 main sections comprising the King II Report. These sections deal with 
the boards and its directors, risk management, internal audits, integrated 
sustainability reporting, accounting and auditing and, lastly, compliance and 
enforcement. All of these sections are, in turn, subdivided into chapters, the 
contents of most of them falling outside of the purview of this thesis. The King II 
Report also includes a code of corporate practices and conduct and a set of 
recommendations, which require statutory amendment or some other action to 
be taken. A set of fourteen appendices is also included within the King II Report, 
some of which include a mention of the members of the King Committee on 
Corporate Governance, the terms of reference of review and the membership of 
task teams, directors’ legal duties, board self-evaluation, model terms of 
reference for board committees, risk management and internal controls, decisions 
in developing a code of ethics and others. 
 
The date of implementation of the King II Report was 1 March 2002, which 
coincided with the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) Securities Exchange 
Listings Requirement for the disclosure of individual director remuneration 
applicable to “affected companies”, which had their financial years commencing 1 
March 2002. The King II proposes that the code of corporate practices and 
conduct will apply to those organisations, which it refers to this time as the 
“affected companies”. 956  
 
An “affected company” is either a company with securities listed on the JSE 
Securities Exchange of South Africa or banks, financial and insurance entities 
defined in terms of the legislation regulating the South African Financial Services 
Sector or public sector enterprises and agencies falling under the Public Finance 
Management Act and the Local Government (Municipal Finance Management 
Laws). Any department of State is also included. Also included is any other 
national, provincial or local administrative sphere of government or other 
institution, which exercises the power or function in terms of the Constitution or 
public power in terms of any legislation, but excludes a court or judicial officer. 957  
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Precisely why the King Report decided to change the definition in this way from 
“affected corporations” in their first Report to “affected companies” in their 
second Report is uncertain.  
 
The definitions of a “company” and of “corporation” are provided.  
 
That is, a corporation is defined as, 
an entity that has legal personality. … (It) consists of a number of members who fluctuate from 
time to time (e.g. a company registered under the Companies Acts) (or) consists of one member 
only and his or her successors. 958  
 
On the other hand, a company is defined as, 
 
an association of people (company members) formed to conduct business or other activities in the 
name of the association. Most companies are incorporated (are corporations) and therefore have a 
legal personality distinct from those of their members. … 959  
 
It can, therefore, be assumed that the King Committee discovered, after 
releasing its first Report, that “corporation” may be capable of being defined also 
as an entity consisting of only one person. Since this may, on an extended 
interpretation, conflict with its specific recommendations as to what it regards as 
“affected” entities, the King Committee may have decided to remove any 
confusion that may arise in this way and therefore to replace the word 
“corporations” with the word “companies” in its second Report. 
 
As was seen with the provisions in the chapter on workplace forums, once again, 
smaller companies seem to be excluded from any consideration. Thus, the King II 
Report does not include smaller companies and close corporations within its 
mention of “affected companies”.  
 
Most of the organisations making up the corporate sphere of South African 
business consist of small private companies and close corporations. Therefore, it 
is arguably a serious omission and, indeed, an oversight on the legislature and 
other bodies to exclude small business. 
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(6.5.2) Further Features of the King II Report 
 
(6.5.2.1) To What Extent Does the King II Report Recommend or Provide for the 
Extension of the Joint Decision-making Roles of Workplace Forums or Employees 
with Employers? 
 
It appears that the recommendations contained within the King II Report are 
primarily aimed at ensuring that the “affected companies” comply with the Code 
of Corporate Practices and Conduct. 960 This is done through the King II Report 
proposing various amendments to the present South African Companies Act 61 of 
1973. The Code of Conduct recommends that all companies, in addition to the 
affected companies, should give due consideration to the application of the 
principles noted therein. The King II Report further recommends that a company 
should report at least once annually on the nature and extent of its social, 
transformation, ethical, safety, health and environmental policies and practices, 
which is also referred to in the King II Report as the “triple bottom” of a 
company. 961
 
Note 2.1.2 of the King II Report and note 1, chapter 1, section 1, which deals 
with boards and directors, proposes once again that the unitary board structure 
(single tiered board system) should be retained in South Africa, and, therefore, 
the dual board structure (two-tier board system) found in Germany, for example, 
should not be adopted into South African law. 962 This is arguably a non-
progressive step and one that is not in the best interests of greater industrial 
democracy for South Africa. Reasons have been provided in this thesis why a 
two-tier board system is preferable, in terms whereof the employees are afforded 
the opportunity to be involved in the joint decision-making processes at board 
level. The two-tier board system is, it is suggested, the best way to achieve the 
greatest degree of employee job satisfaction in a given workplace. Worldwide 
documented evidence of this exists, for example, through the German model of 
corporate governance. As a result, improved customer service and increased 
profitability for the company are likely to occur. Thus, the members of the King 
Committee on corporate governance should seriously consider the adoption of the 
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dual board system into South African corporate practice. It is most important for 
workers to be able to have a say, not only at line management level, but also at 
board-level.  
 
Moreover, business success depends upon the attitudes of the people within it. 
For businesses, this means making room for peoples’ dreams, whilst ensuring 
that organisational expectations are reached. This type of governance system 
allows the organisation to prosper by providing the employees with an increased 
sense of purpose, motivation and value. Many organisations consider this aspect 
as a cardinal attribute to increasing business performance. That is, many 
employees bring themselves to work and take their work home with them. This is 
part of their lives and it may be very difficult to separate these two aspects of 
their being. Businesses that recognise this issue create a work environment that 
incorporates a healthier workplace environment, with better employee 
motivation, better customer service, a higher turnover and a healthier and more 
sustainable bottom line. These results are expected outcomes simply because 
employees care more for this type of organisational structure and therefore they 
perform better in everything they do. Therefore, once employees are aware that 
the company is not only concerned with making as much money as possible for 
itself and in maximising its shareholders’ wealth, but that the organisation is also 
concerned about its employees and other stakeholders, extra energy is then 
created within the organisation, which allows it to enjoy a healthier bottom line. 
Companies that have a narrow shareholder focus are most probably the most 
difficult organisations to run because everyone within it, including the employees, 
has to look after him or herself. There is a lack of unity and purpose in this type 
of setting, which does not inspire employee loyalty towards the organisation. 
 
New Zealand cereal manufacturer Dick Hubbard notes, 
 
there is plenty of evidence to suggest that if you take your eye beyond the short-term profit effect 
that the reward comes back to you in time, sometimes from unexpected directions. 963  
 
In the same way, Stephen Tindall, New Zealand’s founder of The Warehouse, 
expressed these sentiments. He notes, 
 
but the great thing is that when people realise the company cares for more than just making 
money, they get really involved in the ethic and you find there is an exponential energy that didn’t 
exist before. 964  
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Furthermore, with regard to the composition of the board, the King II Report 
proposes that there should be “an appropriate balance” between the executive, 
non-executive and independent directors in the board. 965 It proposes further that 
the executive director is someone who would be involved in the day-to-day 
management of the organisation and/or is someone in the full-time salaried 
employment of the company and/or any of its subsidiaries. A non-executive 
director is someone who is not involved in the day-to-day management and/or is 
not a full-time salaried employee of the company or its subsidiaries. They should 
also be those persons who have the necessary skills and experience to be able to 
make an independent judgment on those issues relating to the strategy, 
performance, resources and standards of conduct within the organisation and to 
be able to evaluate such performance. An independent director is a non-executive 
director who is not a representative of a major share owner or nominated by such 
share owner, has not been employed by the company or its group in any 
executive capacity for the preceding three financial years, is not a professional 
advisor or significant supplier or customer to the company or its group, has no 
significant contractual relationship with the company or group and is free from 
any business or other relationship that could materially interfere with his or her 
capacity to act in an independent manner. The Code also refers to the 
appointment of shadow directors who are considered to be persons in accordance 
with whose directions or instructions the directors are accustomed to act. 966
 
The King II Report has not made it clear what it envisages in advocating “an 
appropriate balance” between the three types of directorships on the board. Does 
this mean that the board should be represented in having more or less or the 
same number of executive, non-executive and independent directors? On what 
basis should this correct balance be determined? Consequently, the King II 
Report has proposed significant amendments to the current South African 
Companies Act, but has not indicated nor clarified how these proposals may be 
implemented. Additionally, other than in the case where usually high-ranking full-
time salaried employees are able to become executive directors, the King II 
report makes no proposal or provision for the participation of employees in the 
joint decision-making processes at board level. This is a serious omission, and for 
reasons discussed in this thesis, the King Committee should propose amendments 
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to South African company legislation in terms whereof a dual board system is put 
into place, which allows employees the opportunity to have their say at that level. 
Furthermore, regarding the appointment of independent directors to the board, 
the King II Report has also not made it clear what it envisages by its proposals in 
terms of which it recommends that independent directors should not have a 
significant contractual relationship with the company or the group, or be a 
significant supplier to the company or the group.  
 
The King II Report proposes that a board should meet at least once per quarter 
and should disclose in its annual report the number of meetings it holds and 
which directors actually attend. 967 It emphasises that the board should ensure 
that it receives relevant non-financial information, which takes into account 
broader stakeholder issues. It also proposes that the board establishes various 
board committees in terms of which certain functions can be delegated to them 
so as to assist the board in the proper discharging of its duties and 
responsibilities. 968 The King II Report also notes that  
 
(d)elegating authorities to board committees … does not … mitigate … the discharge by the board 
and its directors of their duties and responsibilities. 969 … Committees can help share the board’s 
workload. Being smaller, they can go into greater detail and deal with complex issues where the 
full board might not have had enough time. 970 … In establishing board committees, the board 
must determine their terms of reference, life span, role and function. It must create reporting 
procedures and proper written mandates … for its committees. 971 … Board committees should, as 
far as possible, only comprise members of the board. It may be necessary … to co-opt specialists 
as permanent members of such committees but this should be the exception rather than the rule 
and they should comprise a minority on the committee. … (I)n order to ensure its effective 
functioning, a committee will of necessity from time to time call on specialized skills to assist it with 
its deliberations and decisions. 972 All companies should have, at a minimum, audit and 
remuneration committees. Industry specific issues will dictate the requirements for other 
committees. The overriding principle is that boards must establish committees that are responsive 
to the nature of business. … Other committees may be: Chairperson’s, Executive or Management, 
Governance, Actuarial, Information Technology, Risk, Environmental, Safety and Health, 
Nomination, Investment and Employment Equity. It is the responsibility of the board to consider 
the committees appropriate for its purposes. 973  
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Thus, the establishment of board committees is not mandatory in South Africa 
even though the establishment of audit committees in certain overseas 
jurisdictions is mandatory for publicly held companies. 974 Furthermore, the King 
II Report does not provide any further details about the description, composition 
and function(s) of the ‘employment equity’ board committee. 
 
The King II Report also proposes that an independent non-executive director 
chairs a board committee, and that it should be subject to regular evaluation 
regarding its performance and effectiveness. 975  
 
(6.5.2.2) Employee Subcommittees of the Board 
 
It is noteworthy that the King II Report proposes that with regard to board and 
director evaluation, a board should regularly review its mix of skills, experience 
and other qualities so as to assess its effectiveness as a board, its committees 
and the contribution of each individual director. 976 As mentioned previously with 
the first King Report, the King II Report ought to have proposed, at the very 
least, that an organisation establishes, as one of its board committees, an 
employee board committee or, to phrase it differently, an employee sub-
committee of the board. This should be comprised exclusively of the employees of 
the organisation who have been democratically nominated and elected to this 
position by interested stakeholders, including fellow employees, shareholders and 
directors and officers of the corporation. Because an independent non-executive 
director need not chair this committee, it could be chaired by an employee who 
has been democratically elected as the chairperson of this subcommittee.  
 
As with the other board committees, the employee board committee should be 
free to take on independent outside advice as it deems fit, the costs whereof 
would be borne by the organisation. Additionally, the employee board committee 
would be established with proper terms of reference, a determined life span, roles 
and functions, and, as a general principle, should be transparent and therefore 
make full disclosure to the board as this becomes necessary. Employees making 
up the employee board committee do not need to be high-ranking, but must be 
democratically elected to this office. They must also act honestly, responsibly and 
in good faith in the best interests of their fellow employees and of the 
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organisation in discharging their board duties. Their actions, as with other board 
committees, must not, in any way whatsoever, be actuated by self-centered 
ideals, spitefulness, dishonesty or malice. As with other board committees, the 
employee board committee should be subject to regular evaluation regarding its 
performance and effectiveness. 
 
If the King Committee were to have expressly recommended or prescribed the 
establishment of employee board committees, a governance system would 
provide employees with opportunities to have a real decision-making role for the 
first time in those affairs, which would probably not have been given to them 
previously to consider. It is arguable that giving employees the opportunity to 
provide this kind of input on board-related matters would greatly contribute 
towards achieving greater industrial democracy in the workplace. Thus, 
establishing employee board committees would place South African company law 
on a path towards achieving a two-tier board structure, which has been 
implemented and fully integrated into Germany’s corporate governance 
structures.  
 
Additionally, as proposed by the King II Report, the company secretary plays an 
important role and could assist in the induction of new or inexperienced directors 
and therefore, in this way, provide the board as a whole and directors individually 
with detailed guidance as to how their responsibility should be properly 
discharged in the best interests of the company. 977 Consequently, it would make 
little difference whether inexperienced employees or inexperienced executive 
directors or non-executive directors or independent directors are inducted into 
the process and are able to serve on the board, either directly or through a board 
committee.  
 
Furthermore, the King II Report refers to the risk management of the company 
and notes that the board of the company is responsible for this entire process. 978 
Therefore, the management of a company is accountable to the board for 
designing, implementing and monitoring the process of risk management and 
also of integrating it into the day-to-day activities of the company.  
 
The King II Report specifically notes that boards should design risk management 
as a company policy and that such policy should be communicated to all 
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employees in such way that ensures that risk management is in fact incorporated 
into the language and culture of the company. 979 Furthermore, boards should 
use recognised risk management models to ensure that companies behave in a 
way that is responsible to all stakeholders with a legitimate interest. 980 The board 
is responsible for ensuring that a risk management assessment is undertaken at 
least once annually in terms whereof a public statement is made. 981 The King II 
Report recommends a board committee should be appointed to assist the board 
in reviewing the risk management procedures and the risks facing the company. 
982 It also recommends that the board should establish a control mechanism or 
mechanisms, which are designed in such a way that the risks are mitigated and 
the company’s objectives are attained. 983 A board of directors is responsible for 
disclosure of its risk management procedures in its annual report. 984
 
The King II Report has recommended that the affected companies should take 
into account interests other than those interests confined to its shareholders. It 
does this firstly by suggesting that its Code of Conduct is applied to all companies 
(although this is aimed primarily at the affected companies) and, secondly, by 
recommending that risk management models are used to take into account and 
to reduce the possibility of risk and loss to all of the company’s stakeholders. This 
would mean that the company should take into account any negative effects that 
its activities or decisions would have on its employees. By implication, it could be 
argued that the King II Report is suggesting in this section that the stakeholders 
of the company, including its employees, have a role in the decision-making 
processes associated with risk management procedures. However, the King 
Report could have made their recommendations in this section dealing with risk 
management processes more meaningful for employees by expressly 
recommending that employees have a joint decision-making role in the 
formulation of the risk management processes.  
 
Effective systems of governance could have been achieved if the King Committee 
had recommended that the board committee, which is appointed to assist the 
board in reviewing the risk management procedures, be comprised of at least one 
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employee of the company. In this regard, the King II Report could have 
suggested the appointment of an employee or employees to the board committee 
in such a manner and on such terms so that the board committee becomes fairly 
representative of labour in respect to the company’s risk management processes. 
In this way, employees can have a meaningful role in determining the way in 
which risks are managed and mitigated and also in designing those control 
mechanisms that could achieve this. 
 
(6.5.3) Further Issues of the King II Report with respect to corporate 
stakeholders 
 
The King II Report recommends that companies should report on various “non-
financial matters” and should disclose the nature and extent of its commitment to 
social, ethical, safety, health and environmental practices, including 
organisational integrity, by reporting regularly to stakeholders on those policies, 
procedures and systems it has in place in this regard. 985 It also notes that 
corporate citizenship is the commitment to contribute to sustainable economic 
development, working with employees, their families, the local community and 
society to improve their quality of life. 986 Thus, a board of directors should take 
account of the current business environment in South Africa. This includes the 
integration of business processes and safety and health and environmental 
management principles. 987 The King II Report further notes that there should be 
a committed effort to reduce workplace accidents and occupational health and 
safety-related incidents. 988 It recommends that criteria should be disclosed by 
which an organisation measures human capital and in terms of which they 
indicate their requirements regarding the demographics, gender and age of staff, 
including factors relating to people with disabilities, corporate training initiatives 
and employee development. 989
 
Regarding the issue of communication with stakeholders, the King II Report 
proposes that it is the duty of the board to provide to stakeholders a balanced 
and readily understandable assessment report of the company’s position. The 
information is to be based upon principles of transparency and accountability and 
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needs to be a full, fair and honest account of a company’s performance. The 
report should include all material matters of significant interest and concern to all 
stakeholders. Thus, the Report notes, 
 
(t)ransparency implies openness in fully explaining the reasons for any decision or course of action 
adopted by the company. Accountability implies acceptance by the company of its responsibility for 
any decision or course of action adopted by it, the consequences thereof, and a commitment to 
resolving any issues that arise as a result. Both are fundamental tenets of corporate governance. 
990  
 
The King II Report notes that stakeholders include the shareholders, parties that 
contract with the enterprise (for example, the customers, employees, suppliers, 
subcontractors and business partners), parties that have a non-contractual nexus 
with the enterprise (for example, local communities and non-governmental 
organisations) and the State. Thus,  
 
stakeholders are those whose relations to the enterprise cannot be completely contracted for, but 
upon whose co-operation and creativity it depends for its survival and prosperity. 991  
This approach recognises that other stakeholders must be considered when 
developing the strategy of a company and is therefore inclusive. The values by 
which the company operates should be communicated to all stakeholders and 
therefore stakeholders that are relevant to the company’s business should be 
identified. The relationship between the company and its stakeholders should also 
be mutually beneficial. Thus, 
 
(a) wealth of evidence has established that this inclusive approach is the way to create sustained 
business success and steady, long-term growth in shareowner value. 992
 
A Code of Ethics should be implemented as part of a company’s corporate 
governance principles. These provide for a commitment by a company to higher 
standards of behaviour, the development of initiatives to involve the infusion of 
the cultures of all of its stakeholders into the company and the provision of 
information to assist with the behaviour of the employees in the company and a 
demonstration of a commitment to fairness, transparency, honesty, non-
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discrimination, accountability and responsibility and respect for human dignity, 
human rights and social justice. 993
 
From these recommendations, it can be argued that the King II Report places 
greater emphasis on a company’s improved treatment of corporate stakeholders 
other than its shareholders. It endorses, to a greater extent than in its previous 
Report, the principles of transparency of information and the infusion of the 
cultures of the various stakeholders into the company. In this way, the Report 
refers to the employees, their families, the local community and society, the 
environment and other stakeholders. This is a refreshing break from the 
‘traditionalist’ approaches examined earlier, in terms of which increasing 
shareholders’ wealth was the only or main focus of the company through its 
directors. The King II Report also refers to corporate training initiatives and 
employee development, which are very encouraging and positive attributes. 
However, the King II Report should have expanded their discussions of these 
aspects. More specifically, it could have recommended expressly that these 
initiatives would also include employees being involved in the joint decision-
making processes of the corporation with respect to those decisions, which are 
made at board level. Although this intention may have been implied in the King II 
Report, it has, unfortunately, not been expressly stated. This is because the King 
II Report goes to great length to emphasise the significance and participation of 
the other stakeholders in the company, which would include the employees. It 
also enshrines the principles of transparency, accountability, clarity and honesty 
of matters. If expressly stated, these factors would reinforce employee 
development and corporate training initiatives for all parties. However, as it 
stands, the recommendations and principles enunciated by the King II Report are 
encouraging, but vague. Therefore, the King Committee might find that it may be 
rather difficult in practice to persuade or encourage companies to implement the 
recommendations. Consequently, the King II Report should have, for example, 
indicated more specifically what it envisages by a company committing itself to 
higher standards of behaviour and to that of greater transparency. It should have 
also indicated what it meant by those reporting requirements, which are needed 
to address material matters of significant interest and concern to all stakeholders. 
If the Code of Corporate Practices and Conduct expressly and more specifically 
defined and explained what it recommended with regard to these non-financial 
matters, then it would not be so simple for companies to avoid implementing the 
proposed recommendations. 
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(6.5.4) Conclusion 
 
Despite its inherent attributes and progressive stance, the King II Report has not 
gone far enough in establishing the rights of employees or of workplace forums 
with regard to their joint decision-making roles with the employers. This is applies 
even at line management level. Consequently, the King II Report arguably does 
not substantially alter the previous picture in this way. Thus, the rights of 
workplace forums under the South African Labour Relations Act to be involved in 
the joint decision-making processes of the corporation have not been increased or 
improved in any significant manner as a result of the recommendations of the 
King II Report. The King II Report focuses its proposals to a large extent on 
issues such as accounting and auditing practices and the like. It does not pay 
sufficient attention to the advantages of workplace forums and of employees 
participating in the decision-making roles of the organisation. The King II Report 
is in favour of maintaining a unitary board system in South Africa in terms of 
which employees and workplace forums would not be entitled to have a 
participatory role in the decision-making processes at board level. It seems to 
dismiss the idea of a two-tier board system that is practiced in a country such as 
in Germany. As discussed in this thesis, however, to dismiss the two-tier board 
structure is unconvincing and anachronistic. At the very least, the King II 
Committee should have seriously considered the proposals for organisations to 
establish ‘employee board committees’. This would commence the process of 
achieving a system in terms of which employees would have participatory roles in 
joint decision-making at board level. This could develop into a system where the 
employees could be invited to sit on the board itself. This governance system 
does not necessarily advocate that employees need to be directors. There is no 
reason why employees need to be directors to sit on the board. Although this is a 
traditional approach enshrined in deep-seated company law principles, there is no 
reason to assume permanency. By allowing employees a say in decisions taken at 
board level, would, as shown, be advantageous to all parties. It would also help 
to strengthen the processes of industrial democracy in South Africa, which, at 
times, may seem rather fragile.  
 
Finally, although many recommendations and principles of the King II Report are 
encouraging, they are vague. It may thus be rather difficult in practice to 
persuade or encourage companies to implement the recommendations. The King 
II Report has chosen to formulate only recommendations to “affected 
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companies”. This means, in practice, that all of the non-affected corporations 
need not apply the recommendations of the King II Report. It also means that 
since the King II Report only formulated recommendations, they are not 
mandatory and, therefore, even “affected corporations” need not apply them if 
they do not wish to. The recommendations of the King II Report are, therefore, 
arguably legally unenforceable. 
 
 
(6.6) EXAMPLES OF COMPANIES IN SOUTH AFRICA APPLYING CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES BASED UPON THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE 
KING I REPORT 
 
(6.6.1) Introduction 
 
There are companies in South Africa that have practiced and applied very 
progressive corporate governance principles with regard to their employee 
participation schemes. It would be useful to consider the corporate governance 
reports of some of these companies to determine the extent to which, if any, the 
traditional company law approaches in South Africa that create systems and 
processes to maximise shareholders’ wealth and the profitability of the company, 
have been eroded or reduced. 
 
(6.6.2) Companies in South Africa Enforcing Worker Participation 
Initiatives  
 
(1) Argent Industrial Limited, based in Germiston on the East Rand in 
Johannesburg is a holding company. The group obtains its income from 
property, steel trading and processing, equipment fabrication, precision 
engineering, concrete and stone and materials handling. Argent Industrial 
Limited has a unitary board structure, which has full control of the 
organisation and monitors executive management. The company believes that 
it has complied with principles incorporated in the Code of Corporate Practices 
and Conduct, as proposed in the King I Report. The directors have recognised 
the need to conduct the company with integrity and in accordance with 
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generally accepted corporate practices. The corporate governance report lists 
some of its accepted corporate practices as follows: 994 
 
(a) The board is primarily responsible to shareholders, but is aware of other 
stakeholder rights and interests, including those of the employees, customers, 
suppliers and communities. Employees are required to maintain the highest 
ethical standards in ensuring that business practices are conducted in an 
exemplary manner.  
 
(b) Regarding the question of employee participation, the corporate governance 
report of Argent Industrial Limited notes,  
 
(p)articipative management … relies on the building of employee partnerships at every level to 
foster mutual trust and to encourage people to always think about how they can do things 
better. We strive to liberate the initiative and energies of our people, because they are the ones 
who make the difference in our performance. 
 
(c) As to the environment, the company is aware that there is always a risk of 
environmental damage when carrying out its activities. Thus, the company 
engages in education programmes to train their employees to avoid practices 
that could result in long-term damage to the environment. 
 
(d) With respect to the question of ethics, the company endeavours to act with 
honesty, responsibility, and professional integrity with their employees, 
shareholders, customers, suppliers and society at large. In any instance 
where ethical standards are called into question, the circumstances are 
investigated and resolved in an appropriate and fair manner. 
(e) Finally, on the question relating to professional advice, the directors have 
access to the company secretary, who ensures that the board procedures are 
followed. The directors may seek independent professional advice at the 
company’s expense. 
 
Although the company operates a unitary board level, it subscribes to the 
principles of participative management, which rely on the building of employee 
partnerships at every level to foster mutual trust and to improve the way people 
do things. The company is responsible to shareholders, but takes into account the 
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interests of other stakeholders within the company, such as their employees, 
customers, suppliers, the community and environment. However, the board has 
not delegated any strategic powers.  
 
It is evident that this company may have made significant progress in involving 
its employees in the joint decision-making processes of the company, but not on 
those matters that deal with “strategic powers”. Many other companies in South 
Africa have not gone so far. That is, many companies have either not 
contemplated the possible virtues and advantages of participative management 
governance systems, or have refused to give employees any more say than they 
need to in the decision-making processes of the corporation. Therefore, the King 
Committee should formally propose that the unitary board model be replaced 
with the dual board system. This would clarify the position regarding the model 
that companies should adopt with regard to employee participation schemes. This 
would bring about a greater amount of consistency in the workplace for 
employees and employers in corporate South Africa. Argent Industrial Limited 
have noted, 
 
(employees) are the ones who make the difference in our performance. 
 
(2) Powertech (Power Technologies Limited) subscribes to good corporate 
governance values expressed in the King Report. The directors recognise the 
need to conduct the affairs of the corporation with integrity and in accordance 
with generally acceptable corporate practices. This is accomplished through 
the procedures and policies, which govern corporate conduct in the Altron 
group, of which Powertech is a member.  
 
Some of the company’s key corporate principles in their governance report can be 
stated as follows: 995  
 
(a) The company secretary and the secretarial department are responsible to the 
board for ensuring compliance with established procedures and the relevant 
statutes and regulations. All directors have access to this advice. 
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(b) Non-executive directors and the Chief Executive of Powertech are invited to 
attend the meetings of the Altron Remuneration Committee to deal with 
matters, which relate to the remuneration of employees. 
 
(c) With respect to worker participation, the company notes,  
 
Powertech continues to promote a more participative management style and climate, which 
encourages its employees to reach their maximum potential. The group has a variety of 
participative structures, at the various operating company levels, for handling issues, which 
affect employees directly and materially. These structures, which have been set up with trade 
unions and other employee representatives, are designed to achieve good employer/employee 
relations through effective sharing of relevant information, consultation and resolution of 
conflict. …Promotion shall, where possible, take place from within Powertech and employees are 
given the opportunity to develop their potential. 
 
(d) On the question of corporate codes of conduct, Powertech is committed to the 
highest standards of behaviour. Clear guidelines on the behaviour expected of 
employees are contained within the Corporate Code of Conduct. All employees 
are required to act in an exemplary manner. Thus, 
 
(t)he Altron group, of which Powertech is a part, is committed to excellence, integrity, 
professionalism and the growth and development of all its operations. Our people are our most 
important asset and we expect them to share in the group’s values and beliefs, in a manner, 
which demonstrates:  
 
1 Respect for one another; 
 
2 Honesty and integrity in dealings, not only with one another, but with all the group’s 
stakeholders; 
 
3 Confidentiality and discretion in the use of information proprietary to the group; 
 
4 Avoidance of any conflict of interests, which may interfere with the independent exercise 
of their judgment in the best interests of the group; 
 
5 Adherence to all laws and regulations determining the group’s legal and moral 
obligations; and 
 
6 Fostering a non-racial, non-discriminatory work and business environment in promoting a 
climate of harmony and tolerance. 
 
In analysing the principles stated in the corporate governance Report of 
Powertech, it is evident that certain South African companies are already 
following the proposals of the King Report and moving away from the almost 
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entrenched traditional doctrines of company law that enshrine the principle that 
companies exist solely to maximise their own profits and that of the shareholders.  
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(6.6.3) Conclusion 
 
The principles adopted today in many South African companies echo the 
sentiments that “(the employees) our people are our most important asset. …” 
Additionally, many companies are promoting a “more participative management 
style and climate”, as there is a realisation that this would ultimately be 
advantageous to all of the stakeholders of the company. This system of 
governance “encourages its employees to reach their maximum potential”. 
However, the King Committee should, in the near future, consider the idea of 
recommending the establishment of “employee board committees”, as this would 
entrench these principles. Employees should not be barred, for example, from 
sitting on the remuneration committees of companies. Allowing employees to 
participate in decision-making would reduce the number of industrial disputes, 
which are referred either to conciliation committees or to arbitration. For them to 
have a say in determining their own salaries, and the salaries of executives and 
of senior staff, would be beneficial for all parties. It would also provide greater 
transparency to all stakeholders. These steps would ultimately achieve “good 
employer/employee relations” by the “sharing of relevant information” and by the 
“resolution of conflict”. 
 
 
(6.7) WHAT DOES THE KPMG CORPORATE GOVERNANCE SURVEY STATE 
ABOUT THE DISCLOSURE OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRACTICES 
RELATING TO WORKER PARTICIPATION IN SOUTH AFRICA? 
 
(6.7.1) Introduction 
 
During 1996 and 1997 KPMG conducted a survey of the annual reporting 
disclosure practices on corporate governance. 996 The survey was used to 
determine to what extent, if any, listed companies had complied with the 
disclosure requirements recommended by the King I Report. That is, the JSE 
required that all listed companies comment on the extent of their compliance or 
non-compliance with the recommendations of the King I Report regarding its 
Code of Corporate Practices and Conduct. This became a compulsory requirement 
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for all companies that had their financial years ending on or after 30 June 1996. 
KPMG then compared inter alia  
 
… the difference in the level of disclosure between the first year of compulsory corporate 
governance reporting (1996/1997) and the previous year (1995/1996) where such reporting was 
(not compulsory). 
 
The methodology used by KPMG consisted of taking two samples from: 
 
a. The “top 100” companies ranked by market capitalisation as at 10 July 1997; 
and 
 
b. The “other 100” companies selected from the remaining companies listed on the 
JSE. 
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(6.7.2) Research Findings of KPMG Regarding Corporate Governance and 
Worker Participation in South Africa 
 
(6.7.2.1) Where in the Annual Report are Corporate Governance Matters 
Disclosed?  
 
KPMG has obtained statistics as follows: 997
 
Table 2: Disclosure of Corporate Governance Matters During the Periods 
1995/1996 and 1996/1997  
 Top 100 (95/96) Top 100 (96/97) Other 100 
(95/96) 
Other 100 
(96/97) 
(1) In a single 
corporate 
governance 
statement 
45% 69% 39% 67% 
(2) In the 
director’s Report 
21% 19% 18% 15% 
(3) Other  
statements/ 
combinations 
24% 8% 24% 11% 
(4) No reference 
to corporate 
governance 
10% 4% 19% 7% 
 
The statistics obtained by KPMG show clearly that in both the “top 100” 
companies and the “other 100” companies listed on the JSE: 
1. A huge increase existed in the number of companies drafting a single 
corporate governance statement during 1996/1997; 
 
2. A decrease existed in the number of companies drafting their corporate 
governance matters in the directors’ reports during 1996/1997; 
                                                     
997  Ibid. 
Chapter 6 310
 
3. A huge decrease existed in the number of companies drafting their 
corporate governance matters by using other statements or a combination 
thereof during 1996/1997; 
 
4. A huge decrease existed in the number of companies making no reference 
at all to corporate governance matters;  
 
5. There were still listed companies on the JSE that were not commenting on 
the extent of their compliance or non-compliance with the Code of 
Corporate Practices and Conduct, although the JSE required this; and 
 
6. The “top 100” and “other 100” companies displayed very similar statistics 
on the manner in which, in the annual report, corporate governance 
matters were disclosed, especially during the 1996/1997 period. For 
example, using a single corporate governance statement, there was only a 
two percent difference in the 1996/1997 periods. 
 
(6.7.2.2) Does the Annual Report Contain a Description Regarding the Manner in 
which Employees are Permitted to Participate in the Governance of the Company? 
 
KPMG has obtained statistics as follows: 998  
 
Table 3: Employee Participation in the Decision-Making Processes of the 
Company 
 Top 100 (95/96) Top 100 (96/97) Other 100 (95/96) Other 100 (96/97) 
Yes 36% 60% 19% 43% 
No 64% 40% 81% 57% 
The statistics obtained by KPMG show clearly, as disclosed in the annual report of 
the organisation that: 
1. A huge increase existed in the number of “top 100” and “other 100” 
companies disclosing a description of the manner in which employees are 
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permitted to participate in the decision-making processes of the 
organisation during 1996/1997; 
 
2. There were still a large number of the “top 100” listed companies during 
1996/1997 that were not complying with the proposals set out in the King 
I Report to establish mechanisms allowing employees a joint decision-
making role in the governance of the company; 
 
3. There were a majority of “other 100” listed companies during 1996/1997 
that were not complying with the proposals set out in the King I Report to 
establish mechanisms allowing employees a joint decision-making role in 
the governance of the company; and 
 
4. The “top 100” listed companies during 1996/1997 were complying with the 
proposals of the King I Report to establish employee participation 
mechanisms to a much greater extent than the “other 100” companies. 
This is evident in the difference displayed in the amount of seventeen 
percent. 
 
(6.7.2.3) Does the Annual Report State that the Company Has a Code of Ethics? 
 
KPMG has obtained the following statistics: 999
 
Table 4: The Extent to which the Annual Report States that the Company 
Has a Code of Ethics  
 Top 100 (95/96) Top 100 (96/97) Other 100 (95/96) Other 100 (96/97) 
Yes 49% 42% 27% 45% 
No 51% 58% 73% 55% 
 
The statistics obtained by KPMG show clearly that during 1996/1997: 
 
1. The “top 100” companies reduced their number of statements by seven 
percent in their annual reports in which they stated that they had a code 
of ethics; 
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2. The “other 100” companies increased their number of statements by 
eighteen percent in their annual reports in which they stated that they had 
a code of ethics; 
 
3. The majority of the “top 100” and “other 100” companies were not stating 
in their annual reports that they had a code of ethics; 
4. The extent to which the “top 100” and “other 100” companies were stating 
in their annual reports that had a code of ethics was statistically very 
similar with only a three per cent difference; and 
5. More “other 100” than “top 100” companies had stated in their annual 
report that the company had a code of ethics. 
 
(6.7.2.4) Does the Annual Report Provide Details of the Code of Ethics and the 
Manner in which it is Implemented? 
 
KPMG has obtained the following statistics: 1000
 
Table 5: The Extent to which the Annual Report Provides Details of the 
Code of Ethics 
 
 Top 100 (95/96) Top 100 (96/97) Other 100 (95/96) Other 100 (96/97) 
Yes 20% 25% 11% 22% 
No 80% 75% 89% 78% 
 
The KPMG statistics show clearly that: 
 
1. During the periods 1995/1996 and 1996/1997 a large majority of “top 
100” and “other 100” companies did not provide in their annual reports 
details of a code of ethics and the manner in which it was to be 
implemented; 
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2. During the period 1996/1997 the “top 100” companies had only improved 
their disclosure of a code of ethics in their annual reports by a slight five 
percent, whereas the “other 100” companies had doubled their disclosure;  
 
3. The extent to which the “top 100” and “other 100” companies during the 
period 1996/1997 were providing in their annual reports details of a code 
of ethics and the implementation thereof was statistically very similar with 
only a three percent difference; and 
 
4. Slightly more “top 100” than “other 100” companies during 1996/1997 
were providing details in their annual reports of a code of ethics and the 
implementation thereof. 
(6.7.3) Conclusion 
 
From the statistics collected by KPMG over the period 1996/1997, it is clear that 
many of the “top 100” companies had, to some extent, committed themselves to 
the proposals set out in the King I Report of November 1994 on matters of 
corporate governance. Only four percent of the “top 100” companies had made 
no reference at all to corporate governance matters. However, sixty nine percent 
of the “top 100” companies achieved this through a single corporate governance 
statement. In a similar fashion, only seven percent of the “other 100” companies 
listed on the JSE made no reference to corporate governance matters. This was a 
steady improvement from the 1995/1996 financial year, where nineteen percent 
of the “other 100” companies had made no mention at all to matters of corporate 
governance. The reason for this noteworthy increase was due to the fact that the 
JSE had made the 1996/1997 period the first year of compulsory corporate 
governance reporting. Likewise, sixty seven percent of “the other” companies 
achieved this in a single corporate governance statement. However, a small 
minority of “top 100” and “other 100” companies remained defiant in response to 
the proposals on corporate governance set out by the King I Report and, 
therefore, made no reference to corporate governance reporting at all.  
 
Regarding the question of employee participation in the corporate governance of 
the company, the KPMG statistics collected reveal that, although there was a 
significant improvement in this regard by the “top 100” and the “other 100” 
companies between the two periods in question, there were still many companies 
that were not complying with the policies set out in this report. That is, only sixty 
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percent of the “top 100” and forty three per cent of the “other 100” companies 
produced annual reports containing a description of the manner in which 
employees participate in the governance of the company. The “top 100” 
companies need to be exemplars of the smaller companies.  
Concerning proposals of the King I Report relating to corporate codes of ethics, 
KPMG statistics reveal alarming results. During both of the periods in question a 
good majority of the “top 100” companies and of the “other 100” companies did 
not state in their annual reports that their company had a code of ethics. In fact, 
the position deteriorated during the period 1996/1997 for the “top 100” 
companies where only forty two percent of these companies had indicated that 
their annual reports had stated this. Even worse, regarding the question on 
whether their annual reports provided details of the code of ethics and its 
implementation, only twenty five percent of the “top 100” and 22 per cent of the 
“other 100” companies responded affirmatively. Thus, most of the “top 100” 
companies had not adopted the proposals of the King I Report in this way.  
 
The King II Report (2002) on Corporate Governance for South Africa was the first 
governance Report in any jurisdiction to include a section on Integrated 
Sustainability Reporting. Compliance with the Code of Corporate Practices and 
Conduct is a requirement for affected companies with financial years commencing 
from 01 March 2002. The Code addresses the JSE Securities Exchange SA Top 
100 Companies compliance with the recommendations on Integrated 
Sustainability Reporting as contained in section 5 of the King II Report. Section 5 
requires companies to report at least once annually on their sustainability 
performance and to demonstrate some commitment towards organisational 
integrity. Compliance with King II is a listing requirement and should therefore 
comply with section 5. Areas upon which companies should report include health 
and safety (including HIV/AIDS), employment equity initiatives, social investment 
prioritisation (including black economic empowerment), employee integrity 
assessment, board confirmation of compliance to ethical standards and the 
incorporation of global reporting initiative guidelines. 1001
 
According to the 2003 KPMG Survey on Integrated Sustainability Reporting in 
South Africa, which showed an improvement by companies in the disclosure of 
                                                     
1001  KPMG (2003), Integrated Sustainability Reporting in South Africa – executive summary, 2; 
<http://www.KPMG.co.za> (accessed 27 December 2004). See also Blackman et al, above n 
499, paragraph 208, 8-16-8. 
Chapter 6 315
information and in the application of the second King Report’s recommended 
codes of conduct, 85% of the Top 100 companies had provided annual reporting 
on sustainability-related issues. Furthermore, 77% of the companies had 
developed an internal code of ethics or code of corporate conduct. While many 
companies incorporated the King II recommendations, further detailed disclosure, 
however, as outlined by the recommendations, could still be made. Sustainability 
reporting refers to the “triple bottom line” of social, environmental and economic 
performance. It is becoming more important for companies to show responsible 
behaviour through transparent and credible reporting. The survey illustrates that 
South African companies are taking important steps to improve the quantity and 
quality of information available to stakeholders. It is also becoming more 
common for stakeholders to demand that companies provide some third party 
assurance on social, economic and environmental performance. 1002
 
 
(6.8) THE ETHICS INSTITUTE OF SOUTH AFRICA (ETHICSA) 
 
There is an organisation in South Africa called ‘The Ethics Institute of South 
Africa’ (EthicSA), which is an independent, non-partisan, non-profit making body 
that  
 
strives to be a catalyst in fostering and nurturing ethical practices among individuals and 
institutions in both the private and public sectors, through playing a facilitative and collaborative 
role, and working in partnerships with government, business, academic institutions and individuals. 
1003  
 
The aim of EthicSA is to build an ethical South Africa and to advance ethics in 
professional life, business practices and public policy. EthicSA is committed inter 
alia to  
 
… facilitate the development and implementation of codes of ethics, contribute to ethics education 
and training (and) initiate and facilitate ethics research. … The creation of EthicSA is an 
institutional response to the worldwide recognition of … the importance of moral renewal in all 
societies, as well as to the current value and morality crisis in our own society. South Africa is 
experiencing an erosion of moral commitment and practice in a wide range of societal institutions, 
which not only costs the country an enormous amount in terms of resources and human suffering, 
but threatens the very foundations upon which both civil and political society are based. … 1004
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It is interesting to note that EthicSA has broadened its perspectives to now 
include ethical issues in the domains of business, government and other sectors 
of society. Originally, it focused mainly on health care and the rights of patients.  
Following the King II Report, EthicSA launched a nationwide, benchmark survey 
of business ethics amongst private corporations, which has been named ‘Business 
Ethics South Africa’ (BESA). The organisation notes that there are currently 51 
large JSE companies participating in this project, which represent 695 000 
employees in the SA economy. 1005  
 
Landman, the CEO of EthicSA, believes that corporate failures, which are caused 
by the unethical behaviour of individuals and “ethically weak corporate cultures”, 
have weakened worldwide investor confidence. He states further, 
 
that ethics are not an optional extra … to normal business. … (E)thics are woven into the fabric of 
business (and) concern doing what is right and good, or a way of life that goes beyond the 
demands of the law and regulations. … We base our actions on sound values, discharge our 
obligations, respect others’ rights and promote individual and collective well being. 1006
 
Business ethics apply to all stakeholders in every business, individually and 
collectively, from the CEO to the most junior employee. 1007 Consequently, it may 
be possible, and indeed useful, for future committees, such as the King 
Committee, to work together with EthicSA on matters that deal with ethical 
considerations because EthicSA fosters and nurtures ethical practices and 
facilitates the development and implementation of codes of ethics.  
 
Committees, such as the King Committee through the King Report, might find 
that by working with an organisation such as EthicSA its proposals on ethical 
considerations might, in the future, be modified and become more widely 
accepted and implemented by companies than had been the situation during the 
1996/1997 period. There is a real need to get companies to understand that 
ethics must be “woven into the fabric” of the company.  
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 (6.9) THE RIGHTS OF EMPLOYEES TO FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION 
 
(6.9.1) Introduction 
 
The extent to which the Labour Relations Act (LRA) 66 of 1995 makes provision 
for the employees’ rights to freedom of association needs to be determined. 1008 
This all depends upon whether the worker is deemed to be an employee in terms 
of the LRA or, if not, in terms of the common law. If neither applies, then the 
worker, even if connected to the organisation in some way, will not be deemed to 
be an employee and therefore will not enjoy any rights to freedom of association. 
In this section, two aspects will be examined: the relevant sections that deal with 
the employees’ rights to freedom of association and the statutory and common 
law definitions of the employee. 
 
(6.9.2) The Relevant Statutes Enshrining Freedom of Association 
 
Section 4 of the LRA provides, 1009 that every employee has the right to 
participate in forming a trade union or federation of trade unions, 1010 and to join 
a trade union, subject to its constitution. 1011 Every member of a trade union has 
the right, subject to its constitution, to participate in its lawful activities, 1012 to 
participate in the election of its office-bearers, officials or trade union 
representatives, 1013 and to stand for election as an office-bearer or an official, 
1014 or a trade union representative in terms of this Act or any collective 
agreement. 1015 Every member of a trade union that is a member of a federation 
of trade unions has the right, subject to the constitution of that federation, to 
participate in its lawful activities, 1016 to participate in the election of its office-
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bearers or officials, 1017 and to stand for election as an office-bearer or official. 
1018
 
Section 107 of the LRA defines a federation of trade unions as being an entity 
that promotes the interests of employees as its primary object. 1019 Also, an 
office-bearer is an elected representative of the members whereas an official is 
an employee of the union. 1020 This provision only applies to employees. 
Therefore, if a person is not an “employee” as defined in the LRA, it is arguable 
that section 4 would not be applicable. That means only employees, as defined, 
would be able to participate by forming or joining a trade union or a federation of 
trade unions. The Act also only protects the rights of employees who partake in 
the lawful activities of the trade union. Consequently, any unlawful activity would 
fall outside of the protective domains of the Act. It is arguable that by the 
legislature using the phrase “every employer” and not “each employer” it 
intended that an individual employee could not alone form a trade union or a 
federation of trade unions. This is further substantiated by the phrase the “right 
to participate in”, which gives the employee the right to “join in” when forming a 
trade union or a federation of trade unions. The Act, therefore, does not intend 
the employee “to participate” alone. Furthermore, it seems that the legislature 
intended to give “every employee” an automatic right “to participate in forming a 
trade union or federation of trade unions” unless that employee had been 
restricted from doing so for the reason or reasons provided for by its constitution. 
Generally speaking, the employee must be employed “within the industry in 
which the union is active”. 1021 The registration of a trade union would be 
effectively barred if it discriminates against employees on the basis of their race 
or sex. 1022
 
It is apparent that section 4 confers rights upon employees to be able to partake 
in the activities of trade unions or a federation of trade unions. Although section 4 
does not provide information about the situation in which employees may wish to 
make use of these provisions, it can be assumed that section 4 can be used 
against any person wishing to infringe the rights of employees in this way. More 
specifically, the most likely candidate in this scenario would be the employer.  
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Complementing section 4 of the Act, section 5 provides for the protection of 
employees and of persons seeking employment. 1023 It states that no person may 
discriminate against an employee for exercising any rights under the Act. 1024 
Furthermore, section 2 reinforces this provision by providing that no person may 
require an employee or a person seeking employment not to be a member of a 
trade union or workplace forum, 1025 or not to become a member of a trade union 
or workplace forum, 1026 or to give up membership of a trade union or workplace 
forum.1027 No person may prejudice an employee or a person seeking 
employment because of past, present or anticipated membership of a trade union 
or workplace forum, 1028 or because of participation in forming a trade union or 
federation of trade unions or in establishing a workplace forum, 1029 or because of 
a participation in its lawful activities, 1030 or because of the disclosure of 
information that the employee is lawfully entitled or required to give to another 
person. 1031 No person may advantage, or promise to advantage, an employee or 
a person seeking employment in exchange for that person not exercising any 
right conferred by this Act or not participating in proceedings in terms of this Act. 
However, nothing in this section precludes the parties concluding an agreement 
to settle a dispute. 1032 A provision in any contract that directly or indirectly 
contradicts or limits any provision of section 4, or of this section, is invalid, unless 
the contractual provision is permitted by this Act.1033
 
It may be difficult to determine whether there has been discrimination as defined 
by the Act. Because the parties, typically the employer and the employee, 
disagree on a matter does not necessarily mean that there is in fact 
discrimination. It is important to consider all the facts in a particular case before 
one concludes that there has been discrimination. Section 9 of the Act states that 
discrimination is actionable if it is unfair. 1034 Brassey et al note, 
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discrimination denotes a decision that ‘has the potential to impair the fundamental human dignity 
of persons as human beings or to affect them adversely in a comparably serious manner’. 1035
 
Neither the employer nor any other person may prevent an employee from being 
or becoming a member of a trade union or of a workplace forum. It is arguable, 
however, that only an entity, which is classified as one being legally non-persona, 
may prevent membership arising. This may include any organisation, which has 
not been incorporated. Hence, stricto sensu, it is arguable that this type of 
organisation may prevent an employee from partaking in the activities of trade 
unions or workplace forums. This loophole may have to be tested by the courts at 
some stage. Furthermore, neither the employer nor any other person can offer a 
benefit to the employee in exchange for that employee giving up his or her rights 
under the section. For example, an employee cannot be paid a higher salary in 
exchange for him or her agreeing not to become a member of a trade union or of 
a workplace forum. Thus, any agreement in which the employee and employer 
had agreed that the employee would not take part in the activities of a trade 
union or of a workplace forum would be invalid and unenforceable. The Act 
incorporates these provisions to ensure that the rights governing freedom of 
association are maintained and that they are not easily lost through the 
temptation of benefits made to employees. Sections 4 and 5 both emphasise and 
entrench the rights of employees to engage in the activities and become 
members of trade unions, of a federation of trade unions and of workplace 
forums. 1036 In this way, it compliments the provisions in the chapter of the Act 
on workplace forums.  
Employers also have an identical right to freedom of association under the LRA. 
1037 In fact, sections 6 and 7 mirror sections 4 and 5. Additionally, any disputes 
under these sections may be referred in writing either to a council, if the dispute 
falls within its jurisdiction on industrial matters, or to the Commission (CCMA), if 
no council has jurisdiction. 1038 The council referred to would be either the 
bargaining council in terms of section 27 or the statutory council in terms of 
section 39. The council or CCMA must attempt to resolve the dispute through 
                                                     
1035  Brassey et al, above n 747, A2, 8. 
1036  Labour Relations Act 66 (1995), sections 4 and 5. 
1037  LRA sections 6 and 7. 
1038  LRA sections 9(a) and (b). 
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conciliation or, 1039 if the dispute remains unresolved, any party to the dispute 
may refer it to the Labour Court for adjudication. 1040  
 
(6.9.3) Conclusion 
 
Brassey et al succinctly sum up the position on the question of freedom of 
association when the authors note, 1041
 
under the new (Labour Relations) Act the rights given to employees are considerably expanded. No 
one may take steps to prevent or discourage an employer from becoming a member of a union or 
workplace forum or taking part in their activities. 1042 … Most important of all … are the provisions, 
which create a system of in-plant trade union representation. They empower trade union 
representatives to provide assistance at internal disciplinary and grievance proceedings, monitor 
and report on the employer’s compliance with labour statutes, and perform any other function that 
may be agreed between the union and the employer. 1043 …  
 
In this way, therefore, the provisions protecting freedom of association prohibit 
victimisation of any kind.  
 
 
(6.10) WHO THEN IS DEFINED AS AN EMPLOYEE UNDER THE STATUTES? 
 
Whether someone can be defined as an employee or not depends upon whether 
that person is interpreted to be as such, either in terms of legislation or in terms 
of the common law. If someone has been defined as an employee in this way, 
that person would enjoy all the benefits and advantages that are associated 
therewith. As far as the statutes are concerned, there are various Acts that 
provide a definition of an employee and of an employer in South African Labour 
law. It would be of value to mention the relevant sections of these Acts. 
 
The Wage Act provides, 
 
‘employee’ means any person employed by, or working for any employer, and receiving, or being 
entitled to receive, any remuneration and any other person whatsoever who in any manner assists 
                                                     
1039  LRA section 9, subsection (3). 
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1041  Brassey et al, above n 746, E2, 31. 
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in the carrying on or conducting of the business of an employer. … (An) ‘employer’ means any 
person whatsoever who employs or provides work for any person and remunerates or tacitly 
undertakes to remunerate him or who permits any person whatsoever in any manner to assist him 
in the carrying on or the conducting of his business. … 1044
 
The Manpower Training Act provides, 
 
‘employee’ means any person employed by or who performs work for any employer in any industry 
and who receives or is entitled to receive remuneration from such employer”; ‘employer’ is any 
person “… (a) who employs or provides work for any other person and who remunerates or 
expressly or tacitly undertakes to remunerate that other person; (b) who permits any other person 
in any manner to assist him in the carrying on or conducting of his business; or (c) who, otherwise 
than in an educational institution, trains any minor in a designated trade. …” 1045
 
The Basic Conditions of Employment Act provides that an employee is 
 
… any person who is employed by or working for an employer and receiving or entitled to receive 
any remuneration or who works under the direction or supervision of an employer, or any other 
person who in any manner assists in the carrying on or the conducting of the business of an 
employer; ‘employer’ means any person whomsoever who employs or provides work for any 
person and remunerates or expressly or tacitly undertakes to remunerate him, or who permits any 
person in any manner to assist him in the carrying on or the conducting of his business. … 1046
 
The Occupational Health and Safety Act provides that an employee is 
 
… any person who is employed by or works for an employer and who receives or is entitled to 
receive any remuneration or who works under the direction or supervision of an employer or any 
other person”; an employer is “… any person who employs or provides work for any person and 
remunerates that person or expressly or tacitly undertakes to remunerate him. … 1047
 
Finally, the Labour Relations Act provides that an employee 
 
means (a) any person, excluding an independent contractor, who works for another person or for 
the State and who receives, or is entitled to receive, any remuneration; and (b) any other person 
who in any manner assists in carrying on or conducting the business of an employer. … 1048
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Employees usually spend a very large part of their working lives in the workplace. 
From an organisational management point of view, the workplace creates 
relationships and attitudes. The relationships between employee and employer 
and between the employee and others are significant features in the development 
and implementation of sound labour legislation. 1049 It is apparent that the LRA 
enriches the other four Acts. It specifically excludes an ‘independent contractor’. 
This evolved as a result of historical trends both in Roman law and in our 
common law. That is, in Roman law, a distinction was drawn between the 
rendering of personal services by the employee, termed the locator operarum, 
and the independent contractor, termed the conductor operis.  
 
In the decision of Smit v Workmen’s Compensation Commissioner, Joubert JA 
made this distinction clear in noting that in a contract of service the employee 
(locator operarum) provides personal services to the employer (conductor 
operarum). Thus, the employee is under a contract of employment and the 
employer is his or her ‘boss’. Employees must therefore follow the work 
instructions of the employer. However, the conductor operis is more independent 
and need not do the work him- or herself but may rely on the labour of others. 
The conductor operis must also ensure that the work is done or the results 
achieved within the time fixed by the contract of work or within a reasonable time 
where no time has been specified. In this context, the conductor operis has equal 
standing with the locator operis and is bound by the contract of work and not by 
the orders of the locator operis. He or she is not under the supervision of the 
locator operis and need not obey any orders of the locator operis in regard to the 
manner in which the work is to be performed. The conductor operis is his or her 
own master. A contract of service is terminated when the employee dies whereas 
the death of the parties to a contract of work does not necessarily terminate it. 
Likewise, a contract of service also terminates on expiration of the period of 
service entered into while a contract of employment terminates on completion of 
the specified work. 1050
 
The conductor operis does not enjoy any rights under the LRA because he or she 
is not deemed to be an employee in terms of the Act. In many cases it would be 
relatively easy to determine whether a contract is one of service or one of work. 
In other cases, it may be difficult to distinguish the one situation from the other. 
In this way, courts need to formulate principles, policies and rules to clarify the 
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position. For example, in Smit’s case supra, Joubert JA considered what some of 
these principles, policies and rules were. He considered the test based on the 
right of supervision and control, which a master, the conductor operarum, had 
over his servant, the locator operarum. However, he believed that the right of 
supervision was not the only indicium but merely one of the indicia, albeit an 
important one. In order to determine whether someone was a ‘workman’ within 
the meaning of the Act it is necessary to decide what the nature of the legal 
relationship between him or her and the company was. This must be determined 
from the true construction of the contract, which exists between them. Factors 
such as the lack of supervision and control, the non-requirement of personal 
performance of duties, the remuneration by commission and the position of 
independence in the performance of his or her contractual duties are strong 
indicia that the contract is one of work (locatio conductio operis) and not one of 
service (locatio conductio operarum). 1051
 
Additionally, Brassey et al state, 
 
… (n)owadays people worked at a distance from their employer, such as the captain of a ship, the 
pilot of an aeroplane, and the driver of a railway engine, motor vehicle or crane, and it would be 
unrealistic and almost grotesque to say that they were under the employer’s control. Nowadays … 
people were often employed precisely because they had skills and technical knowledge that the 
employer lacked, like the skilled engineer or toolmaker, draftsman or accountant, and they could 
hardly be said to be under the employer’s control. 1052  
 
It appears that the requirement is not that there is necessarily actual control, but 
merely a right of or power to control is sufficient. In effect, the right to control is 
not decisive, but only important in distinguishing between a contract of service 
and one of work. 
 
Joubert JA also considered what is sometimes referred to as the ‘organisation 
test’. According to this test, in distinguishing between the two types of 
contractual situations, the question that could be asked is whether the person 
formed part of the employer’s organisation and had integrated him or herself 
within it as part of its business. That is, did the employee become part and parcel 
of the business? Joubert JA notes, however, that the organisation test is legally 
speaking so vague that in most cases it provides no useful assistance in 
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distinguishing between an employee (locator operarum) and an independent 
contractor (conductor operis). 1053  
 
It is evident that no single test can determine whether a contract is one of service 
or work. Each situation must be decided on a case-by-case basis taking into 
account all of the relevant factors, balancing these up and then determining in 
difficult cases on which side these factors lean. In determining these factors, 
Joubert JA notes that it is the contract itself that is decisive and nothing else. 
There is no exhaustive list of factors. However, Joubert JA submitted that the 
question of remuneration was a very important factor. 1054 That is, if the person is 
paid on a time basis, this may lead one to conclude that he or she is an employee 
of the organisation. If, however, the person is paid on a results basis, this may 
indicate that he or she has been hired as an independent contractor. Thus, 
Joubert JA notes that contractual provisions regarding an agent’s remuneration 
clearly indicate that the company is only interested in the result of an agent’s 
activities and is not concerned with the time spent by an agent in bringing about 
that result. 1055 Thus, Brassey et al note, 
 
the contract to be considered is obviously the one that governed at the applicable time. This may 
not be the original contract, for it may have been varied in the interim. … General principles would 
also allow evidence to be led of matters on which the contract is ambiguous or silent. But 
otherwise the contract should be regarded as the exclusive memorial of the relationship. 1056
Unless one is deemed to be an employee (and not an independent contractor), 
the provisions of the aforementioned acts and of any other relevant acts would 
not be applicable. That is, if not deemed to be an employee under a contract of 
service the person will not be entitled to any rights as an employee under South 
African labour law. This includes inter alia the right to claim unemployment 
insurance (UIF), 1057 salary and benefit advantages, 1058 compensation for work-
related harm and injuries, 1059 the right to participate in and join workplace 
forums, 1060 and the right to receive payment of salaries on the insolvency of the 
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organisation as preferred claimants. 1061 It is worth noting that although a 
company can be an employer, it cannot be an employee. 
 
In 1993, before the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 came into existence, the 
Labour Appeal Court in the case of Borcherds v CW Pearce & J Sheward T/A 
Lubrite Distributors stated that the definition of ‘employee’ did not encompass an 
independent contractor. 1062 The definition of an employee under the statutory 
definition of the Labour Relations Act 28 of 1956 read, 
 
any person who is employed by or working for any employer and receiving or entitled to receive 
any remuneration, and … any other person whomsoever who in any manner assists in the carrying 
on or conducting of the business of an employer. 1063  
 
Furthermore, in Dempsey v Home & Property, Jansen J noted that it was trite law 
that the Act did not apply to the relationship between a principal and an 
independent contractor, as the latter did not fall within the definition of 
‘employee’ as contained in the Act. 1064
It is interesting to note that in terms of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995, 1065 
the word ‘employee’ includes job applicants. This means that if job applications 
are considered in a manner, which is discriminatory, 1066 applicants may institute 
legal proceedings against the organisation concerned. Furthermore, because 
many labour disputes arise after employees have left the company, former 
employees remain employees in terms of the Labour Relations Act until such time 
that the disputes are settled or equity dictates. This was noted in NAAWU v Borg-
Warner SA (Pty) Ltd. 1067 Thus, under the current Act, a dismissed employee 
remains an employee for the purposes of claiming relief arising out of his or her 
dismissal. 1068 This includes an employee who resigns in circumstances amounting 
to a constructive dismissal, 1069 and also an employee who is refused re-
employment when other employees who were dismissed for the same reason are 
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offered it. 1070 Probationary employees are also included now in terms of the 
Labour Relations Amendment Act, 1071 as well as casual employees under the 
Workmen’s Compensation Act. 1072
 
(6.10.1) Conclusion 
 
The current LRA enshrines the common law principles by expressly excluding 
independent contractors from its employee definition section. All that remains is 
for the court to determine, in the more difficult cases, whether a contract is one 
of service or work. There would be compelling reasons for an appellant to be 
declared by the court as someone falling within the definition section of an 
employee as envisaged by the legislature.  
Times are changing and the days when the employment relationship under 
Roman law was based exclusively upon a contract of employment are forever 
gone. Brassey et al sum up this position in noting that  
 
… the pendulum has been swinging back towards legislation … legislation to control … wages, hours 
of work and dismissal – but contract still remains the residual means of regulating the relationship. 
Contract has always been the ‘cornerstone’ of our employment law, and in the absence of a 
legislative intervention, it will continue to be so until the courts are persuaded that its 
shortcomings are so egregious as to require a jurisprudential revolution. ... For the employer, 
contract law provides protections too, some far-reaching: for example, industrial action will be 
treated as duress sufficient to vitiate the resulting contract and reinstatement will frequently be 
refused for fear of the practical problems that can result if an employee is foisted on an unwilling 
employer. … (H)owever liberally it is applied, the law of contract cannot regulate all the problems 
that employment can generate. … (W)here contract leaves off … delict commences. … (W)hen both 
contract and delict fail to provide a remedy, the legislature can step in. The common law, being 
residual, recognises and defers to the acts of the legislature. 1073
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(6.11) WHAT PROTECTION DOES THE BILL OF RIGHTS IN THE 
CONSTITUTION PROVIDE TO EMPLOYEES? 
 
(6.11.1) Introduction 
 
It is useful to consider the extent to which the South African Bill of Rights in its 
current form (and also in the Interim Constitution) focused on the rights of 
employees in the workplace. More specifically, what will be examined is the 
extent to which the Constitution facilitates and advances the rights of employees 
under the Labour Relations Act. The extent to which, if at all, these rights are 
advanced in the Constitution through its reference or discussion of worker 
participation systems or models will be considered as well. 
 
(6.11.2) Relevant Sections of the Constitution Governing the Rights of 
Employees/Workers 
 
Section 23 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa deals with the 
question of ‘labour relations’. 1074 It provides that everyone has the right to fair 
labour practices. This concept is not defined in the constitution and is incapable of 
precise definition. This is due to the varying interests of workers and employers 
that comprise labour relations. Fairness is to be determined in accordance with 
the circumstances of each case and essentially involves a value judgment. The 
fairness required in the determination of an unfair labour practice must be 
fairness towards both the employer and the employee. 1075  
 
Every worker has the right to form and join a trade union, 1076 to participate in 
the activities and programmes of a trade union, 1077 and to strike. Even soldiers 
enlisted in the Defence Force would be regarded as workers in terms of this 
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section. The relationship between members of the permanent force and the 
defence force is akin to an employment relationship. 1078  
 
Every employer has the right to form and join an employer’s organisation, 1079 
and to participate in the activities and programmes of an employer’s organisation. 
1080 Every trade union and every employer’s organisation has the right to 
determine its own administration, programmes and activities, 1081 to organise, 1082 
and to form and join a federation. 1083 Every trade union, employers’ organisation 
and employer has the right to engage in collective bargaining. National legislation 
may be enacted to regulate collective bargaining. 1084
These provisions are by nature general, but reinforce the provisions in the current 
Labour Relations Act. It also has a wider purview than the workplace forum 
provisions under the Labour Relations Act. For example, it will be recalled that 
section 78(a) of the LRA defined an employee as 
 
any person who is employed in a workplace, except a senior managerial employee. … 1085  
 
Section 78(b) went on to say that a 
 
‘representative trade union’ means a registered trade union, or two or more registered trade 
unions acting jointly, that have as members the majority of the employees employed by an 
employer in a workplace. 1086
 
Under the Basic Conditions of Employment Act, a ‘senior managerial employee’ is 
defined as an employee who has the authority to hire, discipline and to dismiss 
employees and to represent the employer internally and externally. 1087 From 
section 78 of the LRA with section 23(1) and (2) of the Constitution it can be 
deduced that all employees, including senior managerial employees, will have the 
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right to fair labour practices, to form and join a trade union and to participate in 
its activities and programmes and to strike, except where this involves dealings 
with workplace forums. It is only in this situation that the rights of these 
employees are reduced or curtailed in this way.  
 
The Constitution also entrenches the rights to collective bargaining. These 
sentiments were expressed to a significant degree in the LRA. For example, 
regarding the establishment of workplace forums, the LRA provides for the 
appointment of a commissioner to assist the parties in establishing a workplace 
forum by collective agreement. 1088 Additionally, the LRA refers to 
 
… a collective agreement by an employer for the purposes of collective bargaining in respect of all 
employees in a workplace. … 1089  
 
This is for the purposes of establishing a trade union based workplace forum. 
Furthermore, regarding the specific matters for consultation, the LRA provides, 
 
a bargaining council may confer on a workplace forum the right to be consulted about additional 
matters in workplaces that fall within the registered scope of the bargaining council, 1090  
 
and that,  
 
(f)or the purposes of workplace forums in the public service, the collective agreement … is (one) 
concluded in a bargaining council. 1091
 
Individual employers also have the right under the Constitution to individually 
engage in collective bargaining. Moreover, both in the Constitution and under the 
LRA, employees, through their various trade unions, have the right to bargain 
collectively. This is further strengthened by section 23(2)(c) of the Constitution, 
which provides for an unqualified right for individual employees to strike. 1092 The 
LRA, however, does not expressly provide for such a right in this way. Section 
213 of the LRA only protects strike action brought by a number of employees. 
Brassey et al note,  
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… the most noteworthy aspect of the strike protection in (the constitution) is that (the) subject is 
not the union but the striker. … Making the right to strike the prerogative and privilege of the union 
… enhances the power of the collective and promotes trade unionism, but the result can be 
unfortunate when … the union is the employer’s stooge or otherwise becomes co-opted or 
emasculated. Locating the right in the individual may make collective bargaining less manageable, 
but it certainly makes it more vital. 1093
 
Very often, individual employee demands are made during individual 
negotiations. If an agreement cannot be reached between the individual 
employee and employer and a deadlock arises, the individual employee may be 
left with no other alternative other than to engage in individual strike action. This 
would obviously not involve collective bargaining or the need to engage in 
collective strike action. Therefore, the Constitution makes it possible now for 
individual employees to engage in individual strike action for whatever reason 
through the provisions contained in section 23(2).  
 
Additionally, the LRA places a number of restrictions upon the right to strike, 
which are not present in the 1996 Constitution. These restrictions include not 
being able to strike in situations involving essential services, 1094 or not striking 
when it breaches a collective agreement, 1095 or not striking when it deals with an 
issue, which can be arbitrated under the LRA or in terms of an agreement. 1096 
The LRA also does not protect strike action actuated by political motivations. 
 
Moreover, a point that should be noted is that in terms of the Interim 
Constitution,  
 
(w)orkers and employers shall have the right to organise and bargain collectively. 1097
 
This means that individual workers or employers have the right to negotiate on 
an individual basis and come to individual agreements on a collective bargaining 
basis. Under the 1996 Constitution, section 23(5) removes this right in the 
individual worker. This was a deliberate change by the Legislature, which was 
designed to enhance collective bargaining amongst trade unions and employers’ 
organisations. Section 23(5), however, retained an individualistic approach on the 
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part of the employer. This was arguably not a progressive step made by the 
Constitutional Assembly. It is reasonable to assume that if employers can enter 
into collective bargaining practices, so should employees be able to. There may, 
however, be situations where a worker alone wants to enter into a process of 
collective bargaining with the employer and therefore not wish to participate in 
collective bargaining in concert with a trade union.  
 
Furthermore, the decision of SANDU 2 noted that although section 23(5) of the 
Constitution grants trade unions the rights to engage in collective bargaining, it 
does not impose an obligation to bargain on the other side. However, in this 
regard the court dissented in SANDU 3. The court in casu determined that section 
23(5) of the Constitution did in fact impose a duty to bargain on the other side 
(the minister) as the employer. The court took the view that collective bargaining 
was central to a proper exercise of the rights conferred by the provisions of 
section 23 of the Constitution. Thus, the court said that one’s right to engage in 
collective bargaining might impose a correlative obligation on another to engage 
in this process. The dissenting decisions of the SANDU cases will need to be 
resolved as soon as possible by a Constitutional Court as to whether section 
23(5) allows trade unions, employers’ organisations and employers only the 
freedom to engage in collective bargaining or whether a positive right exists to 
bargain collectively. 1098  
 
Additionally, the Interim Constitution provided that the 
 
employers’ recourse to the lock-out for the purpose of collective bargaining shall not be impaired, 
subject to section 33(1). 1099
Under the present Constitution, the employer’s right to engage in lockouts has 
been removed. The matter was brought before the Constitutional Court in the 
case of Ex parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In re Certification of 
the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa. The objections were  
 
… that in order to engage effectively in collective bargaining, bargaining parties must have the 
right to exercise economic power against each other [795]. …(B) y including the right to strike but 
omitting the right to lock out, the employers’ rights to engage in collective bargaining is accorded 
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less status than the rights of workers to engage in collective bargaining [65]. … (T)he principle of 
equality requires that, if the right to strike is included in the (New Text), so should the right to lock 
out be included [66]. 1100
 
In discussing these arguments and rejecting the application the Constitutional 
Court noted that 
 
(w)orkers … need to act in concert to provide them collectively with sufficient power to bargain 
effectively with employers. Workers exercise collective power primarily through the mechanism of 
strike action. … (E)mployers … may exercise power against workers through a range of weapons, 
such as dismissal, the employment of alternative or replacement labour, the unilateral 
implementation of new terms and conditions of employment, and the exclusion of workers from the 
workplace (through lockouts). … The argument that it is necessary in order to maintain equality to 
entrench the right to lock out once the right to strike has been included, cannot be sustained, 
because the right to strike and the right to lock out are not always and necessarily equivalent [66]. 
1101
 
The Constitutional Court’s decision not to entrench the lock out provisions under 
the 1996 Constitution is, arguably, correct. It is unnecessary to entrench lock out 
provisions because employers could, in any event, decide to exclude employees 
from the workplace. Employers also have many others means whereby they could 
stifle or repress the interests of their employees. Although the current LRA has 
gone some way in attempting to redress the imbalance of rights endured by 
employees through past unfair labour practices, for example, by developing 
legislation to establish workplace forums, employers still have greater economic 
power and can consequently, in many cases, treat employees as they deem fit. 
Many employees are aware that employers may be committing unfair labour 
practices but may feel intimidated and therefore do nothing about it. An 
interesting question is why the legislature decided to retreat from its decision to 
enact legislation entrenching the right to lock out under the Interim Constitution. 
This retreat may be due to the fact that the Legislature had decided that by 
entrenching the lock out provision, as it had done previously, it would be doing 
more harm than good to establish what it refers to as “fair labour practices”. It 
had probably also decided that it was not necessary to entrench a right clearly in 
favour of the employer. This would sway the balance to an even greater extent 
and would thus directly repress the rights of employees. Hence, this would 
ultimately not achieve the “fair labour practices” that it had hoped for. The 
Legislature may also have deduced that the workplace forum provisions under the 
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LRA had not gone far enough in establishing the rights of employees. It is to be 
recalled that the joint decision-making roles of workplace forums established 
under section 79 of the LRA are rather limited in its purview.  
 
The right to collective bargaining has been entrenched under the 1996 
Constitution. The State, of course, has the overriding power to “regulate” this 
when it becomes necessary for it to intervene. Until then, trade unions, 
employers’ organisations and the individual employer may enter into negotiations 
and come to agreements. The Legislature probably decided to give the State 
overriding power to regulate collective bargaining so that it could intervene in 
deadlock situations, which could bring about a severe threat to the economy or 
financial instability to the Republic. The Legislature was very wise to have done 
this. 
 
Section 18 of the 1996 Constitution also has a freedom of association clause, 
which reads, “every person has the right to freedom of association”. 1102 This 
gives employees the right to join organisations, even political parties. In this 
sense, it goes further than section 4 of the LRA, which provides that every 
employee has the right to participate in forming only a trade union or federation 
of trade unions and to join a trade union, subject to its constitution. 1103  
 
Section 18 provides, for the first time under South African labour law, the 
possibility of employees being free to join any movements they wish other than 
trade unions.1104 This does mean, however, that any movement other than a 
registered trade union will not have the right to establish workplace forums under 
the LRA. That is, it will be recalled that section 78(b) of the LRA provides that a 
 
‘representative trade union’ means a registered trade union, or two or more registered trade 
unions acting jointly, that have as members the majority of the employees employed by an 
employer in a workplace. 1105  
 
Furthermore, subsection 1 of section 80 of the LRA states that a workplace forum 
may be established in any workplace in which an employer employs more than 
100 employees. 1106 Subsection 2 states that any representative union may apply 
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to the Commission in the prescribed form for the establishment of a workplace 
forum. 1107 Therefore, only a registered (representative) trade union having more 
than 100 employees may apply to have a workplace forum established. The LRA 
is, however, subject to section 36 of the 1996 Constitution. Section 36 authorises 
derogation from the rights provided only that it is embodied in a law of general 
application and is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society 
based on human dignity, equality and freedom. 1108 Brassey et al note, 
 
this provision, whose importance cannot be underestimated, allows the court to strike a balance 
between the interests of the individual and the broader interests of society. So much is clear; what 
is less clear is precisely how the section operates and, in particular, how it articulates with the 
substantive rights in this chapter. 1109  
 
This is a very broad provision and it remains to be seen whether, and to what 
extent, it may be used to override any provisions in the LRA in circumstances, 
which are deemed to be neither “reasonable nor justifiable in an open and 
democratic society” nor based on “human dignity, equality and freedom”. 
 
However, section 8(1) of the 1996 Constitution noted,  
 
the Bill of Rights applies to all laws, and binds the legislature, the executive, the judiciary and all 
organs of State. 1110  
There can be no doubt that this is a very powerful provision. It overrides all laws 
and makes the legislature, the executive, the judiciary and all organs of State 
subject to it. However, as Brassey et al note,  
 
a litigant should, where possible, rest the claim on the (Labour Relations) Act rather than the 
Constitution since it is through the Act that the democratically elected representatives of the 
people have expressed their will. … The statutory rights float on top of the Constitution and, when 
they are deficient, the constitutional rights can still be relied on. 1111
 
It should be noted that rule 17(1) of the 1996 Constitution provides direct access 
to the Constitutional Court in certain circumstances. That is, it provides that the 
court is to allow direct access to it only in exceptional circumstances and when 
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the matter is of such urgency, or otherwise of such political significance, that the 
delay caused by using the ordinary procedures, would prejudice the interest of 
the public or prejudice the ends of justice and good government. The 
constitutional court is, therefore, to be approached in the first instance only in 
highly exceptional circumstances. The 1996 Constitution makes the Constitutional 
Court the final court of appeal from the Labour Appeal Court (LAC) on 
constitutional issues. It is not an automatic right of appeal. The 1996 Constitution 
gives the Constitutional Court exclusive jurisdiction with respect to those issues 
dealing with the validity of parliamentary or provincial Bills and the distribution of 
State power. Thus, a constitutional matter includes the interpretation of the 
constitutionality of labour legislation or where an individual believes that their 
constitutional rights had been infringed. 1112  
 
However, on labour law matters, the other superior courts can decide such 
matters as the constitutional validity of a bargaining council agreement. It is 
doubtful whether the Labour Court has the power to invalidate legislative acts. 
The court does, however, have the power to apply the Labour Relations Act in 
accordance with the Constitution. 1113  
 
Labour Courts will, therefore, give effect to the Labour Relations Act in 
accordance with the 1996 Constitution. The courts cannot strike down a provision 
in the LRA that offends against the Constitution, but it can ignore it to the extent 
of not complying with it. In most cases, the Constitutional Court is beyond the 
reach of the labour force as a court of first instance. It may also be very difficult 
to distinguish a situation when a matter is so urgent, or otherwise of such 
political significance, that the delay caused by using the ordinary procedures, 
would prejudice the interest of the public or prejudice the ends of justice and 
good government. In this way, many urgent matters may not reach the 
Constitutional Court at all. Alternatively, using these criteria it is possible that 
some matters that reach the Constitutional Court could easily be disposed of in 
the lower courts. 
 
(6.11.3) Conclusion 
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The Bill of Rights under the 1996 Constitution provides another means under 
which labour could ensure the rights to fair labour practices. Section 23 promotes 
collective bargaining. 1114 However, it is very different to section 27 of the Interim 
Constitution, which stated that both workers and employers had the right to 
bargain collectively.1115 In effect, section 23 removed the previous reference to 
‘workers’ and substituted it with ‘trade unions, employers’ organisations and 
employers’. 1116 Thus, whilst ‘employers’ retained the right under the 1996 
Constitution to engage in collective bargaining, individual workers did not. This 
leads to an imbalance of rights and the Constitutional Assembly and 
Constitutional Court should consider reinserting the word ‘workers’ into the 
provision dealing with labour relations. It is possible for individual employees to 
be part of the collective bargaining process. Thus, requiring them only to act in 
concert as part of the collective bargaining process is unnecessary and restrictive.  
 
Section 23(2)(c) of the 1996 Constitution provides that “every worker has the 
right to strike”. This is an unqualified right that includes both political and socio-
economic strikes. The right to strike under the 1996 Constitution is located with 
individuals, not the union. 1117 Section 213 of the Labour Relations Act, on the 
other hand, does not provide this right on an individual basis, but confers it only 
upon a number of employees acting in concert. 1118 Furthermore, the LRA does 
not protect strike action based upon political motives. Additionally, the Labour 
Relations Act places a number of restrictions on strike action, such as with 
essential services, 1119 or in situations involving a breach of a collective 
agreement, 1120 or when dealing with an issue that can be arbitrated under the 
Act or under an agreement. 1121 Thus, it is the 1996 Constitution that must 
provide the relief for employees who strike in this way. It is evident that the 1996 
Constitution does go much further than the LRA in protecting individual strike 
action for whatever reason that may be. 
 
Section 27(5) of the Interim Constitution provides that the 
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employer’s recourse to the lock-out for the purposes of collective bargaining shall not be impaired. 
…1122  
 
Section 23 of the 1996 Constitution, however, removes this provision in its 
entirety. The removal of this provision was brought before the Constitutional 
Court in the certification case in 1996, but the arguments in favour of 
entrenching the rights to lock out were dismissed by the Court. The court was of 
the view that employers had already sufficient means at their disposal to use 
against its workers, and therefore did not need to have the lock out provision 
entrenched under the 1996 Constitution. This right to lock out was already 
implied in the employer’s right to bargain collectively. Thus, the Constitutional 
Court noted, 
 
… it suffices that the right to bargain collectively is specifically protected. Once a right to bargain 
collectively is recognised, implicit within it will be the right to exercise some economic power 
against partners in collective bargaining. 1123
 
Section 18 of the 1996 Constitution also has a freedom of association clause, 
which reads, “every person has the right to freedom of association”. 1124 This 
clause is wider in scope than section 4 of the Labour Relations Act, which restricts 
the right to freedom of association to trade unions or to a federation of trade 
unions. 1125 Thus, section 18 provides that employees may freely join any 
movements, even political ones. 1126
 
The Constitutional Court only provides direct access to it as the court of first 
instance in very limited circumstances. These circumstances involve those 
matters that are usually so urgent that ordinary procedures should be dispensed 
with. Matters of this kind usually threaten and prejudice the interest of the public 
or the ends of justice and good government. 
 
Generally speaking, the 1996 Constitution entrenches in part constitutionally 
sound principles of labour law. However, it does not go far enough in formulating 
and entrenching certain principles that would achieve greater industrial 
democracy in South African labour and company law. In addition to the 
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shortcomings and restrictions already discussed, the 1996 Constitution does not 
mention the extent to which employees should have a joint decision-making role 
in the running of the organisation. South Africa would move forward in 
establishing a dual board structure and consequently in achieving greater 
industrial democracy if the Constitutional Assembly and/or the Constitutional 
Court take an active role in supporting this. This issue is general and can 
therefore be readily incorporated into any new amendments made to the 
Constitution. It is also important enough to be taken very seriously by the highest 
bodies in the land.  
 
As discussed previously, greater job satisfaction is achieved, as a result of greater 
industrial democracy. This, in turn, would yield greater customer satisfaction and 
improved company profits, which would place South Africa on a sounder 
economic platform. Thus, 
 
(f)or even the most alienated worker, work is never totally unpleasant, never completely rejected 
by the worker. … The need for sheer activity, for social intercourse, and for some status and 
identity in the larger society keeps even unskilled workers on the job after they are economically 
free to retire. … (A) skilled man takes pride in his work. He does not do it merely to earn money. 
He does it to make his contribution to the well being of all. He does it so as to keep himself busy, 
and not idle. To use his skill, and to improve it. To have the satisfaction that comes of a task well 
done. … Something attempted, something done, has earned a night’s repose. 1127  
 
Thus, both the Constitution and the Labour Relations Act should enact provisions, 
which require management to recognise the needs of employees in order to 
achieve job satisfaction in their workplace. In so doing, employers must maintain 
and operate the workplace in such a way, which clearly maximises the possibility 
of attaining these results. This promotes a sense of goodwill and confidence 
amongst the parties and creates an environment, which is conducive to achieving 
greater job satisfaction and enhanced economic productivity. The Appellate 
Division in the decision of Council for Scientific and Industrial Research v Fijen 
noted,  
 
… that in every contract of employment there is an implied term that the employer will not, without 
reasonable and probable cause, conduct itself in a manner calculated or likely to destroy or 
seriously damage the relationship of confidence and trust between the parties. … It is well 
established that the relationship between employer and employee is in essence one of trust and 
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confidence and that, at common law, conduct clearly inconsistent therewith entitles the ‘innocent’ 
party to cancel the agreement. … 1128  
 
In this way, employers are required to treat the employees reasonably. However, 
in the labour provisions and 1996 Constitution there is 
 
no general duty that an employer must treat the employee in a reasonable manner. … It is, of 
course plain that there are some obligations in a contract of employment, which the employer must 
comply with reasonably. … 1129  
 
Consequently, both the 1996 Constitution and the current Labour Relations Act 
still have a long way to go in attaining an acceptable balance in labour between 
the rights of employees and those of the employers. At this time, employers still 
have very much the upper hand in South African labour law. 
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CHAPTER 7:  
 
 
(7.0) THE THIRD STEP OR BUILDING BLOCK: 
PROPONENTS IN FAVOUR OF OR AGAINST EMPLOYEES 
HAVING GREATER RIGHTS IN THE DECISION-MAKING 
PROCESSES OF THE CORPORATION 
 
 
To support the contention that employees should be allowed greater rights in the 
running of organisations, it is necessary to discuss the views of academic and other 
writers who have expressed their ideas on this issue. There are still writers who 
believe that the traditional shareholder maximisation theory should be retained and 
it is therefore necessary to consider some of these views in order to establish 
whether there could be any advantages attached to this reasoning. 
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(7.1) COMMENTARIES ON THE RIGHTS OF EMPLOYEES WITHIN THE 
CORPORATION 
 
Millon makes interesting observations. Firstly, he believes that corporate law is in  
 
the midst of crisis, because of the exhaustion of the shareholder primacy model [1373]. 1130
 
That is, although historically speaking corporate law supported the model of 
shareholder wealth maximisation, policy and society today are eroding this 
traditionalist approach. Whereas the shareholder primacy model ignored the rights of 
non-shareholder constituencies, corporate law in business today is obliged to take 
into account the rights of others, including the employees. Thus, the crisis exists 
because there are two camps labelled the ‘contractarians’ and the ‘communitarians’. 
On the one hand, the contractarians wish to re-establish and firmly entrench the 
traditional shareholder primacy approach, whereas, on the other hand, the 
communitarians are pressing for the recognition by the organisation of non-
shareholder rights (also referred to as the stakeholder view). Millon notes,  
 
the rift is deep and likely to persist. 1131  
 
Similarly, it is evident that the erosion of the shareholder primacy model is not a 
superficial or temporary phenomenon. It is so profound that today the rights and 
interests of non-shareholder constituencies are being modified and supported in 
South African labour legislation, suggesting that there can be now no turning back to 
the traditionalist shareholder approach. Society and business would act quickly 
against any attempt to restore the traditionalist approach. Continued changes have 
to occur. Society and business are dictating further policies to achieve greater 
recognition of non-shareholder rights. Thus, directors are more accountable today 
for their actions than ever before in the past. 
 
Secondly, Millon draws a distinction between the approaches of the contractarians 
and the communitarians. The contractarians, he says, support the shareholder 
primacy model. Contract is the means in terms of which the rights are determined 
and defined. The main aim of these rights would be to maximise shareholder wealth. 
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Non-shareholders, including employees, may negotiate with shareholders for their 
rights. In this way, contracts are to be established between the respective parties 
with legislation playing a limited role in regulating, determining and defining the 
rights of shareholder and non-shareholder interests. Thus, a trend in the nature and 
function of the corporation is to view it as a ‘nexus of contracts’ between the 
shareholders and management, between the shareholders themselves, between the 
corporation and the suppliers or between the corporation and consumers. 1132
 
Communitarians, on the other hand, embrace legislation to determine these rights. 
They do not have much faith in contracts protecting the rights of non-shareholder 
interests. Communitarians regard the social values of corporations as being highly 
significant and can have a deep impact on the public and community.  
 
What differentiates the communitarians from the contractarians is the 
communitarians’ belief that contract alone should not specify the terms of corporate 
governance relationships. 1133 The contractarian theory describes the company as a 
network of contracts, which emphasises shareholder value, whilst the communitarian 
theory emphasises broader community and societal issues. Preference for one 
approach over the other is often indicative of a preference for either a ‘private’ or 
‘public’ perception of the company. Although this dichotomy between contractarian 
and communitarian theories is commonly adopted, it is arguably an inapt distinction 
because contractarian theory is capable of supporting communitarian values. Thus, 
the contractarian/communitarian division arguably fails to properly delimit any 
underlying theoretical differences. 1134 However, because of the very different 
approaches to how, and to what extent, rights are to be determined amongst the 
various stakeholders, these two camps have caused, according to Millon, “the 
current corporate law crisis”. 1135  
 
Contractarians believe that people should be free to make their own decisions. 
Legislation that forces people to make decisions about how they should conduct their 
business is “objectionable”. 1136 Communitarians believe that people owe each other 
something more than just that which could ever be placed in a contract. That is, one 
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must have respect for one another and therefore treat one another with the kind of 
dignity and integrity that society expects and demands. In this way, society dictates 
that people are to be responsible for the quality of life of all those who live in the 
community. The communitarians advocate that social expectations cannot become a 
possibility if based solely upon contractual mechanisms. 
 
Additionally, contractarians abhor rules that impose restrictions upon shareholders in 
order to benefit the non-shareholder constituencies. They believe that this amounts 
to nothing more than a simple redistribution of wealth from shareholders to non-
shareholders. Shareholders are not expected to have to take into account the 
interests of the non-shareholder constituencies. 
 
However, Millon notes, “… that it is the contractarians who ought to justify their 
insistence on a relentless commitment to market-defined outcomes”. 1137 These 
‘market-defined outcomes’ would be considerably improved if greater job satisfaction 
had been first achieved in the workplace. This would, in turn, lead to better customer 
service. Happier customers mean a greater turnover for the business. Many people 
believe that “cash is king”. Arguably, the expression should be that the “customer is 
king”. 
 
Communitarians, however, proceed from a different vantage point to that of 
contractarians. They seek instead to reform corporate law in order to foster 
individual dignity and promote societal welfare. 1138 To a certain extent, these 
sentiments have been captured in the South African labour legislation and also in the 
1996 Constitution. For example, it will be recalled that the current Labour Relations 
Act provided for the establishment of workplace forums on a very limited basis, and 
the 1996 Constitution expanded the concept and application of the right to freedom 
of association. However, the communitarian principles could be endorsed even more 
rigorously in both company and labour law. For example, Millon notes, 
 
as it does in Europe, corporate law might facilitate participation in decision-making by those most 
directly affected by particular kinds of decisions. Employee ownership structures are yet a further 
possibility. 1139  
 
However, Brudney believes that the communitarians will need to explain why 
traditional corporate law doctrines, which enshrine shareholder wealth maximisation, 
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should not be preserved under modern law. In this way, the protection of non-
shareholder interests could be exclusively considered by, for example, labour and 
employment law. 1140 However, this is not the question that communitarians should 
be asking. Different legislation within a country is inextricably intertwined. It often 
happens that legislation in one area refers to legislation in another. South Africa also 
has overriding legislation in the form of a Bill of Rights under a Constitution. Because 
labour law provides the rules relating to employment, this should not mean that 
corporate or company law should ignore the rights of the non-shareholder 
constituencies. The view that corporate or company law is regarded as separate from 
the other legal regimes makes little sense. This dilemma would potentially also lead 
to conflict situations arising in terms of which corporate or company law would be 
focusing on and providing for shareholder wealth maximisation, whilst the other legal 
regimes, such as labour law, would be providing for the inclusion of the rights of 
non-shareholders. Both company and labour law need to provide suitable and 
appropriate mechanisms in terms of which the rights of both shareholder and non-
shareholder constituencies are considered. This understanding is not only necessary, 
but also vital to achieving greater corporate success and industrial democracy. Both 
labour and company law need, therefore, to be complementary for this goal to be 
achieved. 
 
Since the commencement of the current Labour Relations Act and the 1996 
Constitution, both directors in a company and the rest of management itself have 
had to consider, to a much greater extent than ever before, the interests of the 
other stakeholders associated with the organisation. This “multifiduciary model” is 
embraced in the communitarian camp. 1141 It is multifiduciary in the sense that the 
directors of the company and therefore management are now fiduciaries not only of 
the shareholders, but also of the employees and of the other non-shareholder 
constituencies. The South African legislature has also moved away from the 
traditionalist approaches of company law, which emphasises the maximisation of 
shareholder growth. Moreover, it has, moved closer towards the doctrinal ideology of 
the communitarians by allowing legislation to have a greater part in the 
determination of stakeholders’ rights. Thus, company directors “should be entitled, 
and perhaps even obliged” to take other public interests into account. Consequently, 
the aim of the board can longer be based simply upon “immediate profitability”. 1142
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The legislation does have, however, features, which are also characteristic of the 
contractarian model. However, the contractarian approach is arguably too narrow 
and restrictive. Ideologically, it would not be sufficient to establish the rights of 
employees simply by way of contractual means. South Africa has started on the long 
road to achieving greater industrial democracy in the workplace, but the country has 
still a long way to go in establishing adequate rights for its employees. This is 
especially so where rights of employees involved in the decision-making processes of 
the organisation at board level must be established. 
 
Green argues for non-shareholder constituency rights. He notes that managers and 
directors are permitted, in the reasonable exercise of ‘business judgment,’ to take 
longer-term shareholder interests into account and sometimes to defer immediate 
shareholder gain. 1143 Green points out that in the United States of America a few 
states have passed legislation expanding the business judgment rule and therefore 
permitting, but usually not requiring, directors and their management to take into 
account the impact of their decisions on and the interests of non-shareholder 
constituencies, including employees. It is arguable, however, that legislation, which 
generally does not oblige management to take into account non-shareholder 
interests, may reinforce the supremacy of the traditionalist approach in company 
law, which seeks to maximise the profits of shareholders. However, on the other 
hand, Green suggests that the non-shareholder constituency statutes adopted by 
over half the states indicate a firm erosion of the shareholder wealth maximisation 
doctrine. 1144  
 
In South Africa, the traditional company law approaches supporting the 
maximisation of shareholder wealth to the detriment of other non-shareholder 
constituencies, have been eroded, but not eliminated. The South African Companies 
Act itself should be amended to include provisions, which expressly support and 
advance the recognition of the rights of other non-shareholder constituencies. This 
would be in keeping with current South African social and business practices and 
expectations.  
 
However, Bainbridge notes that he is 
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… not persuaded … that the shareholder wealth maximisation norm is both descriptively and 
normatively deficient. … (The) shareholder wealth maximisation long has been the fundamental norm, 
which guides U.S. corporate decision makers. 1145
 
Furthermore, according to Milton Friedman, who supports the traditionalist notion 
favouring shareholder wealth maximisation, 
 
(i)n a free enterprise, private-property system, a corporate executive is an employee of the owners of 
the business. He has direct responsibility to his employers. That responsibility is to conduct the 
business in accordance with their desires, which generally will be to make as much money as possible 
while conforming to the basic rules of society. … Insofar as his actions in accord with his “social 
responsibility” reduce returns to stockholders, he is spending their money. 1146
 
In this, Milton Friedman contends that executives have a direct responsibility to 
make as much money for the company as possible. They are specifically employed in 
the capacity to accomplish this. If they place other interests ahead of this, such as 
non-shareholder interests, and this causes loss to the company, this becomes a loss 
to the shareholders. In his view, this would be similar to stealing money from the 
shareholders. Friedman’s views are, however, very anachronistic. It is not 
conceivable today that the executives in a company should devote all of their time 
increasing the returns to the shareholders. The shareholders are only but one 
constituent body making up the organisation or requiring attention from the 
executives and management. 
 
One salient point that Bainbridge makes, however, is that he believes that the 
entities, comprising the non-shareholder constituency, are better able to negotiate 
their terms of their relationship in the organisation than the shareholders. He 
believes that non-shareholders have a variety of remedies that shareholders lack. 
For example, shareholders generally have no meaningful voice in the decision-
making processes of the organisation. The directors themselves generally make the 
decisions. However, employees under the current Labour Relations Act have a very 
limited role in the joint decision-making processes of the organisation in regard to 
those matters to be dealt with by workplace forums. However, the shareholders 
could decide not to invest in the organisation if they are dissatisfied with the way in 
which the company is being managed or with the returns that they are receiving. 
This is their greatest weapon. On the other hand, dissatisfied employees could 
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embark upon strike action or institute dispute procedures for any alleged unfair 
labour practices under the Act. In addition, non-shareholders have other means to 
influence management that shareholders do not possess. Creditors, for example, can 
refuse to supply the organisation with further products until such time that previous 
debts have been settled. Employees have the right under the Act and in terms of the 
1996 Constitution to enter into collective bargaining procedures in accordance with 
set legislative provisions. A community forum can enter into negotiations with an 
organisation for sponsorship in return for free advertisements. 
 
It is in the interests of the organisation to take into account the interests of the non-
shareholder constituencies as well. The traditionalist theory favouring the 
maximisation of shareholders’ wealth to the exclusion of everything else is 
inappropriate today. Businesses have become too dependent upon the non-
shareholder constituencies for it to be any other way.  
 
Although non-shareholder constituencies are better able to negotiate the terms of 
their relationship with the organisation than the shareholders for the reasons 
discussed, this does not mean that the directors and management should only be 
concerned with the rights of shareholders. In other words, the traditionalist approach 
supporting the maximisation of shareholder wealth cannot be supported simply 
because the non-shareholder constituencies have other means at their disposal to 
influence management decisions.  
 
In this regard, Bainbridge is arguably incorrect when he notes, 
… non-shareholder constituencies have adequate mechanisms to protect themselves (from) 
management misconduct. 1147 … Shareholders are more vulnerable to management misconduct than 
are non-shareholder constituencies, because shareholders lack meaningful access to many of the 
protective mechanisms of which non-shareholder constituencies may avail themselves. … I regard them 
as a compelling set of reasons for retaining the shareholder wealth maximisation norm. 1148 … For 
many years, the basic rule that shareholder interests come first has governed public corporations. That 
rule has helped to produce an economy that is dominated by public corporations, which in turn has 
produced the highest standard of living of any society in the history of the world. A system with that 
record of success cannot be all bad. Nor should it be replaced without a much stronger showing.1149
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(7.2) THE STAKEHOLDER VIEW: A NEW DIMENSION IN THOUGHT? 
 
“Corporations are what we do”. 1150
 
The stakeholder theory was first used in 1963 at the Stanford Research Institute. 1151 
The theory maintained that the objectives of the company would be achieved “by 
balancing the conflicting claims of the various “stakeholders” in the firm, managers, 
workers, stockholders, suppliers (and) vendors”. 1152
 
Thus, the corporation is composed of “multiple constituents” referred to in figure 1.1. 
It provides wealth and other benefits to these constituents. Most of these 
constituents are essential to the corporation because they “contribute inputs, receive 
outputs … actively or passively … and provide its “license to operate” as an 
institution within the economy and society”. These constituents are the stakeholders 
because they have a stake in the successful operation of the firm. 1153 Viewing the 
firm from the inside, the wealth of the corporation can be built through the 
development of favourable relationships with all the stakeholders. From the outside, 
the wealth of the corporation can be built through the development of its status 
within the economy and society. 1154 Thus, it is imperative to recognise the 
participation and interests of the different groups, which “are vital to the success of 
the corporation”. Therefore, the concerns of all of the relevant stakeholders must be 
considered. This commitment must be implemented, either directly or indirectly, 
through appropriate “structures, strategies and practices over the long term”. 1155 
Thus, 
 
(r)elationships with investors, employees, customers, suppliers, communities, governments and other 
stakeholders are part of the history of every corporation. 1156
 
Thus, relevant stakeholders “have had distinct impacts on the firms”. These impacts 
are the stakeholders’ journeys within each corporation. 1157
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The stakeholder view places the firm and its core of strategy, structure and culture at the center of a 
web of stakeholder relationships, and shows how organisational wealth can be enhanced by favourable 
relations (and reduced by unfavourable relations) between the corporation and the stakeholders. 1158
 
Thus, the stakeholder view attaches great significance to “humanistic values and 
ethical practices as a basis for “organisational morality””. “It is not competitive with 
other perspectives, but complementary and integrative”. 1159 Trust is an important 
part of the stakeholder approach. 1160 This view therefore “offers a broader and more 
comprehensive perspective on the source of business success, as well as greater 
insight into potential problems and failure”. 1161 Consequently, corporations are 
recognising the importance of favourable stakeholder relationships by “increasing 
their public commitment to broad societal objectives”. They are doing this by 
adopting a “triple bottom line” commitment to economic, environmental and 
community factors. 1162 Stakeholder management allows the corporation to develop 
relationships on those whom it depends for “its license to operate and for its ultimate 
success”. 1163 Although not every stakeholder wish can be granted, corporate 
managers must consider “the legitimate concerns of all stakeholders”. 1164
 
Adoption of the stakeholder view “increases the ability of managers to … implement 
combinations of strategy, structure and culture that enhance organisational 
wealth”.1165
To maintain its status, … the corporation must earn its “license to operate”, both locally and globally, 
by demonstrating its respect for people and its contribution to building a better world. The wealth of 
the corporation is not merely the property it owns, the financial resources it accumulates, or even the 
intellectual property it develops. The corporation’s most important asset – and the only one it cannot 
create or replace on its own – is its acceptance within society as a legitimate institution. 1166 (Thus), (a) 
smart company is a good investment, employer, customer, supplier and neighbour. 1167
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Thus, the stakeholder view “may be not just a moral imperative, but a commercial 
necessity” where “competitive advantage” is being created “more and more” from 
“values embodied in human and social capital”. 1168
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Figure 1.1: The corporation and its stakeholders 1169
 
 
(7.3) CONCLUSION 
 
The world has moved forward since the formulation of the shareholder wealth 
maximisation doctrine and so has South Africa. It is difficult to endorse a doctrine 
that does not take into account the rights of the non-shareholder constituencies. It is 
not possible to endorse a doctrine that is so antiquated that Milton Friedman 
believed that if the executive “… reduce(s) returns to stockholders, he is spending 
their money”. The current Labour Relations Act has rejected the ‘traditionalist’ 
approach. Although the Act has still a long way to go, it has commenced the process 
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of turning away from the ideology that organisations exist to maximise shareholder 
wealth. It has begun to recognise the rights of non-shareholders. Workplace forums 
now exist and employees, through their trade unions, now have a joint decision-
making role at line management level in limited situations. South Africa has now 
moved beyond the traditional doctrine in company law and there is now no returning 
to it. South Africa must now enact legislation that extends these rights to greater 
and more meaningful dimensions for labour. It needs to do this by establishing dual 
board structures. Rules and provisions regulating the establishment, functioning and 
membership of these structures should be provided for in both labour and company 
legislation. Labour law has progressed to a limited degree in recognising non-
shareholder rights in decision-making processes. It is time that a new South African 
company act reflects these rights as well. 
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CHAPTER 8:  
 
 
(8.0) THE FOURTH STEP OR BUILDING BLOCK: 
INTERNATIONAL MODELS OF CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE 
 
 
In this chapter of the thesis the German, Japanese and French models of corporate 
governance will be discussed in detail and compared. We will also consider the role 
that the banks play in each country in administering corporate governance policies.  
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(8.1) INTRODUCTION 
 
Corporate governance is classified into two broad categories: the outsider-based and 
insider-based systems. In the first category, we find Anglo-American models such as 
that existing in Australia, New Zealand and South Africa. In the second category, we 
find the Japanese, German and Western European systems. The first model category 
depends upon the external markets for shares. The second model category does not 
depend on markets, but has more stable long-term shareholder relationships with 
other companies. Here banks play a main part in corporate relationships. 1170
 
In this part of the thesis some of the most important characteristics of models of 
corporate governance of other countries will be discussed and evaluated. These 
models support the contention that employees should be permitted to have a greater 
say in the running of the corporation and in the decision-making processes. The way 
that corporations are governed is important to all stakeholders. In this regard, 
particular attention to those structures, which endorse a two-tier board or similar 
system, will be discussed. It will be indicated how international features of corporate 
governance could become workable in South Africa. 
 
 
(8.2) WHY IS THIS IMPORTANT? 
 
Poor corporate governance will create weaknesses in the links between the 
managers, directors, shareholders, employees, suppliers, the community and 
environment, the economy and the country. Because it is essential that businesses 
operate efficiently and effectively, the effectiveness of corporate governance 
practices is a vital factor, which contributes to the success or failure of the 
corporation. Moreover, it is vital that all of the stakeholders in the corporation feel 
satisfied with their returns, while it is healthy for all businesses to continually 
consider the progress that other businesses are making in regards to corporate 
governance practices. No business can afford to say that it has the perfect corporate 
governance model and leave it that. Continued research and developments of 
corporate governance models are necessary in order for corporations to remain 
competitive in this our ever-changing world. It is important to examine the features 
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of corporate governance models, which are successful and consequently achieve a 
healthy competitive edge (or have come close to achieving it). Eventually, it is hoped 
that these features could be adopted in South Africa as part of the South African 
corporate governance model for the future on employee participation schemes. 
 
(8.2.1) Germany 
 
Charkham refers to the fact that German attitudes attach much significance to the 
concept of “co-operation” rather than that of “confrontation”. 1171 He states that 
Germans have an overwhelming sense of commitment to the community and “… 
seem to think in the long term and not to expect too much too soon”. He believes 
that the German educational system works closely with industry. 1172 In this way, 
Germans have great respect for and pride in their industry. German companies place 
their employees and customers before the shareholders. 1173 He notes that 
shareholders are but one group of stakeholders and that, although important, 
making a profit is not the only thing that counts. Charkham refers to a quotation 
from Ellen Schneider-Lenne, a member of the management board of Deutsche Bank, 
in her 1992 Stockton Lecture, which is interesting to mention. She notes, 
 
profit is as necessary as the air we breathe but it would be terrible if we worked only to make a profit, 
just as it would be terrible if we lived only to breathe. 1174  
 
In Germany, good industrial relations are paramount to achieving economic success. 
These industrial relations are comprised of three parts - the unions, work councils 
and company boards. The German co-determination system provides for the 
participation of employees in the corporation through works councils and on the 
supervisory board. Co-determination has developed because of “social governance”, 
rather than corporate governance. It also reduces the alienation of employees 
through their involvement in the decision-making processes of the corporation. 1175  
 
The concepts of co-determination and corporate governance have been 
distinguished. Hence, although both concepts “control economic power associated 
with large corporate enterprises” they “diverge in other respects”. Thus, 
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codetermination gives economic power to those who control the means of production and uses 
employee participation as a tool to counter the interests of capital. The prevailing corporate 
governance paradigm, by contrast, places major control in the hands of capital owners and uses 
management as their agents. … In essence, the main difference between the two concepts is that 
codetermination offers social governance, whereas corporate governance provides firm-level 
governance. 1176
 
Thus, some believe that co-determination has established “not only social 
governance but also social peace (Sozialfrieden)”. Any attempt to remove co-
determination from the corporate governance structure existing in Germany, would 
endanger social peace. 1177
 
“Social co-determination” is used to describe employee participation at shop-floor 
level through works councils or other committees (such as safety or job classification 
committees). 1178 “Supervisory co-determination”, however, describes employee 
participation at supervisory board level in the German two-tier board system. 1179 
Thus, in Germany today, co-determination exists on two levels. Firstly, co-
determination exists through workers’ councils at shop floor level. This provides 
employees with the rights and opportunities to participate in the decision-making 
processes that affect them at their workplace. Secondly, co-determination also exists 
at the corporate or supervisory board level (through union and employee 
representation). 1180
 
The German Chancellor, Gerhard Schroder, has indicated that it was due to the 
German system of co-determination that Germany evolved into a stronger 
country.1181
 
Charkham reports that Germany has a simple union system, which is “based on 
industry not craft”. 1182 The unions are inspired today by economic rather than 
political objectives. 
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Work councils encourage employees to participate in the decision-making process. 
They achieve this by promoting trust, co-operation and harmony, which improves 
the relationships between the employer and employee. Thus, the right to be 
consulted ensures that informal discussions occur. Employers believe that informed 
and trusted employees are more loyal and would have a greater understanding of 
the problems of the company. 1183 However, participation in the decision-making 
processes needs to be applicable in all matters pertaining to the working conditions 
of employees. Unfortunately, participation in decision-making in South Africa only 
takes place on a limited basis regarding specific matters. Furthermore, workplace 
forums in South Africa are required only in those corporations whose employees 
exceed one hundred in number. Thus, since most corporations (including close 
corporations) in South Africa have arguably less than this number of employees, 
most corporations will not have workplace forums. There is, therefore, very limited 
employee participation in the decision-making processes of most corporations. This, 
coupled to the definition of “affected corporations” in the King I Report (and 
“affected companies” in the King II Report), means that employees in most South 
African businesses still remain without a solid foundation upon which they could 
legally claim that they have a right to participate in the decision-making processes of 
the corporation. This is unquestionably inadequate. 
 
The main features of German work councils are: 1184
 
1. The Works Constitution Act of 15 January 1972 provides the rights for work 
councils of private companies (which covers almost all of German businesses, 
except very small businesses). 
 
2. The size of the works council depends upon the size of the business. 
 
3. The members are elected for four years by their peers (this is so despite the 
fact that an employee might not belong to a union). 
 
4. The works councils must meet on a quarterly basis during which time its 
members are entitled to receive full pay. 
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5. The works councils are entrusted with the duties to deal with all matters that 
may pertain to the conditions of employment, including such matters as 
hours, overtime, leave, safety at work and the like. 
 
6. In this way, work councils enter into agreements with the employers (with a 
procedure for conciliation if there is a deadlock). 
 
7. They also have rights to participate in decisions (rights of co-determination), 
which pertain to dismissals or employee grievances. 
 
8. In those companies with more than 100 employees, an economic committee 
must be formed. These committees only have rights to information regarding 
those matters dealing with “the economic and financial situation … the 
production and sales situation, the investment programme, rationalisation 
projects and closures, organisational changes, including mergers (and) 
proposed changes in method”. 1185 
 
9. Although the unions have sole bargaining rights with respect to basic pay and 
conditions and also have the right to strike, work councils do not have the 
right to strike. 
 
10. Workplace councils, therefore, handle disagreements through the applicable 
conciliation procedures and labour courts. 
It should be emphasised that these days works councils have “a very considerable 
say” in those matters that concern the shop floor, such as daily working hours, 
overtime, holidays, appointments, promotions, dismissals and social amenities. 1186
Additionally, the work council and its chairperson, which represents the interests of 
the employees, are very much kept informed about the affairs of the company and 
its business development as is the management board. Thus, 
 
(i)t is obvious that the council, and … its chairman, not only has a finger on the company’s pulse but is 
conversant with the workers and their problems. Many of the worker representatives on the 
supervisory board … are also influential members of the works council. 1187 … If we consider all these 
things together … it is not difficult to see that employees in fact participate through the works council. 
Co-determination on the supervisory board only rounds that participation off, and in some respects 
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even leads to duplication. 1188 … It is the two together – works council “below” and co-determination 
(worker participation) on the supervisory board “above”… which are de facto and de jure the essence 
of German entrepreneurial organisation. 1189
Germany, having one of the strongest economies in the world, features the following 
operating mechanisms for its corporate boards: 1190  
 
1. Since the late 1800’s, Germany has had a system of corporate governance for 
all companies, except the very smallest. As time went by, the general 
meetings of many companies became too large. Hence, a system was 
developed of placing matters of supervision into the hands of shareholder 
committees. Therefore, this type of system identified the need for supervision 
and placed this function into the hands of a group of people. It also identified 
the need for direction and management and placed this function into the 
hands of another group of people. In this way, large German companies 
today have a supervisory board, termed the “Aufsichtsrat”, and a 
management board, termed the “Vorstand”. 
 
2. The division of functions between the supervisory and management boards is 
based upon the belief that the stronger management is the less likely it is 
that its interests coincide with those of the owners of the business. 
 
Generally, the main functions of the supervisory board are to compare 
financial statements from year to year, oversee and consult over the manner 
in which the management board runs the corporation, ensure that the 
management board acts lawfully and appropriately, scrutinize the information 
that it receives from the management board and respond promptly when it 
believes that the management board is acting inappropriately. When a 
corporation goes through a difficult period, the duties of the supervisory 
board are extended to change the board members’ duties or to appoint or 
remove members of the management board. Furthermore, in order for the 
supervisory board to supervise the management of the corporation, German 
law provides for the free flow of information between the managing and 
supervisory boards. The management board must report to it periodically. 1191 
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However, it should be noted that the exact scope of duties of the supervisory 
board are uncertain. This is because it is uncertain whether and how the 
duties are defined in terms of the “interests of the corporation”. 1192
 
Although the worker representatives on the supervisory board influence the 
composition of the management board and decisions regarding governance of 
the company, the supervisory board does not influence  
 
the company’s day-to-day life, the social climate, and especially the everyday problems of 
the workforce (including) appointments and dismissals, working hours and organisation, 
breaks, holidays, equipment and safety precautions, further training and promotion. All 
these questions … have nothing to do with the supervisory board; in these matters it has no 
powers at all. … These matters are the responsibility of the management who do not have to 
comply with the wishes of the supervisory board and its worker representatives. 1193
 
3. The Co-determination Act of May 1976 provides for the proportions of 
employee and shareholder representatives on the supervisory board. It also 
requires that one director sitting on the management board shall be entrusted 
with labour matters.  
 
Du Plessis notes that there are four different systems in Germany, which 
appoint the members to the supervisory board. Firstly, in public companies, 
through the Satzung, all members of the supervisory board are appointed 
through the general meeting or in accordance with the provisions in the 
articles of association. In this case, employee participation is not mandatory. 
Secondly, through the Das Statut, one-third of the employees or their 
representatives are appointed to the supervisory board, whilst two-thirds are 
appointed by the general meeting or in accordance with the articles of 
incorporation. Thirdly, in other types of corporations, half of the members are 
appointed by employees or their representatives and the other half by the 
shareholders. The two groups appoint one neutral member jointly. Fourthly, 
in some companies, the employees or their representatives and the 
shareholders appoint an equal number of representatives. The chairperson 
must be elected from the group of persons appointed by the general meeting, 
whilst the employee representative must include a manager or executive 
employee. 1194
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Thus, although the institutional basis for worker participation in German 
companies was only created in 1952 with the enactment of corporate co-
determination legislation in the coal and steel industries (with the board 
reserving one-third of the seats for employees), by 1976, through the Co-
determination Act, the law extended “equal employee representatives on the 
supervisory board to all of the largest companies in Germany irrespective of 
the industry sector”. These companies have more than 500 workers. 1195 
However, a new 2004 German Act on One Third Co-determination of the 
Employees on the Supervisory Board now prescribes that in some companies 
only one third of employee representatives can occupy the seats of 
supervisory boards. Shareholder representatives occupy two-thirds of the 
seats. 1196
 
4. Shareholder and employee representatives on the supervisory board proceed 
with management by co-operation rather than by confrontation.  
 
In this way, the supervisory board has a duty to provide the management 
board with advice (Beratung). Also, the supervisory board provides a good 
discussion forum for business issues because the board consists of employees 
and other people with considerable business experience. Therefore, the 
decisions of management can be tested against a group of individuals who 
come from very diverse and varied backgrounds. 1197
 
5. There is a formal obligation to inform and consult and a system of extensive 
prior consultations. Employees have routine access to confidential information 
and, as members of the supervisory board, they must approve the accounts. 
 
6. Trade unions have a high regard for the two-tier board structure and believe 
that representative employees are better informed. 
 
7. A two-tier board system is to be preferred “on grounds both of principle and 
of pragmatism”. 1198 In principle, it provides a “clear division of function”. 
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Pragmatically, the principle of co-determination would not work well in a 
unitary board system. 
 
8. Most German industries are carried out by one of two types of incorporated 
companies, which are those companies with limited liability (GmbH or 
Gesellschaft mit beschrankte Haftung) and the share companies (AG or 
Aktiengelleschaft). The remaining companies, which do not fall into either of 
these two categories, are hybrids and families usually control them. 
 
9. All AG’s must have a management board. Additionally, all AG’s must have a 
supervisory board whatever their size, but co-determination is not mandatory 
if the company has fewer than fifty employees. However, in smaller GmbH 
companies (with less than 500 employees) a managing director 
(Geschaftsfuhrer) is appointed, who may, regardless of the contractual rights 
therein, be dismissed at any time. Therefore, these companies are not 
required to have supervisory boards. In larger GmbH companies, the principle 
of co-determination applies and a supervisory tier must be established. This is 
so even in the case where there is only one shareholder. In this way, the 
number of employees would determine whether a supervisory board has to be 
formed or not. Shareholders would hold two-thirds of the available seats on 
the supervisory board, whilst the employees or unions would hold one-third of 
the seats. This would also apply to AG companies that have less than 2000 
employees. In the case where an AG company has more than 2000 
employees, half of the available seats would be held by employees/unions. 
The chairman of the supervisory committee is always a representative 
shareholder (except in the coal, iron and steel industries where the chairman 
is neutral) who has the right of two votes, which he or she cannot delegate, 
in the event of a deadlock. Both employees and the unions usually choose 
representative employees. One employee representative must be selected in 
each case from the salaried staff and from the executive staff. 
 
10. Regarding the Vorstand,  
 
… it is a real decision-making body” (and) “… it is by law the engine of management and no 
one may instruct it to act in a way that is injurious to the business. 1199  
 
                                                     
1199  Ibid 19. 
Chapter 8 363
The functions of this board depend upon the nature and size of its business. 
The Vorstand is tasked with ensuring that the company finds business and 
promotes it. The managerial board and CEO are responsible for making the 
day-to-day decisions and must report to the supervisory board, which the 
CEO may neither join nor dominate. 1200
 
Consequently, the management board is responsible for managing and 
directing the business of the corporation and for representing the corporation 
towards third parties. It must act in good faith towards the corporation.1201 
Statutory duties of care, skill and diligence are expected from the 
management board. These duties require the management board to manage 
“as decent and conscientious business leaders”. Members of the management 
board who breach these statutory duties are liable as joint debtors towards 
the corporation for any damages or losses incurred. 1202
 
Within the Vorstand the members may themselves elect their chairman or 
speaker (Sprecher), although there is no obligation upon them to do so. In 
the legislation, the chairman is not given any specific powers. Members of the 
Vorstand are expected to act as a team, rather than individually trying to 
achieve success. In this way, principles enshrining consensual approaches are 
widely endorsed within this type of framework. The success or failure of the 
company results, to a large extent, from the drive or lack of it of the 
Sprecher. It is therefore essential for a Sprecher to be elected to this position 
that will have enough stamina and drive to ensure success. However, when it 
comes to voting, “one person one vote” is applicable.  
 
Appointment to the management board itself is the responsibility of the 
supervisory board and requires a two-thirds majority (except where a 
decision has not been reached in the first round of voting upon which time a 
simple majority of votes will suffice). Both the Vorstand and the Aufsichtsrat 
may bring about nominations. If the supervisory board does bring in external 
nominations and appoints them, the management board may not veto this. 
Additionally, a major shareholder on the supervisory board may exert such 
influence that power is shifted away from the management board. Members 
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of the management board may be appointed on the board for a period of up 
to five years, which is the maximum period permitted by legislation. The 
supervisory board typically reviews management performance two to four 
times per year. 1203
 
A member of the management board can be dismissed for reasons including 
“… gross breach of duty, inability to exercise proper management, or after the 
passing of a vote of no confidence by the general meeting. …” 1204 The 
contract to sit on the management board may be renewed provided only that 
this renewal takes place within six months before it expires. Only the 
supervisory board (and neither the management board itself nor the 
shareholders in a general meeting) can dismiss a member from the 
management board. Generally, however, if a member’s performance is shaky 
or questionable, a deputy will be appointed by the management board to 
assist that member so that his or her contract over the time period in 
question can be fulfilled.  
 
Thus, the supervisory board’s right to appoint or remove members of the 
management board, is an exceptionally significant feature of the two-tier 
board system. This is regarded as one of the most important duties of the 
supervisory board. 1205
 
The general meeting is the organ of the company where the members or 
shareholders can enforce their rights. It is also responsible for appointing the 
supervisory board members where the statutory provisions do not provide for 
their appointment by the employees. Thus, the number of supervisory 
members to be appointed by the general meeting will vary in accordance with 
the size of the corporation, the type and business operations of the 
corporation and in accordance with the provisions in the articles of 
incorporation. Sometimes, the general meeting may appoint all of the 
supervisory board members (referred to as the shareholders’ representatives) 
where employee participation is not obligatory. In other cases, the general 
meeting may appoint one-third or half the number of supervisory board 
members. Generally, these members can be removed by a three-quarters 
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majority of the general meeting. 1206 Furthermore, it has been the subject of 
much debate as to whether there should be a “tightening up of the legal 
consequences” for members of the supervisory board, especially where they 
have breached or have failed to carry out their duties properly. Currently, 
supervisory board members do not become personally liable where they 
perform their duties in a careful manner and to the best of their abilities. This 
general duty of care requires that each supervisory board member must have 
“the minimum standard of knowledge and competence” in order to 
understand matters arising in the normal course of business. 1207
 
11. Board remuneration is not as important to Germans as it is in other countries, 
such as the US or UK. Germans see profit as being important, but not the 
only aspect to consider when making decisions. Thus, there are virtually no 
stock options for tax reasons and pay is not tied to profits. Directors would 
receive about 65 percent of their income as a basic salary. The balance would 
be comprised of annual bonuses and other company benefits. The “Sprecher” 
receives about 30-50 percent more than his colleagues, whilst the chairman 
receives about 200 percent and the vice-chairman about 150 percent of their 
colleagues’ remuneration.  
 
The supervisory board is responsible for determining the total sum of 
remuneration of the members of the management board. The supervisory 
board needs to ensure that the remuneration is reasonable and proportionate 
in regard to the functions of each of the members, the position of the 
company and of the undertaking involved. This is aimed at protecting the 
shareholders, the creditors and the corporation from excessive remuneration. 
If excessive remuneration has been made to the management board, 
members of the supervisory board will be liable on the basis of a breach of 
fiduciary duty. 1208
 
12. The functions of the Aufsichtsrat are covered by legislation. Charkham notes 
on page 22 that this includes overseeing “the company’s accounts (annual 
profit and loss and balance sheet statements) for a specified period (usually 
quarterly), major capital expenditure and strategic acquisitions; closures; 
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appointments to the Vorstand; approving the dividend”. 1209 Its functions are 
therefore strategic in nature. The articles of the company usually extend this 
list further. The supervisory boards ensure that the standards in the 
corporation are not only established, but maintained as well. In this way, 
“(t)he Vorstand proposes, the Aufsichtsrat disposes”. 1210 Consequently, the 
main function of the supervisory board is to ensure that the management 
board acts competently through a framework of consensus. The supervisory 
board may also establish committees to deal with matters requiring “a 
technical understanding”, which have been put forward to it by the 
management board. 1211 Additionally, the supervisory board may appoint 
inspectors, who would report back directly to it. 
 
13. The question of employee representation on the supervisory board is highly 
significant. Although their power is somewhat limited by the casting vote of 
the chairman and the general meeting of shareholders, employee members 
can use their position to bargain. In this way, employees may threaten not to 
vote for a particular member to be elected onto the management board 
(which usually spells out an end to that management nomination). 
 
Thus, if a dispute divides the board equally between labour and the 
shareholders, the chairperson of the supervisory board, who is always elected 
by the shareholders, would have the casting vote to cast a second vote to 
break the deadlock. In practice, this means that the decisions of the 
shareholder representatives would prevail over those of the labour 
representatives. 1212
 
14. The works councils play an interesting and important part in the decision-
making processes of the supervisory boards. In many cases, the works 
councils first discuss complex matters before they reach the supervisory 
boards. In this way, many of the types of difficulties, which may arise in a 
situation, are ironed out before they reach the supervisory boards. This 
facilitates the easier conclusion of agreements, although this may not always 
be necessarily assured. 
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15. The supervisory board may delegate some matters, which are given to it by 
the management board, to appointed committees to investigate matters of 
concern on a more thorough basis. The reasons for them deciding to take a 
closer view of some matters are threefold. Firstly, their personal reputation 
may be at stake. Secondly, in terms of the legislation, if they neglect their 
duties, they may be held personally liable for any losses or damages suffered. 
Thirdly, the members of the supervisory board may have an interest in the 
company, through shareholdings or loans or something else, and, therefore, 
the survival of the business would be of cardinal importance to them. 
 
16. In practice, the members of the supervisory board ratify the chairman’s 
proposals. Such proposals should have been formed usually after consultation 
with members of the supervisory board and with the Sprecher of the 
management board. Sometimes, the chairman may also consult with 
interested outsiders. 
 
17. Members of the supervisory board (except the employee representatives) are 
appointed by the general meeting of shareholders. They are appointed for 
four years, but generally serve for five. Casted votes, in the amount of 
seventy five per cent, are required to remove a member from the supervisory 
board before the period of appointment has been completed. 
 
18. Many companies are very large and are run by the founding families, who sit 
on both boards. Very often the most influential members sit on the 
supervisory boards, although German law expressly disallows an Aufsichtsrat 
to run a company. Thus, the supervisory board, in this way, would give 
orders either to the Vorstand or the Geschaftsfuhrer, despite the fact that in 
law the Vorstand is obliged to act independently. With such a power over the 
members, the Vorstand is in a “weak position”. 1213 
 
19. Many of the top 100 German companies have sent members of the 
management boards to sit on the supervisory boards, and visa versa. This 
indicates the personal connections between the two boards that large 
companies support. These companies usually have link-ups with outsiders as 
well. The whole aim is to promote a consensual, rather than a confrontational 
approach, to business relations and management. 
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20. In addition to the supervisory and management boards, the supervisory 
boards may set up other relationships by establishing small committees, or 
Praesidial committees, which may or may not consist of employee 
representatives. It usually consists of the chairman and vice-chairman of the 
supervisory board and the chairman of the works council together with about 
three other people. This committee considers difficult issues and attempts to 
iron out problems before formally reaching the supervisory board members 
for deliberations. The Praesidial committee may oblige members of the 
management board to appear before it. Thus, links exist, not only between 
the two boards, but also between the supervisory board, the works councils 
and the established Praesidial committees. 
 
21. Regarding the question of partnerships, legislation governing work councils do 
apply, but not legislation, which govern the boards. As such, there is no 
formal supervisory tier and therefore no employee representatives. 
 
German legislation enshrines the principle of “commercial prudence” in accounting 
procedures, rather than the principle of having to show a “true and fair view”, which 
is found in other accounting systems. 1214 In this way, accounting reserves for risks 
are made. Consequently, profits are reduced, but reserves are maintained in case 
the company experiences financial difficulties at some stage. Employees have a 
direct role in approving the reserves, as they sit on supervisory boards and work 
councils in the process of assuring their continued employment. This has a positive 
effect on all stakeholders. Although the profits are reduced, “commercial prudence” 
ensures that the business survives. This principle is more important to German 
companies than any of the reasons attempting to maximise shareholder wealth and 
company profits.  
 
Thus, as Charkham notes,  
 
the whole atmosphere … is one in which the stock market is far less at the centre of the stage. 1215
 
(8.2.1.1) What Role do the German Banks Play in Administering Corporate 
Governance Initiatives? 
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German banks have benefited from the success of the German two-tier board 
system of corporations. 1216
 
1. Germany has approximately 4500 banks, 3000 of which are regional or people’s 
banks. The balance is made up of public sector savings banks. Many of the 
banks are fairly small. 
 
Some German banks have very high “stakes” in German public companies. They 
are also represented on the board of most large German public companies.1217 
Historically, three powerful German banks, referred to the Grossbanken, have 
been more involved in the corporate governance processes of German 
companies than any other German banks. Each bank is an AG 
(Aktiengelleschaft) or share company and is a publicly traded “universal bank”. 
The Grossbanken are the Deutsche Bank, Dresdner Bank and Commerzbank. 
The Deutsche Bank is the “godfather” of corporate Germany and is the dominant 
player in Germany. The other two Grossbanken together do not have the same 
amount of power as the Deutsche Bank. 1218 For example, in 1988, the nine 
largest German Banks held seats on the supervisory boards of 94% of the 
largest German firms. 1219 Furthermore, from a comparative perspective, the 
three largest German banks have assets amounting to 36% of the German gross 
national product (GNP), whilst the three largest US banks have assets equivalent 
to only 7% of the GNP. Thus, German banks are approximately “five times 
“stronger” than the largest American banks”. Consequently, the largest German 
financial institutions have a much larger role in their economy than the largest 
institutions in the US economy. 1220
 
2. The approach of banks towards its clients is based upon ‘relationship’ and not 
‘transaction’ banking. Therefore, when a client decides upon a particular bank, 
there is an implied belief between the parties that the relationship will be a long 
and enduring one. Thus, “what the banks provide is a cross between counselling 
and management consultancy”. 1221 
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3. German banks have become substantial shareholders in non-bank companies, 
although they do not, as a matter of policy, plan to acquire shares in its clients’ 
companies. However, except in those few cases where a bank has attained a 
major shareholding, it is not likely that its own shareholding would significantly 
impact upon matters of corporate governance. Nonetheless, banks may acquire 
effective control of a large number of shares, which they do not own. This is 
through a system in Germany of deposited share voting rights or DSVR. More 
specifically, German shareholders lodge their share certificates with banks, 
which, by law, inform their clients on voting procedures. A proxy form, valid for 
a period of fifteen months, is sent with this information to clients. Since most 
issues are not controversial, most shareholders simply allow the banks to vote 
on their behalf, as the banks deem fit. In this way, banks may impact upon 
matters pertaining to corporate governance, as they would have sufficient votes 
to sustain this. Furthermore, if banks choose to act in concert, their cumulative 
voting power may become very effective on supervisory boards. 
 
4. Banks in Germany are commonly represented on supervisory boards. In this 
way, companies acquire access to information, which they ordinarily may not 
have. In some cases, the banker may even become the chairman of the 
supervisory board. Therefore, 
 
(c)ompanies are glad to have them and they are generally glad to serve. The company benefits 
from their considerable personal skills and experience, the intelligence network they can tap, and 
their contacts. The banks gain by cementing the relationship with the company, by adding to their 
sources of information … (and) the money, which generally they keep. 1222
 
5. German banks are in a strong position to provide the supervisory boards of 
companies with the latest and most up to date information. Many companies, 
having faced difficult times, depend on the support of banks on the supervisory 
boards for their survival. Consequently, “the banks very often have the 
knowledge, motivation and authority to exert influence on company 
management”. 1223 
 
(8.2.1.2) Does the German Two-tier Board System, Consisting of Supervisory and 
Management Boards, Really Work in Practice? 
 
Beuthin notes, 
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Among those who favour some form of internal machinery to protect … employees, there are those 
who have pointed with approval to … the German, experience. The framework and structure of our 
company law, they maintain, has proved itself singularly ill-equipped to protect the interests even of 
the shareholders, and some fundamental changes will have to be made (in) protecting … those groups, 
which have never before in any way been the concern of company law. The solution … lies in the 
lessons to be learnt from the German system. … The division of responsibilities (between the 
management and supervisory boards) … is said to be the key factor, which avoids a danger, which is 
so inherent in the unified board system to which are accustomed, and in which active direction and 
control is vested in the board of directors. 1224
 
This affirms that the German two-tier board structure does work very well in 
practice. Reasons for this are: 1225
1. The Vorstand is accountable to the Aufsichtsrat legally. By having employee 
representatives and bankers on the supervisory boards improves the 
effectiveness of the system as a whole. 
2. Whereas in the USA and UK the chairman or CEO is responsible for the flow of 
information, in Germany, however, works councils are responsible for this 
function. In this way, employee representatives receive information directly. 
Information from external sources will also be received via the bankers that 
sit as representative shareholders on the supervisory boards. Thus, where 
work councils are weak or where there are no bankers on the supervisory 
boards, the effectiveness or otherwise of the supervisory board will depend 
primarily upon its members, especially its chairperson. 
 
3. Banks play a large part in the everyday running of the corporation in 
Germany. They do this not only by providing corporations with borrowing 
facilities, but also by sitting on supervisory boards, gaining additional proxy 
voting power and by being in a position where they are able to provide 
corporations with daily up to date information. In many situations, banks 
have influence rather than power. Consequently, 
 
… the influence of the banks rests primarily on their relationship with individual companies, 
and partly on the interlocking relationships across the whole industrial financial spectrum 
which, taken together, produce a massive flow of intelligence. The power of banks rests on 
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DSVR and only secondarily on their shareholdings. And … influence is more important than 
power. 1226
 
4. Many supervisory boards will receive information from various sources, 
including the management board. An effective supervisory board will ensure 
that the management board provides information to it regularly. It will also 
ensure that it provides its supervisory board with sufficient information to 
keep it well informed. In this way, information moves around the corporation 
in such a way that its boards remain fully informed. Therefore,  
 
… it is not true … to say that (the Aufsichtsrat) are only supervisors and do not contribute. In 
smaller companies the articles may prescribe a wider range of subjects in which the 
Aufsichtsrat must be consulted. 1227
 
5. Primarily, the success or otherwise of a corporation will depend upon the 
strengths and effectiveness of the chairpersons in both the management and 
supervisory boards. Thus, “if there is a poor Vorstand and a weak Aufsichtsrat 
a company will flounder”; 1228 
 
6. In some situations the effectiveness of the two-tier system has been 
criticised. It is argued that employees on the supervisory board and the 
management board may sometimes work together through trade-offs and 
compromises, which may become disadvantageous to shareholders. 
Secondly, for political reasons, a supervisory board may not have any control 
over the management board. This is so where it is considered impolite for 
supervisory members to criticise management in front of works councillors 
(labour representatives sitting at the same table), as managers need to be 
seen to retain their full authority. Thirdly, it is argued that in some large 
companies, the management board may invite friends and colleagues to sit 
on the supervisory board. In this way, the managers are not controlled. 
 
7. Supervisory boards have the power to appoint or dismiss. Generally, if the 
Vorstand, is not performing well, the Aufsichtsrat may give them another 
opportunity to improve. Sometimes, it may only be one or two members of 
the management board that are performing badly. The management board 
has the opportunity to remedy the situation by appointing a deputy to assist 
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that member so that his or her contract over the time period in question can 
be completed. Thus, the Aufsichtsrat will generally only intervene if the 
management board is slow in acting in remedying its poor performance 
levels. In this way, supervisory boards may give members of the 
management boards the opportunity to renew their appointments even more 
than once until there is unequivocal evidence that the member’s performance 
is no longer in the interests of the corporation. 
 
8. It is not unusual for the Sprecher, on his or her retirement from the 
management board, to join the supervisory board as a member, or even as 
its chairman. At the same time, he or she may also have a role in recruiting 
the new chairman, his successor, to the management board. In this way, his 
or her control of the corporation will be further assured. 
 
9. Banks and employee/unions have a significant role in making the supervisory 
tier function adequately. The system depends heavily on networks and only 
function effectively because co-operation is central to this concept. This factor 
has provided German industry with its success over the last forty years. The 
combination of factors, in particular, the availability of a well-motivated and 
trained workforce, technical competence, stable macro-economic climate and 
an effective governance system has enabled the German industry to prosper. 
 
10. A two-tier board system has a clear division of functions, whereas some 
members of the unitary board system may be responsible for overseeing 
supervisory functions. This can give rise to conflicts of interest, as everyone 
in a unitary board has the same legal duties. Therefore, the Germans prefer 
their current two-tier board system. In this way,  
 
the test of any system is how good it is at accommodating individual idiosyncrasies: … 
(B)ecause of the basic German approach … the country has … managed to live with a rising 
currency. … (T)he German view of the purpose of companies gives shareholders an interest 
and a role, but not such a pronounced one as in the UK and USA. They are important, but 
further down the pecking order. 1229
 
11. Over the years, supervisory boards have shifted towards the ideology that 
they should be advising and counselling the management boards rather than 
confronting them. In this monitoring manner, the focus is on mistakes being 
prevented rather than being detected. Thus, in Germany, co-operation rather 
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than confrontation, is significant. This is demonstrated in the relationships 
between sections of the German economy, including proprietors, 
management, employees, the financial sector, government and academia. 
 
12. Germany has long been supportive of the EC (European Communion) Fifth 
Directive, which seeks to harmonise company structure within Europe and to 
introduce the principle of co-determination, which they believe is socially 
desirable and economically beneficial. 
13. Certain changes to the German law of corporate governance came into effect 
on 19 July 2002 upon the recommendations of the Cromme Commission. 
These reforms related to public corporations and to aspects pertaining to 
accounting, transparency and disclosure. The rights and responsibilities of 
supervisory boards were expanded. The supervisory board can now request 
that the management board reports it in the event that deviations exist in the 
agreed business plans during the financial year. 1230 
 
A Code of Best Practice, the official German Code, came into effect on 26 February 
2002. 1231 The Code states that it aims are to make German corporate governance 
more “transparent and understandable” and to promote trust amongst investors 
(national and international), customers, employees and the public regarding the 
management and supervision of listed companies. 1232 The Code has three functions, 
which include giving companies suggestions for good and responsible corporate 
governance, providing recommendations reflecting nationally and internationally 
recognised standards and summarising the main statutory requirements governing 
publicly listed companies. 1233
 
The main aims of the Code were to improve corporate governance practices with 
respect to the management and direction of listed corporations. This code was only 
applicable to listed corporations and was not mandatory. However, listed companies 
still needed to explain if they decided not to follow certain recommendations of the 
Code. This is referred to as the “comply or explain” principle, which was previously 
adopted in the UK, and was statutorily introduced through section 161 of the 
Aktiengesetz (AktG). Thus, supervisory boards are now under a new statutory duty 
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to either comply with the German Code or to explain why they are not doing so. 1234 
This duty applies to three main groups of people: the supervisory and management 
boards (including individual members) and the corporation’s auditors. 1235 Most of 
the provisions in the Code deal with the role of the supervisory board and the 
relationship governing their relationship with the management board.1236  
 
There are three types of provisions in the code. The first provision uses the word 
“shall” or soll. These provisions apply the principles of “comply or explain”. The 
second provision uses the word “should” or sollte or “can” or kann. These provisions 
are not the main ones, but are considered to be good corporate governance 
principles to follow. No explanations are required in this case if corporations decide 
not to follow them. All the rest of the provisions in the Code simply confirm in a 
“general and user-friendly way” the existing legal requirements under the current 
German law, which relate to public corporations. 1237
 
The advantages of this model include the provision of a quick and effective response 
to the changing needs of business, which could not be achieved if corporate 
governance was formalised through legislation. 1238
 
Hirt, however, submits that the wording of section 161 suggests that, where a 
company has not complied with the recommendations of the Code, it need only state 
which recommendations were not complied with. Thus, it need not give any reasons 
for such non-compliance. This is because such explanation is usually contained 
within the annual report. However, because of public pressure and the expectations 
of the capital markets, in practice, the management and supervisory boards will be 
required to explain any such non-compliance. 1239
 
The Code also deals with employee representation. Thus, as explained above, 
companies with more than 500 employees must have employee representation on 
the supervisory board. If a company has more than 500 employees, the supervisory 
board must be composed of one-third employee representatives. If a company has 
more than 2000 employees, the supervisory board must consist of 50% employee 
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representatives. Thus, if half the members of the supervisory board are employee 
representatives, this is called quasi-parity co-determination. 1240 Recently, however, 
(a) new 2004 German Act on One Third Co-determination of the Employees on the Supervisory Board 
now prescribes that only one third of employee representatives can occupy the seats of supervisory 
boards. Shareholder representatives occupy two-thirds of the seats. Thus, there is no parity-co-
determination in these corporations. 1241
 
Thus, supervisory co-determination is complicated, as different forms exist, namely 
quasi-parity and one-third co-determination. To determine which system of 
supervisory co-determination applies it is necessary to consider inter alia the type of 
corporation and the requisite industry it is involved in and also the stated share 
capital and number of employees. 1242 Codetermination has not been portrayed as a 
significant issue under the German Code. 1243
 
On 21 May 2003, the Cromme Commission amended the original Code with respect to the 
remuneration of the members of the management board, particularly in so far as to ensure that the 
supervisory board conducts a regular review of this remuneration. 1244
 
The legal nature of the German Code is uncertain. It has been suggested that the 
Code is neither an Act of Parliament nor a contractual agreement binding the various 
parties to it. 1245 However, both the UK and German Codes are mandatory in the 
sense that they both require compliance with the principles or recommendations of 
the respective corporate governance codes. As mentioned previously, in the UK, 
corporate governance codes are well established. The Combined Code, which is 
annexed to the Listing Rules issued by the UK Listing Authority and based on the 
recommendations of the Cadbury, Greenbury, Hampel and Higgs Committees, sets 
out the current principles of good governance (see heading 2.5). 1246 In Germany 
there is a statutory duty on both the supervisory and management boards to state 
that that there was compliance with the Code or to explain non-compliance. 1247
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Thus, these changes to the German law, relating to public corporations, extended 
the rights and duties of the supervisory board and strengthened its role in fulfilling 
its functions to the shareholders, creditors and employees. It also ensured that good 
corporate practices operated within Germany and introduced into legislation modern 
corporate governance practices. It also allows the German Code to respond speedily 
to changing business needs. 1248
 
Consequently, because of these “remarkable developments” any “criticism aimed at 
the German two-tier board system as recently as 1997 could nowadays be 
discarded”. 1249
 
A further discussion of the major features of the German corporate governance 
system will be given when a new model of corporate governance for South Africa is 
proposed later in this thesis. However, du Plessis sums up the position when he 
notes, 
 
(i)t should … always be kept in mind that there are many checks and balances built into the German 
two-tier system. Viewed in its entirety, the two-tier system has proved to be meaningful in 
Germany.1250 … Even those who criticise the effectiveness of these institutions, do acknowledge the 
merits of the two-tier system. They do indeed emphasise the very important advisory role of the 
supervisory boards in many medium-and small-sized corporations. It is also stressed that supervisory 
boards play a useful role when competent people are elected to serve on them and when they are 
dealing with their task in an efficient way. 1251
 
Furthermore, there are three “practical” reasons why Germany would find it difficult 
to move away from co-determination and the two-tier board system. Firstly, 
employee representatives serving on supervisory boards and the employees 
themselves would most likely counter any move towards this type of change. 
Secondly, trade unions would most likely be unwilling to lose their rights of 
determination and therefore their ability to nominate representatives to the 
supervisory board. Thirdly, it would be “political suicide” for a government to abolish 
co-determination or the two-tier board system. 1252 Consequently, it is most likely 
that the two-tier board system and co-determination will remain fixed in German law 
and culture. Thus, 
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… there is little or no chance that Germany … would forfeit … the two-tier board system … in favour of 
a unitary board system. There is still too much evidence, even from academic circles, that the two-tier 
board system is considered to be the preferred corporate governance model for Germany. It is also 
unlikely that German corporations will readily agree to substitute their two-tier board structure … for a 
one-tier board structure. … 1253
 
It is also well established in the European Union that if a company is incorporated in 
one country, but conducts its business affairs in that of another, this other country in 
which the company is conducting its business affairs, cannot enforce its own law 
relating to codetermination. Thus, it would be possible for a German corporation to 
avoid codetermination by incorporating in another country, but still conducting its 
business affairs in Germany. 1254 This may provide some serious challenges to the 
German two-tier board and co-determination system in the future. 1255 However, the 
German two-tier board and co-determination system has developed remarkably well 
due to the recent amendments to the legislation and the creation of the German 
Corporate Governance Code. Thus, commentators believe  
 
that the German legislature’s dedication to improving the way in which German corporations are 
directed and supervised has, at least for the moment, come to an end. 1256
 
(8.2.2) Japan 
 
Key features of the Japanese corporate governance system will be discussed, which 
would be advantageous in contributing to the formation of a new model of corporate 
governance for South Africa. A new model of corporate governance for South Africa 
would improve the unitary board system currently in existence. 
 
There are very important cultural differences in Japan compared to many other 
countries. This factor markedly affects the manner in which corporate governance is 
applied in Japan. 1257 The unique features of this system are significant and are 
useful in contributing to the formulation of an improved system of corporate 
governance in South Africa. The unique Japanese features include: 1258
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1. The three concepts of obligation, family and consensus affect the application 
of corporate governance principles in Japan. Obligation arises from “specific 
causes”, including the obligation to do one’s duties and to offer service where 
this may be appropriate. As part of a family, one is obligated to serve in the 
family company, which “… envelopes one’s life to an unusual degree”. 1259 
Consensus is very important to the Japanese and hence they would rather 
conduct their affairs by way of agreements between the parties than in an 
authoritarian and dictatorial manner. Arguably, to some extent, all 
organisations have to work in a collegiate manner. However, it is much more 
the norm in Japan and thus much more emphasised. Thus, Japanese 
corporations prefer a collegial approach based upon the principles of 
consensus rather than a confrontational approach. 
 
2. Because Japan bases its market economy upon the family concept, the 
Japanese system has been described as one of “community logic” rather than 
the US/UK system of “market logic”. 1260 That is, whereas in the US the 
markets generally operate freely and the state has been responsible for 
handling the social consequences thereof, in Japan, it is preferable for the 
corporation itself to prevent any tears in the social fabric. Thus, in Japan, the 
government will generally only intervene to mitigate the effects of any 
unavoidable changes. 
 
3. The UK/US “market logic” system is geared around the stock market and the 
maximisation of profits for investors and for the corporation itself. The 
Japanese system, however, recognises that the business family is not there 
simply to make a profit. Profit is important to Japanese companies otherwise 
they would not survive, invest and grow. However, the goals are “often 
expressed in terms of market share rather than profit”. 1261 Therefore, for 
Japanese companies, having greater power is more important than making 
greater profits. Japanese companies attach, in this way, a greater amount of 
emphasis on their ranking in the Japanese corporate world, as a measure of 
their corporate success. Thus, for the Japanese, although profit is important, 
the long-term preservation and prosperity of the family are the main goals 
rather than the maximisation of profits for shareholder. 
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4. There are three types of companies in Japan - the commercial partnerships, 
limited partnerships and limited companies (termed the “Kabushiki 
Kaisha”).1262 Those businesses in Japan that wish to have the benefit of 
limited liability with a public subscription for their shares, must register as 
Kabushiki Kaisha. These companies must have a minimum of three directors, 
who are elected by the shareholders. Most Japanese companies have more 
directors than the minimum required. The “symbolic role” of the bank is 
significant in providing “vision and values in leadership to the members of the 
organisation”. 1263 
 
These limited companies often form groups of companies, which consist of 
two types (termed “Keiretsu” or “association”). 1264 The term “keiretsu” (or 
kairetsu) describes the “grouping or cross-shareholdings into which the 
company fits”. Many of the shareholding institutions are the banks, which 
provide substantial loans to the company. The company is also a “social unit”, 
which unifies management and labour. The managers, having risen through 
the ranks, are also (together with the shareholders) representatives of the 
employees. 1265
 
These groups are either classified as vertical or horizontal “Keiretsu”. With 
horizontal “Keiretsu” groups, companies with dissimilar industries, which are 
in different markets, usually group together, often with banks at the centre 
that have encouraged the formation of groups of this kind. On the other 
hand, companies in a vertical “Keiretsu” group “… produce a more efficient 
production-distribution change for a particular range … of products”. 1266 In 
this way, subcontractors supply the main manufacturer, which develops into a 
long-term relationship. Consequently, “… the purchaser nurtures the 
supplier”. 
 
It can be said that the ownership of Japanese large firms is almost 
“analogous” to that of German corporations. Hence, the “Keiretsu” may even 
aggregate in order to own 50% of each other’s stock. Japanese corporations 
have had, over the last twenty-five years, a “persistent pattern of 
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concentrated ownership”. Furthermore, the largest Japanese banks own large 
stocks in the Keiretsu’s industrial firms, which, in turn, own stocks in these 
banks. 1267 Thus, an important “difference in corporate ownership structure” is 
the existence of “concentrated voting blocks” in German and Japanese 
corporations and the absence of these in American corporations. 1268
 
5. Japanese Annual General Meetings have two essential functions - the 
appointment of directors to the board and the approval of dividends. Company 
directors need not be shareholders and there must be at least three directors 
who cannot be appointed for a period of more than two years, irrespective of 
their level in the corporation. Reappointment is, however, possible, and, in 
some cases, occurs until the age of retirement. Presidents and chairpersons 
very often decide their own retiring ages. Directors must be appointed at the 
general meeting of shareholders and require the support of one third of the 
shareholders to be elected onto the board. The board of directors decide the 
manner in which the affairs of the company will be administered and also 
supervise the actual execution of the duties of directors. Boards must meet at 
least quarterly, but many meet on a monthly basis. The board of directors 
consists almost exclusively of insiders, that is, full-time employees of the 
company. However, sometimes, part-time executives sit on the board of 
directors as well. 
 
6. In smaller companies, the boards of directors are often involved in the 
decision-making processes of the corporation. Thus, they act as the board of 
directors and also as the top management committee of the corporation. In 
larger companies, however, there is a split between the board and the top 
management committee (termed the “Jomukai”), each facet of which holds 
separate and distinguishable roles in the administration of the corporation. 
The top management committee, which controls the company, will consist of 
the president and the main directors. Therefore, the duties of the lower board 
are mainly ceremonial, except in emergency situations or in those situations 
where the board is specifically requested to take part in those matters, which 
concern questions of legal liability. Otherwise, the board simply places a 
rubber stamp on those proposals that they were consulted on earlier. 
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7. Promotion from the lowest rank of director to the highest rank of president (or 
chairman) of the corporation usually occurs from within the company. Thus, 
many members of the board may be in a direct line relationship to others for 
promotion. Promotion depends, therefore, to a large extent, upon the 
president of the corporation who selects the directors through a process of 
nomination or after consultation with other colleagues. The president of a 
Japanese corporation is usually the ‘representative’ director. He or she is the 
most significant person in the determination of strategy and in ensuring that 
the corporation is being run well. It is very difficult to have an incompetent 
president of a corporation removed from office if he or she does not wish to 
stand down. The president will usually be left to complete the term of office, 
as “only God removes a president” of a corporation in Japan. 1269 Alternatively, 
a chairperson may resign so that the president may take up this position. 
Notwithstanding this and in any event, the chairperson appointed is usually a 
former president of the corporation and the president will be seen as “stepping 
down to the chairmanship”. 1270 In this way, the selection of the board and of 
the top management team is regarded as a purely internal matter. Hence, no 
outsiders are consulted, although a select few may be advised as a matter of 
courtesy on the outcome of those directors appointed to the board or to the 
top management team. Sometimes, the roles of the chairperson and president 
may be combined. If not, the role of the chairperson is usually that of an elder 
statesman who is the face of the company performing ceremonial duties at 
official functions. In some corporations, however, the chairperson may have 
more power than this, especially if he or she is slow to hand over the 
presidential reigns. Additionally, the president remains the official nominee of 
the chairperson, the removal of whom can always be orchestrated by the 
chairperson. Advisers may also be appointed. They may have purely 
honorarium roles or may be appointed to give advice to directors on specific 
issues. They may be insiders of the corporation or outsiders usually from the 
government or from the banks. 
 
8. In many large Japanese companies, the general rule is “lifetime employment”. 
It is evident the importance, which Japanese companies attach to their 
personnel. One slogan read, “(b)efore we build products we build people”. 1271 
In this way, Japanese chief executives believe that it is their responsibility to 
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look after and to take under their wings the junior members of the board. This 
is regarded by Japanese society as an honourable thing to do. 
 
9. The processes of decision-making within Japanese corporations vary in 
accordance with the subject matter, structure of the company and 
management systems. Thus, matters that are important to warrant formal 
board approval will be subject to consultation with all relevant parties of the 
business to allow senior management to be “in touch with the mood of the 
company”. 1272 Thus, decision-making in Japanese companies usually consist 
of a powerful chief executive (the president), the chairman, the executive 
management of the board and the rest of the company’s executive 
management who are not on the board. 
 
10. Presidents of corporations in Japan do not receive remuneration in excess of 
sixteen times that of an average industrial worker. This is markedly different 
from the remuneration that a UK or US CEO earns, which can sometimes be in 
the order of 125 to 160 times more than the earnings of an average employee 
of the company. Additionally, Japanese directors do not receive share options 
and the top rate of personal taxes in 1992 was pegged at 65 percent. 
 
11. The shareholders appoint statutory auditors or “Kansayaku”. These auditors 
should be differentiated from the external auditors (accountants) and the 
internal auditors (appointed by management) who are also appointed. 
Statutory auditors have a very interesting and useful role. They keep the 
activities of the directors in check to ensure that they act legally and in 
accordance with the regulations of the company. They also ensure that 
directors act “… in the best interest of the shareholders”. 1273 Thus, the 
statutory auditors continually monitor the activities of the corporation and will 
timely advise the directors of any problems they encounter. The main purpose 
of the statutory auditors is to prevent the company from being sued by any 
activities that may cause this. The Kansayakus’ office is for a period of two 
years. 
 
12. Banks in Japan are relationship rather than transaction driven towards clients. 
Usually, companies have a “main” bank, which has the greater portion of the 
corporation’s business. “Main” banks usually have to take the lead by reducing 
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its lending rates and bank charges to its clients. This relationship with 
corporation clients is viewed as a long-term initiative. In this way, the 
Japanese banks are a ready and useful source of up to date information to 
corporations. A newly established company may well have frequent visits from 
the banking officials to encourage the success of the corporation. Thus, the 
role of the banks depends upon on a particular customer. With an established 
and prosperous major company the bank’s role will be minimal. Generally, the 
“main” banks would try everything possible to ensure the success of the 
corporations, which are their clients. If the corporations fail, this may severely 
tarnish the reputation of the “main” banks concerned. Additionally, in times of 
trouble, banks may assume great responsibility for a company and its 
employees. In this way, unlike in the case with the German banks, Japanese 
banks intentionally acquire shareholdings to secure their relationships with 
their clients and to be able to “strengthen” their influence if the corporation 
fell on difficult times.  
 
13. Compared to the USA, the UK, France and Germany, it is thought that 
Japanese banks have the greatest ownership of shareholdings in corporations. 
Charkham indicates that, during the period 1988 to 1990, ownership of 
“common stock”, which is reflected as a percentage of the total outstanding 
common shares, differed markedly between these five countries. 1274 These 
percentages are 0.5 (USA), 0.0 (UK), 3.5 (France), 8.1 (Germany) and 25.2 
(Japan). ‘Common stock’ is defined by each country as: 
 
A USA and UK: total market values of the securities quoted on the Stock Exchange. 
 
B Germany: total par values of listed and unlisted companies. 
 
C France: total market values of the securities of listed and unlisted companies. 
 
D Japan: total par values of the securities quoted on the Stock Exchange. 
 
However, since the definition of “common stock” is not standard in meaning 
amongst the five countries, it would have been preferable to have compared 
the market/par values of only the listed companies on the one hand, and of 
only the unlisted companies on the other. In this way, the percentages of 
shares held by the banks in listed and unlisted companies for each country 
would have been separately reflected and analysed. This would have been 
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more meaningful in determining the extent to which Japanese banks had a 
greater ownership of shareholdings than in the other countries in regard to 
listed and unlisted corporations. In any event, the issue is that the “main” 
banks take responsibility with the other banks in ensuring the survival of 
corporations. This may even occur when the “main” bank negotiates a merger 
with another Japanese, or sometimes foreign company to prevent the demise 
of a company, which may be ailing. 
 
14. Shareholders in Japanese companies seldom interfere or are confrontational 
with management. These shareholders are stable. They are inclined towards 
assessing the performance of management on a long-term basis. This is so 
unless management makes a serious mistake or is negligent in their 
management of the corporation. If there is clear evidence of a problem, which 
management is unable or unwilling to consider, the ‘stable’ shareholders may 
then play their part in remedial action, as this would raise questions about the 
management of the company. Japanese management always considers its 
employees and customers before its shareholders. Furthermore, 
 
(a)s the shareholders have handcuffed themselves, this seems quite logical … the 
shareholders have to be very roughly treated before they assert themselves. 1275  
 
Japanese companies have tended to place the ‘family’ first. The Japanese 
believe, and are arguably correct, that since employees may devote practically 
their whole life to a particular corporation, it makes sense morally to give them 
a bigger stake in the business than that of the shareholders. Therefore, what 
has made Japan so different is the fact that, outside the company, the 
interested parties, banks and shareholders, share the company’s view that the 
shareholders’ interest does not have to be satisfied by a growing dividend 
stream. Thus,  
 
… (s)hareholders’ interests, in other words, may be pushed to the back of the queue, but 
cannot be wholly neglected. … (Thus) (t)he Japanese feeling about the company as a family 
(is one) … in which shareholders are ‘poor relations’. 1276
 
15. Unions in Japan form not around trade delineations, but around the enterprise 
itself. That is, each corporation may have its union. Confrontations between 
unions and management are infrequent. Both sides contribute towards better 
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communication. Thus, in this way, with labour receiving better education and 
training and understanding the needs of management, management 
simultaneously co-operates in ensuring that its employees adequately 
comprehend its policies. Furthermore, 
 
(t)here is as a result greater unity of purpose … leaders of unions sometimes find 
themselves appointed to the board on retirement. 1277  
 
Consequently, although unions have their members’ interests at heart, they 
are also concerned with the survival of the corporation. 
 
Thus, in summary, the most notable features of the Japanese corporate governance 
system include: 1278
 
1. Powerful government intervention, which is dominated by the Japanese 
Ministry of Finance; 
2. Systemic patterns of cross-shareholdings of corporations, which include 
customers and suppliers. Often, a dominant shareholder, such as a main bank 
(or keiretsu) is present. The keiretsu system can be defined as “relationship 
investing”; 
3. The existence of close relationships between corporations and the 
government; and 
4. A non-existent market for corporate control with minimal takeover activity. 
 
Consequently, although the traditional (or Western model) is based upon a belief 
that managers and directors should direct their concerns to maximising profits for 
“the providers of capital”, in Japan, however, the interests of the company and of its 
employees are considered before those of the “outside directors”. In this way, “pay 
is tied to growth, not profits”. 1279 Thus,  
(s)hareholders are passive; they have very few rights if they are not happy with management, and 
what rights they do have are seldom exercised. An extensive system of cross-holdings provides 
stability, but it does not provide much by way of market pressure to respond to poor performance.1280
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In May 1998, Japan produced a corporate governance code. The Code accepted the 
fact that Japanese corporate culture takes “a more holistic view than the West”. The 
Forum comprised executives, academics, lawyers and shareholder representatives. 
The Forum recommended some major changes to the corporate governance system 
operating in Japan. For example, it suggested that more outside directors should be 
appointed (as they had only accounted for 4 percent of board seats). Furthermore, 
the Forum recommended that board committees, which were non-existent in 
Japanese corporations, be formed. These committees could include independent 
audit, pay and nomination board committees. This Forum “monitors progress and 
has urged the Tokyo Stock exchange to incorporate the Code into its Listing Rules”. 
1281
 
The main features of the Japanese corporate governance system will be considered 
when constructing a new corporate governance model for South Africa.  
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(8.2.3) France 
 
France has unique features of corporate governance. The main features include: 1282
 
1. The French government is inextricably tied to French business and 
consequently to corporate governance. Thus,  
 
‘stay close to government’ is advice that seems often given and generally heeded. ...‘(E)very 
subsidiary has central or local government as its main customer’. 1283  
 
Moreover, the French government supplies various services to businesses, 
which are the Centrale des bilans. This is an information exchange, which is 
run by the “Banque de France”. Many large corporations in France, whether 
from the manufacturing, construction or retailing sectors, voluntarily furnish 
information about themselves to the bank. In return, these large companies 
can purchase reports produced by the bank on their performance. 
 
Centrale des risques: The “Banque de France” operates an information 
exchange, which furnishes businesses with reports on any debts owed by 
companies. 
 
Fichier bancaire des entreprises: Linked to the Centrale des risques, this 
system provides information on the ratings of companies to banks. 
 
The Minister of Economy and Finance (Tresor) in France wields considerable 
power, especially in the financial sector. Over the years, the Tresor has been 
instrumental in saving many companies experiencing financial difficulties. 
Thus, the extent to which it becomes involved depends on how well the 
industry is doing. Consequently, the state has a protective role and its 
influence also extends to those situations, which do not “endanger public 
order, health or national defence”. 1284 For example, the French government 
may use its influence to stop a merger for a “French solution”. Furthermore, 
even the unions believe that the State has a significant role in ensuring that 
the market operates in the general interest of all stakeholders. Thus, only the 
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State can establish the rules in areas such as competition, pollution and 
employment. 
 
2. The French regard education as vital to success. In this way, 
(t)heir national attitude was that their role was to assist in the creation of a strong national 
economy, that quick money was immoral money, and that financial wizardry was less 
important than building up major industries. This thinking permeated the banking system 
too. … This means that there is an empathy between government and industry and excellent 
lines of communication. 1285
 
3. Company structures in France consist of various types. The two main types 
will be mentioned. Societés anonymes (SAs) are public companies similar to 
the AG’s in Germany. Any company in France with shareholders that exceed 
fifty in number must be incorporated as an SA company. These companies 
must have a capital base of at least FF 250,000. Societés a responsibilité 
limitée (SARLs) are limited liability companies similar to the GmbH in 
Germany. They must have shareholders not exceeding fifty in number and a 
capital base of at least FF 50,000. 
 
4. Very uniquely in France there is a choice between two types of corporate 
governance systems. These are either the unitary board or two-tier board 
structures (which comprise the supervisory boards). 
5. The unitary board structure, which houses the traditional French system of 
corporate governance, consists of two main components: the président 
directeur-général (PDG) and the board (Conseil d’Administration). The PDG is 
elected by the board, which, in turn, is elected by the shareholders. The PDG 
has the only right to represent the company, a right, which cannot be 
delegated. The PDG has greater power than the CEO in the USA or in the UK 
and may create an executive committee, which would be charged with 
administering various key functions. The board, however, has the power to 
dismiss the PDG, but, generally speaking, the PDG remains in office until 
retirement at the age of 65 or until a later date in those circumstances where 
the board and general meeting have granted a renewal of term of office. The 
personality of the PDG may vary considerably. In this way, the PDG may 
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either decide to work as a team member with the board and to consult with 
them widely, or may decide not to. PDG’s may either be appointed internally 
within the corporation, or may be an outside recruitment. Boards meet fairly 
regularly (usually every two months). They must have between three and 
twelve members (except holding companies) of which two-thirds of the board 
must be non-executive. The board members, in practice, are selected by the 
board itself and elected to office by the shareholders at a general meeting. 
The PDG, however, may play a significant part in the election process. The 
board does not take part in the day-to-day operations of the corporation. Its 
functions are usually confined to the hiring or firing of the PDG and the 
authorisation of new capital or mergers. If the corporation remains financially 
sound, the board generally takes on passive roles and allows the PDG to run 
things. If not, the board may intervene and, if the situation warrants this, 
may even dismiss the PDG from office. However, French boards over the last 
decade have, on the whole, become more active than previously. This has 
provided the major shareholders with a greater voice during the consultation 
period with the PDG. In addition to these two components, and because of 
the statutory limitations placed upon board numbers, “censors” may be 
appointed. They may participate in board discussions, but they have no 
voting powers. Their main roles (for which they are usually paid) are to 
ensure that the corporation follows the correct procedures, especially during 
those times when it might matter most. 
 
6. The other option for companies is to have a system of corporate governance 
based upon the two-tier approach, which incorporates the additional 
supervisory board structure. This system, introduced by the French 
government in 1966, is similar to the two-tier approach found in Germany 
comprising the Vorstand and Aufsichtsrat. In this way, the French two-tier 
board structure comprises the directorate (directoire) and the supervisory 
board (conseil de surveillance). The directorate consists of two to five 
members, who have been appointed for a two to six year term of office. A 
supervisory board of three to twelve members appoints them with members 
of the supervisory board having been elected at ordinary general meetings of 
shareholders. A quorum is established where at least 25 per cent of the 
capital has voted. If not, the meeting is reconvened and, in this situation, a 
quorum is not required but only a simple majority. Membership of these two 
bodies is kept separate. A member of the directorate becomes the leader of 
the directorate (président de directoire). The supervisory board, however, 
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cannot dismiss members of the directorate. This is the function of the 
shareholders in a general meeting, consensus of which must be based upon a 
simple majority. This is markedly different from the supervisory boards in the 
German corporate model where only the supervisory board (and not the 
management board itself nor the shareholders in a general meeting) can 
dismiss a member from the management board. Additionally, the French 
directorate has the executive authority and decisions are taken by a majority 
vote. In Germany, however, it would appear as if the supervisory board has 
executive functions as well. This is because, the German supervisory boards 
ensure that the standards in the corporation are not only established, but 
maintained as well. In this way, “(t) he Vorstand proposes, the Aufsichsrat 
disposes”. 1286 Consequently, the main function of the German supervisory 
board is to ensure that the management board acts competently through a 
framework of consensus. The German supervisory boards have shifted more 
towards the ideology that they should be advising and counselling the 
management boards than confronting them. It appears that German 
supervisory boards take a more proactive role than the French supervisory 
boards in ensuring that the management board performs competently. 
Consequently, it would appear as though the supervisory boards of French 
Companies have less authority and power than the supervisory boards of 
German companies. 
 
7. In France, one or more members of the directorate are appointed by the 
supervisory board to act as the representatives of the corporation. Whereas 
members of the French directorate do not have to hold any qualifying shares 
to sit on the board, members of the supervisory boards do. The French 
directorate must furnish the supervisory board with its quarterly report. 
 
8. In both the unitary and two-tier French board models, members receive 
remuneration in the form of attendance payments (jetons de présence), 
which is determined by the shareholders. The board determines the 
remuneration for the PDG. Regarding the shareholders themselves, French 
shareholders feel that large payments are never justified. If a company is not 
doing well, it cannot afford them. If it is, it should maintain its resources. 
“The model preferred is for steady unspectacular growth, which produces 
commensurate capital appreciation. …” 1287 This would then provide attractive 
                                                     
1286  Ibid 22. 
1287  Ibid 142. 
Chapter 8 392
tax advantages. Therefore, the stock-market in France “… is not in any way 
as important as it is in the UK or USA”. 1288 
 
9. Regarding the roles of the unions and of the workforce in corporate 
governance processes, it is to be noted that all companies (over a certain 
size) must have a comité d’entreprise, which is a committee on which labour 
and the unions are represented.  
 
The process of representation consists of three stages, being those of 
information, consultation and participation. However, this process of 
representation is not nearly as powerful as the representative system (work 
councils and supervisory boards) practiced in Germany. Thus, the French do 
not have much regard for the German co-determination ideology “… because 
they feel it leads to a confusion of roles”. 1289 Hence, problems arise with the 
three-stage process because of the confidentiality of the information, the 
scope of consultation and the difficulties with power sharing, which is part 
and parcel of the process of participation. The French are, in many cases, 
content to leave the decision with the PDG, except where the boards of 
nationalised industries exist, as they have employee representatives on them. 
Notwithstanding this, members of the comité d’entreprise do attend board 
meetings, even though they do not possess any rights of voting. The 
influence of the members of the committee is therefore limited. The 
committee can, however, appoint its financial adviser to examine the 
accounts. In addition, the unions and management do believe that the 
committee has some value. Consequently, through the committee, there is 
consultation on some fundamental issues, including  
 
… structure, closures, expansion and diversification. … The comité d’entreprise and the 
presence of employees at board meetings cannot stop a PDG but can give him pause – and 
the very existence of the formal structure opens useful informal channels of communication. 
1290
 
10. Most companies prefer to have banks as shareholders because this provides 
them with protection against take-over. It also provides them with general 
support should the need for this arise. The advantage for the banks is that a 
banking relationship is established rather than simply a source of short-term 
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profit. However, a conflict of interest may then be created for the banks. They 
would have to wear two hats when dealing with the corporation, those of 
managers and those of suppliers of credit. Thus, the question arises whether 
a banker, as a board member of an industrial company, is to give preference 
to the interests of the company or to his or her bank? 
 
11. A corporation may, at any time, change from the unitary board structure to 
the dual board structure and visa versa, provided that it calls an 
extraordinary general meeting and, at such meeting, acquires a two-thirds 
majority of votes in favour of the change called for. 
 
12. The main reason why another model of corporate governance was introduced 
into France was primarily due to the differing personalities of people. It was 
thought that the personalities that could not fit within the traditional, older 
structure would fit within the newer, more modern version. Thus,  
… in the end personalities matter more than structure, and … it is logical therefore to offer 
alternatives to fit people rather than force people to fit a single type of structure. 1291
 
13. It is interesting to note the variety of circumstances in which corporations 
preferred the dual board system. This has usually been: 1292 
(1) At the stage when the nature of the corporation has dramatically 
changed, for example, after a merger; 
 
(2) To limit or reduce the power of the PDG; 
 
(3) To solve problems that are associated with having problematic 
personalities in control with executive powers. In this way, the PDG with 
executive powers in a unitary board structure could become the chairman 
of the supervisory committee of the dual board structure. A new 
président de directoire can then be appointed; 
 
(4) To find directorships for more than twelve people when this is required 
(this is the upper limit for the number of board members allowed on a 
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unitary board structure, whilst the legal upper limit in a dual board 
structure is seventeen); 
 
(5) To divide power equally on the two boards, for example, where two 
families have equal shares; 
 
(6) To upgrade managers or family members to the directorate, whilst still 
retaining a power of supervision over them; 
 
(7) To allow five directors in family businesses to qualify for tax advantages 
for employees, instead of only up to four under the unitary board system; 
 
(8) To allow for a better transition from a partnership to an SA, members are 
either appointed to the directorate or the supervisory board; 
 
(9) To allow for a greater security of tenure of the directorate. The conseil 
d’administration can summarily dismiss the PDG (and without 
compensation), whilst shareholders at a general meeting can only dismiss 
the directorate. This is so except in those cases where the conseil de 
surveillance controls the shares and therefore the company. Then, the 
directorate would not enjoy security of tenure in this case, especially 
since they do not need to hold any shares; 
 
(10) To facilitate the decision-making process, as it is easier to get the 
directorate together than the conseil d’administration; 
 
(11) To satisfy German holding companies, which, due to their own two-tier 
board system, prefer to have also the two-tier board system in their 
French subsidiaries; 
(12) To satisfy foreign owners who, by and large, prefer the distinction 
between management and supervision; 
 
(13) To prevent legal liability. That is, members of the conseil 
d’administration can be sued for fault, whereas members of the conseil 
de surveillance cannot be.  
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(14) To allow for greater accountability. Very often boards in the traditional 
model of corporate governance did not 
 
… hold the PDG accountable in any consistent way. They were often aged; they met 
seldom; were little consulted; and were quite content to cruise along passively unless 
and until the ship was nearly on the rocks. Even when it was clear they should throw the 
captain overboard, they did so with great reluctance, usually after the vessel was badly 
holed. 1293
 
 
(8.3) AN OVERVIEW AND CONCLUSION ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN 
GERMANY, JAPAN AND FRANCE 
 
In discussing whether a model of corporate governance is effective or not, Charkham 
refers to what he calls the ‘two criteria’ - dynamism and accountability. 1294 With the 
question of dynamism, it should be asked whether the corporation could conduct its 
affairs in such a way that governmental interference, litigation or displacement does 
not significantly impede it. The German government generally interferes on a very 
limited basis, whereas governmental intervention is still rather visible in Japan and 
France. Litigation, unlike in the USA, does not make a large impact on corporate 
governance in any of these three countries. In Germany and Japan, company take-
overs are rare and there is limited pressure, which the share market can exert on 
companies. In this way, displacement of an existing management structure through 
a takeover bid does not occur. The threat of take-overs, however, may still exist in 
some French companies, which may obviously yield competitive disadvantages for 
them. With the question of accountability, formal mechanisms need to operate, 
which allow a board to control management, such board having been appointed by 
the shareholders. This is evident to a greater or lesser degree in Germany, France 
and Japan. In addition, in order to have a system of accountability that is credible, 
Charkham reports that certain elements are essential. That is,  
 
(t)here must be an adequate and timely flow of relevant information from management. … Those who 
receive it must be able to understand it. … These people, be they bankers, fellow members of the 
board, or shareholders, must be in a position and willing to exert influence. 1295  
 
                                                     
1293  Ibid 152. 
1294  Ibid 354-66. 
1295  Ibid 360. 
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The two criteria, which have been suggested to test the effectiveness of a corporate 
governance model, relate only to the company’s economic performance. Some say 
that a third criterion should be taken into account. This is based upon a corporation’s 
social performance. 1296 In this way, the corporation should be seen as doing its 
share for society, either positively by contributing to society’s well being, or, at the 
very least, by not damaging it. Thus, economic and social policies are inextricably 
tied together. Economically successful corporations will often have socially desirable 
programmes in place for its employee on the basis that happier employees are more 
productive and that more productive companies generate greater returns. This 
factor, in turn, allows these companies to be more appealing to do business with, 
whilst, at the same time, impressing the customers who continue to support the 
business. 
 
Charkham does not believe it to be necessary to list the social performance criterion 
as a separate factor. He believes that this is automatically taken into account when 
discussing the economic performance criterion. 1297 However, this argument is 
arguably flawed. It is necessary to establish social performance as a separate 
category in evaluating corporate governance models. This is to ensure that this 
criterion is emphasised and taken into account when the effectiveness of such 
system is evaluated. 
Consequently (and not surprisingly), of the three systems studied, Charkham 
contends that the German model of corporate governance is the most favourable. 
That is,  
 
… with its tendency towards rigidity, the Germans make their system work more consistently. … And 
most of those outside Germany, who criticise it, do so from positions of relative weakness. My 
judgment is not based on Germany’s phenomenal rise since 1945 but on its development for more 
than a century. The two terrible conflicts into which its leaders drew the country conceal the probability 
that continuous peace might well have shown the relative superiority of their corporate governance 
system much sooner. … To praise the apparent effectiveness of a particular system is not to advocate 
that others should seek to emulate it. There are many paths to the top of the mountain. … (T)he 
distinctive nature of each country’s culture, history, and institutions means that it would be impossible 
for one nation to copy another’s arrangements in their entirety. … (Other countries) will gradually 
decide what bests suits their own history and culture. It would be a vast task to chronicle each and the 
changes occurring within them. It would, moreover, not seem to be necessary, since the basic 
principles appear to be universal, however they are applied. … We must never ever forget that what is 
here discussed is power, and that in every country someone already enjoys it however well the 
                                                     
1296  Ibid 354. 
1297  Ibid 354. 
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corporate governance system works as a whole. … It must be remembered there is nothing more 
difficult to plan, more doubtful of success, nor more dangerous to manage than the creation of a new 
system. … It is, nevertheless, vital to keep a system of corporate governance under review. It is as 
important to a nation as any other crucial part of its institutional framework, because on it depends a 
good portion of the nation’s prosperity; it contributes to its social cohesion in a way too little 
recognised. A proper framework for the exercise of power is an economic necessity, a political 
requirement, and a moral imperative. … 1298  
 
Finally, these sentiments are reiterated in a very interesting and recent paper. 
Firstly, du Plessis notes that corporate governance needs to be considered 
specifically in terms of a “country’s own tradition, history, culture and … corporate 
law system”.1299 Secondly, in comparing the various features of the unitary and two 
board structures, du Plessis notes, 
 
(i)n a corporation where the business of the corporation is not managed by the board, but “under the 
direction of directors”, with a majority (of) independent non-executive directors … and several 
subcommittees, it can hardly be said that such a corporation has a “unitary board” comparable to the 
“unitary board” that was the focus of attention of many studies over many years. … If one looks at the 
modern unitary board it does not look so single dimensional, as some would believe.  … Because of the 
way the traditional unitary board was reinvented, we will probably have a score slightly in favour of the 
two-tier board system if we really must select a winner in “the unitary board” versus “the two-tier 
board” contest, but at the end of the day it is perhaps best simply to realise that the so- called “fit-all 
board structure” does not exist and will probably never exist. 1300
 
 
We will now progress to consider in chapters 9 and 10 the manner in which and the 
extent to which the four building blocks or steps discussed in chapters 5 to 8 – being 
organisational development, legislative changes, corporate attitudes and 
international models of corporate governance – would contribute towards the 
development of an improved model of corporate governance for South Africa. This is 
especially significant in so far as it pertains to a more meaningful participatory role 
of corporate stakeholders (especially those of the employees) in the affairs of the 
corporation. 
 
                                                     
1298  Ibid 363-6. 
1299  Du Plessis (2003), above n 158, 382. 
1300  Ibid 383. 
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CHAPTER 9: 
 
(9.0) THE BIRTH OF AN IMPROVED MODEL OF 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FOR SOUTH AFRICA 
 
 
A pivotal point in this thesis has now been reached where an improved model of 
corporate governance in South Africa is to be developed. We saw in chapters 2 to 8 
that an increased level of worker participation in the governance of corporations is 
highly desirable for both the corporation itself and for the other stakeholders of the 
corporation. In this chapter these various strands will be tied together in a general 
model of corporate governance for South Africa. These strands constitute the four 
main building blocks or steps in the formulation of a new and improved model of 
corporate governance. They consist of the introduction and maintenance of a system 
of organisational development within the corporation, the enactment of new 
company and labour legislation, changes in traditional corporate attitudes and the 
extraction and implementation of favourable features comprising successful 
international governance models. 
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(9.1) INTRODUCTION 
 
An improved model of corporate governance can work in South Africa provided that 
there is a desire by those that use it to make it work. There needs also to be a desire 
to change. Unfortunately, for many people, making any change at all, moving away 
from the known to the unknown, is probably the most difficult thing in life to do. Yet, 
this is what life requires of us and this is what must be done if society is to adapt 
successfully to and cope with the new burdens and problems that are thrust upon it. 
In this way, the business world is no different. Even with the technological advances 
occurring today, which very few people can keep up with, it is still very important to 
modify and adapt the business world so that all of its stakeholders might feel 
satisfied. The proposed model of corporate governance for South Africa does this. 
Focus has been placed primarily on the rights of employees. Arguments are made, 
which have been based primarily upon a review of the literature. More specifically, it 
is argued that it is fundamentally important for employees to be afforded the rights 
to participate in corporate governance decisions that are taken at board level. This is 
presently not legally acknowledged in South Africa and therefore not implemented. It 
is hoped that this new model will be viewed as a refreshing beginning to a new order 
of corporate governance practice in South Africa. 
 
 
(9.2) METHODOLOGY 
 
Through an extensive review of the literature on corporate governance over the 
years, those writings have been selected that could be used to develop an improved 
and workable model of corporate governance for South Africa. These writings fall 
into four main categories and form the four main steps, which are used in the design 
of the building blocks of a new model on corporate governance. In turn, each one of 
these steps or building blocks is composed of sub-blocks or factors, all of which 
cemented together, form the composite whole. In this way, this proposed model of 
corporate governance could be likened to any building, which has been structurally 
engineered. That is, each building consists of four walls and each wall is made up of 
a number of bricks, which fit tightly together. Therefore, if any one or more of the 
bricks are missing it is possible that the wall will be weakened or not stand at all. 
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Similarly, if any of the factors constituting the four steps of this proposed corporate 
governance model are missing, the model will weaken and, depending upon which 
factor is missing, may even collapse. If any one of the four steps in this corporate 
governance model is disregarded, the model will not succeed. The four steps are 
therefore the fundamental building blocks of this corporate governance model and 
are just as important as four walls, which are required to keep most building 
structures standing. Another way of looking at this and hence emphasising the 
importance of all of the constituent parts or factors, which make up this corporate 
governance model, is to compare it to a jigsaw puzzle. If even one piece of a jigsaw 
puzzle is missing, it will markedly change the overall effect of the work. In this way, 
a model of corporate governance in South Africa will be formulated, which is built 
upon the four main steps or building blocks. Each one of these steps is built upon a 
variety of factors. To ensure a good understanding of this proposed model of 
corporate governance, there will be a consideration of the significance and value of, 
and the manner in which, each step separately has a role in constituting a new 
corporate governance model for South Africa. Each step will be labelled either A, B, C 
or D and each factor, constituting each step, will, in addition, be labelled numerically. 
A full discussion of each step, or factor constituting each step, has been referred to 
in previous chapters of this thesis. This model is also illustrated, step-by-step, in 
Table 6, which follows after its detailed discussion. 
 
 
(9.3) THE SIGNIFICANCE AND VALUE OF, AND THE MANNER IN WHICH, THE 
FOUR STEPS CONSTITUTE A NEW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE MODEL FOR SOUTH 
AFRICA 
 
 
(9.3.1) The Building Blocks That Form the First Step (A) 
 
The aim of step A is to introduce and maintain a system of organisational 
development within the corporation. The empowerment of employees in the 
corporation is cardinal to their job satisfaction, which positively affects the 
performance of the business and greatly improves customer service. Organisational 
development is a long-term, planned process, which ultimately seeks to enhance the 
well being of employees. The success or failure of a business is primarily in the 
hands of its employees. Employees will respond positively to changes surrounding 
them in the corporation provided that they had a role in the decision-making 
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processes affecting them. This step de-emphasises hierarchical authority and control. 
It emphasises improved employee productivity, greater job satisfaction, better 
customer service and greater productivity for the corporation and for South Africa as 
a whole through the implementation of systems and programmes designed to 
achieve improvements in the workplace.  
 
(A1) To achieve effective organisational development patterns in the corporation, 
changes in the behaviour of its participants must occur. Behavioural changes are 
managed through change agents, who are the catalysts in this process. Change 
agents can be recruited from within the corporation or can be outside recruits. They 
can be managers or even the employees. Their roles are to change any stagnant and 
undesirable attitudes in the workplace through the introduction of uplifting and 
encouraging systems and processes. 
 
(A2) Seven processes are required to achieve effective and successful changes in the 
workplace. All seven processes must be complied with before there can be any 
successful and meaningful change in the corporation. These seven processes are: 
 
(A2 (1)) Pressure for change: Without pressure, any suggested changes in the 
workplace would either be slow or non-existent. Any pressures thrust upon the 
participants in a corporation must be done in a carefully planned and meaningful 
manner. 
 
(A2 (2)) A cleared shared vision: Employees need to be able to understand clearly 
why changes are required and why pressures are being brought to bear upon them. 
Employees must participate in this process by being permitted to express their views 
to management. 
 
(A2 (3)) Capacity for change: The corporation must ensure that it has enough 
resources and funding to introduce any changes that are being advocated. The 
introduction of changes, which are inadequately funded, could impose further 
stresses and disadvantages upon the workplace. 
 
(A2 (4)) Actionable first steps: It is vital for managers to encourage small wins. Once 
employees feel positive about their achievement, however small, this will encourage 
them to achieve greater goals in the future. There is nothing more discouraging than 
employees receiving negative feedback from their managers, or no feedback at all, 
after having made a real and determined effort to get something right. 
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(A2 (5)) Model the way: It is essential that, in the first instance, managers make, or 
are seen to be making, a sterling effort towards the vision that the corporation is 
trying to achieve. If managers do not act as exemplars in this way, it is hardly likely 
that the employees are going to share in the vision.  
 
(A2 (6)) Reinforcement of change: Any changes introduced into the workplace must 
be reinforced through a system of active encouragement and participation. In this 
way, the efforts of employees in their attempts at participation could be rewarded in 
some form or another. 
 
(A2 (7)) Evaluate and adapt: It is necessary to evaluate the success or otherwise of 
any introduced changes in the workplace. This must happen on a regular basis. It is 
of no use to any party concerned to continue to flog a dead horse. 
 
(A3) Various means must be integrated into the workplace to achieve the desired 
changes, and, through this process, employee empowerment. These means can 
comprise a variety of different forms, such as, group feedback sessions, feedback 
questionnaires, process consultation, team-building exercises, inter-group 
development systems, organisational restructuring and total quality management 
programmes.  
 
 
(9.3.2) The Building Blocks That Form the Second Step (B) 
 
The aim of step B is to suggest changes for South Africa of a legal nature, which 
would promote an improved and more meaningful system of worker participation in 
the corporation. In this regard, modifications will be suggested that should be made 
to the major South African legislative enactments and to the King Reports, which 
have thus far attempted to provide employees with some rights of participation in 
the decision-making processes of the corporation.  
(9.3.2.1) Workplace Forums Established in Terms of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 
1995 (B1) 
 
The chapter on workplace forums in the Labour Relations Act is inadequate in 
protecting and equalising the rights of employees as against the employer. This is 
due to the fact that there are provisions in the legislation that are ambiguous, 
restrictive, vague and in conflict with one another. Another shortcoming of the 
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legislation is that it only provides for the participation of employees in the joint-
decision-making processes at line-management level on specific matters on a limited 
basis. It does not advocate the participation of employees in decision-making 
matters at board level. The establishment of workplace forums is not a mandatory 
requirement under the Act. 
 
(B1 (1)) Section 78(a) of the LRA excludes a senior managerial employee from the 
definition of ‘employee’.  
 
The provision should be amended to remove such restriction and should therefore 
read,  
 
‘employee’ means any person who is employed in a workplace whose contract of employment or status 
confers authority to do any of the following in the workplace. … 
 
(B1 (2)) Section 78(b) of the LRA defines a representative trade union as one or 
more trade unions that is/are registered and that have as members the majority of 
the employees employed by an employer.  
The provision should be amended to remove such restrictions and should therefore 
read, 
‘representative trade union’ means any trade union, or two or more registered trade unions acting 
jointly, that have as members employees employed by an employer in a workplace. 
 
(B1 (3)) Section 79(d) notes that a workplace forum is entitled to participate in joint 
decision-making regarding those matters referred to in section 86.  
 
The provision should be amended to remove such restrictions and should read, 
 
a workplace forum established in terms of this Chapter is entitled to participate at all levels in the 
company, including at board level, in joint decision-making processes on any matters affecting the 
interests of all employees in the workplace. 
 
(B1 (4)) Section 80(1) states that a workplace forum may be established in any 
workplace where more than one hundred employees are employed.  
 
The provision should be amended to read,  
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a workplace forum must be established in any workplace in which an employer employs more than ten 
people. In the event that ten or less people are employed in the workplace, the employees are entitled 
to participate at all levels in the company, including at board level, through a nominated and elected 
employee representative, in joint decision-making processes on any matters affecting their interests, 
either directly or indirectly, in the workplace. 
 
(B1 (5)) Section 80(5)(b)(iii) states that there must not be any functioning 
workplace forum already established at the workplace.  
 
This provision should be amended to read,  
there must be no workplace forum already established at the workplace. 
 
(B1 (6)) Section 83(1) states that there must be regular meetings of the workplace 
forum.  
 
This provision should be amended to read,  
 
there must be monthly meetings of the workplace forum. 
(B1 (7)) Section 83(2)(a to b) states that there must be regular meetings between 
the workplace forum and the employer at which the employer must present a report 
on its financial and employment situation, its performance since the last report and 
its anticipated performance in the long and short terms. The employer must also 
consult the workplace forum on any matter arising from the report that may affect 
its employees.  
This provision should be amended to read,  
there must be monthly meetings between the workplace forum and the employer. … 
 
(B1 (8)) Section 83(3)(a) states that at regular and appropriate intervals, there 
must be meetings between the workplace forum and the employees where the 
workplace forum must report on its activities generally on matters in respect of 
which it has been consulted by the employer and on matters in terms of which it has 
participated in joint decision-making with the employer.  
 
This provision should be amended to read, 
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there must be meetings between members of the workplace forum and the employees employed in the 
workplace on a monthly basis. …  
 
(B1 (9)) Section 83(3)(b) states that each calendar year, at one of the meetings 
with the employees, the employer must present an annual report of its financial and 
employment situation, its performance and on its future prospects and plans.  
 
This provision should be amended to read, 
 
each calendar year, at one of the various scheduled meetings to take place with the employees. 
 
(B1 (10)) Section 84 states, “(u)nless the matters for consultation are regulated by a 
collective agreement with the representative trade union, a workplace forum is 
entitled to be consulted by the employer on those proposals (my italics) relating to 
any of the following matters - restructuring the workplace, including the introduction 
of new technology and work methods, changes in the organisation of work, partial or 
total plant closures, mergers and transfers of ownership in so far as they have an 
impact on the employees, the dismissal of employees for reasons based on 
operational requirements, job grading, criteria for merit increases or the payment of 
discretionary bonuses, education and training. …”  
 
This provision should be amended to read,  
 
unless the matters for consultation are regulated by a collective agreement with the representative 
trade union, a workplace forum is entitled to be consulted by the employer on any of the following 
matters. … 
 
(B1 (11)) To section 84 an additional deeming provision, section 84(1A), should be 
added, which would provide, 
the workplace forum must also be consulted by the employer on employee-related matters if (1) such 
matters are of such an urgent nature that to postpone the disclosure thereof would most likely cause 
severe hardship to the employees, the employer or the company, or (2) the workplace forum deems 
the disclosure of any matter to be in the best interests of the company. 
 
(B1 (12)) Regarding section 85, which expands upon the duty to consult in terms of 
section 84, a further provision, section 85(5), should be added.  
 
This provision should read,  
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in the event that any agreed procedure cannot be reached between the employer and the workplace 
forum, this dispute should, in the first instance, be resolved by the Commission through conciliation. If 
the dispute remains unresolved, the matter must be resolved through arbitration. 
 
(B1 (13)) Section 86(1) states that unless the matters for joint decision-making are 
regulated by a collective agreement with the representative trade union, the 
employer must consult and reach consensus with a workplace forum before 
implementing any proposal concerning disciplinary codes and procedures, rules 
relating to the proper regulation of the workplace in so far as they apply to conduct 
not related to the work performance of employees, measures to protect and advance 
persons who are disadvantaged by unfair discrimination and changes by the 
employer or its appointed representatives on trusts or boards of employer-controlled 
schemes to the rules regulating social benefit schemes.  
This section should be amended to read, 
 
unless the matters for joint decision-making are regulated by a collective agreement with the 
representative trade union, the employer must consult and reach consensus with a workplace forum 
before implementing any matter concerning disciplinary codes and procedures, rules relating to the 
proper regulation of the workplace in so far as they apply to the conduct of its employees. … 
 
(B1 (14)) Section 86(4) reads, “if the employer does not reach consensus with the 
workplace forum, the employer may - …”.  
 
This section should be amended to read,  
 
if the employer does not reach consensus with the workplace forum, the employer must - … . 
(B1 (15)) To section 86 an additional provision, section 86(1)(e), should be added, 
which would provide, 
 
any other matters, including board-related matters, affecting the interests of the employees, either 
directly or indirectly, in the workplace. 
 
(B1 (16)) Section 86(7) reads, “If the dispute remains unresolved, the employer 
may (my italics) request that the dispute be resolved through arbitration”.  
This section should be amended to read,  
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if the dispute remains unresolved, the employer must request that the dispute be resolved through 
arbitration. 
 
(B1 (17)) To section 86 an additional provision, section 86(4A), should be added, 
which would provide, 
 
if the employer does not reach consensus with the workplace forum, the workplace forum may – (a) 
refer the dispute to arbitration in terms of any agreed procedure; or (b) if there is no agreed 
procedure, refer the dispute to the Commission. 
(B1 (18)) To section 86 an additional provision, section 86(7A), should be added, 
which would provide, 
 
if the dispute remains unresolved, the workplace forum may request that the dispute be resolved 
through arbitration. 
 
(B1 (19)) To section 87 an additional provision, section 87(1)(d), should be added, 
which would provide, 
any other matters, including board-related matters, affecting the interests of the employees, either 
directly or indirectly, in the workplace. 
(B1 (20)) Section 87(4) reads, “A review of the disciplinary codes and procedures, 
and rules, must be conducted in accordance with the provisions of section 86(2) to 
(7) except that, in applying section 86(4) (my italics), either the employer or the 
workplace forum may refer a dispute between them to arbitration or to the 
Commission”.  
 
This provision should be amended to read, 
 
either the employer or the workplace forum may refer a dispute between them in subsection 1 to 
arbitration or to the Commission. 
(B1 (21)) Section 87(3) should be deleted. 
 
(B1 (22)) The short title of section 87 reads, “Review at request of newly established 
(my italics) workplace forums”.  
 
This short title should be amended to read,  
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review at request of workplace forums. 
 
(B1 (23)) Section 92 has the short title “(f)ull-time members of workplace forum”. 
Section 92(1) reads, “In a workplace in which 1000 or more employees are 
employed, the members of the workplace forum may designate from their number 
one full-time member (my italics)”.  
 
This provision should read,  
in any workplace in which more 10 or more employees are employed, the members of the workplace 
forum may designate from their number one or more full-time members. 
 
(B1 (24)) Section 82 has a short title “(r)equirements for constitution of workplace 
forum” Section 82(1)(s) reads, “The constitution of every workplace forum must 
provide for the designation of full-time members of the workplace forum if there are 
more than 1000 employees in a workplace (my italics)”.  
 
This section should be deleted. 
 
(B1 (25)) Section 93(1 to 4) reads, “a representative trade union in a workplace may 
request a ballot to dissolve a workplace forum. If a ballot to dissolve a workplace 
forum has been requested, an election officer must be appointed in terms of the 
constitution of the workplace forum. Within 30 days of the request for a ballot to 
dissolve the workplace forum, the election officer must prepare and conduct the 
ballot. If more than 50 per cent of the employees who have voted in the ballot 
support the dissolution of the workplace forum, the workplace forum must be 
dissolved (my italics)”. 
 
Section 93 should be amended to read, 
 
a representative trade union in a workplace must request a ballot to dissolve a workplace forum when 
such workplace forum becomes a non-viable or non-functional body. If a ballot to dissolve a workplace 
forum has been requested, an election officer must be appointed in terms of the constitution of the 
workplace forum. Within 30 days of the request for a ballot to dissolve the workplace forum, the 
election officer must prepare and conduct the ballot. If a significantly large number of the employees 
who have voted in the ballot support the dissolution of the workplace forum, the workplace forum must 
be dissolved. 
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(9.3.2.2) The King Reports (B2) 
 
The King Reports do not provide adequate recommendations to protect and equalise 
the rights of employees as against the employer. Both King Reports dismiss the 
ideology that a two-tier board structure is preferable in South Africa. Consequently, 
both King Reports recommend that a unitary board structure be retained in South 
Africa despite overwhelming evidence in a country, such as Germany, that the two-
tier board structure has, over many years, been a significant factor, which has 
greatly contributed towards achieving a very strong market economy. 
 
(B2 (1)) The recommendations of the King Committee are primarily directed towards 
“the affected corporations” (King I Report) or “the affected companies” (King II 
Report). The ideology that “large” entities are those that have shareholder’ equity of 
R50 million or more is unsound and restrictive. The recommendations need to be 
transformed into mandatory rules, which should be applied right across the board to 
all corporations, whatever their nature or size, being both public and private, 
including close corporations. It is inadequate for the King Report to merely 
“encourage” all companies to adopt the recommendations and the Code. The next 
King Report should require all corporations, whatever their nature or size, to engage 
in corporate governance processes, especially regarding those issues that relate to 
worker participation matters. This is because participative management relies on the 
building of employee partnerships at every level to encourage employees to do their 
best. After all, the employees are the ones who will make a difference in the 
business performance of the corporation.  
 
(B2 (2)) The King Reports write in favour of retaining a unitary board system of 
corporate governance. The next King Report, however, should recommend that 
employees become part of the decision-making processes of the board through the 
introduction and development of either, or a combination of, the following structures 
(noted below in a particular order from the least to the most preferable option): 
 
(B2 (2)(1)) The unitary board structure is retained, whilst making provision for the 
participation of employees, through employee representatives, in the decision-
making processes of the corporation at board level. Additionally, a new and improved 
workplace forum is developed, which has extended powers as suggested under 
building block B1. 
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(B2 (2)(2)) An employee sub-committee of the board (or employee board 
committee) in a unitary board system is created. The board itself would delegate 
some of its functions that deal with employee issues to the employee sub-committee 
of the board. Which issues would be delegated to the employee sub-committee 
would have to be agreed upon by management and the employee representatives in 
the various corporations. This sub-committee would be composed of only employee 
representatives, who have been nominated and elected to this office by interested 
stakeholders, including their peers, the shareholders and management. The 
authority of such sub-committee would be in writing from the board, which would set 
out the parameters and context within which such powers are conferred. This 
authority would also be incorporated in the Articles of Association of the corporation. 
The sub-committee of the board would be chaired by one of the employee 
representatives who have been nominated and elected to this office by interested 
stakeholders, including their peers, the shareholders and management. Additionally, 
a new and improved workplace forum could be developed, which has extended 
powers as suggested under building block B1. 
 
(B2 (2)(3)) A supervisory board is created. The supervisory board would, together 
with a management board, constitute the two-tier or dual board system. This system 
would co-exist with the unitary board system. This would mean that corporations 
would have the option of selecting the unitary or dual structured corporate 
governance model that suits them best. Additionally, a new and improved workplace 
forum could be developed, which has extended powers as suggested under building 
block B1. 
 
(B2 (2)(4)) A two-tier board system is created in South Africa, which consists of a 
supervisory and management board structure. Additionally, a new and improved 
workplace forum could be developed, which has extended powers as suggested 
under building block B1. 
 
(B2 (3)) Regarding the questions of disclosure and consultation, the King Reports 
have, by way of varying recommendations, inconsistently attempted to define how, 
when and what type of information needs to be disclosed to the stakeholders of the 
corporation during stakeholder communication. Future King Reports should consider 
formulating one statement, which clearly defines the issues pertaining to the 
questions of disclosure and consultation. A workable statement would be, 
 
it is the duty of the board to present a report to all stakeholders of the corporation on those matters 
that affect their interests or rights either directly or indirectly. Such report would be couched in easily 
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understandable language and would be transparent, fair, true, accurate and complete. Such report 
would be disclosed to the stakeholders as soon as management knows of an issue or issues, which may 
affect their interests or rights in this way. Consultation must take place between management and 
labour on any other matters, including board-related matters, which affect the interests of the 
employees in the workplace. Such consultation would also be couched in easily understandable 
language and would be transparent, fair, true, accurate and complete. Such consultation would take 
place with labour as soon as management knows of an issue or issues, which may affect their interests 
or rights in this way. During such consultation, management and labour would resolve any disputes, if 
not immediately, as expeditiously as possible. 
 
(B2 (4)) The King Committee should not incorporate both enabling and mandatory 
terms in its Report or in its Code of Corporate Practices and Conduct. The next King 
Report should compose its Report in a form of rules, rather than recommendations, 
which should be mandatory. These rules should then be incorporated into legislation 
and be applicable to all corporations whatever their size, nature or type. 
 
(B2 (5)) The King II Report recommends that a board committee should be 
established to assist the board in reviewing risk management procedures. The next 
King Report should expressly include a statement to the effect that at least one 
employee representative of the corporation should take part in any of the decision-
making processes, which are associated with the risk management procedures. 
 
(B2 (6)) The next King Report ought to include a statement, which notes,  
 
corporations must establish participative management for its employees at all operating company 
levels. This will achieve exemplary employer/employee relations and will encourage its employees to 
reach their maximum potential. 
 
(B2 (7)) The next King Committee should engage in discussions with EthicSA on 
matters dealing with ethical considerations. This would encourage companies to 
understand the reasons why ethical issues have to be woven into the fabric of the 
corporation. 
 
(9.3.2.3) The Bill of Rights (B3) 
 
The Bill of Rights reinforces and expands some of the provisions in the current 
Labour Relations Act. It entrenches the rights to collective bargaining, expands the 
rights of freedom of association, provides that everyone has the right to fair labour 
practices, widens the definition of the concept of employee and provides an 
unqualified right for individual employees to strike.  
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However, the Constitution does not go far enough in formulating and entrenching 
certain principles that would achieve greater industrial democracy in South African 
labour law. For example, the 1996 Constitution does not mention the extent to which 
employees should have a joint decision-making role in the running of the 
organisation. South Africa would move forward on the issue of having a dual board 
structure and, in this way, achieve greater industrial democracy if the Constitutional 
Assembly and/or the Constitutional Court take an active role in supporting this. This 
issue is general enough and can therefore be incorporated quite easily into any new 
amendments that are made to the Constitution. It is also important enough to be 
taken very seriously by the highest bodies in the land. 
 
(B3 (1)) Section 23(5) reads, “every trade union, employers’ organisation and 
employer has the right to engage in collective bargaining. National legislation may be 
enacted to regulate collective bargaining”. 
 
Section 23(5) should be amended to read, 
 
workers and employers shall have the right to organise and bargain collectively. 
 
(B3 (2)) To section 23 an additional provision, section 23(1)(A), should be added. 
The contents of such provision would ultimately depend upon which model of 
corporate governance is selected.  
 
(B3 (2)(1)) Should the current unitary board system be retained as is, the provision 
should read,  
 
every workplace forum is entitled to participate in joint decision-making on any matters, including 
board-related matters, affecting the interests of the employees, either directly or indirectly, in the 
workplace. 
 
(B3 (2)(2)) Should the unitary board system be retained with the introduction of 
employee representatives on the board, the provision should read, 
 
every workplace forum and employee representative(s) of the board are entitled to participate in joint 
decision-making on any matters, including board-related matters, affecting the interests of the 
employees, either directly or indirectly, in the workplace. 
 
(B3 (2)(3)) Should a unitary board system be retained with the development of 
employee sub-committees of the board, the provision should read, 
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every workplace forum and employee sub-committee of the board are entitled to participate in joint 
decision-making on any matters, including board-related matters, affecting the interests of the 
employees, either directly or indirectly, in the workplace. 
 
(B3 (2)(4)) Should a unitary board system be retained alongside the introduction of 
a two-tier board structure, the provision should read, 
every workplace forum, employee sub-committee of the board and supervisory board are entitled to 
participate in joint decision-making on any matters, including board-related matters, affecting the 
interests of the employees, either directly or indirectly, in the workplace. 
 
(B3 (2)(5)) Should a two-tier board system be introduced alone, the provision should 
read, 
 
every workplace forum and supervisory board are entitled to participate in joint decision-making on 
any matters, including board-related matters, affecting the interests of the employees, either directly 
or indirectly, in the workplace. 
 
(B4) To section 23 an additional provision, section 23(1)(C), should be added. This 
should read, 
 
every employer has a duty to treat every employee in a reasonable manner. 
 
 
(9.3.3) The Building Blocks That Form the Third Step (C) 
 
The aim of step C is to suggest changes in the patterns of traditional corporate 
thinking and attitudes by continuing to reject the anachronistic principles of company 
law. It is necessary to seriously consider the ideology that employees should have 
greater rights in the decision-making processes of the corporation at all levels. This 
establishes greater insight into the reasons why this has become necessary in order 
to achieve an improved market economy. 
(C1) The traditional shareholder primacy model, which firmly entrenches the 
shareholder maximisation theories, should be rejected and abandoned. Corporate 
law in business today must take into account the rights of all stakeholders in the 
corporation. Society and business require greater recognition of the rights of non-
shareholders.  
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A provision should be inserted into the Companies Act 61 of 1973 that reads, 
 
the directors of a company must recognise and pay sufficient regard to the rights of all of the 
stakeholders of the corporation, which include, but are not limited to, the employees, shareholders, 
suppliers, creditors,  community and environment. 
 
(C2) Both company law and labour law are inextricably interdependent. It makes 
good sense for each branch of law, through its respective legislation, to recognise 
the rights of all stakeholders in the corporation. In this way, the rights of employees 
in the decision-making processes of the corporation at all levels would be widely 
recognised. Company law should therefore formulate a multi-fiduciary model, which 
would oblige the directors to become fiduciaries for all of the stakeholders.  
A simple and clear provision should be inserted into the Companies Act 61 of 1973 
that reads, 
 
the directors act as the fiduciaries for all of the stakeholders in the corporation. 
 
(C3) Both the contractarian and communitarian (stakeholder) models have features 
that could be advantageous in corporate governance. It is preferable, therefore, to 
draw on these features rather than to force legislation or recommendations around 
one or other of the models. In this way, a new model could be created, which 
recognises the need for the existence of a framework based upon the typical social, 
moral and ethical values of a country. For example, contract could be the means in 
terms of which the rights of the parties are determined, defined and recognised. At 
the same time, however, legislation could play a significant role in regulating, 
determining and defining the rights of shareholder and non-shareholder interests 
where the contract is silent, or where the contact is ambiguous, vague or 
unconscionable. Legislation, in this regard, could take into account any social values 
that may typify a culture or a community. In this way, legislation could take into 
account any social expectations that are not necessarily covered in a contract. This 
would foster individual dignity and promote societal welfare. 
 
 
(9.3.4) The Building Blocks That Form the Fourth Step (D) 
 
The aim of step D is to extract the most favourable features from successful 
international corporate governance models and use them, as building blocks, in the 
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design of a new and improved model of corporate governance for South Africa. The 
features apply primarily to the issue of stakeholder participation in the decision-
making processes of the corporation. In this regard, focus will be placed upon the 
participation of the employees. For this, it is proposed that there are unique and 
advantageous features in the corporate governance models of Germany, Japan and 
France.  
 
(D1) To attain economic success, it is imperative that all of the stakeholders in the 
corporation feel satisfied with their returns.  
 
(D1 (1)) Stakeholders would then consider any obligations they have as their duties 
to offer their services where required.  
 
(D1 (2)) No business can afford to assume that it has the perfect corporate 
governance model and leave it at that. Therefore, continued research into and the 
upgrading of corporate governance models are necessary for corporations to remain 
economically competitive and to be able to achieve a healthy competitive edge. 
 
(D2) Businesses need to be able to think in the long term and therefore must not 
expect too much too soon. 
 
(D2 (1)) It is preferable for corporations to proceed by way of co-operation than by 
confrontation. It is therefore preferable for a business to conduct its affairs through 
consensus and by agreements between the parties than in an authoritarian and 
dictatorial manner. 
 
(D3) Shareholders are but only one group of stakeholders that need to be 
considered. Making a profit should not be the only thing that counts.  
 
(D3 (1)) Informed and trusted employees are more likely to have the welfare of the 
business at heart, to be sympathetic to its aims and understanding of its problems. 
 
(D3 (2)) If employees are treated as members of a family, rather than simply as 
workers, employees will offer an improved service to the corporation. In this way, 
the ideology of lifetime employment ought to develop and manifest within the 
corporation. 
 
(D3 (3)) Promotion of employees through the ranks should be greatly encouraged. 
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(D3 (4)) Education and training programmes for employees should be introduced 
more rigorously into South African corporations. Such programmes foster an 
intelligent and disciplined labour force, which, in turn, creates a strong national 
economy. 
 
(D3 (5)) The principle of ‘commercial prudence’ in accounting practice is preferred 
to the principle of showing ‘a true and fair view’. In this way, profits may be 
reduced, but accounting reserves for risk are made, which promote the survival of 
the corporation. 
 
(D4) A unitary board system, in any form, is not the preferred option. A two-tier 
board system, based upon co-determination, is recommended on grounds both of 
principle and of pragmatism. In principle, it provides a clear division of function. 
Pragmatically, the principle of co-determination would not work well in a unitary 
board system. 
 
(D4 (1)) The principles of co-determination consist of three phases, which are the 
information, the consultation and the participation stages. 
 
(D4 (2)) Since South Africa has not yet endorsed the two-tier board structure, a 
choice between this model and the unitary board structure might be created. Thus, 
in the transition phase until the two-tier board structure is widely accepted and 
adopted, corporations could be given the option of choosing between the unitary 
board and the two-tier corporate governance models. 
 
(D4 (2)(1)) A corporation may, at any time, change from the unitary board 
structure to the dual board structure and visa versa, provided that it calls an 
extraordinary general meeting and, at such meeting, acquires a two-thirds majority 
of votes in favour of the change called for. 
(D5) A two-tier board structure would consist of a supervisory board and a 
management board.  
 
(D5 (1)) The supervisory board would consist of shareholder and employee 
representatives.  
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(D5 (1)(1)) All corporations, which have more than ten employees, whatever their 
nature or type, would have a supervisory and management board. In those 
companies having ten or less employees, a managing director would be appointed, 
with or without a management board consisting of no more than three members. 
These corporations, therefore, do not have supervisory boards, but at least one 
employee representative must be nominated and appointed to this office by the 
employees. 
 
(D5 (1)(2)) Both shareholder and employee representatives would hold an equal 
number of seats on the supervisory board.  
 
(D5 (1)(2)(1)) The shareholder representatives would be nominated and elected to 
the supervisory board by a majority vote of the shareholders themselves in the 
general meeting.  
 
(D5 (1)(2)(2)) The employee representatives would be nominated and elected to 
the supervisory board by a majority vote of the employees themselves, including 
the members of the workplace forum.  
 
(D5 (1)(2)(3)) The chairperson of the supervisory board committee would always be 
a representative employee appointed to that position by a majority vote of the 
employees themselves, including the members of the workplace forum. The 
chairperson of the supervisory board would always hold the casting vote, which he 
or she cannot delegate in the event of a deadlock situation arising. In this case, the 
casting vote would have a value of two votes.  
 
(D5 (1)(2)(4)) Members of the supervisory board would be appointed to the board 
for a period of five years, after which time re-election must take place.  
 
(D5 (1)(2)(5)) Seventy-five percent of votes of the employees and of members of 
the workplace forum would be required to remove an employee representative, 
including the chairperson, from the supervisory board before the expiration of the 
five-year term of office. 
 
(D5 (1)(2)(6)) Seventy-five percent of votes of the shareholders in a general 
meeting would be required to remove a shareholder representative from the 
supervisory board before the expiration of the five-year term of office. 
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(D5 (1)(2)(7)) A member of the supervisory board may be dismissed on grounds of 
any one of, or a combination of, a gross breach of duty, an inability to exercise 
proper supervisory management, a passing of a vote of no confidence, or for any 
other reason, which is determined by the board to be in the best interests of the 
corporation.  
 
(D5 (1)(3)) The number of seats available on the supervisory board would depend 
upon the number of employees employed in the workplace. This would be 
determined on a sliding scale basis. 
 
(D5 (1)(3)(1)) If a corporation employs between eleven to one hundred employees 
(inclusive), up to six seats would be available on the supervisory board. 
 
(D5 (1)(3)(2)) If a corporation employs between one hundred and one employees 
and five hundred employees (inclusive), up to twelve seats would be available on 
the supervisory board. 
 
(D5 (1)(3)(3)) If a corporation employs more than five hundred employees, up to 
eighteen seats would be available on the supervisory board. 
(D5 (1)(4)) The main function of the supervisory board is strategic in nature. The 
function would be to supervise, advise and counsel the management board and to 
ensure that it acts competently through consensus. It ensures that the standards in 
the corporation are not only established, but maintained as well. The management 
board would, therefore, be legally accountable to the supervisory board.  
 
(D5 (1)(5)) The main functions of the supervisory board are to be covered by 
legislation, although there can be an extension of these functions as agreed upon by 
the supervisory board and the management board. Such extension of functions 
would be clearly tabled in the articles of association or constitution of the 
corporation. 
 
(D5 (1)(6)) The main functions of the supervisory board would be to oversee the 
accounts of the corporation, which the management board prepares. Additionally, 
the supervisory board would supervise any major capital expenditure, mergers, 
acquisitions and closures, which the management board is involved in. It would also 
approve the dividend and make appointments to the management board. 
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(D5 (1)(7)) Members of the supervisory board would have routine access to 
confidential information of the corporation.  
 
(D5 (1)(8)) The supervisory board may also establish any sub-committees, or 
appoint inspectors, whose task would be to thoroughly examine matters of a 
technical or complex nature. 
 
(D6) Workplace forums would be involved in the decision-making processes of the 
supervisory boards. In many cases, workplace forums would first follow the 
processes to discuss matters with the management board, which affect the interests 
of all of its employees in the workplace, before formally placing them before the 
supervisory board. The supervisory board is to be kept advised of any developments 
during the consultations between the workplace forum and the management board. 
Should no agreement be reached between the workplace forum and the 
management board, the supervisory board would step in and take an active role in 
attempting to reach an agreement with the management board. In this way, many 
of the difficulties of a situation are ironed out before reaching the supervisory 
boards. This does not affect the main functions of the supervisory board in (D5 
(1)(6)), which it alone must consider. Workplace forums must also be in a position 
to receive information directly, which they must then pass on to the supervisory 
boards. 
 
(D7) The main function of the management board would be to ensure that the 
company finds business and promotes it. It would also decide the administration of 
affairs of the corporation. 
 
(D7 (1)) Members of the supervisory board would nominate and elect to office 
members of the management board. This would require a two-thirds majority vote 
in favour of the nominated member or members. 
 
(D7 (2)) The members of the management board would appoint, by majority vote, a 
chairperson to the management board. 
(D7 (2)(1)) If the members of the management board cannot or will not appoint a 
chairperson to the management board, members of the supervisory board will do so 
by majority vote. 
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(D7 (2)(2)) The chairperson of the management board would always hold the 
casting vote in the event of a deadlock situation arising, which he or she cannot 
delegate. In this case, the casting vote would have a value of two votes.  
 
(D7 (3)) Members of the management board would be appointed to the board for a 
period of five years, after which time re-election must take place.  
 
(D7 (4)) Both the supervisory and management boards may dismiss a member or 
members from the management board. Seventy-five percent of votes of the 
members of the management or supervisory board would be required to remove a 
member from the management board, including the chairperson, before the 
expiration of the five-year term of office. 
 
(D7 (4)(1)) A member of the management board may be dismissed on grounds of 
any one of, or a combination of, a gross breach of duty, an inability to exercise 
proper management, a passing of a vote of no confidence, or for any other reason, 
which is determined by the board to be in the best interests of the corporation.  
 
(D7 (4)(2)) The management board may, with a seventy-five percent voting 
majority of supervisory board members, appoint a deputy to assist a member who 
has committed a breach on any grounds stated in (D7 (4)(1)), in order that such 
member may complete his or her term of office with the corporation. 
 
(D7 (5)) The number of seats available on the management board would depend 
upon the number of employees employed in the workplace. This would be 
determined on a sliding scale. 
 
(D7 (5)(1)) If a corporation employs between eleven to one hundred employees 
(inclusive), up to six seats would be available on the management board. 
 
(D7 (5)(2)) If a corporation employs between one hundred and one employees and 
five hundred employees (inclusive), up to twelve seats would be available on the 
management board. 
(D7 (5)(3)) If a corporation employs more than five hundred employees, up to 
eighteen seats would be available on the management board. 
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(D7 (6)) Members of the management board would have routine access to 
confidential information of the corporation.  
 
(D7 (7)) The management board may also establish any sub-committees, or appoint 
inspectors, whose task would be to thoroughly examine matters of a technical or 
complex nature. 
 
(D8) Banks, as shareholders, should be encouraged to sit on supervisory boards. A 
corporation would greatly benefit from their considerable personal skills, knowledge, 
motivation and experience. Corporations would also benefit by having access to the 
latest and most up to date information, which banks can bring along with them. 
 
(D9) Management boards and supervisory boards must operate in such a way so as 
to ensure that each one of them provides information to the other on a regular 
basis. In this way, both boards remain fully informed. 
 
(D10) Former members of the supervisory board may be elected as members of the 
management board of the same corporation, and visa versa, provided only that no 
member shall hold membership of both boards simultaneously. 
 
(D11) Members of both the supervisory and management boards must meet 
regularly. At the start of the calendar year, a schedule of meetings for the year 
must be devised where the two boards agree to meet at least on a monthly basis. In 
this way, the supervisory and management boards would work together in the best 
interests of the corporation. Individual boards would also devise a schedule of 
meetings, which would allow its members to meet regularly. 
(D12) A top management sub-committee of the management board may be 
established, which consists of no more than four members of the management 
board. 
 
(D12 (1)) The top management sub-committee would consist of the chairperson of 
the management board together with up to three other members of the 
management board who have been nominated and appointed by majority vote to 
this position by the management board members themselves. 
 
(D12 (2)) The functions of the top management sub-committee will be mainly 
ceremonial in nature, which would give a face to the corporation in matters of 
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importance. It would also be empowered to deal with matters that are so urgent in 
nature that, if delayed, would seriously affect the interests of the corporation.  
 
(D12 (2)(1)) In the event that a matter is so urgent, the top management sub-
committee does not have to confer with the supervisory board.  
 
(D12 (2)(2)) The supervisory board cannot overturn the decision taken by the top 
management sub-committee.  
 
(D12 (2)(3)) The top management sub-committee would not be legally accountable 
to the supervisory board for such decision taken.  
 
(D12 (3)) The members of the supervisory board may, by majority vote, demand 
that the top management sub-committee disband on grounds of any one of, or a 
combination of, a gross breach of duty, an inability to exercise proper management, 
a passing of a vote of no confidence, or for any other reason, which is determined 
by the board to be in the best interests of the corporation.  
 
(D13) In addition to the internal and external auditors and accountants appointed, 
all corporations, employing more than ten employees, must also appoint statutory 
auditors. 
 
(D13 (1)) The members of the supervisory board would appoint statutory auditors 
for a period of three years. 
 
(D13 (2)) The main purpose of the statutory auditors would be to monitor the 
activities of the corporation, to timely advise the management board of any 
problems that they encounter and to prevent the corporation from being sued for 
breaching any legislative regulations and rules.  
(D14) Shareholders, who are elected to the membership of the supervisory board, 
must hold qualifying shares to sit on the board. However, employee representatives, 
elected to the membership of the supervisory board, do not need to hold qualifying 
shares to sit on the board. 
 
(D14 (1)) Members of the management board do not need to hold qualifying shares 
to sit on the board. 
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(D14 (2)) Qualifying shares are to be determined by the management board and the 
supervisory board from time to time. 
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Table 6: A Schematic Diagram of the Major Building Blocks or Steps and 
Sub-blocks/steps of the Proposed Corporate Governance Model for South 
Africa 
STEP A STEP B STEP C STEP D 
(A1) Change 
agents 
(B1) Workplace forums (wpf) (C1) Abandon 
traditional 
shareholder 
model 
(D1) Satisfaction of all 
shareholders 
(A2) Seven 
processes 
(B1 (1)) Section 78(a) Senior 
managerial employees 
(C2) 
Company/labour 
law linked/ multi-
fiduciary model 
(D1 (1)) Obligations seen as 
duties 
(A2 (1)) Pressure 
for change 
(B1 (2)) Section 78(b) 
Representative trade unions 
(C3) 
Contractarian/ 
communitarian 
models 
(D1 (2)) Continued research 
(A2 (2)) Clear 
shared vision 
(B1 (3)) Section 79(d) Joint 
decision-making matters 
 (D2) Long-term planning 
(A2 (3)) Capacity 
for change 
(B1 (4)) Section 80(1) 
Number of employees 
 (D2 (1)) Co-operation and 
consensus 
(A2 (4)) Actionable 
first steps 
(B1 (5)) Section 80(5)(b)(iii) 
Functioning wpf  
 (D3) Profit does not only count 
(A2 (5)) Model the 
way 
(B1 (6)) Section 83(1) 
Monthly meetings of wpf 
 (D3 (1)) Informed and trusted 
employees  
(A2 (6)) 
Reinforcement of 
change 
(B1 (7)) Section 83(2)(a)(b) 
Monthly meetings between 
wpf and employer  
 (D3 (2)) Family/ life-time 
employees 
(A2 (7)) Evaluate 
and adapt 
(B1 (8)) Section 83(3)(a) 
Monthly meetings between 
wpf and employees 
 (D3 (3)) Promotion through the 
ranks 
(A3) Means (B1 (9)) Section 83(3)(b) 
Annual Report 
 (D3 (4)) Education and training 
programmes 
 (B1 (10)) Section 84 
Proposals/ matters 
 (D3 (5)) ‘Commercial prudence’ 
principle 
 (B1 (11)) Insert new 
deeming section 84(1A) 
 (D4)) Two-tier board: principle 
and pragmatism 
 (B1 (12)) Insert new section 
85(5) 
 (D4 (1)) Principles of co-
determination 
Chapter 9 425
 (B1 (13)) Section 86(1) 
proposal/ conduct of 
employees 
 (D4 (2)) A choice between 
unitary/dual boards 
 (B1 (14)) Section 86(4) 
Consensus between employer 
and wpf 
 (D4 (2)(1)) Revocable choices 
 (B1 (15)) Insert new section 
86(1)(e) 
 (D5) Two-tier board structure 
 (B1 (16)) Section 86(7) 
Unresolved disputes 
 (D5 (1)) Constituents of the 
supervisory board 
 (B1 (17)) Insert new section 
86(4A) 
 (D5 (1)(1) Number of 
employees 
 (B1 (18)) Insert new section 
86(7A) 
 (D5 (1)(2)) Number of seats 
available 
 (B1 (19)) Insert new section 
87(1)(d) 
 (D5 (1)(2)(1)) Shareholder 
representatives 
 (B1 (20)) Section 87(4) 
disputes to arbitration or 
Commission 
 (D5 (1)(2)(2)) Employee 
representatives 
 (B1 (21)) Delete section 
87(3) 
 (D5 (1)(2)(3)) Chairperson/ 
casting vote 
 (B1 (22)) Short tile of section 
87 
 (D5 (1)(2)(4)) Term of office 
 (B1 (23)) Section 92(1) full-
time members of wpf 
 (D5 (1)(2)(5)) Removal of 
employee representatives 
 (B1 (24)) Delete section 
82(1)(s) 
 (D5 (1)(2)(6)) Removal of 
shareholder representatives 
 (B1 (25)) Section 93(1-4) 
Ballots 
 (D5 (1)(2)(7)) Grounds of 
dismissal 
 (B2) The King Reports  (D5 (1)(3)) Available seats 
 (B2 (1)) Nature/ size of 
corporations/ mandatory 
rules  
 (D5 (1)(3)(1)) Eleven to one 
hundred employees 
 (B2 (2)) Development of 
other structures 
 (D5 (1)(3)(2)) One hundred 
and one to five hundred 
employees 
 (B2 (2)(1)) Unitary board/ 
employee representatives/ 
wpf 
 (D5 (1)(3)(3)) More than five 
hundred employees 
 (B2 (2)(2)) Unitary board/ 
l  b
 (D5 (1)(4)) Strategic functions/ 
l l t bilit  
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employee sub-
committees/wpf 
legal accountability 
 (B2 (2)(3)) Supervisory 
board/ unitary board/ wpf 
 (D5 (1)(5)) Stated functions in 
legislation/ extension in articles 
 (B2 (2)(4)) Supervisory 
board/ wpf 
 (D5 (1)(6)) Functions to 
oversee/ supervise/ approve 
and appoint 
 (B2 (3)) Disclosure and 
consultation 
 (D5 (1)(7)) Access to 
confidential information 
 (B2 (4)) Mandatory rules  (D5 (1)(8)) Establish sub-
committees/ inspectors 
 (B2 (5)) Risk Management: 
employee representative 
 (D6) Involvement of wpf 
 (B2 (6)) Participative 
management at all levels 
 (D7) Functions of management 
board 
 (B2 (7)) Engaging with 
EthicSA 
 (D7 (1)) Election of 
management board members 
 (B3) Bill of Rights in the 
Constitution 
 (D7 (2)) Appointment of 
chairperson by management 
board 
 (B3 (1)) Section 23(5) 
Collective bargaining 
 (D7 (2)(1)) Appointment of 
chairperson by supervisory 
board 
 (B3 (2)) Insert new section 
23(1)(A) 
 (D7 (2)(2)) Casting vote of 
chairperson 
 (B3 (2)(1)) Section 23(1)(A) 
unitary board 
 (D7 (3)) Term of office 
 (B3 (2)(2)) Section 23(1)(A) 
unitary board/ employee 
representatives 
 (D7 (4)) Dismissal of members 
 (B3 (2)(3)) Section 23(1)(A) 
unitary board/ employee 
subcommittees 
 (D7 (4)(1)) Grounds of 
dismissal 
 (B3 (2)(4)) Section 23(1)(A) 
unitary board/ dual board 
 (D7 (4)(2)) Appointment of a 
deputy to assist members 
 (B3 (2)(5)) Section 23(1)(A) 
dual board 
 (D7 (5)) Available seats 
   (D7 (5)(1)) Eleven to one 
hundred employees 
   (D7 (5)(2)) One hundred and 
 t  fi  h d d l  
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one to five hundred employees 
   (D7 (5)(3)) More than five 
hundred employees  
   (D7 (6)) Access to confidential 
information 
   (D7 (7)) Establish sub-
committees/ inspectors  
   (D8) Involvement of banks 
   (D9) Information sharing 
between boards 
   (D10) Switching to alternate 
boards 
   (D11) Board meetings 
   (D12) Top management sub-
committee 
   (D12 (1)) Composition 
   (D12 (2)) Functions 
   (D12 (2)(1)) Overriding powers 
in urgent matters 
   (D12 (2)(2)) Decision cannot 
be overturned 
   (D12 (2)(3)) No legal 
accountability 
   (D12 (3)) Grounds to disband 
top management sub-
committee 
   (D13) Appointing statutory 
auditors 
   (D13 (1)) Term of office 
   (D13 (2)) Functions 
   (D14) Qualifying shares for 
shareholder supervisory board 
members/ not required for 
employees 
   (D14 (1)) Not required for 
management board members 
   (D14 (2)) Determination of 
qualifying shares 
Chapter 10 428
CHAPTER 10:  
 
(10.0) CONCLUDING REMARKS REGARDING THE 
PROPOSED CORPORATE GOVERNANCE MODEL 
 
 
The approach taken in this study was premised upon three key research theses: 
 
 
Research thesis 1: Corporate governance systems and legislation in South 
Africa have become anachronistic, especially in regard to employee 
participation. 
 
This enquiry has been addressed by considering inter alia the two King Reports on 
corporate governance, South African company and labour legislation and the 
constitution. The problems associated with the traditional doctrine of company law 
enshrining the principles of wealth maximisation for shareholders were fully 
discussed. The significance of corporate stakeholders’ rights and interests were 
considered in detail. 
 
More specifically, in chapter 6, part 6.2, it was concluded from the analysis and 
discussion of the provisions relating to the establishment, functions and operating 
mechanisms of workplace forums, that they are inadequate in protecting and 
equalising the rights of employees for three main reasons.  
 
Firstly, in the legislation there are provisions that are ambiguous, vague or in conflict 
with one another. Various provisions in the legislation should therefore be modified, 
amended or deleted to allow consistency and greater understanding and clarity for 
all the parties concerned.  
 
Secondly, it is important that the establishment of workplace forums is made a 
mandatory requirement under the Act for those corporations that have more than 
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ten employees. In those corporations with ten or less employees, an employee 
representative must be nominated and elected to office by the employees. As it 
currently stands, only those workplaces with one hundred or more employees may 
establish workplace forums.  
 
Thirdly, the legislation only allows for joint decision-making between the workplace 
forum and employer at line management level and, then, in only very limited and 
defined circumstances. Thus, the legislation needs to expand in such a way that it 
opens the doors for workplace forums to be involved in many more matters as part 
of the joint decision-making processes. This would mean allowing the workplace 
forum and its employees a joint decision-making role in those matters decided even 
at board level. If the employees were happy and satisfied, this would most likely lead 
to improved customer satisfaction, and, through this, improved profitability of the 
organisation.  
 
 
A critical analysis and detailed discussion of the King Reports I (1994) and II (2002) 
in parts 6.3 to 6.5 of chapter 6 revealed that the guidelines referred to in each 
Report were inadequate in ensuring that worker participation exists in the 
corporation for the following reasons.  
 
Firstly, the King Reports cannot be construed as enforceable legal documents. They 
have to rely on other factors to encourage compliance therewith. Some of these 
factors may be viewed as unreliable, especially those that encourage compliance 
with the Code through peer pressure. Although many recommendations and 
principles of the King Reports are encouraging, they are vague. It may thus be 
rather difficult in practice to persuade or encourage companies to implement the 
recommendations. 
 
Secondly, the King Reports have made recommendations that ought to be applied to 
only “affected corporations” (King Report I) or “affected companies” (King Report II). 
Hence, the majority of corporations in South Africa, whatever their nature, size or 
type, are generally not expected to comply with the recommendations contained 
within the King Reports, although they may if they wish to. Since the King Reports 
only formulated recommendations, they are not mandatory and, therefore, even 
affected corporations/companies need not apply them if they do not wish to.  
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Thirdly, the King Reports do not support the development and implementation of the 
two-tier board system. Although the Reports acknowledge the success of this type of 
system in Germany, they encourage the unitary board system to be retained in 
South Africa. The reasons the Reports provide for this conclusion are based upon 
affirmative action policies and greater personal interaction for new board members 
and are therefore unsound. As discussed in this thesis, however, to dismiss the two-
tier board structure is unconvincing and anachronistic. At the very least, the King II 
Committee should have seriously considered the proposals for organisations to 
establish ‘employee board committees’. This would commence the process of 
achieving a system in terms of which employees would have participatory roles in 
joint decision-making at board level. This could develop into a system where the 
employees could be invited to sit on the board itself. This governance system does 
not necessarily advocate that employees need to be directors. There is no reason 
why employees need to be directors to sit on the board. Although this is a traditional 
approach enshrined in deep-seated company law principles, there is no reason to 
assume permanency. By allowing employees a say in decisions taken at board level 
would be advantageous to all parties. It would also help to strengthen the processes 
of industrial democracy in South Africa, which, at times, may seem rather fragile.  
 
Fourthly, the King Reports repeat various points throughout the text with variations 
in content and application, which can cause much confusion to the reader. A more 
succinct and concise text would have been preferred in each Report. Therefore, the 
King Reports suffer from too much disorganisation in structure and content to be 
entirely useful to corporations.  
 
Fifthly, the rights of workplace forums under the South African Labour Relations Act 
to be involved in the joint decision-making processes of the corporation have not 
been increased or improved in any significant manner as a result of the 
recommendations of the King II Report. The King II Report focuses its proposals to a 
large extent on issues such as accounting and auditing practices and the like. It does 
not pay sufficient attention to the advantages of workplace forums and of employees 
participating in the decision-making roles of the organisation.  
 
 
In part 6.11 of chapter 6, it was indicated that the Bill of Rights under the 1996 
Constitution provides another means under which labour could ensure the rights to 
fair labour practices. Section 23 promotes collective bargaining. However, section 23 
removed the previous reference to ‘workers’ and substituted it with ‘trade unions, 
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employers’ organisations and employers’. Thus, whilst ‘employers’ retained the right 
under the 1996 Constitution to engage in collective bargaining, individual workers 
did not. This leads to an imbalance of rights and the Constitutional Assembly and 
Constitutional Court should consider reinserting the word ‘workers’ into the provision 
dealing with labour relations. It is possible for individual employees to be part of the 
collective bargaining process. Thus, requiring them only to act in concert as part of 
the collective bargaining process is unnecessary and restrictive.  
 
Generally speaking, the 1996 Constitution entrenches in part constitutionally sound 
principles of labour law. However, it does not go far enough in formulating and 
entrenching certain principles that would achieve greater industrial democracy in 
South African labour and company law. In addition, the 1996 Constitution does not 
mention the extent to which employees should have a joint decision-making role in 
the running of the organisation. South Africa would move forward in establishing a 
dual board structure and consequently in achieving greater industrial democracy if 
the Constitutional Assembly and/or the Constitutional Court take an active role in 
supporting this. This issue is general and can therefore be readily incorporated into 
any new amendments made to the Constitution. It is also important enough to be 
taken very seriously by the highest bodies in the land. Thus, both the Constitution 
and the Labour Relations Act should enact provisions, which require management to 
recognise the needs of employees in order to achieve job satisfaction in their 
workplace. In so doing, employers must maintain and operate the workplace in such 
a way, which clearly maximises the possibility of attaining these results. This 
promotes a sense of goodwill and confidence amongst the parties and creates an 
environment, which is conducive to achieving greater job satisfaction and enhanced 
economic productivity. Consequently, both the 1996 Constitution and the current 
Labour Relations Act still have a long way to go in attaining an acceptable balance in 
labour between the rights of employees and those of the employers. At this time, 
employers still have very much the upper hand in South African labour law. 
 
 
Research thesis 2: In order to achieve higher levels of corporate 
performance and to become more competitive on the global market, South 
Africa needs, amongst other things, to update its corporate governance 
systems, structures and legislation. 
 
This enquiry has been addressed by proposing in chapter 9, parts 9.3.2.1 to 9.3.2.3, 
numerous recommendations for change to inter alia company and labour legislation, 
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the Constitution and future King or similar Reports. Thus, the aim is to suggest 
changes for South Africa of a legal nature, which would promote an improved and 
more meaningful system of worker participation in the corporation. In this regard, 
modifications were suggested that should be made to the major South African 
legislative enactments and to the King Reports, which have thus far attempted to 
provide employees with some rights of participation in the decision-making 
processes of the corporation.  
 
 
Additionally, chapter 9, part 9.3.1, revealed that seven steps needed to be complied 
with in order to ensure successful changes in the workplace. These steps focus on 
what managers need to do to show the various stakeholders of the organisation that 
they are flexible enough to introduce progressive changes to the workplace and to 
adapt to a changing environment. These steps are critical in establishing not only 
effective employee participation in the workplace, but also in enhancing a system of 
improved employee satisfaction in their jobs. It is to be noted that all of these seven 
steps need to be complied with in order for any successful change to be 
implemented. Different adverse symptoms result in each case if one of the seven 
steps is not present.  
 
Furthermore, various organisational development means were discussed to bring 
about the changes resulting in greater employee empowerment. Thus, by 
empowering employees and allowing them to participate in the decision-making 
processes of the corporation, this would lead to changes in their working 
environment and thereby promote their sense of well-being. As a result, 
organisations would generate greater job satisfaction, improved customer service 
and enhanced profitability. 
 
 
Changes in the patterns of traditional corporate thinking and attitudes were 
suggested in chapter 9, part 9.3.3, by continuing to reject the anachronistic 
principles of company law. It is necessary to seriously consider the ideology that 
employees should have greater rights in the decision-making processes of the 
corporation at all levels. This establishes greater insight into the reasons why this 
has become necessary in order to achieve an improved market economy. Thus, The 
world has moved forward since the formulation of the shareholder wealth 
maximisation doctrine and so has South Africa. It is difficult to endorse a doctrine 
that does not take into account the rights of the other non-shareholder 
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constituencies. The current Labour Relations Act has rejected the ‘traditionalist’ 
approach. Although the Act has still a long way to go, it has commenced the process 
of turning away from the ideology that organisations exist to maximise shareholder 
wealth. It has begun to recognise the rights of non-shareholders. Workplace forums 
now exist and employees, through their trade unions, now have a joint decision-
making role at line management level in limited situations. South Africa has now 
moved beyond the traditional doctrine in company law and there is now no returning 
to it. South Africa must now enact legislation that extends these rights to greater 
and more meaningful dimensions for labour. It needs to do this by establishing dual 
board structures. Rules and provisions regulating the establishment, functioning and 
membership of these structures should be provided for in both labour and company 
legislation. Labour law has progressed to a limited degree in recognising non-
shareholder rights in decision-making processes. It is time that a new South African 
company act reflects these rights as well. 
 
 
Research thesis 3: Corporate governance models based on those systems, 
which have proven successful elsewhere and can be adapted to South 
Africa’s specific needs and cultural dimensions, will provide a strategic 
platform to facilitate substantial improvements in corporate performance 
and productivity. 
 
Substantial improvements to South Africa’s corporate governance structures were 
recommended through its implementation of certain features of governance models 
used in Germany, France and Japan. As a result, if implemented, corporate 
performance and productivity will substantially improve. In chapter 9, part 9.3.4, the 
most favourable features from successful international corporate governance models 
were extracted as the building blocks in the design of a new and improved model of 
corporate governance for South Africa. The features extracted apply primarily to the 
issue of stakeholder participation in the decision-making processes of the 
corporation. In this regard, focus was placed upon the participation of the 
employees.  
 
 
Finally, based on the arguments and discussions in this thesis, the proposed 
corporate governance model will offer an improved system of corporate governance 
to organisations in South Africa. This is particularly apposite in so far as the 
participation of the employees in the decision-making processes of the corporation at 
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board level is concerned. The King Reports have been reluctant to recommend a 
change from the current unitary board structure to the two-tier board structure. 
However, the two-tier board structure is, for reasons provided, the preferred option. 
In the proposed corporate governance model, it is recommended that certain 
features of other systems be adopted, which further the interests and the rights of 
employees in the decision-making processes at board level. These systems could be 
introduced into the unitary board structure whilst the development of the dual board 
structure is underway. Ultimately, however, if South Africa is firmly intent on turning 
its economy into one that is stronger and better, corporations will have to introduce 
the two-tier board model of corporate governance into their business practices. 
 
 
The proposed corporate governance model consists of four main steps, which are 
also the four main building blocks, or pillars that keep it upright. These four building 
blocks consist of: 
 
The introduction and maintenance of a system of organisational development within 
the corporation;  
 
The introduction of new legislation in South Africa, which promotes an improved and 
more meaningful system of worker participation in the corporation; 
 
The introduction of changed patterns of corporate thinking and a rejection of 
antiquated principles of company law; and  
 
The introduction in South Africa of some of the favourable features of successful 
international corporate governance models. 
 
 
Each of the four main building blocks is made up of sub-blocks or factors, all of 
which cemented together, form the composite whole. Each factor, as mentioned 
previously, can be likened to a brick in a wall of any building. If one or more of the 
bricks are missing, the wall or, in this case, the corporate governance model, will be 
weakened.  
 
The proposed corporate governance model is presented as a potentially new and 
refreshing start to effective corporate governance practices in South Africa. Changes 
are always viewed with great skepticism, but are nevertheless vital to progress and 
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it is therefore recommended that this model be seriously considered. It is an 
economic necessity and a moral imperative and will contribute to a wealthier and 
happier South Africa.  
 
Appendix 436
APPENDIX:  
 
 
A discussion of the recommendations and proposals of the Department of Trade and 
Industry highlights the fact that corporate reform will commence in 2006 with the 
introduction of a new South African Companies Act. This discussion is also significant 
because it sets the scene for the commencement and implementation of a new 
corporate governance structure for South Africa in 2006 through legislative changes 
in the South African Companies Act. 
 
 
(A.1) The Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) 
South Africa 
 
In May 2004 the DTI issued for public comment a policy document. 1301
 
According to Mandisi Mpahlwa, the South African Minister of Trade and Industry, the 
main purpose of this policy paper is to establish the approach that government 
intends taking to review company law in South Africa. The report also establishes a  
 
… framework for detailed technical consultation to ensure that we have company law, which is up-to-
date, competitive and designed for a modern corporation that is not only a domestic institution 
operating in a new environment but also an international competitor. 1302  
 
This will involve a review of the Companies Act 1973, the Close Corporations Act, 
1984 and the common law. 1303 The Minister also acknowledges the fact that since 
the introduction of the 1926 Companies Act there has only been one significant 
review of South African company law and that was through the introduction of the 
1973 Companies Act.  
                                                     
1301  Department of Trade and Industry, above n 159. 
1302  Ibid 5. 
1303  Ibid 10. 
Appendix 437
 
Havenga also believes that the South African Companies Act is “in need of 
comprehensive review”. 1304
Although the 1973 Act was a major review of South African company law, it left the 
traditional framework and principles of English law firmly entrenched in our company 
law. 1305 This policy document will be used as the foundation to draft a new 
Companies Act to be considered by cabinet for publication in September 2005. It will 
then be published for public comment during the period September to December 
2005. The State President will proclaim the Bill in June 2006. 1306
 
The broad areas of review will focus upon issues of company formation, finance, 
corporate governance, mergers and takeovers, liquidation and corporate rescues and 
non-profit corporate entities. 
 
The DTI policy document has recommended certain changes in the areas of company 
formation and corporate governance, some of which are relevant to the discussions 
and arguments in this thesis. Many of the changes, which have been outlined in the 
DTI review paper, are identical or very similar to the amendments, modifications and 
suggestions that have been proposed in this thesis. There are, however, various 
principles outlined in the DTI Report, which are arguably incorrect or unconvincing.  
 
 
(A.2) Major reform proposals of the Department of 
Trade and Industry 
 
In this thesis, the significance and application of key principles have been discussed 
in an attempt to formulate, design and construct a new and workable model of 
corporate governance for South Africa. The proposals set out in the DTI public 
discussion document have highlighted some of the key principles and issues argued 
in this thesis. These issues will be divided into two categories depending upon 
whether the proposals set out in this thesis concur with the views of the DTI or not. 
                                                     
1304  Havenga (1997), above n 36, 323. 
1305  Department of Trade and Industry, above n 159, 4. 
1306  Ibid 53. 
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Firstly, based upon the arguments in this thesis, the following ten major proposals 
and concerns of the DTI are sound: 
 
1. Any regulatory policy must recognise the unique South African context and 
therefore promote equity in such a manner, which is consistent with the 
South African Constitution. 1307 
 
2. Company law should encourage principles of transparency and high standards 
of corporate governance and therefore recognise the broader social functions 
of corporations. 1308 
 
3. The review will also consider the relationship between company law and any 
other rules, which protect the interests of shareholders, employees, the 
State, the environment, consumers and suppliers. 1309 
 
4. From an international perspective, company law review is a continuous 
process, which ensures that the laws are reflective of market practices and 
societal needs. Because we now live in a world of greater globalisation, 
increased electronic communication and greater sensitivity to social and 
ethical concerns, South Africa must review its legislative policies or be left 
behind. There is a growing recognition by companies and governments that 
higher standards of corporate governance are required. There is a need for 
further interdependence between corporations and communities. Corporate 
failures in South Africa have revealed serious defects in the current standard 
of corporate governance, which have resulted in extensive losses to 
investors.1310  
 
5. The most significant change was the adoption of the Constitution in 1996. No 
area of South African law can be evaluated without a consideration of the 
Constitution, which is the supreme law of the country. Chapter 2 of the 
Constitution provides for the Bill of Rights, which “constitutes a cornerstone of 
democracy in South Africa”. It enshrines the “democratic values of human 
dignity, equality and freedom”. It regulates the relationship between 
economic citizens and has fundamental implications for company law. “… 
                                                     
1307  Ibid 9. 
1308  Ibid 10. 
1309  Ibid 11. 
1310  Ibid 14. 
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Legislative and other measures, which reflect these constitutional principles, 
include the attempt to balance the interests of employees and employers and 
to enhance equity in employment, as captured in labour legislation, 
particularly the Labour Relations Act of 1995”. Furthermore, new company law 
should be consistent with the Constitution of South Africa and with the 
principles of equality and fairness and with other legislation as well. 1311 
 
6. Current company law does not contain clear rules regarding corporate 
governance issues and the duties and liabilities of directors. These matters 
have been left to the common law and Codes of Corporate Practice. Thus, 
there is no extensive statutory scheme, which covers the duties, obligations 
and accountability of directors. Thus, directors and senior management of 
large companies are generally “immune from legal control”, except in more 
serious criminal cases. Another significant weakness is the “absence of a 
public institution” charged with the powers to “enforce the rights of 
shareholders and other stakeholders”. 1312 
 
Havenga is of the opinion that South African company law would benefit 
“from a general statement of directors’ fiduciary duties in the Act”. This duty 
“should confirm” that fiduciary duties are to be owed to the company and also 
consider “other stakeholders’ interests”. 1313 This would allow directors to be 
accountable in the way that they exercise their powers. 1314
 
7. The economic success of a company will bring about social benefits to many 
stakeholder constituencies. This will not happen if the company is a financial 
failure. The issue of obliging directors to act primarily for the benefit of 
shareholders alone was questioned. Corporate governance reforms were 
undertaken in many parts of the world in the late 1980’s and early 1990’s. 
This reform process questioned whether the interests of the company should 
be managed for the shareholders alone or for the other corporate 
stakeholders as well. There are many views that strongly support the idea 
that corporate governance should be seen as a system by which corporations 
are to be governed for the benefits of all stakeholders, including 
shareholders, employees, creditors, suppliers and the community. In this 
                                                     
1311  Ibid 15. 
1312  Ibid 18. 
1313  Havenga (1997), above n 36, 323. 
1314  Ibid. 
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way, “companies should be run as communities in partnerships with all their 
stakeholders”. Thus, the success of a company is inextricably intertwined with 
a consideration of the rights and interests of its employees and other 
stakeholders. 1315  
8. In South Africa, company law must consider the rights and interests of the 
other corporate stakeholders such as the community, customers, employees, 
suppliers and the environment. Thus, consideration must be given to both the 
economic factors and also to the social and environmental factors. In this 
regard, a review of company law in South Africa would follow world trends 
and also consider the country’s unique social and legislative environment. 
Hence, ‘a company should have as its objective the conduct of business 
activities with a view to enhancing the economic success of the corporation, 
taking into account, as appropriate, the legitimate interests of other 
stakeholder constituencies’. Consequently, directors should consider the 
policies and principles, which are reflected in the Constitution and other 
legislation for the benefit of other stakeholders. 1316 
 
9. Company law needs to recognise that companies affect society and therefore 
many stakeholders. However, some of the relationships, such as those with 
employees, are best regulated through specific laws. Furthermore, codes of 
best practice ensure that stakeholder interests are considered. Thus, there is 
a need to promote corporate citizenship. 1317 Company law must protect 
investors in companies, including the equity investors, employees and 
creditors. This is so notwithstanding the fact that the rights of employees are 
generally protected in labour law. Furthermore, many creditors rely on 
contract in order to protect their investments. 1318  
 
10. The categorisation of business entities between close corporations, private 
companies and public companies is artificial and hence no longer economically 
viable for South Africa. Thus, it is necessary to move away from this 
separation of different business forms and to recognise only one business 
structure in order to provide simpler company practices and legislation. 1319 
                                                     
1315  Department of Trade and Industry, above n 159, 22-23. 
1316  Ibid 26. 
1317  Ibid 27–28. 
1318  Ibid 37. 
1319  Ibid 32. 
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In light of the arguments in the thesis, the following proposal of the DTI is arguably 
incorrect and unconvincing: 
 
There has been a question in South Africa for some time whether we should follow the example of 
continental Europe in establishing a two-tier board or whether a unitary board structure should be 
required. While a two-tier board provides for the opportunity for stakeholder representation, the 
European experience has shown that this type of Board structure is often inefficient, may deter 
investment and is not necessarily desirable for stakeholders. Furthermore, South Africa has largely 
adopted a unitary board structure to date and imposing a legal requirement for a two-tier structure 
may be costly. For this reason, the position of this policy document is that a unitary board structure be 
retained, but that stakeholder representation on that board should be optional. 1320
 
Arguments refuting the contentions of the DTI with regard to the two-tier board 
structure of corporate governance are set out below. 1321
 
A Regarding the issue of efficiency, the two-tier board structure identifies the 
need for supervision and places this function into the hands of a group of 
people. It also identifies the need for direction and management and places 
this function into the hands of another group of people. In this way, large 
German companies today have a supervisory board and a management 
board.  
 
A key reason for the division of functions between the supervisory and 
management boards is based upon the belief that if management is stronger, 
it then becomes less safe to assume that its interests coincide with those of 
the owners of the business. Shareholder and employee representatives on the 
supervisory board proceed with management by co-operation rather than by 
confrontation. Thus, trade unions have a preference for the two-tier board 
structure and believe that representative employees are better informed. 
 
A two-tier board system is, therefore, to be preferred “on grounds both of 
principle and of pragmatism”. In principle, it provides a “clear division of 
function”. Pragmatically, the principle of co-determination would not work 
well in a unitary board system. Based upon these features, the two-tier board 
structure certainly appears to be a far more efficient system of corporate 
governance than the unitary board system. 
                                                     
1320  Ibid 39. 
1321  Charkham, above n 87, 14-56. 
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B Regarding the question of the desirability of the two-tier board structure for 
stakeholders, shareholders would hold two-thirds of the available seats on the 
supervisory board, whilst the employees or unions would hold one-third of the 
seats. This would apply to AG companies that have less than 2000 
employees. In the case where an AG company has more than 2000 
employees, half of the available seats would be held by employees/unions. 
Both employees and the unions usually choose representative employees. 
One employee representative must be selected in each case from the salaried 
staff and from the executive staff. Based upon these features, the two-tier 
structure would certainly be one, which would allow a greater amount of 
stakeholder representations in having created its supervisory boards. 
Furthermore, banks in Germany also commonly sit on supervisory boards. In 
this way, companies may have access to information, which they ordinarily 
may not have. This would be a far more desirable system for corporate 
stakeholders.  
C Regarding the question of attracting investment, the two-tier board structure, 
through the German legislation, enshrines the principle of “commercial 
prudence” in accounting procedures, rather than the principle of having to 
show a “true and fair view”, which is found in other accounting systems. In 
this way, accounting reserves for risks are made. Consequently, profits are 
reduced, but reserves are maintained in case the company experiences 
financial difficulties at some stage. This has an overall positive effect on 
stakeholders, a factor, which German corporations tend to value highly. 
Therefore, although the profits are reduced, “commercial prudence” ensures 
that the business survives. This principle is more important to German 
companies than any of the reasons, which attempt to maximise shareholder 
wealth and company profits. This, in effect, removes the stock market from 
the centre of the stage. Furthermore, banks and employees and unions have 
a very important role, which has enabled the supervisory board to function 
adequately. This success has largely depended upon the establishment of 
networks, which only function effectively because co-operation rather than 
confrontation is regarded as the way forward. This system has given rise to 
the success of German industry over the last forty years. In particular, the 
German industry has prospered due to the creation of a well-motivated and 
trained workforce, a relatively stable macro-economic climate and an effective 
two-tier board governance system. In this way, Germany has consistently 
had a rising currency. This success may be due to the fact that there is a 
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genuine belief that co-determination is socially desirable and economically 
beneficial. Therefore, on the whole, the two-tier board system in Germany 
has not deterred, but very much enhanced, German investment. Thus, the 
“general consensus … of German commentary” is that the German two-tier 
board system would not benefit if replaced by a single board structure. Thus, 
there is no need to change the current system in Germany, “which would 
bring about changes and upheaval to a legal culture … evolved over many 
years”.1322 Finally, du Plessis believes  
that the German two-tier system provides answers to many of the compelling problems 
associated with the unitary system: Through such a system a broader spectrum of interests 
in the corporation are formally recognised and it ensures that exclusive shareholder control 
is not the norm anymore. 1323
 
D It is not clear what the DTI means when it submits that “a two-tier structure 
may be costly”. Although it may be costly (from a monetary point of view) for 
South Africa to convert from a unitary to a two-tier board structure of 
corporate governance, the advantages of having a two-tier board system 
would easily outweigh the financial costs involved. In any event, it would 
appear (from the wording “(f)or this reason”) as if the DTI has placed primary 
emphasis on the question of costs. The DTI ought not to rely on the questions 
of costs as its prime reason to reject the two-tier board system. If the DTI is 
referring to costs of a non-pecuniary nature, it needs to spell out exactly what 
it intends in its proposals in this regard. 
 
 
(A.3) Conclusion 
 
Regarding the aforementioned discussions, the DTI policy report has made a number 
of sound proposals concerning corporate law reformation. I have held many of these 
views ever since work was started on this thesis in 1995. Thus, many of the 
sentiments, which have been expressed in this thesis regarding stakeholder interests 
in corporate governance, have finally been recommended as a way forward for South 
African corporate governance. The DTI is, unfortunately, arguably incorrect in its 
recommendation to retain the unitary board system of corporate governance in 
                                                     
1322  Shearman, above n 453, 24. 
1323  Du Plessis (1996), above n 104, 45. 
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South Africa. Hopefully, this thesis will prompt the DTI to place greater value on the 
effects and advantages of the two-tier board structure of corporate governance for 
South Africa. 
 
Finally, it is arguable that the view set out below may have some general 
significance for South African corporate governance. In a recent Australian corporate 
governance research report, it was noted that  
 
(t)here is a wide gap between the maximum possible and the minimum excusable, and the whole 
spectrum is observable in Australian corporate governance; the best of our boards are performing well, 
but there is a long tail of boards in which little thought is given to governance, and in which more 
attention is given to personal gain than fiduciary duty. 1324
 
Thus, some business entities would have very good corporate governance structures 
in place, whilst others would have governance structures, which were poor or 
deficient in some way or another. Company and labour legislation (and bodies such 
as the King Committee and the Department of Trade and Industry) must ensure that 
corporate governance processes are considered significant and put into practice in 
the most workable and efficient manner possible by all business entities in South 
Africa.
                                                     
1324  H Bosch (2001), Collapse Incorporated, CCH, Australia, 5, quoted in Horwath (2002), “Corporate 
Governance Report”, <http://www. newcastle.edu.au/school/newc-business/horwath/index.html>. 
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